Is Stealing to live Justified According to Objectivists

[epistemologue]

20 hours ago, Eiuol said:

My idea is that your principles -cannot- be applied to certain radical situations

When and why?

20 hours ago, Eiuol said:

To choose to live requires being able to choose to live.

...

"choosing to live" here is made impossible, there is no life to choose.

You seem to be saying that in some situations you're "unable to choose to live" and thus you are outside of the "context of morality". But as SL said earlier:

On 1/15/2016 at 3:14 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

In an emergency a man faces better and worse choices... particularly in consequence to his life and values...only a nihilist or a skeptic would say the choices are ALL EXACTLY EQUAL.

So the question isn't "is there any choice to live?", but rather, "which of my possible choices best supports my life?"

I've given an argument about what choice best supports your life and why. SL has argued that the opposite choice in this situation is the one that best supports your life. We disagree on the conclusion, but at least agree that both choices have some bearing on your life, that you're situation is within the "context of morality", and that there actually is a right answer about what you're supposed to do in this situation. If you disagree with my conclusion, then why don't you think SL's choice is in support of your life?

As far as my argument goes, it doesn't depend on cryonics or anything specific like that. The argument is that the human mind will continue to gain understanding of nature and the ability to control it, as has been happening throughout history up to this point, and we have every reason to believe will continue, and given benevolent premises about the nature of reality and of man, we should expect to achieve existentially necessary values like immortality and resurrection. And no, my argument was not "you'll get revived if you're good", it was that following the NAP is the most effective way to contribute to the productivity of man, which is the best way to support inventing these technologies, which are in fact your only hope for survival over the long term.

20 hours ago, Eiuol said:

If you want to double down on revival, there would still exist conditions that you'd be destroyed. The abnormal scenarios will still exist.

I'm not sure what you mean.

[Eiuol]

Best to just continue the discussion about Rand's quote on dictatorships, which I say is exactly the position I am taking. SL made a post about it to say I misunderstood Rand, I made a rebuttal that he misinterpreted Rand. I sort of talked about it with Harrison after that. I also replied how better/worse does not mean better is therefore always a moral choice, earlier in the thread.

[Devil's Advocate]

In looking back on your quote I came across the following, which I believe clarifies her overall position on maintaining moral principles in the context of dictatorships:  "... Nothing but a psycho-epistemological panic can blind such intellectuals to the fact that a dictator, like any thug, runs from the first sign of confident resistance; that he can rise only in a society of precisely such uncertain, compliant, shaking compromisers as they advocate, a society that invites a thug to take over; and that the task of resisting an Attila can be accomplished only by men of intransigent conviction and moral certainty." ~ ARL, Dictator

This suggests to me that there is in fact, always a moral choice to be made when faced with adverse, abnormal conditions  for survival.  And that the choice to live requires an "intransigent conviction" to moral certainties about accepting or rejecting impediments to normal conditions; to "live" (uncertainly) on your knees, or to risk going down swinging.

Edited May 24, 2016 by Devil's Advocate
cleanup

[Eiuol]

As far as I see that quote is about how a dictator rises to power, and that people are morally responsible for it happening. I agree with the quote. It gets a bit uncertain about what resisting is, I think it depends on if a country has completed transition into dictatorship. It doesn't speak about being in the grips of a dictatorship like Kira Argounova. Kira was in no way responsible for her plight. She stole potatoes later on to survive. Rand never went to say later that Kira was immoral, or anything bad about her. In fact, we know for sure that she said there can be no moral rules prescribed in such a situation, which necessarily means there is no moral answer.

AIn any case, no one yet actually argued against my analysis of Rand's quote. SL started to. I welcome people to continue my discussion towards Harrison and SL. 

Epist, I will try to piece together a summation of my analysis, or open disagreements.

Edited May 25, 2016 by Eiuol

[Eiuol]

Epist, I condensed what I'm interested in talking about. The last part is what I want to talk about most. The strike-through is because I don't like that wording anymore:

If you're trapped on a lifeboat with 5 people, with limited supplies of food, it's far from any metaphysically normal context. There are literally no applicable moral principles. No rational choices exist - rationality as we know it would be impossible. If a moral principle (not stealing) leads to you dying, either the principle is wrong (stealing is not actually wrong), or the principle doesn't apply (stealing in a lifeboat scenario isn't up for moral evaluation). Or a third answer is that your own life isn't what morality is about (like a categorical imperative).

I think Rand agrees with me, from this quote:

"Every code of ethics must be based on a metaphysics--on a view of the world in which man lives. But man does not live in a lifeboat--in a world in which he must kill innocent men to survive.

Even as a writer, I can barely project a situation in which a man must kill an -innocent- person to defend his own life. I can imagine him killing a man who is threatening him. But suppose someone lives in a dictatorship, and needs a disguise to escape. If he doesn't get one, the Gestapo or GPU will arrest him. So he must kill an innocent bystander to get a coat. In such a case, morality cannot say what to do.

Under a dictatorship--under force--there is no such thing as morality. Morality ends where a gun begins. Personally, I would say the man is immoral if he takes an innocent life. But formally, as a moral philosopher, I'd say that in such emergency situations, no one could prescribe what action is appropriate. That's my answer to all lifeboat questions. Moral rules cannot be prescribed for these situations, because only -life- is the basis on which to establish a moral code. Whatever a man chooses in such cases is right--subjectively. Two men could make opposite choices. I don't think I could kill an innocent bystander if my life was in danger; I think I could kill ten if my husband's life was in danger. But such situations could happen only under a dictatorship, which is one reason not to live under one."

- Q&A session of the Ayn Rand lecture, "Of Living Death" (Ayn Rand Answers: the Best of Her Q&A)
"

SL and Harrison pressed me about the part I bolded, to which I responded:

1) rational decision-making in a strict sense isn't only for moral reasoning, 2) all proper moral choices are rational, 3) rational thought obeys rules, 4) rational moral rules require being in contexts where flourishing proceeds by induced rules

If you can't prescribe a rule, you certainly can't apply one. So if Rand said moral rules can't be prescribed in a particular situation, then she's also saying there is no moral rule to apply to that situation. If -no one- could prescribe an answer, there is no rule to be found.

[epistemologue]

On 5/24/2016 at 9:14 PM, Eiuol said:

SL and Harrison pressed me about the part I bolded, to which I responded:

1) rational decision-making in a strict sense isn't only for moral reasoning, 2) all proper moral choices are rational, 3) rational thought obeys rules, 4) rational moral rules require being in contexts where flourishing proceeds by induced rules

If you can't prescribe a rule, you certainly can't apply one. So if Rand said moral rules can't be prescribed in a particular situation, then she's also saying there is no moral rule to apply to that situation. If -no one- could prescribe an answer, there is no rule to be found.

I'm not really following this. Why can't a rule be prescribed? StrictlyLogical made the point quite clearly that you can, just as Rand described in Ethics of Emergencies, and I don't know how you think you've refuted this:

"In an emergency a man faces better and worse choices... particularly in consequence to his life and values...only a nihilist or a skeptic would say the choices are ALL EXACTLY EQUAL ... In the end there still is an objective morality"

...

"the question becomes rather uninteresting as it is the application of known principles in a particular context"

 

On 5/24/2016 at 9:14 PM, Eiuol said:

If a moral principle (not stealing) leads to you dying, either the principle is wrong (stealing is not actually wrong), or the principle doesn't apply (stealing in a lifeboat scenario isn't up for moral evaluation). Or a third answer is that your own life isn't what morality is about (like a categorical imperative).

I think you're wrong to suggest Rand based her ethics on the idea that physical survival is the ultimate end, and actions are justified causally according to the likelihood of their effects on that end. That wasn't her claim in The Objectivist Ethics, that isn't the position she defends in her non-fiction, and it's not the motivation of the characters in her fiction.

[Eiuol]

Earlier in thread, I spoke about how the essay "Ethics of Emergencies" isn't about the sort of cases like stealing to live in extreme, atypical situations. I agree that the emergencies like a  burning building don't suspend ethics; rules can be prescribed. I reread the essay when I originally brought it up.

It's -different- to talk about dictatorships and cases where you would DIE if you don't steal. To be sure, the choices are not exactly equal, the problem I see is that the context of knowledge you form moral concepts is ruined. That is, any decision you make is not one pertaining to morality. It'd pertain to some other standard. Thus, any -moral- choice would actually be subjective, an assumption of morality. The bottom line is that undermining the basis of morality makes morality -impossible- to apply. Same with science. I think evolutionary psychology starts by undermining how to develop psychological principles, making it impossible to apply psychology. The difference here is that a peculiar, extreme situation caused it, not an epistemological error.

On 10/3/2016 at 2:56 AM, epistemologue said:

I think you're wrong to suggest Rand based her ethics on the idea that physical survival is the ultimate end, and actions are justified causally according to the likelihood of their effects on that end. That wasn't her claim in The Objectivist Ethics, that isn't the position she defends in her non-fiction, and it's not the motivation of the characters in her fiction.

If an action causes you to die, it's immoral.

If an action causes you to live, it might be moral.

If an action causes you to live but not flourish, it's immoral

If an action causes you to live and flourish, it's moral.

[epistemologue]

On 10/9/2016 at 1:43 PM, Eiuol said:

It's -different- to talk about dictatorships and cases where you would DIE if you don't steal. To be sure, the choices are not exactly equal, the problem I see is that the context of knowledge you form moral concepts is ruined. That is, any decision you make is not one pertaining to morality.

The context of morality is this: a conscious, rational being acting in the face of an alternative. There is no distinction between "emergency situations" and "lifeboat situations" as far as the context of morality is concerned. You are still in the same reality*, you are still conscious and rational, and you are still facing alternatives in which you can act.

* quoted from an earlier post:

On 1/19/2016 at 8:34 PM, epistemologue said:

Metaphysics does not change depending on what situation you are in. Just because you're not in a metaphysically normal situation doesn't mean metaphysics itself is any different, only the situation itself is abnormal. Your moral principles ultimately grounded in metaphysics do not change, they simply are applied to this particular situation.

 

On 10/9/2016 at 1:43 PM, Eiuol said:

If an action causes you to die, it's immoral.

If an action causes you to live, it might be moral.

If an action causes you to live but not flourish, it's immoral

If an action causes you to live and flourish, it's moral.

Your claim is still essentially the same: life and happiness must be possible outcomes of one's actions in order for morality to make any sense - because morality is defined as choosing actions that are most likely to lead to these outcomes.

That is consequentialism. That is not Objectivist morality.

On 10/3/2016 at 2:56 AM, epistemologue said:

That wasn't her claim in The Objectivist Ethics, that isn't the position she defends in her non-fiction, and it's not the motivation of the characters in her fiction.

 

[Eiuol]

1 hour ago, epistemologue said:

The context of morality is this: a conscious, rational being acting in the face of an alternative. There is no distinction between "emergency situations" and "lifeboat situations" as far as the context of morality is concerned.

If you mean Rand didn't, she did... It's in the quote I put bolds in. I agree, for her reasons. What you left out of the context of morality is how and when a person forms moral principles originally. Remember, I am being specific to the OP scenario.

For emphasis: "But suppose someone lives in a dictatorship, and needs a disguise to escape. If he doesn't get one, the Gestapo or GPU will arrest him. So he must kill an innocent bystander to get a coat. In such a case, morality cannot say what to do." -Rand

Consequentialism only involves consequences. To some degree, they matter. After all, we want to bring about flourishing, We're able to measure flourishing by the effects it has on one's life concretely. So, being dead is far from flourishing. But it becomes virtue ethics if we focus on habits and virtues with their benefits to life. Those habits and virtues are not based on consequences, while their value is from their consequences.

Part of the disagreement is here:

"you are still conscious and rational, and you are still facing alternatives in which you can act" -Epist

Are ALL choices and rational decision making part of moral reasoning? I say no. ALL choices are between alternatives, even dogs, yet dogs aren't moral agents. One reason to say dogs aren't moral agents is lack of ability to know moral facts. There's no means for a dog to discover let alone prescribe moral rules. For people at least, a foundation makes it possible to prescribe moral rules. If that foundation gets destroyed, no one could prescribe an appropriate action - no one at all. Despite this, rational decision-making could happen without moral rules, just that life -couldn't- be the standard.

If ALL choices are part of moral reasoning, I'd be wrong. Or to prove me wrong, describe how one discovers moral facts.

[epistemologue]

31 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

For emphasis: "But suppose someone lives in a dictatorship, and needs a disguise to escape. If he doesn't get one, the Gestapo or GPU will arrest him. So he must kill an innocent bystander to get a coat. In such a case, morality cannot say what to do." -Rand

My opinion on this statement is that Rand meant that, in that moment during a live Q&A for a totally different topic, she could not possibly imagine how to grapple with such a moral dilemma. This answer was really poorly done on her part (I don't think she's perfect in everything she says all the time), and I don't see any reason to take this as a contradiction of her written philosophy, or as her conceding some inherent limitations in her philosophic or artistic ability in general, as she's grappled with many other difficult problems before without throwing her hands up and saying philosophy cannot say what to do.

 

31 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Consequentialism only involves consequences. To some degree, they matter. After all, we want to bring about flourishing, We're able to measure flourishing by the effects it has on one's life concretely. So, being dead is far from flourishing. But it becomes virtue ethics if we focus on habits and virtues with their benefits to life. Those habits and virtues are not based on consequences, while their value is from their consequences.

So, you're confirming my basic analysis of your morality, that "morality is defined as choosing actions that are most likely to lead to these outcomes", and you're simply noting that virtues are helpful rules of thumb for one to follow, which we've induced to be moral rules from experience, because they generally lead to good outcomes - that is, outcomes where the real moral value is located.

 

31 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

dogs aren't moral agents

Dogs aren't moral agents, and their choices are not moral choices, because they are not rational beings (which I've already said is part of the context of morality).

 

Again, I fundamentally disagree that Rand's morality was consequentialist in the way you're describing. She did not regard values as these outcomes, of one's physically being alive or feeling happy, and she did not regard virtues as rules of thumb induced from experience according to how frequently they lead to positive outcomes.

Edited October 10, 2016 by epistemologue

[Eiuol]

1 hour ago, epistemologue said:

So, you're confirming my basic analysis of your morality, that "morality is defined as choosing actions that are most likely to lead to these outcomes", and you're simply noting that virtues are helpful rules of thumb for one to follow, which we've induced to be moral rules from experience, because they generally lead to good outcomes - that is, outcomes where the real moral value is located.

No, I didn't say heuristics, nor did I say anything that amounts to it. I am not -deriving- morality from outcomes. I am saying outcomes are how to measure IF something is part of one's flourishing. Being dead isn't part of flourishing. Man's nature is what allows him to flourish - being alive is at a minimum required and part of one's nature. Being dead violates this, no? Acting towards one's death is not moral, as it violates that nature. Here I'm not talking about the OP example. In a way, I'm saying dictatorships erase man's nature and corrupts life, thus there is no nature to violate. Same with stealing in order to live.

Also, I agree, there is no reason to see that quote as a contradiction - and it's not because it was "poorly done" as an answer. It's not a LIMITATION at all, it's more like a hard stance on the evils of dictatorship, and all her typical emphasis of using life as a standard. Rand grapples with it in her books - Kira stealing potatoes, Dagny killing a guard, Francisco being a lying playboy. They are not portrayed as people who made a mistake or acted wrongly.

The bit about dogs is to get you to say why it is lacking rational agency means lacking moral agency. Is lacking rational agency identical to lacking moral agency? If not, what about -rational- agency leads to a lack of moral agency? Animals choose too, so ability to choose isn't sufficient for rational agency.

Edited October 10, 2016 by Eiuol