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DiscoveryJoy

Relationship between Object and Percept in perceptions

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Hey guys,

I have decided to create a new thread to continue the leading question that has been raised in the following thread about the Matrix:

http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=8011&page=6#entry335892


We have been faced with the following claim:

"The form or perception does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."

It has also been claimed that "object" and "entity" are synonyms. Judging on the Objectivist view on how perception works, I disagree, since perceptions means the following:

"There is an Object in reality that exists independent of my perceiving it. When it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of a particular entity."

This rules out the possibility of "object" and "entity" being synonyms. Entities are a product of object-sense-interaction. They exist only while we are perceiving them. They cease to exist when we fall asleep. Objects do not.

So my question was then and is now:


How do we know that "The form or perception does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."?

Is there anything inherent in the nature of perception that necessitates this?

Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between object and entity?

Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many?

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Discover, did you get to read the part of my deleted post to Louie concerning the use of synonyms for axiomatic concepts-philosophic primaries before it was deleted?

Here is an example for you:

"All independent existents, when perceived by the senses, are perceived as particular beings with identity"

Does that make being a contribution from the form of perception?

Edited by Plasmatic

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Discover said:

"There is an Object in reality that exists independent of my perceiving it. When it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of a particular entity."

Are you making a hypothetical statement here? My statement is meant to be a hypothetical example of using axiomatic statements synonymously in the same sentence. You appear to be claiming that the above is a direct quote though. It doesn't matter if it is because my point still stands but your quoted statement is not on the Oist research CD. Are you quoting something else? Edited by Plasmatic

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Discover, since I object to the current form of your question-the context you are presupposing in asking it, we have to straighten that out first.

I have a series of questions to ask you but will wait till you answer my first question in #2.

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Discover, did you get to read the part of my deleted post to Louie concerning the use of synonyms for axiomatic concepts-philosophic primaries before it was deleted?

Here is an example for you:

"All independent existents, when perceived by the senses, are perceived as particular beings with identity"

Does that make being a contribution from the form of perception?

 

Well, the last thing I read from you was post #137.

 

To your example:

 

You are talking about "independent existents". What do you mean by "existent" here? A necessarily coherent thing? Or just "something", possibly a collection of multiple things, each of them coherent?

If the former, then no, being is not a contribution from the form of perception, since it was already there before.

If the latter, then yes, being is a contribution from the form of perception, since it wasn't there before.

 

In any case, whatever the answer, the perceiver is just lucky or in bad luck, since different senses could very well have had different results when interacting with that existent.

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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Discover said:

Are you making a hypothetical statement here? My statement is meant to be a hypothetical example of using axiomatic statements synonymously in the same sentence. You appear to be claiming that the above is a direct quote though. It doesn't matter if it is because my point still stands but your quoted statement is not on the Oist research CD. Are you quoting something else?

 

No, I wasn't trying to make a hypothetical statement. I thought I was properly representing what is discussed on http://campus.aynrand.org/classroom/70/:

 

Ayn Rand Campus -> History of Philosophy Lecture 22 -> The Validity of the Senses -> The Objectivist Position

 

and in

 

Ayn Rand Campus -> History of Philosophy Lecture 22 -> Sensory Qualities as Real -> Effects of Causal Primaries Real

 

My "quote" is what I gather from that lecture.

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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What would a "one-to-many" relation be? Do you mean something like perceiving one object can be done with more than one form? Say, an apple, being perceived by sight or touch?

 

I wouldn't characterize entities as forms of perception. If you were going off me saying entities are types of objects, I only meant the bounds of an object as can be recognized by human perception. Those bounds exist if you're asleep or not. It's not like electrons can be perceived by human perception, but they're still bounded. I'm not sure if -Rand- thought entity and object are distinguished in this way, or if she thought they're synonyms.

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Discovery, Im not confused but truly puzzled how one comes to the confusion here about a difference between the synonyms object and entity. I am absolutely iron clad certain that object-entities are not form dependent for Oism and I have been trying to think of the best way to get you to explain exactly the psycho-epistemic process you have gone through to reach this conclusion.

I can prove right now that you are wrong but really would like to understand this error and how one came to it honestly. Could you please explain the best you can what you read-heard that lead you to think that entities are "object-sense" dependent? Where in those lectures? Your "quote" is a total misrepresentation of what is said on the relation of primaries to "qualities" in the Oist repudiation of the primary-secondary quality distinction....

I'm not trying to offend you by condescending. I want to understand how you came to this idea.

Edited by Plasmatic

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Discovery, Im not confused but truly puzzled how one comes to the confusion here about a difference between the synonyms object and entity. I am absolutely iron clad certain that object-entities are not form dependent for Oism and I have been trying to think of the best way to get you to explain exactly the psycho-epistemic process you have gone through to reach this conclusion.

I can prove right now that you are wrong but really would like to understand this error and how one came to it honestly. Could you please explain the best you can what you read-heard that lead you to think that entities are "object-sense" dependent? Where in those lectures? Your "quote" is a total misrepresentation of what is said on the relation of primaries to "qualities" in the Oist repudiation of the primary-secondary quality distinction....

I'm not trying to offend you by condescending. I want to understand how you came to this idea.

One possibility is simply overthinking the issue. One time I was interested in the relationship between a certain pair of concepts, so I wrote out my thoughts at length, using a number of carefully chosen examples and distinctions. The next day I looked at what I had written and I realized that the two concepts were just synonyms. It's a seductive error to make because you start developing distinct accounts for both concepts and it feels like you're making progress when actually you're just playing with words.

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Synonymousness isn't important here. Whether entity and object should be treated as synonyms is a separate issue from the connection between objects in reality and representations of objects. It looks like Discovery is thinking about it like Locke might, as in we pick up properties of external objects as sensory primitives which are formed into objects or forms of perception by means of associations and correlations. So an apple-as-perceived would just be a sensory correlation with a detected object. Objectivism doesn't mention sensory primitives, though; "entity" is the most basic, not sensory primitives. 

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Louie said:

Synonymousness isn't important here. Whether entity and object should be treated as synonyms is a separate issue from the connection between objects in reality and representations of objects.

Of course it is important. The very question the OP is asking is predicated on objects NOT being the same as entities and then predicating on that premise a one to one correspondence between two different existents, one object of perception and one form dependent. How can this be missed??!! I want to understand how people do that so easily.... I mean that sincerely.

Louie said:

It looks like Discovery is thinking about it like Locke might, as in we pick up properties of external objects as sensory primitives which are formed into objects or forms of perception by means of associations and correlations. So an apple-as-perceived would just be a sensory correlation with a detected object. Objectivism doesn't mention sensory primitives, though; "entity" is the most basic, not sensory primitives.

How would you differentiate what you claim Discovery is saying from what you claimed about entities and sense perception in the previous thread?

Edit: And what do you mean by "representations of objects"?

Edited by Plasmatic

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Of course it is important. The very question the OP is asking is predicated on objects NOT being the same as entities

Yes, but even if they're not synonyms, the OP question doesn't necessarily follow from them merely being different concepts. My view is just that entity is a little more specific than object. In the OP, they're totally different. The rest of your thought didn't make sense to me.

"And what do you mean by 'representations of objects'? "

That part isn't my view, it's just an "entity" that's independent of perception. Or that we only get images or ideas of objects, I think that's Locke's belief, albeit the object representations are built from observations.

 

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Discovery, Im not confused but truly puzzled how one comes to the confusion here about a difference between the synonyms object and entity. I am absolutely iron clad certain that object-entities are not form dependent for Oism and I have been trying to think of the best way to get you to explain exactly the psycho-epistemic process you have gone through to reach this conclusion.

I can prove right now that you are wrong but really would like to understand this error and how one came to it honestly. Could you please explain the best you can what you read-heard that lead you to think that entities are "object-sense" dependent? Where in those lectures? Your "quote" is a total misrepresentation of what is said on the relation of primaries to "qualities" in the Oist repudiation of the primary-secondary quality distinction....

I'm not trying to offend you by condescending. I want to understand how you came to this idea.

 

Okay, will probably have to go into more details to explain my psycho-epistemic process.

 

But to give you something right away, just the following. Maybe its better to start with this. If you already detect the error right here, then let me know. Otherwise I would have to get into even more details:

 

 

1.

 

Looking at http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/entity.html I read:

"Of man’s five cognitive senses, only two provide him with a direct awareness of entities"

 

"provide" as in "giving him something" (the senses do). Doesn't this make it obvious that the entity lies in the stimulated senses? ("stimulated" meaning that an object had to stimulate them). In any case, that the senses are definitely part of what is "the entity"?

 

Obviously, the senses cannot provide us with a direct awareness of external objects, since our consciousness lies behind the senses. They do not "provide" in the sense of just "handing over" external objects to us like a hot potatoe. Yet they provide our consciousness with something that is related to external objects. The senses provide our consciousness with the stimulated state of our senses. Hence the term "entity".

 

 

2.

 

In the lecture, look at the description about the "energy puffs":

It says that when the energy puffs which comprise external reality (= certain objects) interact with the energy puffs which comprise human beings (= our senses, in part) the result is: "A man" or "a feather" (= entities), or ....

 

Note the words "interact" and "result" here. My understanding of "result of interaction" is that of some kind of output, i.e. a product (the word "product" or "produce" is also mentioned in that passage of the lecture). Like in a chemical reaction. Output un-equals Input. The input being the energy puffs that make up the object. They act on the energy puffs that make up our senses. And the output is "a man", "a feather" etc. Remember, output un-equals input.

 

So if the objects are the input, and the things we become aware of ("man", "feather" etc.) are just a "result" (the output) and if we call the latter things entities, then:

Voilà! Objects un-equals entities, too. Because: Output un-equals input.

 

After all, you wouldn't equate the inputs and outputs of photosynthesis to each other, would you? So why equate objects and entities?

 

 

3.

 

I hope you don't think that what I am presenting here is Kant. I understand that Kant would pretend like there is some manipulative mental activity going on in the interaction between object and senses, which I am excluding. We get aware of entities only after they have already been created as a result of the interaction. Of the interaction, not of our mind.

 

 

4.

 

I hope you are still not running mad yet. Thanks for your enduring patience and interest ;-)

 

 

5.

 

I still have all the energy puffs necessary to create a drawing that depicts my understanding, if necessary ^_^

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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Discovery said:

 

1.

 

Looking at http://aynrandlexico...con/entity.html I read:

"Of man’s five cognitive senses, only two provide him with a direct awareness of entities"

 

"provide" as in "giving him something" (the senses do). Doesn't this make it obvious that the entity lies in the stimulated senses? ("stimulated" meaning that an object had to stimulate them). In any case, that the senses are definitely part of what is "the entity"?

 

Obviously, the senses cannot provide us with a direct awareness of external objects, since our consciousness lies behind the senses. They do not "provide" in the sense of just "handing over" external objects to us like a hot potatoe. Yet they provide our consciousness with something that is related to external objects. The senses provide our consciousness with the stimulated state of our senses. Hence the term "entity".

 

You are stating the exact opposite of the Oist position and Dr. Peikoffs purpose of the "extravagant" hypothetical using "deliberately undefined" "puffs of meta energy". The whole point of that hypothetical is that the fact that perception is relational does not make it indirect or unreal or somehow unobjective. In fact in the recapitulation of the lecture in OPAR Dr. Peikoff uses the phrase "external entities" when referring to the "objects" that are comprised of these hypothetical "puffs".

 

OPAR said:

 

 

For the sake of the argument, let us make the extravagant assumption that they are radically different from anything men know now; let us call them "puffs of meta-energy," a deliberately undefined term.At this stage of cognition, scientists have discovered that the material world as men perceive it, the world of three-dimensional objects possessing color, texture, size, and shape is not a primary, but merely an effect, an effect of various combinations of puffs acting on men's means of perception.

 

What would this sort of discovery prove philosophically? Ayn Rand holds that it would prove nothing.

 

If everything is made of meta-energy puffs, then so are human beings and their parts, including their sense organs, nervous system, and brain. The process of sense perception, by this account, would involve a certain relationship among the puffs: it would consist of an interaction between those that comprise external entities and those that comprise the perceptual apparatus and brain of human beings. The result of this interaction would be the material world as we perceive it, with all of its objects and their qualities, from men to mosquitoes to stars to feathers.

 

What's more is that the hypothetical even reverses the synonyms in the same scenario:

 

OPAR said:

 

Man's consciousness did not create the ingredients, in the present hypothesis, or the necessity of their interaction, or the result: the solid, three-dimensional objects we perceive. If the elements of reality themselves combine inevitably to produce such objects, then these objects have an impregnable metaphysical foundation: by the nature of their genesis, they are inherent in and expressive of the essence of existence.

 

 

Here "objects are said to be the "result" of this "interaction".

 

In the 1976 lectures (the lecture you are referring to came from these), in Ms. Rand's presence, Dr. Peikoff answers the question "How would you answer the following argument against the objectivity of concepts? If man did not exist metaphysical entities would still have something in common, even without a human consciousness to identify it as such. Therefore there must be some basis for a Platonic status for concepts?" While answering this question he states "if there were no human beings their would be entities. They would have the attributes they have" Lecture 5 157:12

 

Now Oism holds that "entities are the only metaphysical primaries". This alone precludes "objects" from producing "entities".

 

The concept entity is an axiomatic concept and that means it requires synonyms to describe it.

Edited by Plasmatic

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OK, I'll look into it, but if your quotes are right, then I was really just using the wrong terminology for the question I wanted to ask.

 

Instead of "entities", I think what I should have used is the term "percepts". Does my question and all the explanations I have made make sense if you replace "entities" with "percepts" everywhere?

 

Now a percept is clearly form-dependent, right?

"percept" = an object/entity as it arrives in our consciousness, i.e. the result of the interaction.

 

Sorry for the confusion, my mistake.

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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What would a "one-to-many" relation be? Do you mean something like perceiving one object can be done with more than one form? Say, an apple, being perceived by sight or touch?

 

 

Yes, and that is, with more than one form simultaneously, i.e. multiple forms, i.e. multiple sense data objects, i.e. multiple percepts. Why not?

 

But really on the perceptual level, not just the sensual one you are mentioning here (sight or touch). Say, something like an apple out there, being perceived in the form of two billiard balls.

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Yes, but even if they're not synonyms, the OP question doesn't necessarily follow from them merely being different concepts.

 

Yes, you're right, my question doesn't follow from them merely being different concepts. That's why I have tried to rephrase my question, since I had gotten the semantics of the term "entity" wrong. I am replacing it with "percept", hoping that it clears all misunderstandings.

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Just to make sure we're still on the same page: There has obviously been a misuse in terminology in forming the leading question of this topic.

 

1. The thread should properly be named (admins please edit, if possible):

Relationship between Object and Percept in perceptions

 

 

 

 

2. Were we stand now is the following:

 

Perceptions mean the following:

"There is an Object in reality that exists independent of my perceiving it. When it acts on my senses, I perceive it in the form of a particular percept."

This rules out the possibility of "object" and "percept" being synonyms. Percepts are a product of object-sense-interaction. They exist only while we are perceiving them. They cease to exist when we fall asleep. Objects do not.

So my question is:


How do we know whether "The form or perception (i.e. the percept) does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."?

Is there anything inherent in the nature of perception that necessitates this?

Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between object and percept?

Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many?

 

 

A key motivation for answering that question is to know that individual rights are justified, so that anybody - independent of his form of peception - can always be held accountable for violating them.

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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The metaphysically given percept(s) serve as the basis or foundation for the man-made concepts of one or many, or notions of many-to-one and one-to-many. relationships.

 

OPAR, Chapter 2, Sense Perception and Volition: The Senses As Necessarily Valid

The validity of the senses is an axiom. Like the fact of consciousness, the axiom is outside the province of proof because it is a precondition of any proof.


Proof consists in reducing an idea back to the data provided by the senses. These data themselves, the foundation of all subsequent knowledge, precede any process of inference. They are the primaries of cognition, the unchallengeable, the self-evident.

 

Consider tying this in with John Galt's statement "A process of reason is a process of constant choice in answer to the question: True or False?—Right or Wrong?" Is it right or wrong for individuals to be free to exercise (or not) the reasoning process for themselves?

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The metaphysically given percept(s) serve as the basis or foundation for the man-made concepts of one or many, or notions of many-to-one and one-to-many. relationships.

 

True. There are many examples where you can identify such relationships, examples that have nothing to do with object vs percept. Examples where you just deal with content within the perceptual world alone. Just take a tree: One branch has many leaves: One-to-many. Or two human beings can have multiple children. Two-to-many. And on and on. Don't see how this gives any lead as to what the relationship between external object and percept is, though. Or why concepts of one or many etc. would have to be based on the premise of a one-to-one relationship between external object and percept.

 

OPAR, Chapter 2, Sense Perception and Volition: The Senses As Necessarily Valid

The validity of the senses is an axiom. Like the fact of consciousness, the axiom is outside the province of proof because it is a precondition of any proof.

Proof consists in reducing an idea back to the data provided by the senses. These data themselves, the foundation of all subsequent knowledge, precede any process of inference. They are the primaries of cognition, the unchallengeable, the self-evident.

 

Consider tying this in with John Galt's statement "A process of reason is a process of constant choice in answer to the question: True or False?—Right or Wrong?" Is it right or wrong for individuals to be free to exercise (or not) the reasoning process for themselves?

 

Sure, the senses are necessarily valid. Meaning: The percepts that the senses give us are fully real. They (the percepts) are not constructed, imagined or subjective. They are the observed content, the things of which we become aware of in the most direct sense possible, and they are irrefutable. But how does that make any statement on how those percepts were produced during the preceding process of perception? How do we know how many external objects were necessary to produce one percept?

 

If you don't understand the justification for the latter questions, let all of the following serve as a highly important insight into my psycho-epistemological process:

How do we know that such a thing as some kind of "senses" is even necessary for us to be conscious of anything out there at all? Well, we know it, because to be conscious at all, we need a means to consciousness. Consciousness cannot somehow magically wrap itself around one external object after another wherever it wants to in that large and unlimited universe. Rather, reality must act on some kind of medium where all the external objects' influences are bundled together, a medium that is condensed enough so that consciousness can just cling to that medium without the need of leaping from one external object to another. That medium is what may properly be called senses. So we know we have such senses, even without any reference to the things we call our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc. whatsoever. We can deduce that we must have some senses from the fact of our being conscious alone. But we don't know what those senses are, because our consciousness can only be in direct contact with the percepts. The percepts which those unknown but proven-to-exist senses must have produced in interaction with some external objects.

 

So what then are the things we call our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc.? Primarily percepts, right? I mean, what else could they ever be, if anything our consciousness can ever get in direct contact with is percepts? So those so-called "sense organs" must be percepts, too, just like anything else. Or can eyes, ears and noses be our means of perception at the same time? Well how, if they are actually just the result of the latter? Can something be both a means and a result of perception at the same time? How would that be consistent with the law of identity?

 

Our so-called "sense organs" have yet another quite funny thing about them: Their co-existence strangely correlates with our ability to be aware of both them themselves and the entire rest of our perceptual world. Their existence and certain interactions between them and other percepts we observe in our perceptual world happen to be empirically necessary so that we can have awareness of both them and the other percepts. To put it in similar terms as before:

There are certain objects in the external world. They necessarily must interact with some senses (I don't dare to say those senses are our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc.) so that the result is a "man" or a "tree" or a "feather" etc....OR EVEN an "eye", an "ear" or a "nose" etc. which are things we like to call "sense organs". The sense organs - or at least some of them - must always be among those results, otherwise reality simply doesn't allow us to be aware of the other things, either. That's just the rules.

 

Just like the analogy in an ego shooter computer game: See the world on your computer screen? Notice the little man in the foreground, too? Notice him suddenly get shot and disappear from the screen? The entire screen turns black. You're dead. Not allowed to observe the virtual world anymore. Game over. That's just the programming of this computer game.

The little man was your sense organs. You there, the guy sitting in front of the screen, was your consciousness, observing both the man and the rest of the virtual world. The program code was and still is the external objects that interacted with the computer hardware (your actual senses) to produce the output, i.e. the percepts on the screen, for you, the observing consciousness.

Note that the game could've been written in a way without the entire screen turning black if your little man dies. But it wasn't. Don't ask me why. It just wasn't.

Also note that potentially many program code objects could have been necessary to produce just one thing in the virtual world on your screen. Or one such object to produce many.

 

So the question remains:

 

How do we know whether "The form or perception (i.e. the percept) does not contribute anything that the entity-object does not possess in regard to the metaphysically singular status of bounded particulars."?

Why does there always have to be a one-to-one relationship between object and percept?

Why not many-to-one? Or one-to-many?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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True. There are many examples where you can identify such relationships that have nothing to do with object vs percept. Examples where you just deal with content within the perceptual world alone. Just take a tree: One branch has many leaves: One-to-many. Or two human beings can have multiple children. Two-to-many. And on and on. Don't see how this gives any lead as to what the relationship between external object and percept is, though. Or why concepts of one or many etc. would have to be based on the premise of a one-to-one relationship between external object and percept.

I'm a bit flummoxed here. While the notion of one-to-many is perfectly applicable to one branch having many leaves, what don't you get between the one-to-one relationship of the external object of the branch and your percept of the branch, or the one-to-one relationship between each external object of each leaf relating to each percept of each leaf. thus allowing you to derive 'many' leaves?

 

In your earlier inquiry about one object-to-one percept — how do we know it is one-to-one and not one-to-many or many-to-one — this example does not seem to equatable for illustrating the dilemma. Rather it comes across as substantiating what I pointing out about deriving the concepts of 'one' and 'many' from percepts.

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So what then are the things we call our "eyes", "ears", "nose" etc.?

This doesn't make sense. How can we see an eyeball by means of an eyeball? Look at someone else. Or use a mirror. An eye doesn't see itself. Eyes aren't the result of perception, and it's better to primarily call them entities. The form in which you see is a percept, and the form of perception depends on 1) the nature of the object, and 2) the nature of the sense organ (including the relevant parts of the brain). 1 is how the world is. 2 operates by specific rules. In that sense, object to percept is one to one: one input, one possible output, in a given context.

If I follow your thinking, you're wondering how we know 2 doesn't add more to 1 in the process, resulting in a percept that is "extra" than the input. Now, it is possible to glean information that only 2 provides, but nothing is *added* beyond what was there to start with. But there are still many ways for an object to appear, to the extent 2 varies (e.g. humans and dogs smell in very different ways).

Edited by Eiuol

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I'm a bit flummoxed here. While the notion of one-to-many is perfectly applicable to one branch having many leaves, what don't you get between the one-to-one relationship of the external object of the branch and your percept of the branch, or the one-to-one relationship between each external object of each leaf relating to each percept of each leaf. thus allowing you to derive 'many' leaves?

 

Because our consciousness is not in any direct contact with the external object of the branch. Only with the percept of the branch. So its perfectly legitimate to assert the one-to-many in the perceptual branches having many perceptual leaves, since you're staying in the perceptual world this way. What you cannot do is claim that the external object of the branch is really one bounded particular independent of your perceiving it. You cannot make any unquestionable statements of this kind about things that you're not in contact with.

 

 

In your earlier inquiry about one object-to-one percept — how do we know it is one-to-one and not one-to-many or many-to-one — this example does not seem to equatable for illustrating the dilemma. Rather it comes across as substantiating what I pointing out about deriving the concepts of 'one' and 'many' from percepts.

 

Which example do you mean here? Still talking about the branches?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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This doesn't make sense. How can we see an eyeball by means of an eyeball? Look at someone else. Or use a mirror. An eye doesn't see itself. Eyes aren't the result of perception, and it's better to primarily call them entities. The form in which you see is a percept, and the form of perception depends on 1) the nature of the object, and 2) the nature of the sense organ (including the relevant parts of the brain). 1 is how the world is. 2 operates by specific rules. In that sense, object to percept is one to one: one input, one possible output, in a given context.

 

Not sure what you're saying here. If you're looking into a mirrow or if you just use your hand to feel your eyeball, what are you doing? You are getting the percept of an eyeball. Your consciousness is fed the direct information that there is an eyeball to know. If consciousness can only aquire the result of perception and if what it aquires in this case is an eyeball, then the eyeball must be a percept.

 

I agree about what the form of perception depends on in 1) and 2). You say "in that sense", object to percept is one-to-one. Well, yes, but only in that sense. But that's not the sense in which one-to-one is thought of. Just by lumping whatever the external object/s is/are into one super-term of "one input", doesn't make that "one input" really "one bounded external object". Anything can be an "input". Just as a function can have many parameters, which we might then call the "one input".

 

If I follow your thinking, you're wondering how we know 2 doesn't add more to 1 in the process, resulting in a percept that is "extra" than the input. Now, it is possible to glean information that only 2 provides, but nothing is *added* beyond what was there to start with. But there are still many ways for an object to appear, to the extent 2 varies (e.g. humans and dogs smell in very different ways).

 

Again, how can this be claimed, since we don't even know anything about that thing to which something is added or not added in the first place? We cannot compare our percept to anything.

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