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Vik

variation as a basis for applying concepts

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Consider the concept of quantitative relationship. The concept of quantitative relationship was formed by leaving unspecified such aspects as shape, composition, etc.  Weight is invariant with respect to shape. Also two things can weigh exactly the same despite being composed of different materials. Is that sufficient grounds for concluding that the effect depends on a quantitative relationship?  If not, what is missing?

Consider the concept of action. The concept of action was formed by leaving unspecified the kind and degree/intensity of the action and the entities performing the action. The temperature of mercury within a thermometer can be equal to the temperature of what it's in contact with.  Two things can be the same temperature despite variation in composition (i.e. what is hot?).  Is that sufficient grounds for concluding that the effect depends on similar behaviour of dissimilar constituents?  If not, what is missing?

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Or, it could be that the measurement you're using fails to make a distinction, thereby combining two concepts when they're better off as separate. Children combine felt weight and mass, so end up getting confused in all sorts of ways you wouldn't expect. Similar behavior is sometimes due to an overlapping measurement when you might want two distinct ways to measure. A start to my answer is that this is just a correlational analysis, so it's not enough to see two things share a measurement. You need to say how the quantitative relationship will hold - is it extrinsic or intrinsic in terms of measurement? This is the problem scientists had when analyzing temperature. 

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Vik asked:

 

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Consider the concept of quantitative relationship. The concept of quantitative relationship was formed by leaving unspecified such aspects as shape, composition, etc.  Weight is invariant with respect to shape. Also two things can weigh exactly the same despite being composed of different materials. Is that sufficient grounds for concluding that the effect depends on a quantitative relationship? 

Quantitative relationship of what? That is, it seems your question presupposes that there are entities with no qualities. That is, are you asking if the effect we experience called weight is an effect of the number of fundamental constituents in the substance and not the kind of entities the substance contains? The only difference being the number of entities?

Think about the basis for both the conceptual and the mathematical.... All omitted measurements, the "more and less" that is the basis of class inclusion, are quantitative differences. The concept entity-1  is the base of both fields because it is the ontological bedrock metaphysically and epistemically. The "some but any" is a consequence of the irreducibility of the concept entity in terms of fundamental characteristics. 

 

ITOE said:

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AR: In a certain sense the measurements omitted from the concept of numbers are the easiest to perceive. What you omit are the measurements of any existents which you count. The concept "number" pertains to a relationship of existents viewed as units—that is, existents which have certain similarities and which you classify as members of one group. So when you form the concept of a number, you form an abstraction which you implicitly declare to be applicable to any existents which you care to consider as units. It can be actual existents, or it can be parts of an existent, as an inch is a part of a certain length. You can measure things by regarding certain attributes as broken up into units—of <ioe2_197> length, for instance, or of weight. Or you can count entities. You can count ten oranges, ten bananas, ten automobiles, or ten men; the abstraction "ten" remains the same, denoting a certain number of entities viewed as members of a certain group according to certain similarities.

Therefore, what is it that you retain? The relationship. What do you omit? All the measurements of whichever units you are denoting or counting by means of the concept of any given number.

Here the omission of measurements is perceived almost at its clearest. And I even give the example in the book—it's an expression I have heard, I did not originate it—that an animal can perceive two oranges and two potatoes but cannot conceive of the concept "two." And right there you can see what the mechanics are: the abstraction retains the numerical relationship, but omits the measurements of the particulars, of the kind of entities which you are counting.

Edit:

Posted too soon

However, since entities are their attributes how could the ontological-qualitative differences not be relevant? Likewise, without the qualitative differences we would have no differentia, no foil epistemically.

 

 

Edited by Plasmatic
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19 hours ago, Eiuol said:

Or, it could be that the measurement you're using fails to make a distinction, thereby combining two concepts when they're better off as separate. Children combine felt weight and mass, so end up getting confused in all sorts of ways you wouldn't expect. Similar behavior is sometimes due to an overlapping measurement when you might want two distinct ways to measure. A start to my answer is that this is just a correlational analysis, so it's not enough to see two things share a measurement. You need to say how the quantitative relationship will hold - is it extrinsic or intrinsic in terms of measurement? This is the problem scientists had when analyzing temperature. 

In order to form a concept of mass, we needed to have a concept of weighing first.  So at that earlier stage, weight is all we can deal with at that time.

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Weight is invariant with respect to shape. Also two things can weigh exactly the same despite being composed of different materials. Is that sufficient grounds for concluding that the effect depends on a quantitative relationship? 

P: Quantitative relationship of what? That is, it seems your question presupposes that there are entities with no qualities

V: I don't see how that is implied.  The concept of weight and the concept of "material" presupposes concepts of entities.  After all, something is being weighed and something is made of something.

 

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> However, since entities are their attributes how could the ontological-qualitative differences not be relevant? Likewise, without the qualitative differences we would have no differentia, no foil epistemically.

A pound of oranges and a pound of apples will balance a scale.

In forming the concept of weight, can we leave unspecified the materials as if they were measurements?

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> Weight is invariant with respect to shape. Also two things can weigh exactly the same despite being composed of different materials.

The conceptual context at that stage is: entities, attributes, actions, relationships, weight.  Anything outside of that context is beyond the scope of what we can conclude.

The questions are:

Does the concept of quantitative relationship get activated by these facts?  Or not?  I'm not trying to apply any other concepts at that THIS stage of knowledge but the concept of quantitative relationship. And I'm trying to apply the concept of quantitative relationship to entities.

If the concept of quantitative relationship DOES get activated, can we or can we not say that weight is a quantitative relationship, even if we don't know much else beyond that at that stage of knowledge?

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"Also two things can weigh exactly the same despite being composed of different materials. Is that sufficient grounds for concluding that the effect depends on a quantitative relationship?

Two things can be the same temperature despite variation in composition (i.e. what is hot?).  Is that sufficient grounds for concluding that the effect depends on similar behaviour of dissimilar constituents?"

It looks to me you're wondering if two things share a measurement of a particular type, is it sufficient to say that the same measurement reflects a quantitative relationship that both things share. So, if object A is measured as 10 degrees celsius, and object B is measured as 10 degrees, it is sufficient to say both objects share a quantitative relationship.

My objection is that it isn't sufficient, although it is relevant. It's not sufficient because it is unable to point out whether you really are measuring the same thing. You'd need to at least define the purpose of your measurement, and see a causal relation as well. Indeed, prior to knowing "mass", weight is all you'd have, but you can still reach invalid and contradictory ideas even if apparently the measurement works fine, or measurements match. The relationship may simply be a correlation, though it shows that evidence exists for a quantitative relationship.

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> It looks to me you're wondering if two things share a measurement of a particular type, is it sufficient to say that the same measurement reflects a quantitative relationship that both things share. So, if object A is measured as 10 degrees celsius, and object B is measured as 10 degrees, it is sufficient to say both objects share a quantitative relationship.

No, I'm saying that you apply a concept through a process of measurement-inclusion.

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The 10° C should be a shared quantitative relationship. The measurement-inclusion is along the axis of X° C, where a ° C is spread incrementally across the span referencing the freezing and boiling point of water (later incorporating an altitude) divided into 100 equal parts using a volume of mercury in a tube having a uniform cross section, along which the increments are specified. The range of the inclusion would be ascertained by the solid/liquid/vapor state of mercury.

Unless, of course, we're all referencing something completely different.

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49 minutes ago, dream_weaver said:

The 10° C should be a shared quantitative relationship. The measurement-inclusion is along the axis of X° C, where a ° C is spread incrementally across the span referencing the freezing and boiling point of water (later incorporating an altitude) divided into 100 equal parts using a volume of mercury in a tube having a uniform cross section, along which the increments are specified. The range of the inclusion would be ascertained by the solid/liquid/vapor state of mercury.

Unless, of course, we're all referencing something completely different.

The use of "shared" is throwing me off.  I wouldn't say that two things "share" weight or "temperature".  I'd say they are equal in weight or equal in temperature. 

Is there a better term for this?

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4 hours ago, Vik said:

The use of "shared" is throwing me off.  I wouldn't say that two things "share" weight or "temperature".  I'd say they are equal in weight or equal in temperature. 

Is there a better term for this?

It could be put as two things have the same weight or the same temperature, or that their weights and/or temperatures are equal in measure.

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A volume of mercury in a tube having uniform cross-section records temperature expands or contracts to some level. 

We know WHAT is moving: the mercury. 

We know that two things can be equal in measure of temperature despite their different compositions,

And let's pretend we don't know about chemical atoms.  We'll pretend our conceptual context goes as far as "pure substance" and "subdivision". So we'll say we know mercury is divisible on the perceptible scale, but we don't know what happens if you keep trying to divide a sample of the stuff. 

Do we have sufficient grounds for applying the concept of "activity" in some small way even if we don't know what pure substances were made of or how they gave rise to expansive motion?

For example, is it proper to ask: "What imperceptible activity is giving rise to perceptible motion?"

In other words, is it proper to conclude:  "We know there is SOME kind of activity giving rise to the expansive motion, but we do NOT know what is happening on an imperceptible level."

 

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By the time the difference between element ("pure substance") and compound were set, Newton had already provided the terms of mass and density. The observation of the expansive motion could be correlated with no-change in weight, against change in volume across a range in temperature. Similar activity can be observed in other elements that would vary in degree or magnitude.

The answer to the three questions is yes, yes, and yes.

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Vik said:

The conceptual context at that stage is: entities, attributes, actions, relationships, weight.  Anything outside of that context is beyond the scope of what we can conclude.

Are you thinking that weight is not a species of action, attribute, or relationship? 

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