Modern Philosopher's bemoaning of "not knowing things in thems

[StrictlyLogical]

Title:  Modern Philosopher's Bemoaning of "not knowing things in themselves"

 

 

Just what is it these philosophers are bemoaning man cannot know?  What is claimed to be missing in our knowledge of things which constitutes our not being able to know the "things in themselves"?  Just what is the distinction (to these fellows) between "the thing" and "the thing in-itself"?

 

Why do they claim the senses provide only "indirect" perception of reality as opposed to "direct" perception of reality?  What is claimed to be missing in actual perception which otherwise would make it "direct"?

 

 

My impression is that what they want is for knowledge to provide an omnipotent complete revelation, not only of that the thing is and what properties/attributes/behaviors it exhibits from a third person view, but what it is like to BE the thing from a first person view.  e.g. we cannot know what a piece of music sounds like in itself because we only know what it sounds like TO US... (this implies what they want is knowledge of something like... what the music sounds like to itself or knowledge of what is like to BE music...)

 

Of course we can never know what it is like to BE any other aspect of reality because we have identity, as do our perceptual apparatus...

 

 

Any speculation as to what these philosophers (knowingly or unknowingly) were really aiming at?

Edited April 29, 2015 by StrictlyLogical

[Eiuol]

Which philosophers? You need some names.

 

It's not like this has to do with philosophy today. I mean, sure, some people think this, but I'm pretty sure a lot fewer people think this way than years ago. I don't know anyone nowadays who make claims this strong, 

[William O]

I have taken a class on epistemology in an academic setting, so I can offer some relevant testimony.

 

When we started the chapter on perception, the professor explained what direct realism was and then said "I don't think anyone here would be attracted to a view like that, right?" Everyone said no (I didn't respond, because I'm usually fairly reluctant to speak up in class and I wasn't in any position to defend direct realism against a whole class of philosophy majors), with one student saying "not if we're taking a class and reading a two hundred page book!"

 

This is the approach that academic philosophy takes toward the view that we directly perceive reality, in my experience. It's seen as something only a naive person would believe.

 

Edit: I should add that direct realism is not completely dead in contemporary philosophy. There are philosophers who have defended it recently, like Jonathan Lowe.

Edited April 29, 2015 by William O

[Plasmatic]

William O said:

 

 

This is the approach that academic philosophy takes toward the view that we directly perceive reality, in my experience. It's seen as something only a naive person would believe.

 

In fact, direct realism is most often referred to as "naïve realism" amongst academics.

[Eiuol]

In fact, direct realism is most often referred to as "naïve realism" amongst academics.

As far as I know, not all direct realism is naive realism. But anyway, it's pretty varied, so I don't know if it's always supposed to be a negative term. I'm taking a seminar in epistemology on perception, and a lot of deals with evidence. Some speakers were more on a direct percception perspective, or in any case, not anywhere near as bad as the type of view portrayed in the OP. I'm not sure about the majority view, but ideas resembling direct perception aren't ignored or waved away it seems.

[Plasmatic]

Louie said:

 

As far as I know, not all direct realism is naive realism. But anyway, it's pretty varied, so I don't know if it's always supposed to be a negative term. I'm taking a seminar in epistemology on perception, and a lot of deals with evidence. Some speakers were more on a direct percception perspective, or in any case, not anywhere near as bad as the type of view portrayed in the OP. I'm not sure about the majority view, but ideas resembling direct perception aren't ignored or waved away it seems.

 

 

There is certainly recent revival of direct realism.  Searle just published "Seeing Things as They Are", which I recommend. However, "modern philosophy" (OP) is overwhelmingly Kantian (by a longshot) with postmodernism ( social constructivism specifically) as its current intellectual heir infecting the philosophy of education increasingly .  

 

Consider how such a term as "naïve" could even have become used to describe the premise.  You can almost tell what view a philosopher has on the topic by which terminology they use...

Edited April 30, 2015 by Plasmatic

[StrictlyLogical]

Louie said:

 

 

There is certainly recent revival of direct realism.  Searle just published "Seeing Things as They Are", which I recommend. However, "modern philosophy" (OP) is overwhelmingly Kantian (by a longshot) with postmodernism ( social constructivism specifically) as its current intellectual heir infecting the philosophy of education increasingly .  

 

Consider how such a term as "naïve" could even have become used to describe the premise.  You can almost tell what view a philosopher has on the topic by which terminology they use...

 

Thank you Plasmatic for clarifying for Louie what "Modern Philosophy" is, and that it is different from "Post-Modern Philosophy". 

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modern_philosophy

 

Would I be correct to assume some current philosophers would characterize themselves as followers of "Modern Philosophy" while others might call themselves "Post-Modern"?  Do you think you could, for example, still find a self-proclaimed "Hegelian" or "Kantian" philosophy professor out there?

 

Just to confirm my understanding, would you agree schools of Modern Philosophy and followers thereof (alive OR dead) are/were as "bad" (to put it as Louie did so eloquently and adroitly) as made out in the OP?

 

 

Finally, what are your thoughts re. my specific questions?  I'm curious to know what you think.

[Eiuol]

What do you mean clarifying for me? Searle is an example of modern philosophy, and he's inclined to direct realism, so Plasmatic gave an example of how not all modern philosophy is as bad as you thought. I find that fair. You made a massive claim as though all modern philosophy, i.e. post 17th century as the link says, is Kantian or Hegelian, which isn't true. Nietzsche isn't remotely like the type of philosopher in the OP. I agree that, from what I've seen, most of it is extremely rationalist, but it's not right to lump it all into one group like your OP. Even if you prefer to strictly stick to "up to Wittgenstein" and exclude contemporary philosophy, that includes Rand!

I don't think "modern" is a good term here since it's only a term describing a time period, not a style of thought. If you want, we can distinguish philosophy before, and after, the cognitive revolution. Rand is at the start of it, and she belongs in it given how she talks so much of cognition as opposed to disembodied "stuff" like a thing-in-itself. I prefer that distinction. That's why and how philosophy seems to be going in a better direction nowadays.
 

[StrictlyLogical]

The point of the post is to dissect just what went wrong with a specific bit of Modern Philosophy and why "disembodied stuff like a thing-in-itself" was ever even conceived of.

 

 

I was genuinely interested to hear what people have to say about a particular issue a particular school of thought, called Modern Philosophy, came up with.  I never said ALL current philosophers belong to that class. I never said that ALL philosophers of that class have that particular issue. 

 

 

If you do not have an interest in the particular subject I am asking about by all means invest your time elsewhere.  Badgering me for not explaining and identifying all the metes and bounds, genus' and species' of various schools of philosophy and all their individual adherents since the 17th century is not particularly enjoyable... and doing THAT was never my intention nor purpose. Feel free to start your own thread on that subject if you wish I am sure not to participate in it.

 

 

If you are interested in discussing the subject of my post and the specific questions it raises by all means please feel welcome to continue to participate in this thread I created.  This last I mean in all earnestness, and if in response civility ensues in the spirit of the above, I will sweep everything said heretofore aside, and do my best to discuss it with you afresh.

[Eiuol]

The point of the post is to dissect just what went wrong with a specific bit of Modern Philosophy and why "disembodied stuff like a thing-in-itself" was ever even conceived of.

Well, which philosophers? I don't know which ones you want to talk about. Modern is way too broad, so we need to narrow it down more to find an answer. Hence defining the terms first.

 

How it came about is probably Kant's answer to Hume's skepticism about knowledge.

 

Edit: Is that more along the lines of what you'd like to know? If so, I can say more.

Edited April 30, 2015 by Eiuol

[William O]

To add a potentially helpful clarification, philosophers usually use the term "modern philosophy" to refer to roughly the period between Descartes and Kant, and "contemporary philosophy" to refer to all of the philosophy being done right now.

[Plasmatic]

SL, let me try and state how I understood your question.

 

By modern philosophy I took you to be establishing a time frame that bounds a particular period that ranges more or less from Kant to the present. I figured this mostly because of Dr. Peikoff's bounding "Modern Philosophy" from "Kant to the present". Add that to the same usage of "Modern philosophy" within Oist literature of being within that time frame and characterized by Kant's overall influence. (for better or worse in the eyes of contemporary philosophers) I presumed from this interpretation that you where wanting anyone who wants to speculate about any instance of a Philosopher rejecting knowledge of "things in themselves" from within that time frame to share their thoughts.

 

I added "Post Modernism" to this because 1). It falls within that time frame, (despite its name) and 2). I see PM as being a consequence of Kant's influence satisfying both senses of Modern above.

 

 

For contrast, the SEP had this to say:

 

 

Modern philosophy begins with Kant, and yet he marks the end of the “Modern” epoch (1600–1800 AD/CE) in the history of philosophy.[1] The appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 marks the end of the modern period and the beginning of something entirely new.

 

 

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-development/

 

 

It doesn't say what was "new" which isn't helpful.

 

 

Ms. Rand, while talking of the similar "motive" and "method" between Kant and Rawls, says of Kant:

 

 

[...] Kant's purpose was to corrupt and paralyze man's mind, so the egalitarians' purpose is to shackle and paralyze the men of ability <arl_176>  (even at the price of destroying the world).

 

If you wish to know the actual motive behind the egalitarians' theories—behind all their maudlin slogans, mawkish pleas, and ponderous volumes of verbal rat-traps—if you wish to grasp the enormity of the smallness of spirit for the sake of which they seek to immolate mankind, it can be presented in a few lines:

 

"'When a man thinks he's good—that's when he's rotten. Pride is the worst of all sins, no matter what he's done.'

 

"'But if a man knows that what he's done is good?'

 

"'Then he ought to apologize for it.'

 

"'To whom? '

 

"'To those who haven't done it.'" (Atlas Shrugged.)

 

 

What do you think of that? Do you see that as motivating his neumenal-phenomenal ideas? A method for "making room for faith"?

Edited May 1, 2015 by Plasmatic

[StrictlyLogical]

You have correctly identified my interest was not in identifying or classifying philosophers who have/had certain beliefs but an attempt to get under why any philosopher would ascribe to them.

 

 

 

Certainly motivation and evasion 'making room for faith" are ingredients leading to the kinds of errors mentioned in the OP.  Those probably mostly manifest with question begging.  There are also honest mistakes more connected to context dropping and implicit influence by pre-existing orientation such as being oriented to rationalism, Platonism, and innate ideas.  I suppose in a historical context many of the ideas such as "things in themselves" and "indirect perception" are explicitly and consciously linked to ideas going all the way back to Plato and the hierarchy of forms. I want to get under the explicit and conscious and get at the implicit and subconscious. 

 

What is underneath a man's genuine belief that "things" are distinguishable from "things in themselves", that perception is missing something and is therefor "indirect"?  What are the implicitly held premises for a man to imagine-up and demand "direct" perception which is different from actual perception?

 

 

Plasmatic what do you think about my musing about these fellows' demand for omniscience "of a thing" and my inclusion within it of a need by these fellows to know something from a "first person" type view?  Have I gone to far?... i.e. no one consciously or unconsciously conceived of "things in themselves" and "direct perception" in such a way. 

[Plasmatic]

SL asked:

What is underneath a man's genuine belief that "things" are distinguishable from "things in themselves", that perception is missing something and is therefor "indirect"? What are the implicitly held premises for a man to imagine-up and demand "direct" perception which is different from actual perception?

I think the "form-object" error is one fundamental error here. One could speculate that this error was undergirded by a groping for the god-kind of awareness. Taking that misintegration as the standard and then fashioning man in that shadow.

SL asked:

Plasmatic what do you think about my musing about these fellows' demand for omniscience "of a thing" and my inclusion within it of a need by these fellows to know something from a "first person" type view? Have I gone to far?... i.e. no one consciously or unconsciously conceived of "things in themselves" and "direct perception" in such a way.

It reminds me of one of my realizations when coming out of religion. I realized that for a god to be everywhere it would have to be everything. That multiplicity constrained the possibilities of particulars. That a singular that is all, is also the only one....

I dont know if this would be a implicit logical conclusion of an out of context absolute floating in ones subconscious, or if anyone held this type of first person neccessity to ground the premise explicitly.

Edited May 1, 2015 by Plasmatic

[William O]

It reminds me of one of my realizations when coming out of religion. I realized that for a god to be everywhere it would have to be everything. That multiplicity constrained the possibilities of particulars. That a singular that is all, is also the only one....

I dont know if this would be a implicit logical conclusion of an out of context absolute floating in ones subconscious, or if anyone held this type of first person neccessity to ground the premise explicitly.

This sort of sounds like Spinoza. Spinoza thought that God was the only thing that existed and that all of the things we perceive are just different "modes" of God, i.e., different ways in which God appears to us.

 

Spinoza's view on perception is also relevant here. He thought that everything exists under two attributes, the attribute of thought and the attribute of extension. So, when you have a thought, that thought is identical to a physical state of your brain - it just appears to you under the attribute of thought rather than the attribute of extension. He would say that physical things like chairs also exist under the attribute of thought, but we are only aware of them under the attribute of extension.

 

Spinoza would say that sensory perception is not knowledge, because when you perceive something, that is just a state of your brain appearing to you under the attribute of thought. When I perceive a tree, for Spinoza, that perception is just the state of my brain, but presented to me as a thought. So, sensory perception isn't really knowledge about the world, it's just introspection, basically.

 

What Spinoza did think was knowledge was ironclad logical deduction from what he thought were our a priori ideas. We have these ideas because we are made of matter, matter obeys certain laws, and everything under the attribute of extension also exists under the attribute of thought, so those laws appear to us under the attribute of thought as a priori ideas in our minds. We know them with certainty, and we can deduce things from them that also count as knowledge with certainty.

 

As a result, Spinoza doesn't really even have an epistemology in the usual sense. If you think the only form of knowledge is ironclad deduction, then you don't need criteria for evaluating knowledge - either it's a crystal clear logical deduction or it's not. The way he put this is "truth is its own criterion," which means that we know something is knowledge just by looking at it or its proof.

 

Anyway, I just thought this seemed relevant to the "first person" type view being discussed in this thread and the assumptions underlying that view. I should also mention that Spinoza is often thought to be simply a more consistent and explicit version of Descartes.

[Eiuol]

You have correctly identified my interest was not in identifying or classifying philosophers who have/had certain beliefs but an attempt to get under why any philosopher would ascribe to them.

Answering why first requires answering what -sort- of philosophers we're talking about. I understand you weren't asking about classifications, but it was part of your question - you classified modern philosophers in one way, and asked why they think that way. I can tell you why Kantians or Hegelians care about a thing in itself. I can tell you how any person would believe such a thing. To answer your question best, we'd need to know 1) which modern philosophers think this way, 2) which modern philosophers rejected the idea, and 3) possible predecessors. 2 is important, as those are the people who explain the motivations of 1.  It'd still help if you answered -which- philosophers you have in mind.

 

A speculation I want to throw in is that a "thing-in-itself' originates in a desire to erase worries of skepticism by asserting that there is an ideal type of evidence which is unaffected by any role performed by the mind. Epistemology without a mind. 

[dream_weaver]

A speculation I want to throw in is that a "thing-in-itself' originates in a desire to erase worries of skepticism by asserting that there is an ideal type of evidence which is unaffected by any role performed by the mind. Epistemology without a mind.

Epistemology without a mind. An intriguing way to put it.

 

Paraphrasing:

It might have been in Peikoff's Philosophy presentation where he offered that trying to know a "thing-in-itself" was considered problematic because the sense have identity. To know a "thing-as-itself" is to know it as God knows it. Super senses, if you will. The ability to know things as they are by some undefined super-sense; which is to know things without the limitations, finiteness, or the identity of the processing by the senses. Essentially, unprocessed knowledge. Yet, he adds, all knowledge is processed.

 

Elsewhere Miss Rand noted that if a body was born without any sensory apparati, it would not be conscious, nor would it live long (presumably unassisted). Are the mind and senses symbiotic? Can the mind exist without the senses, or, conversely, the senses without the mind?

[StrictlyLogical]

Answering why first requires answering what -sort- of philosophers we're talking about. I understand you weren't asking about classifications, but it was part of your question - you classified modern philosophers in one way, and asked why they think that way. I can tell you why Kantians or Hegelians care about a thing in itself. I can tell you how any person would believe such a thing. To answer your question best, we'd need to know 1) which modern philosophers think this way, 2) which modern philosophers rejected the idea, and 3) possible predecessors. 2 is important, as those are the people who explain the motivations of 1.  It'd still help if you answered -which- philosophers you have in mind.

 

A speculation I want to throw in is that a "thing-in-itself' originates in a desire to erase worries of skepticism by asserting that there is an ideal type of evidence which is unaffected by any role performed by the mind. Epistemology without a mind. 

 

 

"Some apples are red.  Please discuss the redness of the types of apples you know and would characterize as red."

 

Just replace the apples and the red with philosophers and issues of the OP.

 

 

Interesting point about evidence which is unaffected.  I wonder about what could constitute "evidence" other than "revelation" of the most mystical kind.  The "evidence" cannot be knowledge, because knowledge has a certain form, "human knowledge", it can't be an internal image or a sense experience because it would be a "human experience".  I cannot think of what that evidence could be in order for it not to be only an imperfect representation of the "thing-in-itself" and hence a distortion of the ting-in-itself. 

 

Perhaps the demand is that like "Epistemology without the mind" they require evidence without form.  In fact "revelation" without knowledge...

 

Revelation without a form of revelation... revelation without identity.

 

I think you need to be an infinite God, and all things within you, you simply possess as part of your oneness the totality of the "thing-in -itself" in no particular form whatever but in the most intimate and direct way because you ARE it and it is part of you.

[Plasmatic]

William, your comments reminded me of something and by chance I put on Dr. Peikoff's lecture on Hegel.

"To be, is to be known".... "the identity of knowing and being"... Dr. Peikoff mentiones Hegel's notion of the absolute reaching its fullest self realization when "it was everything and everything was it". This brings about an end to self alienation and a return to being. This lecture is followed by Dr. Peikoff's comments on the Oist criticism of Kant. Therein he focuses on senses without identity-seeing without eyes, senses that are nothing in particular. The other noteworthy points are on Kant's integration of sense data into wholes....

[William O]

William, your comments reminded me of something and by chance I put on Dr. Peikoff's lecture on Hegel.

"To be, is to be known".... "the identity of knowing and being"... Dr. Peikoff mentiones Hegel's notion of the absolute reaching its fullest self realization when "it was everything and everything was it". This brings about an end to self alienation and a return to being. This lecture is followed by Dr. Peikoff's comments on the Oist criticism of Kant. Therein he focuses on senses without identity-seeing without eyes, senses that are nothing in particular. The other noteworthy points are on Kant's integration of sense data into wholes....

I wish Peikoff would make his history of philosophy lectures into a book. I would love to see what he has to say but I don't like listening to audio lectures.

[Eiuol]

Interesting point about evidence which is unaffected.  I wonder about what could constitute "evidence" other than "revelation" of the most mystical kind. 

It seems like a point Spinoza would care about, going by William's description of Spinoza. But it seems like a different conception of a "thing-in-itself" than a more Kantian angle. The unifying idea seems to be that there is some thing to be acquainted with, an "object" of knowledge independent from a person's abilities, mind, or capacities. They may vary on how what our abilities/mind/capacities do for epistemology, or how to be acquainted with that "object" of knowledge and to what degree, but the first concern is evidence. I use scare quotes to say that it's illusory objectivity, that it's more like revelation than evidence.

To me, any skeptic like Hume felt that knowledge is ultimately illusory because of our limitations as people, so by saying that an ideal form of evidence exists that is mindless, the illusion goes away. Before Hume, I don't know if it was a "problem" to have limitations (an identity to our mind, essentially!) so it seems to all stem from Hume, and responses to skepticism of knowledge. Of course, a thing-in-itself isn't anything attainable in whole, so we get all sorts of weird terminology like "synthetic a priori" and all kinds of mental gymnastics to say we can align with how the world "really" is. Yet it has to come down to revelation, as the underlying premise is that our capacities are a barrier to our knowledge. With a thing-in-itself, we may even be able to be quite accurately and reliably related to the world, but it's only by comparison to form of perfect evidence or omniscient knower.

Edited May 2, 2015 by Eiuol

[William O]

To me, any skeptic like Hume felt that knowledge is ultimately illusory because of our limitations as people, so by saying that an ideal form of evidence exists that is mindless, the illusion goes away. Before Hume, I don't know if it was a "problem" to have limitations (an identity to our mind, essentially!) so it seems to all stem from Hume, and responses to skepticism of knowledge. Of course, a thing-in-itself isn't anything attainable in whole, so we get all sorts of weird terminology like "synthetic a priori" and all kinds of mental gymnastics to say we can align with how the world "really" is. Yet it has to come down to revelation, as the underlying premise is that our capacities are a barrier to our knowledge. With a thing-in-itself, we may even be able to be quite accurately and reliably related to the world, but it's only by comparison to form of perfect evidence or omniscient knower.

There is a recent movement in Hume scholarship that asserts that Hume isn't skeptical about things like physical objects or causality, he's just saying that we acquire our idea of physical objects or causality by means of a generally unreliable faculty that he variously calls "habit, instinct, or custom" rather than by reason. According to this interpretation, he's dead certain that these things exist, we just don't know that they exist rationally. So, if that interpretation is correct, then the view that human knowledge is limited would originate more from Kant.

 

If you want to look into this interpretation of Hume more, the introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Hume explains it in detail.

[StrictlyLogical]

Just chewing on this right now but I want to encourage everyone now taking part substantively in this discussion.  It is VERY interesting.

[Eiuol]

There is a recent movement in Hume scholarship that asserts that Hume isn't skeptical about things like physical objects or causality, he's just saying that we acquire our idea of physical objects or causality by means of a generally unreliable faculty that he variously calls "habit, instinct, or custom" rather than by reason.

That makes sense to me, I should say I was focusing on skepticism of knowledge as a whole, not necessarily skepticism of specifics like causality. I usually thought of relating his ideas about habit to ethics, not about knowledge, but it's a good idea. Whether Hume is really skeptical of causality is one thing, but my idea is more like "our capacities are unreliable, so we need a form of evidence that is independent of capacities". Nowadays, it is sometimes tweaked so that our capacities are deemed reliable, but the measure of reliability is still some standard independent of capacities, although a "thing-in-itself" isn't really part of the reasoning. The question of reliability - whether the answer is that capacities are or aren't reliable - seems to be the important point. As far as I know, Hume didn't answer that question as deeply as Kant, just said that people are more emotionally driven than previously believed, so our knowledge is questionable. If we can't rationally know something, it's a problem, so if we avoid the mind for evidence, it seems like a solution.

 

An Objectivist solution would probably be "reliability has nothing to do with knowledge, we already apprehend the world directly! Knowledge is a matter of how we apply rationality to the evidence of the senses."

[dream_weaver]

It is problematic to call into question the reliability of the senses. Doing so implicitly relies on them. They are our means of apprehending the world.