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Eiuol

Universe as Object

55 posts in this topic

1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

On page 6, she says "awareness of an object, a thing - is represented by the implicit concept 'entity' ".

Either I'm living in an alternate reality, or you are. Or publishers have altered the text of ITOE since the second edition.

I have taken a picture of the relevant paragraph in ITOE. Please note that Rand did not write what you just quoted her as writing.

IMG_20161116_174559.jpg

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On 7/1/2016 at 3:02 PM, Eiuol said:

The parts that I am talking about are not accessible to unaided perception, that is, what the table is decomposable into and is therefore constituted of. The table is constituted of molecules, which cannot be detected just by looking. With a microscope molecules can be detected, and they would have the same distinctness I recognize when I looked at the table without any help. In order to make the distinction between things which I can see without assistance of the things I can't see without assistance, I will consider objects to be both of these, while I will consider entities to be those things that I can see without assistance. Such a distinction is important because I cannot recognize the aspects of a molecule in the same way I can recognize the aspects of a table. A different method is required in order to comprehend a molecule, that is, reliance on tools.

In both instances however, you are reliant on the "tool" light - whether you are looking at something with the naked eye, a microscope or a telescope.  You don't see either the molecule or the aspects of a table, you see the light reflecting off of them.  This is part of the point I was trying to make in my above posts.

I point this out for two reasons:

1) From ITOE, p. 194.

Rand: "I'm saying that when we speak of measurement, we begin with a perceptually given unit, and that unit is absolute and exact [within the context of our means of perception].   Then conceptually we may refine our methods and we many measure such things as milliseconds and a part of a subatomic particle, which we can't do perceptually.  But the standard of these measurements, the base from which conceptual complications may later be derived, is that which we perceive directly on the perceptual level; that is what measurement means, that is its base.  Therefore, when I say that for measurement there has to be a unit of measurement, I mean that even when you take a submicroscopic, conceptual type of measurement, that type ultimately has to be reduced back to our standard of measurement, which is the perceptually given, and nothing more or less."

2) Einstein understood this, and it formed a part of his Special Theory of Relativity with regards to the Relativity of Simultaneity and the train-platform thought experiment.  For the first time he pointed out that science must account for (in it's equations) how information regarding an event (measurement) is acquired.  And that the measurements themselves exist independent of the thing being measure - in a medium such as lightening flashes.

This dovetails nicely with Rand's insight on measurement.

It seems like much of what you are discussing is straddling different domains: Epistemology, Set Theory (which you note with your reference to Russell's Paradox) and Physics.

Why do you see it important that the Universe be regarded as an "object".  Which domain benefits?  What problem are you trying to solving?  What observation exists that is not already well served by one of the three domains listed above?

 

 

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1 hour ago, MisterSwig said:

Please note that Rand did not write what you just quoted her as writing.

IMG_20161116_174559.jpg

The only difference is she used plural instead of singular. I said it was paraphrased, and it looks like I almost got it verbatim. Is that what you mean?

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44 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

The only difference is she used plural instead of singular. I said it was paraphrased, and it looks like I almost got it verbatim. Is that what you mean?

No. Take a look at the conjugation of the verb represent. The way you paraphrased it radically alters the meaning of the sentence. And it's a very crucial meaning to get right. Precision is paramount here.

Edited by MisterSwig

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The first stage represents the concept entity. It is the representation of things which we are aware. It is not true in this sentence that Rand is saying that entities represent awareness of objects only (but she usually uses it that way elsewhere), it's just that the first stage is only awareness of objects. I mean, the first stage is OF awareness of objects, altogether representing 'entity'. The meaning of entity, here, is that it refers to objects that we are aware of (you would be right if she left out "awareness of"). That I see what you mean now, that it's not a good paraphrase, but it still not true that she's defining 'object'. She's talking about objects that we are directly aware of.

Edited by Eiuol

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LET US adopt the convention that the following:

X says/said "fdkjf kdj lkdjf lkdjf"

Is posted ONLY when whaterver is inside the quotes is ACTUALLY what X says/said, and not merely a restatement or paraphrase authored by the poster.

Seem reasonable?

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10 hours ago, Eiuol said:

That I see what you mean now, that it's not a good paraphrase, but it still not true that she's defining 'object'. She's talking about objects that we are directly aware of.

That's right. We are talking about axiomatic concepts, so we aren't going to get real definitions, only self-referential descriptions.

Let me try to put it another way.

The concepts of entity and object refer to the same existents in reality, but from different mental vantage points. As a young child your vantage point is wholly from your own perceptual-level consciousness. You haven't learned to conceptualize the contents of your mind versus the contents of the outside world. But in the process of doing so, you start to recognize that there are objects that are not you (the subject). The concept of an object therefore refers to something which a subject is perceiving and which is also separate from the subject itself. 

Only later can a more developed mind achieve a wider mental vantage point. Having abstracted existence from the various units of existence, a person now views reality from an advanced conceptual framework. He realizes that not only are objects the things that are separate from a conscious subject, they are also units of existence, i.e., entities.

Thus, an object is a thing in relation to consciousness, while an entity is a thing in relation to existence, which includes consciousness. And that's why I say that entity is the more universal concept. It comes out of a broader mental vantage point.

If we're still disagreeing, perhaps I can dig around in ITOE again and find some more relevant quotes.

Edited by MisterSwig

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12 hours ago, Eiuol said:

A supercomposition is the opposite of decomposition

I failed to notice this the first go-around, but I disagree here too. The opposite of a decomposition should be a  recomposition. And the opposite of super- should be sub-, as in a subcomposition, which, for purposes of this discussion, we might consider to be an object that is composed of no entities whatsoever. In other words, it's the reification of nothing--as its opposite, the supercomposition, is the reification of everything.

Edited by MisterSwig

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SL, do you really not see how what I wrote is still the same meaning? That is, it's not a significant or notable alteration of meaning. We still know that at the first stage, the content of the implicit concept 'entity' is the objects that we are aware of. Any errors of comprehension are mine.

Swig, I don't know where you're getting the idea that, in Rand's writing, she said an object refers to only something a subject perceives that is separate from the subject. Objects are indeed separate from the subject, but on these pages she is not talking about "objects", she's talking about "objects of awareness". This is narrower. She then talks about the concept 'entity'. Further, there is no place I know of she even is totally clear that 'object' is a different concept than 'entity'. So I make it clear in my paper, and limit entity to 'objects of awareness' as opposed to almost synonyms.

Also, units of existence are existents - unless you mean concrete units of existence?

Anyway, if objects are the things that are separate from a conscious subject, well, you already said that objects are things that exist concretely. So then it can't be just a thing in relation to consciousness. In other words, from Rand's reasoning, 'object' isn't going to pertain to a developmental process.

Supposing I were wrong, how would my distinctions in my paper specifically make problems given definitions I gave for -my- terms?

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1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

SL, do you really not see how what I wrote is still the same meaning? That is, it's not a significant or notable alteration of meaning. We still know that at the first stage, the content of the implicit concept 'entity' is the objects that we are aware of. Any errors of comprehension are mine.

One NEVER misquotes others if one is being honest.   It's really simple IF you take exact words put them in quotes.. if NOT simply don't put the words you have put together in quotes.  Period. 

 

Not being honest:

Lincoln once said:  "87 years ago, those before us made a new country on this continent"

Kennedy once said: "Ask yourself what you can do for your country not what your country can do for you."

Armstrong once said: "It's just a little step for me but it means much more for humanity"

Edited by StrictlyLogical

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Perceptual Ontology appears to be a "solution" looking for a "problem".  This post is just degenerating into a game of definitions.

What concrete problem does Perceptual Ontology solve?  Why is it necessary to form the new concept.

Rand's Razor:

The requirements of cognition determine the objective criteria of conceptualization. They can be summed up best in the form of an epistemological “razor”: concepts are not to be multiplied beyond necessity—the corollary of which is: nor are they to be integrated in disregard of necessity.

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2 hours ago, Eiuol said:

Objects are indeed separate from the subject, but on these pages she is not talking about "objects", she's talking about "objects of awareness".

I suggest studying chapter four of ITOE. Pages 29-31 should be sufficient for you to get a sense of what I'm talking about.

For example:

IMG_20161117_095722.jpg

Here Rand uses object to refer to the content of a consciousness.

And she does it again on the next page:

IMG_20161117_095443.jpg

And there she even makes it clear that the object-content refers to things in (or derived from) the external world, as opposed to the internal world of consciousness.

You ask how misdefining terms would cause specific problems for your theory. For one, it invalidates your very definitions, instructing you to begin anew with more precision and clarity. I cannot redefine your terms for you, although I have certainly tried.

If you cannot dispense with the whole theory altogether, why not begin with the idea that the universe-as-object must be available to our perceptual awareness? You seem committed to the notion that the universe is some kind of superobject, beyond our perceptual grasp; but then you go on to describe its attributes and relationships. So clearly it should be available to our perception, even if we are only capable of looking upon it from the inside, correct? Like Truman Burbank gazed upon his superobject in The Truman Show, we should be able to do the same with ours. 

[Deleted extraneous image]

IMG_20161117_095614.jpg

Edited by MisterSwig

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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

One NEVER misquotes others if one is being honest.   It's really simple IF you take exact words put them in quotes.. if NOT simply don't put the words you have put together in quotes.  Period.

Seriously, I literally said I paraphrased. Please don't go calling me dishonest when I stated it's a paraphrase, I didn't take exact words, and I never said I quoted her. Sorry I didn't edit out two quotation marks? I said it was paraphrased right after that in the same post. So anyway, don't go derailing or saying I'm somehow twisting anyone's words. Let's be productive here. By definition, a paraphrase is a "misquote", i.e. not what the original writer wrote. Dishonest would be claiming I quoted her.

Buddha, I'll get to your posts later. (You have good points I want to address)

Swig, the first quote would mean that objects of any sort can be involved in awareness, and any state of awareness always has objects as the content. Yes, here, object refers, in this sentence, to the content of awareness, there's no reason to suspect she has any unique usage of the word "object" besides what people usually mean. Entity is a concept especially applicable to the development of one's cognition. All entities are objects, so it's at least arguable that Rand thinks objects and entities are synonyms. We know, though, Rand doesn't tell us in any clear/definitive way that objects and entities differ. She uses a few different senses of the word 'entity', as in different concepts.

Overall, there's no reason to think that Rand is narrowly limiting 'object' to directly available perceptual things. And she's clearly saying the content of awareness can't be contentless, the content will always involve external existent. Thus, we don't get "objectless content" or "pure hallucinations".

I go on to say that my terms are defined, and you know what I mean. Whether I disagree with Rand is one point, but still keep in mind my reasoning STARTS with entities as Rand means it. I introduce 'object' as a distinct concept to work with. Call it object2. Even Peikoff uses the idea of two definitions, one descriptive, one normative. Also, identical words are sometimes okay to use for different concepts. I am using object2 as 'all external stuff that are concrete'. It is not limited to direct perceptual content. (This is in the paper)

" beyond our perceptual grasp "

No, I say it's not DIRECTLY available, like a molecule requires a microscope. Tool-assisted is indirect. I discuss how "beyond perception" is invalid. So, I go to wonder why molecules are objects and wholes if we can't see them as we do an apple.

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Let's try something else, because now you're alternating between variations of the concept object. When I was trying to focus on one of them.

You claim that looking at a molecule through a microscope is an indirect perception, whereas looking unaided at an apple is direct perception. And this seems to be why you distinguish entity versus object in your particular way. But this indicates a misunderstanding of perception. Perception is direct awareness. There is no "indirect perception." Such a thing does not exist.

You perceive what you perceive. Nothing more, nothing less. You perceive a magnified, reflected image of a molecule through a microscope. That is the direct perception. There is no indirect perception to be had. Such a thing is impossible, unless you redefine perception to mean conceptual knowledge.

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3 hours ago, MisterSwig said:

Let's try something else, because now you're alternating between variations of the concept object. When I was trying to focus on one of them.

They aren't variants really, I'm using it in a standard way, it is just odd you insist somehow Rand says the term 'object' to only denote objects of awareness. I don't know how else to say I don't know where you see Rand saying this. Keep in mind I said "only" in that sentence.

Seeing a molecule is perhaps best expressed as not readily available to perception. So I'd probably edit it to make this clearer. For a molecule to be perceivable without merely inference, a tool is needed. As objects, we can't notice them as kids. So I use entity to only denote what we see unaided, what we use to form the concept 'entity' in the first stage. 'Object' I use as a generic concrete existent regardless of awareness. In other words, our ability to see a concrete wholly as a singular doesn't determine that ONLY such concrete singular wholes are real.

By the way, you make good points, and it is the sort of critique I was looking for.

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1 hour ago, Eiuol said:

it is just odd you insist somehow Rand says the term 'object' to only denote objects of awareness.

I didn't insist on that. I was trying to show how Rand used object as opposed to entity in her theory of conceptual development, because you made a point of distinguishing these terms in your essay about forming a new concept. Obviously Rand uses these words in other contexts. As do I.

I have one or two more objections which I'll save for tomorrow. In the meantime, you should read the workshop section in ITOE called "Entities and Their Makeup." (p. 264) The first ten or eleven pages are particularly relevant. In the section she makes a distinction between metaphysical entities and epistemological ones. (pp. 271-72) She also makes a distinction between primary entities and dependent ones. (p. 273) At the end she also examines whether the universe is an entity. (p. 273)

It's important to note that in this extended conversation about the nature of entities, nowhere do the philosophers or Rand bring up the word object. Yet object is used many times in the fourth chapter, entitled "Concepts of Consciousness."

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On 7/1/2016 at 3:02 PM, Eiuol said:

The main idea is that causality spreads in a systematically related way across a system with emergent attributes, or for all constituents of a given object. Applied to the whole universe, causality is eternal and will not cease as long as the universe exists. Eternal causality entails a systematically related universe with at least one emergent attribute.

You present three conditions that, if met, should establish a group of objects as a composition, and thus an object. You then argue that the universe meets these conditions, thus making it a supercomposition and an object. I'll present an objection or two for each condition identified.

Systematic

While it's true that causality is a law of nature, there are at least two types of causation: physical and volitional. Most actions in the universe are caused by physical entities. But some are caused by mental entities. And the mental actions, specifically those in humans, are affected by the faculty of choice. I do not see this fact accounted for in your view of the universe as systematic.

Also, you argue that "there is nothing to remove from the universe, and there is nothing to add." Yet a type of causality, human volition, and more generally consciousness itself, is added and removed every minute of every day on Earth, as new people are born and old people die.

Relational

Again, you leave out mental existence, and describe only the spatial and chronological relationships between physical objects.

This failure to integrate mental existence with the theory of compositionality might exemplify a more fundamental failure to integrate mental existence (consciousness) with the conception of object by mentally distinguishing it from entity during the early stages of conceptual development.

Emergence

You present time as an emergent quality of the universe. But time is a quality of objects in motion, not the universe. Time is a measurement of motion, which would not be a unique trait for a supercomposition, since even molecules move.

Bonus Objection

Without being able to perceive the supercomposition directly, how can you ever be certain that a particular phenomenon actually emerged from the universe? Perhaps time, or anything else, is an emergent quality of a composition before the supercomposition. Perhaps there is a pre-supercomposition, beyond which exists even more entities of the universe. Perhaps these entities have no time and therefore cannot be composed on that basis.

It does no good to counter that the universe is necessarily composed of all things, because you did not start from a conception of the universe. You started from perception of entities. Thus you must get from the entity-level object to the universe-level object. Which now seems impossible, since, again, you have no means of objectively identifying a universe-level emergence.

Edited by MisterSwig

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On 11/17/2016 at 1:36 PM, New Buddha said:

Perceptual Ontology appears to be a "solution" looking for a "problem".  This post is just degenerating into a game of definitions.

Well, I would say calling light a tool is wordplay and metaphorical. It's like calling eyesight a tool, so you can't see the world as it is. Clearly, the apple doesn't travel INTO your eyeball if you see it, but it doesn't therefore mean you only "really" see light and not the apple. You still see the apple, or more specifically, you see what apples look like through telescopes, or eyeballs, or x-ray film. So it is the apple you see, in different forms. I distinguish objects like molecules since before microscopes, it'd be impossible to see them as a whole, or at all.

I don't know how or what is important about regarding the universe as an object. On the one hand, I don't see it as altering any Objectivist epistemology. On the other hand, it does get at denying Cartesian and Kantian big 'R' Rationality by emphasizing the intimate relation between all things that exist, and spiral theory of knowledge. Set Theory and Physics may be helped, but I haven't studied either a lot. I'm proposing a deeper systematicity than the universe-as-multiplicity has. It's not just existence as a conceptual existent.

As with any idea, it is not always clear what implications are. What makes an atom an object, but not a galaxy? At least this is one attempt at answering related questions. I called it perpetual ontology by the way, intended to call into question perceptual ontology as I defined it. Under perpetual ontology, I see over-emphasis on human modes of perception. That's great for epistemology, but not for metaphysics.

I'll get to Swig again another time.

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On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

In order to make the distinction between things which I can see without assistance of the things I can't see without assistance, I will consider objects to be both of these, while I will consider entities to be those things that I can see without assistance.

The first part is unclear. Why call immediately perceived objects a more conceptually heavy term 'entity'? By the way, in Russian linguistics nouns are defined as entities. (Rand might have gotten it from there.)

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The only aspect they all have in common in relation to each other is a spatial characteristic.

Sounds like space is only within and not around the objects as well. If relation is only an aspect, then this is not different from Kantian category 'relation.'

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

“I knocked over the table, so everything fell off”

The meaning of 'everything' employed here is 'every thing.'

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The set of objects on the table on the other hand are not reduced from my having seen a larger entity.

You are using the idea of reduction here as it is used against idealists. Rather, reduction is applied from greater to smaller, not in reverse. It's not a reduction to thought but an ontological reduction from whole to its part(s).

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

I did not see an entity and then break it down further. In this way, I have determined that the universe cannot be object.

Non sequitur. It's like using reduction and then saying the greater object doesn't exist. Besides, while you've mentioned studying molecules by using a microscope, you forgot the use of telescopes to study the greater object in more detail.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

As characterized, perceptual ontology is immediately vulnerable to subjectivity in metaphysics.

Oh-oh, welcome Kant. And then you are just equating metaphysics with epistemology.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

Even more, entities can be considered primary or fundamental to comprehending metaphysics.

And that's your L8 breaking through.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

a massive creature could detect groups of planets like a person detects a dog

Sounds like you are projecting L8 (your 'perceptual ontology') higher up, unable to understand how planets can be objects without massive creatures floating in vacuum trying to perceive them. By the way, World would be the ultimate context for mat8, like for Schopenhauer. There is nothing beyond it for you, not even the universe. Rather, World is the universe for all materialists. Of course, these kinds of discussions only show how ontology is epistemologized by human consciousness based on its type.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

an abstraction or mental object, which is by definition neither physical nor independent of one’s awareness

If an abstraction or mental object is a thought, then indeed they are physical because they are within the brain and nervous tissues. A thought, by the way, can be conscious or unconscious. We have thoughts when we sleep, for example, and call them dreams, which we sometimes remember and sometimes not. Applying N's criticism of "I", you can see how thoughts can be not in one's awareness like the brain is not in our awareness.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

At worst, maya is human conceit attempting to satisfy a constant desire to label and categorize, a cause of suffering.

Yes, for those who are not integrators.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

At best, it is the world of appearances that the subject acknowledges, which need not determine how the world really is.

From my point of view, this is also untrue. While, metaphysically speaking, ontological reality can be viewed as an illusion, it doesn't follow that we shouldn't concern ourselves with it. Rather, we are unable not to not concern ourselves with it in each of our own ways. Besides, for integrators like me, metaphysics leads to analyzing, clarifying, and specifying the ontology, not trying to move away from it into some imaginary metaphysical realm, like Brahman.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The idea of a singularity is wrong because it is parasitic upon more fundamental premises: to speak of a singularity requires having already defined or conceptualized a variety of objects.

Yes, to rise to the greater you must grasp the lesser.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

While metaphysics does not take into account a perceiver for a claim to be valid, coming to understand metaphysical claims takes addressing how one is conscious of reality.

Yes, this is interesting because it not only shows how our consciousness is structured metaphysically but also the reason we cannot understand each other.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

If I will never know of gooblegorks, nor why they qualify as fruits, likewise, I won’t know why apples or bananas qualify.

That's a vast overgeneralization. Just because we don't give much thought to objects we consider to understand, it doesn't mean we don't know them. We do because we perceive them. The thinking processes can be so automatized that they don't reach our awareness. We simply accept apples and bananas without being conscious of what they are in themselves. On the other hand you give a very good descriptions of Buddhist beliefs, but you fail to understand that any of their applications or comparisons do not describe reality for everyone.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The greater point is to emphasize that all solutions so far are parasitic upon defining objecthood already by means of my awareness and consciousness.

Not all solutions are 'parasitic,' but only the false two choices from Buddhism or Hinduism that you seem to know so well, limiting yourself only to them. Besides, I don't like the notion of 'parasitic' here, since it's offensive and dismissive of other views.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

A solution requires keeping the idea that entities are distinct and bounded - explaining objecthood any other way is parasitic.

Nice try at red herring. You review mat8 options and come up with your own mat8 option, defined by you. I've started this comment with explaining that your conception of entity is unclear in terms of its relation to objects and that it is overconceptualized. The overconceptualization may help you erase some boundaries in order to compare this to maya/Brahman options, but really you are simply unable to reach beyond the limits of maya/Brahman as they are conceived by a mat8 consciousness (or it's also a reduction from some idealists' quibbles with mat8 illusionists).

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The solution I see is to say that objects are also the things entities supercompose into.

??? -- [after reading to the end, I finally understand what you wrote here and that this reflects my own understanding of objects. Good point.]

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

all things that are objects depend on composability

That's also a hefty claim. You have yet to show an ontological model in which these objects are shown to be composed from something else.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

Why not instead suppose that composition extends infinitely?

Yes, why not? Because it's a claim that's easy to 'decompose,' thinking that composition is ongoing, when in fact it may not be so. Humankind may 'decompose' itself through a nuclear holocaust, for example. Its 'decomposition,' however, depends on disintegrators. You then say that it's not infinite, but how about showing that you value compositions above all else? Not a chance.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

compositions end at a single object as opposed to two or more

So why can't they end at two or more objects? There is surely more than one object we can perceive in reality. Are you trying to show that objects are infinitely distant from each other in order to grasp at the universe?

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

In principle, there is no reason to say nothing composes from entities like tables into “supertable”.

The issue is that you are still staying on L8, being stuck on it perceptually.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

the process of life and the resulting attribute of being alive don’t make all of a creature’s constituent elements alive

I disagree with this materialist-emergentist claim because it reduces consciousness to an appearance or an aspect. Our bodies are alive because they are organic. They are not corpses that decompose into inorganic molecular compounds, such as dried out skeletons.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

There are no good examples of a supercomposition aside from science fiction.

You don't have to go that far. A society is a supercomposition. So is race. None are fictional.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

one particular candidate may qualify as a supercomposition: the universe, the unification of all objects that exist

That's a high jump. You need to understand the lesser before you rise to the greater.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The actions of a planet orbiting a star impacts other stars and other stars’ planets.

Yeah, if they collide. But even then the 'impact' with other stars would be trivial. After all, they are not billiard balls but relatively stable systems. Why don't you consider solar systems further as supercompositions before you go to the universe?

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

A supercomposition is not a special form of composition with unique attributes.

Actually this seems to contradict the proper 'system' understanding and even your emergentist 'test'. If a system has no unique attributes other than its objects, then it's not a system but merely a collection of independent objects.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

the absolute end to any causal chain would be an absolute end to the universe, or at least the universe would be in a frozen state. I’d argue that a frozen state is identical to nothingness, i.e. is nonexistence.

This is very interesting. Indeed this is true of Limits of L17. You must have gotten this idea by accident, however, probably referring it to Nonexistence below L1 as you see universe as merely a collection of particles without a unique attribute other than its composing objects. Basically, you are confusing scales as most materialists do.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The universe is the most complete system there is...

Not true. String-theorists' omniverse is more complete because it contains all possible sets of physical laws. String-theory interpretation of quantum mechanics is currently one of the most advanced and accurate interpretations there are. This theory subsumes all experimental evidence, unlike many other theories, which are surely less complete.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

Otherwise, the system is incomplete, meaning that it is something different than the universe as defined.

Oh, so if scientific evidence doesn't match your idea of the universe then the theories that use this evidence are incomplete? You have no idea of what a universe is. As I said earlier, start with the lesser before you rise to the greater. If you cannot grasp the lesser, you will never rise to the greater.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

...at opposite ends of the universe...

So, what are the ends of the universe like? This is actually quite an important question because the surface of the universe, as also a surface of a black whole, contains holographic information about what's inside. This is supported by not only string theory but also holofractographic universe theory.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

This is why knowledge of one fact affects how all knowledge is structured.

I disagree. The structuring of knowledge comes from pre/metaconcepts, not particular concepts themselves. Rather, what happens with an addition of one significant conceptual fact is a growth of knowledge, not the entire (re)organization of it.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

the universe is an object. / A similar idea is that the universe is plenum

I strongly disagree here. A plenum has no specific boundary like the universe does. Instead, plenum is metacosmos, a greater contextual whole. This term specifically relates to dark energy, as used and coined (in this context) by Nassim Haramein.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

a theory of compositionality is not compatible with universe-as-plenum

It surely isn't because that contextualizes universe, thus making it metaphysical. And it's not, also in Rand.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

a continuous substance that connects all things that exist. ... Plenum would be a theory that the universe is an object

That's false, even coming from your own words. Continuous 'substance' is not an object. Rather, you confused object-context when you first wrote universe-as-plenum. And in such handwaving metaphysics, no statement can be true. It's merely your imagination. And no rationalizations can get you out of this because your premise is false. You cannot make premises true by other premises or by conclusions, Eiuol. Put in other words, your concept of universe contradicts Rand's distinction between universe and existence, a distinction which is crucial in idealism because it shows their Position to be metacosmic, out of reach of any materialist.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

The added “closeness” of plenum does not help.

You've invented this 'closeness' through your imagination, a straw-man of actual theory. Thus, just as you've done with Brahman, you've seemingly dismissed something you don't understand, namely a metacosmic level of ontology, a supercomposition, allowing an analysis of universe from above rather than from below, like you are doing.

On 02.07.2016 at 1:02 AM, Eiuol said:

compositionality is a theory that the universe is perpetuum

Yes, so that would be defining it as context, which is metaphysical, yet false because physical things cannot be metaphysical.

New Buddha: In TOC of How we know there are two things that interest me: logical hierarchy and Bottom-up vs. Top-down Theories. Also interesting sections are Naïve Realism: consciousness as reproduction and The Failure of Realism. Know anything about these? Maybe I should read it, but I don't have time! It's funny how he talks about 'Kantian reversal' in the overview in 'some' history. It's something I would've started the book with. I've already categorized Binswanger as a Descartean idealist (based on Hsieh's Survey of Objectivist Commentary on Philosophy of Mind), so his secondary-positional convergence with Kant at the end looks legit, all his commentaries and criticisms of Kant notwithstanding. Nonetheless, Binswanger's ideas are surely more interesting to me because he won't confuse universe with existence.

On 14.11.2016 at 9:17 PM, New Buddha said:

The perceptual world is spatially arrayed.

I cannot agree more. This is on the spot. Space(time) is the condition of perception.

On 14.11.2016 at 9:17 PM, New Buddha said:

The content of perception is metaphysically given.

And with this I cannot disagree more. Spacetime is physical, not metaphysical. Perhaps Binswanger idealizes the realistic Direction of Einstein, who idealized light, not spacetime, thus keeping the latter physical.

On 14.11.2016 at 9:17 PM, New Buddha said:

perception is unjudgeable

Oh, this is Kantian bull.

On 14.11.2016 at 9:17 PM, New Buddha said:

it makes no sense to evaluate the content of perception

If you don't, you might as well take it as sensation. Binswanger equivocates like Rand by believing in one thing but saying completely the other. I say: to not evaluate the content of perception is to reject ontology by replacing it with epistemology.

On 14.11.2016 at 9:17 PM, New Buddha said:

Rainfall is neither “valid” nor “invalid”—it just is. In exactly the same way, hearing the rainfall is neither valid nor invalid—it just is.

Yeah, except 'rainfall' is closer to sensation than perception. That's what happens when you reject ontology: your thought lacks clarity, and anything based on it stops being objective. The rest are his rationalizations of his hybrid idealism. That's another reason I don't want to read his book.

On 15.11.2016 at 3:03 AM, Eiuol said:

...the spatial relation is metaphyically given...

Oh, and that's existence, right? (The only way it could be in my metaphysics: Existence as (meta) Space, but this doesn't ignore physical spacetime. Instead it structures it.) I would differentiate your imaginary idea from Binswanger's, though. At least he looks from the metacosmic plane (L15).

On 15.11.2016 at 3:03 AM, Eiuol said:

provide 3 "tests" to see if the relation is strong enough

I like Peikoff's definitions of integration (connection, unity/one, whole/combination, system, necessity) in DIM better (ch. 1, sec. 2). He explains it more broadly than you do.

On 15.11.2016 at 3:03 AM, Eiuol said:

I do think Representationalism, in it's weaker forms, is correct. [etc]

Surely, a Kantian one (L7). I rather agree with Binswanger's and New Buddha's take on this issue. A bowl of applies indeed is perceived, rather than merely sensed, as you've identified it. Except I don't follow how something is metaphysically given here. Rather, it is physically given, since apples and the bowl are physical, and so are all the senses that reach us from them.

On 15.11.2016 at 8:56 AM, New Buddha said:

But perception is not limited to vision.  Almost all the example in the OP are centered around "seeing" objects.

In a way a good point, but trivial, in this context, I think.

On 15.11.2016 at 10:46 PM, Eiuol said:

Not only does a bowl of apples fail to be an entity - a perceptual whole object - it fails to be any object.

Oh, yes, welcome Stefan Molyneux and his 'forests do not exist, but trees do' argument! And you said he was a 'moron,' Eiuol? You seem to confirm the opposite interpretation now. A bowl of applies exists just as a forest exists, both in their own rights of being physical objects (not metaphysical or metaphysically given or some other mumbo-jumbo). We aren't talking about unicorns here, unless you've imagined a bowl of applies on a table where there is no bowl of applies and it's all in your head. Maybe you want to eat some applies? (j/k)

To be exact, applies are objects of organic tissues L6 and bowl of inorganic molecules L3 (if it's mass manufactured and has no personal value) or L8 (if it's custom made, and thus prized for its artistic features, say china). Hence there are two levels represented of a bowl of applies while we perceive both, but their compositions are different. The point that this ontological elaboration makes is that we can indeed perceive anything physical, even subatomic particles, but with help of computers or other instruments - yet the latter doesn't make things more confusing or complex to the point that one claims that particles don't exist or that bowls of applies don't. Anything physical can be perceived, sensed, and conceived (on every individual level, every object and every context). My ontology proves this. That you are unable to perceive a bowl of applies is a limitation of your consciousness but not necessarily everyone else's.

On 15.11.2016 at 10:46 PM, Eiuol said:

I explain that it leads to a subjective (perception-dependent) metaphysics.

Imagination of a mat8 who cannot exceed the limits of his consciousness to be someone else. It's okay, Eiuol. No one can.

MisterSwig is partially wrong and partially right. The composition part seems to be accurate in terms of trying to grasp the whole (the universe), which Eiuol is unable to do without fallacies at this state. The part of unbounded universe is wrong, though, since anything physical is bounded. Now, this fact is metaphysically given!

On 16.11.2016 at 1:33 AM, Eiuol said:

I explain that causality matters.

Yes, but your causality is situational, context-, not object-, dependent. You don't even think that a bowl of applies is immediately perceivable! (Who would perceive it other than a human, though?)

On 16.11.2016 at 1:33 AM, Eiuol said:

The bound of a universe is all that exists, i.e. it is its own boundary. It is still boundless as far as a "hard limit" does not exist

Makes no sense. First you talk about objects from different 'ends' of the universe being related spatially, and now you say that the universe is the boundary and cannot be defined accurately. Like I've implied before, you've imagined a self-contradictory universe that doesn't exist other than in your head.

On 16.11.2016 at 3:55 AM, MisterSwig said:

the idea that the universe, as an object, is a metaphysical fairytale, much like God. If God's not in charge of everything and giving order to chaos, then what is? Ah, it must be the "universe."

Haha, excellent reduction of idealists! Except, MisterSwig, you fail to differentiate physical universe (L14) from metacosmic idea(l)s (L15). And because you fail at this, you are asking to be defined as an materialist. Poor family feud you got here. SL, MisterSwig, and Eiuol - all having the same kind of consciousness but arguing over trivialities, mere ideas! Gentlemen, let me tell you a metaphysically given truth: every person is unique with their own unique ideas. Hence no idea is better than any other because it's only an idea! My goodness... What's the point of meaningless conflicts?

On 16.11.2016 at 3:55 AM, MisterSwig said:

[1] How can the universe be binded by causality, if it's an entity? [2] Where did causality come from? [3] Did the universe cause that which binds it together? [4] If so, how did it cause causality, before it was even an entity? .../ my brain is starting to hurt now.

To be the devil's advocate I'll help you with the headache and answer on your questions, numbering them for easier reading.

  1. The universe is bound by causality the same way every entity or object is bound. In that regard, universe is not so different: it's an existent, an identity.
  2. The question of whether the universe caused its own causality or something else did is interesting, but if you consider that there are two directions to take it at, then this makes answering the question simpler: the bottom-up direction (which I prefer) claims that objects and contexts compose the universe, but the universe thus has a unique attribute (which Eiuol ignores and possibly rejects), namely that it is different from objects and contexts that compose it because it is greater than them. The top-down direction is the general idealists' direction (whether atheist or theist - doesn't matter) that the universe is metaphysically (read: metacosmically) necessitated to be what it is and to have what it does (also causally).
  3. If you look top-down, then yes, because it's metaphysically necessitated. If you look bottom-up, then no, as absolute nothing preceded it, thus preceding quanta and later formations that came about from the vacuum, forming the universe as we see it now.
  4. Causality could be differentiated into metaphysical and physical. However, the bottom-up approach can also be viewed metaphysically, namely that all differentiations of matter, energy, and force resulted from Nonexistence. These physical entities then became the physical foundation of causality while the universe was growing long ago and now has stabilized into the universe we see in the past (like cosmic background radiation) and the future (all the light from the stars far away). Hence the point is that what we know as the universe is not the singularity but the past and the future universe. The singularity, on the other hand, is the unreachable present moment of the universe, which is like Nonexistence. This metaphysical singularity must be differentiated from the universe-as-singularity, but many scientists don't do that, like those who developed and support inflation theory, which is a kind of modern era preformism on universal scale - an imaginary particle-as-the-universe. Unknown present moment of the universe and the known past-and-future one must be differentiated in order to not confuse scales.
    1. As a side-note: although I compare present-moment singularity with Nonexistence and claim it is unknown rather than unknowable, I have to add that the present moment itself is Nonexistence and it is unknowable, but the singularity can be known through the bottom-up approach. Once the puzzle of dark energy is cracked, then we'll know what it's like to be a singularity in a non-idealist sense.
On 16.11.2016 at 4:34 AM, Eiuol said:

I'm not proposing an "origin" to causality, like an unmoved mover. It's eternal - there is no start or end, there's only existence or non-existence to causality.

Oooh, but they are so similar, as you can see from what I wrote above.

On 16.11.2016 at 4:35 AM, dream_weaver said:

As time is in the universe, the universe isn't in time

Yes, as also per my differentiation of present and past-future universe. Nonexistence is (metaphysical) Time, which isn't really a physical time, but rather it exists in physical time, yet can never be reached, known, or comprehended, since it is actually eternal.

On 16.11.2016 at 8:05 PM, MisterSwig said:

People who struggle with this idea will also struggle with the social concepts of individualism versus collectivism, because at the metaphysical level they have already accepted a collection as a real, physical entity.

Oh, yes, so you are agreeing with Eiuol's non-existing bowl of applies and Molyneux's non-existing forest. Join the fray, I was right about you after all!

On 16.11.2016 at 10:18 PM, Eiuol said:

A "society" would not qualify as an object under my thinking, it lacks emergence.

Just because you are not conscious of the social processes doesn't mean they don't exist. Collective unconscious is a real thing, Eiuol, and also the fact that everything that surrounds you and clothes you is conditioned on international relationships of societies (such as businesses, factories, committees, etc.), and not mere individuals who cut the deals. Besides, there would be a society of these individuals, if it's international and, particularly, government trade.

On 16.11.2016 at 10:18 PM, Eiuol said:

"Was Rand mistaken?"

Oh, that's my favorite question as of late! Of course she was, but only to the extent of her convergence with Kant.

On 17.11.2016 at 6:06 PM, MisterSwig said:

an object is a thing in relation to consciousness, while an entity is a thing in relation to existence, which includes consciousness

I don't understand what the fuss is all about. It's merely words we assign to mean things. Whether an object is what we perceive or it's a noun (which we also perceive when we read) as an entity, so what? MS ignores the differences between physical and metaphysical on the greater scales and rejects the metaphysical, and yet he can quibble about the differences of Randian categories of objects and entity to no end. In my system, I call objects things we can sense, perceive, and conceive that are thus related to consciousness and also metaphysics. Thus, to me there is no difference between object and entity. They are both nouns we use for same exact things. For example, a human body is an object, but if it's an alien body it's an entity. But a body is a body, right? Maybe if we stop differentiating objects and entities we can get other, more important things straight.

On 17.11.2016 at 7:53 PM, MisterSwig said:

The opposite of a decomposition should be a  recomposition. And the opposite of super- should be sub-, as in a subcomposition

This would be a more accurate way of representing things than Eiuol follows. I like the point of 'sub-,' as it allows understanding that there are ontological levels of different scales: below, immediate, and above.

On 17.11.2016 at 7:53 PM, MisterSwig said:

supercomposition, is the reification of everything

Very interesting. I knew there was something fuzzy in Eiuol's discussion of the universe.

On 17.11.2016 at 8:19 PM, Eiuol said:

[awareness of objects is represented by entities vs. awareness of objects represents entities i]s not a significant or notable alteration of meaning

I agree because there isn't really a difference between objects and entities which you at the same time wish to believe.

On 17.11.2016 at 8:19 PM, Eiuol said:

Further, there is no place I know of she even is totally clear that 'object' is a different concept than 'entity'.

Proves my point exactly. I like 'object' better though. It sounds more... concrete. "Entity" is like a children's word before they learned to differentiate objects in their awareness. Objects as mental constructs is harder to pinpoint, though, because they exist on the sub-level in relation to our immediate perception. Tissues of nervous system are concrete objects but thoughts would be more contextual, as bioelectromagnetic impulses).

Overall, I have to say that Eiuol seems to be on the right track in developing an ontology. Nice work!

On 18.11.2016 at 2:10 AM, MisterSwig said:

There is no "indirect perception." Such a thing does not exist.

By using your own terms, MS, to clarify what Eiuol was developing, consider direct or immediate perception being on a particular level of composition, while subcompositions and supercompositions are perceptual but in a compositionally different way from the immediate level upon which someone's consciousness is positioned. Eiuol is completely right in presuming that consciousness is level-dependent and there are different types of consciousness based on their levels. This is confirmed by much evidence, starting with Peikoff's DIM as represented in my Diagram.

On 18.11.2016 at 2:10 AM, MisterSwig said:

You perceive what you perceive. Nothing more, nothing less.

You can perceive a tissue, an organ, a body, a society. All of these are on different levels of perception. In fact, levels is what differentiates these percepts.

On 18.11.2016 at 2:10 AM, MisterSwig said:

You perceive a magnified, reflected image of a molecule through a microscope. That is the direct perception.

No, because information is not coming directly into your brain from the environment. Instead, it's processed by an instrument (which organizes raw sense data) and then enters your brain. This shows perception in this instance not to be direct, but assisted, thus indirect, as Eiuol correctly identified. The idea that MS can't grasp is that concepts also exist on different levels. We conceive of molecules and applies, and what differentiates these concepts is their levels in the hierarchy. However, we also can perceive them, albeit differently. In the first case, concepts are closer related to sensation, and in the second case concepts are closer related to perception. Hence in molecules (L3), the mix of sensation-perception-conception leans more toward sensation, whereas in apple (L6) -- more toward perception, although you can argue that apples are merely somewhere between strict sensation and strict perception, since direct perception for me is L9.

On 18.11.2016 at 5:55 AM, Eiuol said:

'Object' I use as a generic concrete existent regardless of awareness.

Then this is a true ontological object (I use the exact same term and definition). Nice job, Eiuol! You seem to start differentiating ontology and epistemology as you should. MS doesn't get it yet.

On 18.11.2016 at 5:55 AM, Eiuol said:

In other words, our ability to see a concrete wholly as a singular doesn't determine that ONLY such concrete singular wholes are real.

Wonderful, wonderful. Do you see what the Model is now? Do you see how wonderful it is? Your point also stresses that the singular vs. multiple distinction doesn't really matter. Quantity is not ontological per se.

On 18.11.2016 at 8:28 PM, MisterSwig said:

Perhaps there is a pre-supercomposition, beyond which exists even more entities of the universe. Perhaps these entities have no time and therefore cannot be composed on that basis.

A very interesting speculation concerning possible parallel universes beyond the veil of Nonexistence.

On 18.11.2016 at 8:28 PM, MisterSwig said:

you have no means of objectively identifying a universe-level emergence

Yes, he is not ready yet, but he is trying his best.

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1 hour ago, Ilya Startsev said:

By the way, in Russian linguistics nouns are defined as entities.

Nouns are the same thing in all languages. Not all nouns are entities, e.g. "happiness"

1 hour ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Collective unconscious is a real thing,

Uhh... Please Ilya, the forum isn't for your pet theories.

1 hour ago, Ilya Startsev said:

That's false, even coming from your own words. Continuous 'substance' is not an object.

That's why I reject it.

I won't respond to more as most of your comments appear as if you wrote them before reading all of the essay.

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Actually, I've read everything I wrote after reading the entire thread, so it all reflects my views as accurately as possible.

Happiness is not an entity? How would you define a noun then?

Collective unconsciousness is not my 'pet theory.' It's a famous psychological understanding started by Carl Jung. You don't know about it?

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59 minutes ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Collective unconsciousness is not my 'pet theory.'

Pet theories as in nonsense theories you use for odd arguments. Jung is not a serious psychologist at all. Serious objections are welcome, not mysticism.

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17 minutes ago, Eiuol said:

Pet theories as in nonsense theories you use for odd arguments. Jung is not a serious psychologist at all. Serious objections are welcome, not mysticism.

Jung is more serious than Freud. Besides, I love Jung exactly because he was a mystic. Mystics have heart and soul, non-mystics don't.

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On 11/15/2016 at 8:35 PM, dream_weaver said:

As time is in the universe, the universe isn't in time1, so too causality is in the universe, the universe isn't in causality.

 

6 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

 

That was part of my response to MisterSwig.

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3 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Jung is more serious than Freud. Besides, I love Jung exactly because he was a mystic. Mystics have heart and soul, non-mystics don't.

Do you have a heart and soul Ilya, are you a Mystic?

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