Why did Rand view Kant as evil?

[Hal]

3.  Everyone, EVERYONE, including Nietzsche, gets hung up on this little phrase and its contrary - "the thing-in-itself" and "appearances", respectively.  The only reason why I think that this is such an issue is..

People think they are such an issue because they are part of the fundemental core of Kant's philosophy. Whatever they were meant to be (and there is endless debate on this amongst Kant scholars), they are central to his transcendental idealism.

5.  Kant was a firm believer in democracy, particularly a republican form of it:  rule of law, private property rights, limited government interference with business, etc.  He in fact makes explicit reference to jurisprudence in the CPR. 

Have you read What is Enlightenment?. Appealing to buzzwords like 'democracy' and 'rights' is misleading; Kant makes it perfectly clear that the 'freedom' he advocates is limited to the 'freedom' to speculate on abstract philosophical matters, rather than freedom in any practical sense. His position is closer to "you can think whatever you like as long as you do what you're told" than it would be to any modern notion of 'freedom'. Edited April 9, 2005 by Hal

[Hal]

3.  More importantly: so what?  Are we going to complain because the meaning of a sentence is complex or requires more than one reading?  What, because it stretches the limits of our cognitive capacity to read this stuff?

Yes. There's a difference between 'being difficult due to expressing difficult ideas', and 'being difficult due to poor writing'. Even Kant's prefaces and introductions are difficult to read, let alone his actual philosophy. And no, it's purely because he was writing in German. A lot of horrendously obscure philosophical writing does happen to be German (Kant/Hegel/Heidegger being the big 3), but several others have managed to use the German language to produce beautifully written philosophy - Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Frege come to mind.

In any case, I could go on and on, which probably wouldn't amuse you nearly as much as it would amuse me. Remember also - the fact that Kant does actually have all of the commas, subordinate clauses and weird grammatical construction is because we, you and I, read a translated version of it. This is what's in part responsible for its obfuscation, not his style.

Most traditional translations of Kant (eg Norman Kemp Smith) actually cleaned up his writing, which brought about accusations that this was helping to cause misinterpretations. The standard academic translation of the CPR these days (Guyer-Wood) tried to rectify this by sticking as closely as possible to his actual sentence structure and style - it is generally thought to be 'as close to the German' as youre likely to get. And yes, it is a nightmare to read.

edit: I don't know German, so I'm basing this on my reading of translations, along with what I've heard claimed by those who do speak German.

Edited April 9, 2005 by Hal

[ashishin]

People think they are such an issue because they are part of the fundemental core of Kant's philosophy. Whatever they were meant to be (and there is endless debate on this amongst Kant scholars), they are central to his transcendental idealism.

They are important to his philosophy, yes. They are a necessary part of the structure - to deny that would be insane. But the emphasis that he places upon them is different than the emphasis that they place upon them. Nietzsche's and Rand's respective criticisms of Kant make it sound like he's *really* super concerned with getting knowledge about them or that he's denying the real existence of things (I assume that his is what Rand means with the phrase "evasion of reality", although I might be formalizing it a bit), both of which are positions that he does not hold.

I don't think I made this clear in my original post.

Have you read What is Enlightenment?. Appealing to buzzwords like 'democracy' and 'rights' is misleading; Kant makes it perfectly clear that the 'freedom' he advocates is limited to the 'freedom' to speculate on abstract philosophical matters, rather than freedom in any practical sense. His position is closer to "you can think whatever you like as long as you do what you're told" than it would be to any modern notion of 'freedom'.

Well, I went and read the piece. Never read it before. It doesn't seem like this is the case. To begin with, he seems to be concerned about the time, place, and decorum of refusing to pay taxes (more about this in a second), disobeying an order, or speaking out against church dogma; he's not suggesting that we just blindly do what we're told and then we can think whatever we wish on our own time. Furthermore, the kinds of criticisms he suggests as examples are indicative of a Republican bent, e.g. the one about taxation. More importantly - why would we speak out? To change things, maybe? I don't know whether you are an Objectivist or not, but even this emphasis on free thought and expression should be important (if you are). He also makes it clear that minds cannot operate under institutions that are unnecessarily coercive - Rand's (and most libertarians) stuff about the evils of the initiation of force seems relevant here. And there are other examples here and elsewhere. Look up "Kant Democracy" on any search engine and you will find plenty of other stuff that shows that he was definitely for liberal democracy. Now, he has other commitments - the royalty, religion, etc. - so the idea is confused in some cases, but it is definitely present.

[ashishin]

Yes. There's a difference between 'being difficult due to expressing difficult ideas', and 'being difficult due to poor writing'. Even Kant's prefaces and introductions are difficult to read, let alone his actual philosophy. And no, it's purely because he was writing in German. A lot of horrendously obscure philosophical writing does happen to be German (Kant/Hegel/Heidegger being the big 3), but several others have managed to use the German language to produce beautifully written philosophy - Wittgenstein, Nietzsche and Frege come to mind.

Most traditional translations of Kant (eg Norman Kemp Smith) actually cleaned up his writing, which brought about accusations that this was helping to cause misinterpretations. The standard academic translation of the CPR these days (Guyer-Wood) tried to rectify this by sticking as closely as possible to his actual sentence structure and style - it is generally thought to be 'as close to the German' as youre likely to get. And yes, it is a nightmare to read.

edit: I don't know German, so I'm basing this on my reading of translations, along with what I've heard claimed by those who do speak German.

Okay, fair enough. So the level of difficulty *wholly* resides in the German language or his style, as the case may be. It seems I hastily misestimated this, but I have some experience reading philosophy in other languages and it seems that one of the main, general problems is sensically translating complex, dependent clauses and whatnot - of which there are many in Kant. Here, I'm generalizing from my experience with Greek and Spanish. This seems to be a source of much confusion in reading English translations of works in other languages. (Probably *any* language.) This is compounded by the fact that a great deal of native English speakers don't know a lot about the grammar of their own language. They think (and this is what I was taught in 3rd grade) that you place a comma where a "pause" is supposed to go...

But again, I fail to see how this difficulty is truly a serious evil or worth much philosophical mention - that is, if you agree with the other posts. I think the implication in it's strongest form, from Rand and others, is that "Kant wrote intentionally in a difficult manner to confuse people, obfuscate the truth, or to cover up the fact that he didn't know anything" - hence, you don't need to read it because its worthless to you anyway. People say things like this all the time when the grounds they have for saying it are really only their own personal experience of difficulty when reading it - which can come about for *any one* of a number of reasons. It is certainly no reason to avoid reading it. Don't get me wrong - I like clarity in philosophical writing, and you can rib Kant/Hegel/Heidegger for writing in a manner that doesn't lend itself to that, but that's what you're stuck with if you get acquainted with their stuff.

I was unaware of the accusations against Norman Kemp Smith. Where could I find out more about that?

[dougclayton]

1.  First off, if Peikoff is describing the psychology of short-term memory, as I think he is, then he is *factually* inaccurate in the third paragraph of that section.  The normal range of "items" that one can store in short-term memory is from 5 to 9, not 6 to 8, with the average being 7.  Go look that up in any introductory psychology book; this has been empirically tested many times.

This is irrelevant. He is not writing a psychology book; he is writing a philosophy book. To argue his philosophical points are wrong because the range is 5-9 instead of 6-8 is utterly absurd. Would you throw out what he wrote about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy (in ITOE) because 2L of water + 2L of alchol make (say) 3.7L of fluid, not 3.4L (or whatever) as he said?

More importantly: so what?  Are we going to complain because the meaning of a sentence is complex or requires more than one reading?  What, because it stretches the limits of our cognitive capacity to read this stuff?  If that's it, I honestly don't understand the issue here.

If a writer wants to be understood, he has to write to be understood. This is his burden. Similarly, if a reader wants to understand, he has to exercise his mind while he reads. However, this does not mean, as you seem to assume, that any amount of obfuscation on the part of the writer is acceptable.

Edited April 9, 2005 by dougclayton

[softwareNerd]

The normal range of "items" that one can store in short-term memory is from 5 to 9, not 6 to 8, with the average being 7. 

Ashish, Are you hoping that believing such blasphemy would force me to abandon a life-long committment to Objectivist dogma?

To hell with averages. As your posts attests, there are some brains that can hold many more items, and each item can be pretty complex. Perhaps I can only hold 1 + 1 + 1 (is that 3?). For all I know, you can hold:

0.123465 + 0.0890812 + 0.009822112 + 0.567668 + 0.067844390 (Wow! That is so much more, or is it?) I'd say, more to cogitate on but less to cogitate with.

And even if you are fully rational, remember that the supposed irrational majority here are actually superior because the term that describes your state is constucted from 2 multiplied by 4 letter-elements, while the one that describes our state is 2 multiplied by some number that is 25% larger than the one that was mentioned as multiplied by 2 to arrive at the number of letters in the word rational, and further every letter in the prior is in the latter making the latter a superset of the former and therefore making irrationality so much more complete that simple rationality. That, sir, is profundity?

[ashishin]

This is irrelevant.  He is not writing a psychology book; he is writing a philosophy book.  To argue his philosophical points are wrong because the range is 5-9 instead of 6-8 is utterly absurd.  Would you throw out what he wrote about the analytic/synthetic dichotomy (in ITOE) because 2L of water + 2L of alchol make (say) 3.7L of fluid, not 3.4L (or whatever) as he said?

Yes, that's right, he's writing a philosophy book, which is precisely what makes me wonder how and why he just suddenly asserts, with no grounds, that this figure is the right one. Is it research or reflection? My surmise is that he is wrongly quoting a figure that comes out of empirical studies on short term memory recall. If he is not quoting this, then I would certainly like to know where he got the number from...

It *is* a relevant part if he wishes to assert that a writer is "deliberately flouting crow-epistemology" because he overloads the capacity of our occurrent awareness. If he assesses this capacity in terms of "units", is wrong about the number of units our mind can contain at a time, and hence is wrong about our capacity for understanding, it would be a mistake worth noting, no? Would you care if a psychologist said that he could augment your mental capacity or that he threatened to trim it a little? What if you protested in the latter case and then he told you "Oh, come on, it's just one unit, it's not really that important". That's the difference here.

More importantly: this is a factual matter, not even a philosophical one, as you've already pointed out. But the error is his, not mine. The error is that he thinks this is actually philosophical issue, when the real philosophical stuff is something that lies deeper. What counts as a "unit"? How is it that we have arrived (erroneously) at this number of them? Does describing the limits of occurrent awareness (and precribing, as a normative belief, that someone not transgress them) in scientific, psychological terms really help us to understand how this stuff works?

If a writer wants to be understood, he has to write to be understood.  This is his burden.  Similarly, if a reader wants to understand, he has to exercise his mind while he reads.  However, this does not mean, as you seem to assume, that any amount of obfuscation on the part of the writer is acceptable.

I'm curious - where did I "assume" this? Did I not, in fact, speak out for clarity, even if a little weakly, in my previous post? All I've said about the obfuscation is that, well, along with other things that may prove to be frustrating, confusing, or derailing, it happens! Very well, let me say it directly now - obfuscation and lying ought to be avoided by writers. Also, complaints about inevitable things and refusals to read an author based on a highly preconditioned dislike or discrete but narrow standards of what counts as a proper reading experience are to be avoided as well.

My grounds for "inevitability" in this case are a)6,000,000,000 living human beings and a larger number of dead ones on planet Earth that b)don't (or didn't) speak the same language, live in the same time period, or have the same level of education that I do.

[ashishin]

Ashish, Are you hoping that believing such blasphemy would force me to abandon a life-long committment to Objectivist dogma?

To hell with averages. As your posts attests, there are some brains that can hold many more items, and each item can be pretty complex. Perhaps I can only hold 1 + 1 + 1 (is that 3?). For all I know, you can hold:

0.123465 + 0.0890812 + 0.009822112 + 0.567668 + 0.067844390 (Wow! That is so much more, or is it?) I'd say, more to cogitate on but less to cogitate with.

And even if you are fully rational, remember that the supposed irrational majority here are actually superior because the term that describes your state is constucted from 2 multiplied by 4 letter-elements, while the one that describes our state is 2 multiplied by some number that is 25% larger than the one that was mentioned as multiplied by 2 to arrive at the number of letters in the word rational, and further every letter in the prior is in the latter making the latter a superset of the former and therefore making irrationality so much more complete that simple rationality. That, sir, is profundity?

Well, I suppose the nonsense is intentional and is supposed to somehow illustrate what it is that I'm *really* endorsing or saying. To hell with averages indeed! But I see that you're also missing the point of what it is that I'm saying. Shall we join hands and do a ring-around-the-rosy?

And, my dear, this is a free country, people can practice whatever religion they want. Accordingly, I wouldn't dare get between a person and their dogma, Objectivist or not. I've done it before when I was a teenager and learned quickly. Its a situation best represented by this little man right here -> All that stuff is there for the practitioner to work out. However, I can correct facts and gross philosophical mistakes when they come near my orbit.

Edited April 10, 2005 by ashishin

[iouswuoibev]

1.  First off, if Peikoff is describing the psychology of short-term memory, as I think he is, then he is *factually* inaccurate in the third paragraph of that section.  The normal range of "items" that one can store in short-term memory is from 5 to 9, not 6 to 8, with the average being 7.  Go look that up in any introductory psychology book; this has been empirically tested many times. 

The article makes it quite clear that he is not talking about short-term memory. He is refering to the ability to grasp percepts. For instance, one couldn't, to use Piekoff's example, grasp ///////////// (13 slashes) at the perceptual level - or 13 men, houses, needles, etcetera. You could count them individually, and then designate a number for that quantity (13); but then you would have risen to the conceptual level by the use of a number, which is a concept. On the other hand, one can grasp and retain 3 percepts (///) at the perceptual level (i.e. as a single percept, without the use of a number) as can certain animals like the crows in the example given. There are a wealth of implications behind this principle, such as the requirement of using a percept (e.g. a word, typically) as the referent of a concept (e.g. 13).

The numbers involved are not important. The principle still stands regardless of the detail.

2. Along with the above, IF he is talking about the psychology of short term memory, then the notion of a "unit" is itself in question. By a process called "chunking", we seem to be able to store more information if we break it up into larger pieces. For instance, if the series of numbers (which could be a code or a serial number, if you need to be practical about it) "176 820 592" could be read off as individual digits or 3 3-digit chunks. This itself has limits I would imagine, but they are not discussed in Peikoff's work.

It is implicit within what he does state, that you can reduce the number of percepts you have to retain by having seperate percepts merged several together into one percept. It is also said earlier on in the book that all our mental faculties, as with everything physical, is finite, and therefore would have limits. I don't know why you said the notion of "unit" is in question.

Why does he not discuss the psychology? To do so would be anti-conceptual. In the formation of a definition, you retain what is essential, and exclude what isn't. By the same reasoning, all knowledge is interconnected, but that doesn't mean we venture off on every related idea for the sake of being thorough - instead you pick out what is essential to the idea you are describing, and stick with it. If you drop this principle, how are you to know when to cover something and when not to? The end result of this will be total confusion, both for the author of the writing, and the person reading it should the author ever finish.

It is obviously not Piekoff's intention to cover psychology, and he is doing the reader a favour by not doing so. If anyone wants to know the psychology that he alluded to, the solution is simple: read a different book.

[y_feldblum]

Yes, that's right, he's writing a philosophy book, which is precisely what makes me wonder how and why he just suddenly asserts, with no grounds, that this figure is the right one.  Is it research or reflection?  My surmise is that he is wrongly quoting a figure that comes out of empirical studies on short term memory recall.  If he is not quoting this, then I would certainly like to know where he got the number from...

This is getting absurd and has got to stop. Both figures are correct. There's another correct figure, too: 4-10, with an average of 7, which you don't cite.

But let's pretend like we know math. The average number of units is 7. Most people fall into the range 1 less than the average to 1 more than the average. A few people, but enough to be noticeable, are either a lot less able than most, and can only hold two less than the average, or more able than most, and can hold up to 2 more than the average. Still fewer, people, this time an insignificant number, can hold no more than three less than the average, or can hold up to 3 more than the average. Most people are in the first category (within 1 of the average), the vast majority are in the second category (within 2 of the average), and nearly everybody else is in the third category (within 3 of the average). Most people are in the first category; there are some who are in the second but not in the first, and there are an insignificant number who are in the third but not in the first or second. Peikoff's "normal" range includes most people; your contentious "normal" range includes the vast majority of people. What you are arguing about is how far away from the average you still want to call "normal". Peikoff includes most people, but not the really dumb or really smart people; you include them too, but not the retards or the geniuses.

It *is* a relevant part if he wishes to assert that a writer is "deliberately flouting crow-epistemology" because he overloads the capacity of our occurrent awareness.  If he assesses this capacity in terms of "units", is wrong about the number of units our mind can contain at a time, and hence is wrong about our capacity for understanding, it would be a mistake worth noting, no?

You both cite the same average number of units! The average number of units is the most important point. That most people can hold 6, 7, or 8, while a few can also hold 5 or 9, and one in a thousand might hold 4 or 10, is not the important point, and is absolutely insignificant in his critique of Kant. You're making an issue out of nothing whatsoever, and the issue that you're making is an error in mathematics on your part.

[softwareNerd]

Well, I suppose the nonsense is intentional and is supposed to somehow illustrate what it is that I'm *really* endorsing or saying.

No, Ashish, it is not. In fact, if you read it carefully, you will see that it is not nonsense in the sense of being a word-soup of nouns, verbs, etc. put together in a pattern that resembles language. The only way to illustrate that it is nonsense is to point to the flawed theory of concepts that it propounds. If you are unable to answer the proposition, which has complete "internal logical consistency", then do not dismiss it as nonsense out of hand. An insult is not an argument.

I see that you're also missing the point of what it is that I'm saying.

What you have said is this:

1) People who say Kant is complicated are "whiners" who cannot "put aside" their "hubris". And yet, you "had to read ...at least 30 times". Clear as mud?

2) In a forum of owned, run and populated by Objectivists you try to pretend that the following is not impolite, but simply

ordinary hyperbole: "Everytime I see something like "Rand's Razor", ..., I don't know whether to laugh or puke"

3) On some topics you ,the self-proclaimed "athiest and realist", "have several pretty good reasons (which [you] don't think Objectivists would listen to) "

4) You even say you "could go on and on, which probably wouldn't amuse [us] nearly as much as it would amuse [you]".

5) As "positive critique", you comment on "5 to 9" versus "6 to 8" as though any Objectivist ever claimed to care about the exactness of those numbers.

Is all this what you were saying, or how you were saying it? My contention is that it not mere rudeness, but has a very higher percentage of the what. Since you seem to think psychology is important, have you considered the psychology that would draw someone to engage in pointless discussions, with people he thinks are unwilling to open their minds, will not willing to listen to him and are worthy of ridicule, only to amuse himself?

I can correct facts and gross philosophical mistakes when they come near my orbit.

How likely is that...you see, we're here on Earth.

[ashishin]

The only way to illustrate that it is nonsense is to point to the flawed theory of concepts that it propounds. If you are unable to answer the proposition, which has complete "internal logical consistency", then do not dismiss it as nonsense out of hand. An insult is not an argument.

What "flawed theory of concepts" does your paragraph attempt to propound? Since it says nothing directly about this idea, it would seem not to propound anything, but to be an example of the flaw - an example that is meant to illustrate a very complicated, deceptive, and sophistical argument by exaggeration. It would seem to me to be nonsense. Nonsense used for a sensible point, but nonsense nonetheless. More importantly, who's flawed theory of concepts? Kant's? Mine? Rand's?

What you have said is this:

1) People who say Kant is complicated are "whiners" who cannot "put aside" their "hubris".     And yet, you "had to read ...at least 30 times". Clear as mud?

No, no, no...I'm thinking of some Objectivists who patently *refuse* to read him because they encountered some difficulty, AND ALSO criticize him without having read him. Oftentimes, though not always, when people (not just Objectivists) denounce something as nonsense to steer others away from it, they speak merely from their own experience of difficulty which they take as an object case of why no one would understand it. And this is true of so-called "professional" philosophers as well as people who have no interest in the topic. They are whiners, yes, but the more important point, the one I really want to emphasize is that they are doing themselves and others an intellectual disservice. There is more than one post like that up above. I never claimed Kant was clear at all or that his obfuscation was necessary or any of the other things which people may have tried to pin on me. I am not a Kant apologist, nor am I one for unclearness, obfuscation, confusion, etc. I suppose that, in certain light, I was giving a counterexample - drawing upon my own experience of difficulty, which I later overcame, in understanding that damn book. "If I can do it, so can you", that cheesy sales phrase you hear all the time in infomercial ads, seems relevant here.

2) In a forum of owned, run and populated by Objectivists you try to pretend that the following is not impolite, but simply

    ordinary hyperbole: "Everytime I see something like "Rand's Razor", ..., I don't know whether to laugh or puke"

That was a more than a little uncivil...my apologies.

3) On some topics you ,the self-proclaimed "athiest and realist", "have several pretty good reasons (which [you]don't think Objectivists would listen to) "

Well, the "atheism" and "realism" are philosophical beliefs which, from a general standpoint, align myself with most Objectivists, no? I was trying to establish why I might have some common ground with others on this board - in terms of belief, not civility, apparently. But the second phrase didn't really have anything to do with either of those beliefs - it was about ethical reasons I thought I had why torture is wrong. AND the fact that I don't think people who follow Ayn Rand's philosophy would really listen to them, because they haven't in the past when I've attempted to discuss these issues with them.

4) You even say you "could go on and on, which probably wouldn't amuse [us]nearly as much as it would amuse [you]".

Yes, because I thought that there were more examples of the same kind and didn't necessarily want to keep presenting them, which might have been considered boring, as I had already been mildly reproached for loving to type for it's own sake. The word "amuse" might come across as "playfulness for me, not for you" but *that* was not my intention.

5) As "positive critique", you comment on "5 to 9" versus "6 to 8" as though any Objectivist ever claimed to care about the exactness of those numbers.

Okay, let's see if I can straighten myself out on this: Forget the debate about averages and ranges, which was a pointless discussion on my part. My point is that a)Peikoff and others seem to be basing their opinions about Kant on how he plays hard on the limits of our awareness, b)Peikoff seems to quantify those limits in terms of objects of short-term memory recall, and c)seems to be factually wrong. If this isn't the case, and the point of the section is only to grasp the conceptualizing move, minus the definite numbers, then why trot out the numbers to begin with and along with it, the crow example? If it isn't short term memory, then what IS he talking about? I'm pretty sure I didn't use the words "positive critique" to describe this, because it doesn't really pass as one. On the one hand, it's an attempt to correct what seemed to me to be a factual error, on the other, it is an assault on what seems to be a psychological ground for our estimation of the limits of our awareness.

The reason why it seemed relevant to me is because we are speaking for or against reading (and understanding) a guy whose prose can torture the ability to grasp meaning. Whether we have a definite or vague criterion for conceptualization, intelligibility, perceptualization, etc., would you really recommend that someone read Kant if you're convinced that you shouldn't read someone who routinely passes beyond those limits, however you want to define them? I don't think you would. I'm denying the grounds for that recommendation...

My real critique, strangely enough, is that I'm *not* interested in psychology. As I think most people here are not, either. However, it seems that Peikoff is. iouswuoibev mentioned rereading the section in question - I did so and then I pointed out a simple error, which has since become one of the foci of this thread. However, I believe I also said in that same post that I wasn't convinced that the science of psychology was the end-all, be-all of judgments about our mental life. And here is where the philosophy really would come in - but Peikoff doesn't say how or why it does. That is, he doesn't really make an argument for it.

If anything strikes me as the huge philosophical issue in all of this, it is not psychology but mathematics.

I don't deny that I can have meaningful intellectual discourse and intellectual exchange and change your mind just as I expect to have mine changed. But there are obviously limits to this, which anyone would be aware of. And let's be realistic - Objectivism is a philosophy for which any significant compromise, moral or philosophical, is not really an option left open. Is this not one of the roots of the Kelley/Peikoff split? Ayn Rand expounded this in many different places, right? I expect that there are some things that you just won't change on, just as *you* expect that people who follow the philosophy of Ayn Rand will not change on them.

Edited April 10, 2005 by ashishin

[Capitalism Forever]

ashishin, let me begin my critique of your posts, which I have had the opportunity to read in two instalments, one before the weekend and one today, and whose essential theme I therefore admittedly have a lesser familiarity with than I would have had if I had had the good fortune to be able to peruse them, along with the intervening replies of our fellow posters, in a single session, by stating that, although, as required by a basic sense of charity due towards all of one's fellow individuals, I give you the benefit of the doubt in matters of intellectual honesty, I cannot help but to have a lingering sense of suspicion--and, lest I be mistaken, I should emphasize that what I am talking about is merely a suspicion and does not rise to the level of a certainty or even probability--that (especially given your, as softwareNerd has already alluded to in his last post and you have already apologized for in your own last post, rather uncivil, remarks, whose number has by this point risen to what one may, for the purpose at hand, justly consider a multitude, which can be viewed as symptoms of your emotional reactions towards Objectivism) your motivation for your presence and posting on this forum in general and on this thread in particular may have less to do with an honest desire to discover the truth than with a design, if not to promote the philosophy of Immanuel Kant--which you have explicitly denied, but which denial, depending on your honesty or lack thereof, may or may not cover the facts of the matter, and therefore does not disprove its object--then at least to discredit Objectivism. With these prolegomena, I shall now proceed to the substance of my critique and posit that the fundamental error in the approach evidenced by your posts is the premise, which you, upon some occasions, have come close to stating explicitly, and which or whose equivalent one may debate if you have not actually stated explicitly in certain places (as I said in my prolegomena, my familiarity with your posts is limited due to the, for the purpose of developing a mental picture of a train of thought that I consider to be, due to its fallacy, of limited relevance, rather lengthy temporal discontinuity in my perusal of them), although such debate would be irrelevant given that no explicitness at all is necessary to prove my point, that the ideas presented and their chosen form of presentation are, in much the way the mind and body were, originally in the philosophy of Plato and subsequently, with an added definiteness, in the philosophy of the German gentleman we are discussing, disjoined, to be considered separately, as if neither bore symptoms of the attributes of the other and therefore a right choice in the makeup of the (essential) one would not necessarily at least encourage, if not positively necessitate, a right choice in the execution of the (material) other, and conversely, that an overbearing unpleasantness evident in the one (referring, this time, the material one) could not be correctly judged as, if not a compelling evidence, then at least as a strong hint of the rampant malevolence permeating the other--unless, that is, the unpleasant style of presentation be chosen as an educative parody.

Get it?

[HaloNoble6]

If I might be so kind as to say, Capitalism Forever, at the risk of adding nothing to your eloquent, yet transcendental, response to our friend pot, I mean ashish, that even though, as you say, judging the intentions, whether conscious or subconscious, of a random poster on a forum, is rather difficult, if not impossible, that there appears to be, it seems to me, enough evidence, based on the quality and quantity of posts available, that he ( like many who have chosen to stand on a soap box of, how could you say, ideas which are antithetical to the, as defined by the forum rules, purpose of this forum) appears to be engaging in verbose, yet somewhat academic, chatter, for a purpose which I can only ascertain, inspite of the minimal time I have here to make this post, to be driven by, as you say, at least, an emotional response to Objectivism.

[y_feldblum]

Here's a good idea for a contest. First person to diagram any one sentence in either of the last two posts wins. (That excludes "Get it?".) Such a contest should remain open for a period of one year. If after one year nobody wins, both Capitalism Forever and Felipe win. Answers must be submitted on no more than one ream of paper.

We can't try this contest with Kant. Nobody is going to wait around a period of decades just to find out who wins.

Edited April 11, 2005 by y_feldblum

[HaloNoble6]

I must admit, y_feldblum, that, given my lack of formal training in the English tongue, I can only guess as to what it means, if I understand you correctly, to "diagram a sentence," per se, so I'm afraid that I, unlike my esteemed colleague Capitalism Forever, could not, and would not, consider myself eligible for such a prestigious prize as you propose above, regardless of any prowess, as little as it may be, that I demonstrate in writing seemingly endless, yet dangerously poignant, sentences. Needless to say, I thank you for your thoughtful, as well as timely, suggestion, for it might create, at the very least, an army of posters whom, motivated by the desire to win the "ObjectivismOnline Immanuel Kant Wanna-be Award," will polish the art of, as I will refer to it henceforth, endless-sentencing, and in the process, to my enjoyment, mock those whom may think of endless-sentencing, malicious and few as those may be, as a venerable activity.

Cheers.

[y_feldblum]

That's a lot of words to use just to say, "I never learned to diagram sentences. Nevertheless, writing endless sentences is fun." That's what I suspect you said, at any rate.

And here's a lot of words to use just to say, "I don't know what you meant":

In my capacity as an impartial observer or, perhaps to take a better word, reader, of your writing, which, if not evidencing formal training in the English tongue, at the very least and most assuredly, evidences formal training in the immitation of the style of the classical German philosophers, not the least of whom, and even, perhaps, the most esteemed of whom, is Immanuel Kant, I must profess, and without further deliberations or the taking of literary roundabouts in the communication of what ought to be concisely and lucidly and eloquently verbalized ideas do so profess, a most singular kind of ignorance, a kind which lacks even a particle of its opposite, which opposite is the negation of that to which it is opposite, and where the opposite of ignorance is understanding, insofar as understanding is the negation of ignorance, since it renders it nonexistent, and even more than a singular kind of ignorance, a hopeless ignorance, an ignorance without even a chance of being restored to its opposite, where, as aforementioned, its opposite is understanding, and to add to the definition of the opposite of ignorance, is a clear understanding, as to what the contents of your sentences, which though they do not appear to be sentences nevertheless are, and which do not appear to be sentences because they seem to lack end, whereas all know sentences must end at some point, and which appear dangerously to tend to the category of run-ons of infinite length, mean, though, in the process of replying to them, you must have made many references to sentences, this time of apparently finite length, which I wrote, by which verb I mean typed, at a prior time, and which after writing I submitted to this very same bulletin-board system as the one to which you submitted your gloriously unterminating and distinctly Kantian sentences, and even more than to the very same bulletin-board system, to the very same forum and the very same thread within that bulletin-board system, and which to have been referred to must have been read by you at some appropriate time in the past, where the phrases "prior time" and "time in the past" should be interpreted as synonyms, and insofar as you referenced my terminating and distinctly comprehensible message, where a message is an ordered collection of sentences written and submitted to a bulletin-board system, it appears to the naked intellect that the writer of the terminating sentences ought, generally speaking, to understand the references made to it even in unterminating and, as aforecategorized, gloriously Kantian, sentences, nevertheless the author, which you may have, by now, concluded is the very same author as the author of this sentence, remains ignorant, unfortunately yet truly, even of those references.

[iouswuoibev]

Oh I get it now! You're all speaking Kantian.

[softwareNerd]

Oh I get it now! You're all speaking Kantian.

The amused has become the object of amusement.

[dougclayton]

ashishin, let me begin my critique of your posts, which I have had the opportunity to read in two instalments, one before the weekend and one today....

Very nice. I confess that I got about 1/3 through it before my mind started to wander and I thought, "Why is this so dense?" Then I looked at the topic and figured out what you were doing.

[Capitalism Forever]

... your sentences, which though they do not appear to be sentences nevertheless are, and which do not appear to be sentences because they seem to lack end, whereas all know sentences must end at some point, and which appear dangerously to tend to the category of run-ons of infinite length, mean, though, in the process of replying to them, you must have made many references to sentences, this time of apparently finite length, which I wrote ...

Phenomenal! I think you're the winner!

[ashishin]

I *think* I've got it now:

Short thoughts good, long thoughts bad.

You might call that l'esprit d'escalier.

Have a good time amongst yourselves...don't get too caught up in that cult thing, now, ya here?

[DarkWaters]

*** Mod's note: Merged with an similar, earlier topic - sN ***

Hi,

To further my understanding of Objectivism, I am trying to articulate why Immanuel Kant is the most evil person. I understand the disastrous consequences of a peaceful intellectual extolling horrendous philosophy. However, I am unsure why Kant is necessarily more evil than other D2 philosophers such as David Hume. Is it merely because Kant was more influential in terms of crippling the minds of subsequent generations? Are there more essentials in Kant's philosophy that make him fundamentally worse than the other two aforementioned philosophers?

In the essay Fact and Value Dr. Peikoff states the following:

The cause of such ideas has to be methodical, lifelong intellectual dishonesty; the effect, when they are injected into the cultural mainstream, has to be mass death. There can be no greater evasion than the open, total rejection of reality undertaken as a lifetime crusade. And only evasion on this kind of scale, evasion as the motor of an entire philosophic system, makes possible and necessary all the atrocities of our age.

It seems that David Hume also qualifies for this quoted description.

Thanks,

--DW

Edit: Removed discussion of Plato.

Edited August 28, 2008 by softwareNerd

[LaszloWalrus]

I'm not sure that Hume qualifies for that description; he came up with a ton of skeptical arguments that he could not answer, but I'm not sure that he was dishonest, and I'm certain that he was not dishonest on the scale of Kant.

My own take on Kant is that in order to come up with such a system, he had to have seen clearly the truth, and methodically turned away from it at every point. He corrupted the term "reason" trying to refute it while pretending to uphold it, for one, and his stated purpose in philosophy was to save altruism (especially of the Christian variety) from Enlightenment influences.

[DarkWaters]

[H]is stated purpose in philosophy was to save altruism (especially of the Christian variety) from Enlightenment influences.

Do you know where Kant stated this? Is "altruism" here being used in the Randian sense or under a different definition propounded by Kant?