Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum
Sign in to follow this  
dream_weaver

Laura Schultz: Cognitive Scientist

Rate this topic

Recommended Posts

Several positive observations:

The distinction between brain and mind, or preference of mind over brain.

Distinguish between capabilities of the mind being a difference of kind from a machine.

A focus on getting things right, vs. the focus on getting things wrong.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1KIVZw7Jxk

 

Differences in composition of data, sample selection from the composition, from reactions observed.

 

Providing clues to a pre-linguistic inductive approach?

 

(Shared by John Paquette via Facebook.)

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Brain is material and we are continuing to get closer to an understanding.  But mind, I don't know.  So I take the philosophical view of treating it temporarily by the basic axiom truth I do know and not speculating beyond common knowledge.  What else can you do but take the limited knowledge you have as the given?  If you don't know the entire fundamental truth, you have to accept the limited part you have discovered.  This method is a reflection of the truth that knowledge is hierarchical.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

So I take the philosophical view of treating it [the mind] temporarily by the basic axiom truth I do know and not speculating beyond common knowledge.

Can you clarify this: treating it [bracketed: mine] with, by the basic axiom truth I do know?

 

I'm trying to juxtapose this with "when one deals with words, one deals with the mind."

Edited by dream_weaver

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now

Sign in to follow this  

  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    No registered users viewing this page.

×