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DiscoveryJoy

Relationship between Object and Percept in perceptions

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Discovery asked:

What is the "evidentiary category"?

The category possible.

Oism holds that the categories of evidence are possible, probable and certain. The arbitrary is not an evidentiary status but the lack of one.

Edited by Plasmatic

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Compared to consciousness, a percept is something you apprehend. Consciousness is an activity, a capacity of your mind to apprehend things such as percepts. As a capacity, it may fail to be used properly, or at least, there are conditions to be met to say it performed its function. In that way, perception is also a capacity. Whether or not we should split consciousness into nonvolitional and volitional is a separate question (though there are definitely nonvolitional aspects for sure).

 

 

Apprehend percepts? Apprehension equals understanding equals reason equals volitional consciousness equals the conceptual level of consciousness. As opposed to the non-volitional, perceptual level of consciousness we share with animals. No apprehension in that. We just become aware of percepts passively.

 

Whether or not we should split consciousness into non-volitional and volitional, i.e. perceptual and conceptual, is not just a separate question, but a highly crucial distinction that Hume refused to make, thereby destroying any understanding of the human mind.

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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You have also stated that percepts are not faculties. Aren't they that which can occur when senses and objects interact? Potentials, capacities, things that objects and senses can do when they act together?

 

Anyway, how did you want to use the status of percepts as interaction properties, in order to answer the question of correspondence?

 

Just reminding you of my objections:

 

Yes, that's where I diverge. Or at least need better proof. "Only has exactly the information external reality provides". Does it really? Or is it not just that it used to have it? But when colliding with our senses, maybe new information was generated by the collision? Just like some chemical reactions can turn molecules into atoms, or put atoms together into molecules?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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You can talk about content of percepts, formation of percepts, correspondence of percepts, or percepts in general without saying anything about a specific percept's content. A particular percept has particular content. Determining where the content comes from is important for discussing correspondence.

To apprehend here means to come into contact with. We're going in circles now - you aren't asking about conceptual understanding, now you are. Percepts are something to be aware of, to come into contact with, and have different content than the concept "percept".

I said consciousness has non-volitional aspects, but my point was about if there is a such thing as a purely non-volitional consciousness. Doesn't matter here a lot, perception is non-volitional anyway.

"So everything is a faculty?"
Huh? Tennis balls aren't faculties. A tennis ball is not a capacity to bounce. A tennis ball has a capacity to bounce. So, you could say a tennis ball has some faculty which results in its capacity to bounce. That also answers how a faculty is a type of propety. Attribute might be a better word.

I will get to your main objection. The thing is, my answer is one that involves faculties, the content of percepts (what a percept is "filled" with), and how one comes into contact with percepts.

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You can talk about content of percepts, formation of percepts, correspondence of percepts, or percepts in general without saying anything about a specific percept's content. A particular percept has particular content. Determining where the content comes from is important for discussing correspondence.

To apprehend here means to come into contact with. We're going in circles now - you aren't asking about conceptual understanding, now you are. Percepts are something to be aware of, to come into contact with, and have different content than the concept "percept".

I said consciousness has non-volitional aspects, but my point was about if there is a such thing as a purely non-volitional consciousness. Doesn't matter here a lot, perception is non-volitional anyway.

"So everything is a faculty?"
Huh? Tennis balls aren't faculties. A tennis ball is not a capacity to bounce. A tennis ball has a capacity to bounce. So, you could say a tennis ball has some faculty which results in its capacity to bounce. That also answers how a faculty is a type of propety. Attribute might be a better word.

I will get to your main objection. The thing is, my answer is one that involves faculties, the content of percepts (what a percept is "filled" with), and how one comes into contact with percepts.

Well, unfortunately my reply to this was removed. But anyway, I remember reading your reply. You didn't want to apply the concept of faculty to entities that can give us percepts in the way I stated in my post.

Anyway, the more important point for you to make the point of correspondence was the content VS percept distinction. From my memories about your reply I gather that - though they physically refer to the very same thing - the term "percept" takes into account its being caused by external objects stimulating senses, while the term "content" does not (although it implicitly also has to be caused by such stimulation). If you could have content without external causes, then, of course "content" and "percept" would not refer to the same thing at all, percepts would be a particular kind of content.

Assuming that this is all cleared, I would like to know how you make the point of correspondence.

Also bear in mind the unresolved question of hallucination. It is my understanding that hallucinations are not distinguishable from real entities to the person hallucinating. Any references on whether it is distinguishable to the person not hallucinating, after he has been in a hallucinatory state? Like you know it was a dream after you wake up? Can it be distinguised on the perceptual level alone? This is also important to know for making the point about correspondence (percepts really corresponding to real objects 1:1).

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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As an analogy, a book without words has no content, so it's possible to talk about content being there or not, and if it requires a "container". It's a philosophical position for sure to say percepts are -only- content, which I believe according to today's lingo is a form of internalism.

Regarding hallucination, for modern philosophy, there are generally two positions: that it is possible to distinguish real percepts from hallucinations, and that it's not possible. The first is called disjunctivism. I'm not familiar enough with either to tell you more, but as far as I know, disjunctivism fits in better for direct realism.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/

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On 9/29/2015 at 0:47 AM, Eiuol said:

As an analogy, a book without words has no content, so it's possible to talk about content being there or not, and if it requires a "container". It's a philosophical position for sure to say percepts are -only- content, which I believe according to today's lingo is a form of internalism.

Regarding hallucination, for modern philosophy, there are generally two positions: that it is possible to distinguish real percepts from hallucinations, and that it's not possible. The first is called disjunctivism. I'm not familiar enough with either to tell you more, but as far as I know, disjunctivism fits in better for direct realism.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/

I'm sorry, this got quite out of focus over time. I was still waiting for you to make the point of correspondence. And since you have brought the right term into play, I would like to ask it using the more restrictive term "content" instead of "percept" (You agree that it is a philosophical position to say that percepts are only content, calling this position "internalism"):

Judging from this "internalistic" starting point of only content available (The only starting point that we can actually be 100% sure of): How do we know for sure that the content our consciousness gets into contact with adds nothing to the external world in terms of boundedness etc.?

Edited by DiscoveryJoy

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