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11 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Can anyone show evidence that any other philosopher used synthetic a priori (Kantian categories)?

As you are probably aware, Peikoff wrote an article on The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy included in ITOE, where he indicated the following:

The theory was originated, by implication, in the ancient world, with the views of Pythagoras and Plato, but it achieved real prominence and enduring influence only after its advocacy by such modem philosophers as Hobbes, Leibniz, Hume and Kant. (The theory was given its present name by Kant.)

According to a wikipedia entry on the Analytic-synthetic distinction, Frege and Carnap revise the Kantian definition touching base on the mathematical side. You can also add the logical positivists as being sympathetic to this view as well.

Peikoff further identifies:

Today, each man must be his own intellectual protector. In whatever guise the theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy confronts him, he must be able to detect it, to understand it, and to answer it. Only thus can he withstand the onslaught and remain epistemologically untouched.

More importantly he continues with:

The theory in question is not a philosophical primary; one's position on it, whether it be agreement or opposition, derives, in substantial part, from one's view of the nature of concepts.

Given the position that each man must be his own intellectual protector, there is merit in concurring with Rand in her article "For the New Intellectual":

Those who accept any part of Kant's philosophy—metaphysical, epistemological or moral—deserve it.

The law of identity, as well as a corollary found in the Crow Epistemology indicates that in his own intellectual defense he must be able to detect and understand it as a clear and present danger. If a man pulls a gun on you, it is relatively easy to detect and understand it as a clear and present danger.

In some martial arts, defense against guns and/or knives can be an adjunct to the training. There are techniques and approaches toward dealing with either. They go hand in hand along with the recognition that there are risks involved, dealing with either, that also need be taken into consideration.

It is interesting to note that Peikoff's Criticisms are listed (as of this posting date) on this same wikipedia entry as well.

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Thank you for sharing that page, Greg, which I meant to share but didn't. To anyone who is reading this thread, I suggest reading that Wikipedia article on the synthetic/analytic distinction and the arguments concerning this distinction.

I also agree with Quine and Peikoff, as I haven't found a single example of when another philosopher explicitly uses synthetic a priori (as formalized by Kant), and the use of terms or their implication is very important in philosophy, which is essentially based around terms. Kant reduced Aristotle's predicates, which had relations to reality, to a list of mathematics-like terms/words.

From the example of the Wikipedia page, Kant shows that the first sentences don't use his synthetic a priori categories, whereas the second does:

  1. "All bodies are extended." (implying space, a form of intuition in Kant, which in Crit#3 we learn also to be either schematic or symbolic)
  2. "All bodies are heavy." (implying mass)

I still don't see what category the second uses from Kant's list. Or how do his categories structure the second proposition?

From the same article, we find Kant's a priori definition going against Aristotle in thinking that logical necessity is true for a proposition that is not grounded in experience. Thus Kant builds the road to Frege and self-contradictory logical-mathematical, purely symbolic systems.

Then the whole idea of "all bachelors are unmarried" being (analytic) a priori, even though we couldn't have grasped the concept bachelor without knowing of an actually existing unmarried man. Finding something a priori is like talking of a three-legged monster existing among humans. Kant escapes this criticism by inventing epistemology that is not based on origin of concepts but on their justification. This would mean that one can know everything from just reading books and passing their words through one's elusive synthetic a priori ('true' a priori knowledge). And yet this contradicts the nature of Kant's synthetic a priori. How can we justify analytic a priori? Kant says we cannot. But if we cannot justify the justification and cannot know that all bachelors are unmarried, how do we know that then? Either I don't understand something in Kant, or Kant leaves this question open.

Now, if one can simply justify knowledge from words alone, as Kant seems to imply, then there can be no other way to justify his synthetic a priori. Otherwise, Kant's defining his analytic a priori not from experience but from word-based justification seems hooky like an internalized straw-man.

If it was so simple to just peek into words and grasp concepts therefrom, we could do the same for Kant's synthetic a priori, can we not? But I don't see any concepts contained there and no experience either, which would explain how his synthetic a priori are not applicable to other philosophies.

In contrast to Kant's categories, my metacategories provide genuine understanding of all philosophies, and because it's been three long years of intense research with not a single contradiction in sight, I am considering calling my hypothesis a theory, or at least thinking of it as one.

So, I am going to repeat my argument for everyone to dare to contradict: I claim that I understand human nature by the help of metacategories, which I discovered and formalized from extensive empirical research of people (currently 388 individuals categorized). I can grasp their natures from contextual comparisons/contrasts among them. Thus, the nature or the essence of a person is found to be his or her consciousness and not their ideas (or the individual categories they may use). By understanding the person's essential character, I also agree, from the inherent delineation I've explained concerning metacategories and categories, that I do not mean to understand a person's non-essential characteristics, which may or may not involve (based on the individuals' set of mind) their personal ideas. Hence I delineate the human nature that can be known from various idiosyncrasies that may not be known or even understood.

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An illustration of Kantian anti-epistemology: "Imagine a group of scientists is on Mars. They experience some event that they don't understand. The leader of the group experiences yellow (quality), 2 (quantity), close (relation), and possible (modality). Other group members experience the same, except a lady scientist experiences necessity rather than possibility in terms of its modality. They have no idea of what they are experiencing and thus do not know. Their experience is not knowledge."

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From the illustration above, you can see that Kant not only confuses experience with knowledge but also sensation with perception. The reason for these confusions is a much deeper confusion based on linguistic ambiguity.

Rand is not different from Kant in this respect, as she also bases her philosophy on a linguistic ambiguity. Here are the ambiguities in Rand and Kant with explanations:

  1. Rand's 'everything' and 'every thing': everything is taken as every thing, or something, in Rand, yet the two are not the same because everything is not 'within' something. If you reduce everything to something, something contradicts everything, but this contradiction is implicit in Rand, thus making her dogmatic in terms of creating concepts out of nothing.
  2. Kant's 'mind' and 'reason': mind is taken as reason in Kant, yet the two are not the same because mind is not 'within' reason. If you reduce mind to reason, reason contradicts mind not only ontologically but also epistemologically, and this contradiction is explicit in Kant as he sends mind to noumenon (Nonexistence) through the necessary disintegration by fragmentary categories.

edit: Kant's Vernunft (through Verstand) means 'mind' and 'reason'.

Edited by Ilya Startsev

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3 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Rand's 'everything' and 'every thing': everything is taken as every thing, or something, in Rand, yet the two are not the same because everything is not 'within' something.

So in the two specific instances, according to The Objectivism Research CD, where she specifically used 'every thing', . . . oh my, look at the time. Gotta run.

Edited by dream_weaver
changed "the Objectivsm" to "The Objectivism" (and, secondly, italicised.)

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Greg, 'every thing' is synonymous with 'something.' For usage of 'every thing' in an argument concerning Rand's formulation of existence please refer to a statement by Harrison Danneskjold. For usage of 'something' in regard to everything, Peikoff in Understanding Objectivism can be handy, as in the following:

Quote

once you say “existence,” that implies it’s something, and “A is A” just makes that explicit. (p. 149, digital)

Or the equivalent statement from his Objective Communication: Writing, Speaking and Arguing:

Quote

Everything is something; it is what it is; it is definite, it has a nature, it is something specific. (p. 26, digital)

 

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1 minute ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Greg, 'every thing' is synonymous with 'something.'

What is your first language?

How would you translate "Every thing on that table which is gold belongs to Peter"

What does "Something on that table which is gold belongs to Peter" indicate?

 

Something means "unspecified thing" and works like a combination of "some" with "thing".  The following "responding to some thing, smell, or instinct, the dog suddenly jumped at him", means that the dog responded to some unspecified thing, smell or instinct. 

 

"Every thing" as a phrase, does not designate the "unspecified", it mean no less than each and every (i.e. all of them) of the things, in the context in which it is used. 

"Every thing made of gold in that drawer is mine" 

"Each and every thing made of gold in that drawer is mine"

 

Where did you get the idea that "something" is literally a synonym with the phrase "every thing"?

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My first language is Russian, but I understand English linguistics.

Something, in itself, is unspecified, but it surely is specific, if you follow Peikoff.

The idea of 'every' and 'some' follows the same logic as 'everything' and 'something.' 'Every thing' is like attaching 'every' to 'some' or 'a' thing. So, saying 'every thing' on a table is the same as saying 'something' (unspecified in terms of quantity). On the other hand, equating 'every thing' with 'some thing' follows a reduction (subaltern) from a quantity of objects to a more concrete quantity. It's the same as taking a greater quantity of objects to be a singular quantity in itself. For example, if I say 'every dog' in the house is Peter's, comparing Peter's dogs [to those] from another house, say Lucy's, if supposing they become mixed, you could say some dogs (or some dog, if a specific instance) are Peter's rather than Lucy's. Interestingly, we cannot say [*]'every things' but we can say 'some things' implying 'some thing' [or rather ?some 'something'], a category. Whether it is dogs or dog doesn't matter. Any quantity, say for demographic purposes, can be taken as a whole and compared to other wholes.

'Every thing' is as unspecified as something. By saying every Peter's dog, you are equivalently saying some (Peter's) dogs in contrast to some other. In the first instance, though, you are putting category 'dog' under [things owned by] Peter, while in the second under 'person'. Because Peter is a person, they are equivalently the same, just referring to less or more specific things or categories. And 'every dog' is a something, meaning concept 'dog.' So yes, every dog is all dogs taken as 'dog,' specific concept, a 'something.'

A synonym of 'everything' is 'each thing' and 'each thing' is the same as 'every' thing[: all this is ambiguous]. You can find this on Google or Dictionary.com. 'Each' is also synonymous with 'any' (and even 'all' - [in some instances could also be considered an] ontological contradiction). 'Any' is logically equivalent to 'some.'

Edited by Ilya Startsev

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11 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

From the illustration above, you can see that Kant not only confuses experience with knowledge but also sensation with perception. The reason for these confusions is a much deeper confusion based on linguistic ambiguity.

Rand is not different from Kant in this respect, as she also bases her philosophy on a linguistic ambiguity. Here are the ambiguities in Rand and Kant with explanations:

  1. Rand's 'everything' and 'every thing': everything is taken as every thing, or something, in Rand, yet the two are not the same because everything is not 'within' something. If you reduce everything to something, something contradicts everything, but this contradiction is implicit in Rand, thus making her dogmatic in terms of creating concepts out of nothing.

Your objection doesn't make a lot of sense. Your point here makes less sense.

"Rand's everything and every thing" is not a distinction she makes in a unique way - and you offer no citation. If you mean she failed to make distinction between "a set of every something from a wider group" and "EVERY SINGLE THING that exists", that's also wrong. Rand knows what a subset is as seen in her discussion on forming concepts in ITOE. She also knows that existence is not -within- anything, made explicit by saying nothing is beyond existence. Existence is not treated as a unitary -thing- by Rand anyway.

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No, I am saying Rand failed to make a distinction between a set of absolute everything, the ultimate meta-set, and every single thing that exists. Knowing what a subset is doesn't help her. Her problem is that she saw 'nothing' beyond existence. This construct of 'nothing' is the limitation on her metaphysics that didn't allow her to ask metaphysical questions and thus kept her metaphysics in a kind of stasis, an 'open' question that nobody can ask.

And because existence becomes 'every thing' in Rand, it is not treated as a unitary thing, and yet it is because it is metaphysical!

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What evidence do you have for the wild assertions that  A. there is 'something' beyond existence and B. that 'existence' is a "unitary thing" (impliedly beyond or in addition to each and every thing)

 

4 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Her problem is that she saw 'nothing' beyond existence.

 

4 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

because existence becomes 'every thing' in Rand, it is not treated as a unitary thing, and yet it is because it is metaphysical!

 

PS- By "evidence" I do NOT mean the introspective ramblings of any single or group of humans, insane or otherwise, but objective evidence in reality which can be independently verified by third parties through sense perception. 

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To say that there is 'something' beyond existence is a contradiction. I do not claim that there is 'something' beyond existence. I claim that logical metaphysics is much greater than what Rand presumed. There isn't only existence or identity in metaphysics, but also nonexistence and non-identity, neither one of which can be simply reduced to 'something,' nor can both of them be reduced to 'nothing.'

Existence is not 'a thing' as a whole, neither unitary nor fragmentary. Existence is absolute everything. Everything is not 'a thing' (ignoring the linguistic ambiguity). In other words, there is existence before there is identity, but there isn't only existence before there is identity.

The ultimate evidence is the Model, which is structured by a priori metametaphysical categories of Existence and Nonexistence.

Model.jpg

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1 hour ago, Ilya Startsev said:

To say that there is 'something' beyond existence is a contradiction. I do not claim that there is 'something' beyond existence. I claim that logical metaphysics is much greater than what Rand presumed. There isn't only existence or identity in metaphysics, but also nonexistence and non-identity, neither one of which can be simply reduced to 'something,' nor can both of them be reduced to 'nothing.'

Existence is not 'a thing' as a whole, neither unitary nor fragmentary. Existence is absolute everything. Everything is not 'a thing' (ignoring the linguistic ambiguity). In other words, there is existence before there is identity, but there isn't only existence before there is identity.

The ultimate evidence is the Model, which is structured by a priori metametaphysical categories of Existence and Nonexistence.

Model.jpg

This is not evidence of ANY kind.  It is nothing but introspective (and wildly fantastical and imaginative) ramblings of one or more human mind(s).

If you have any evidence based on reality and verifiable by third parties through perception of reality, I would open to persuasion on that basis, however, until then I will you leave to discuss this matter with other members of the forum.

Best of luck.

Edited by StrictlyLogical

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This is how objective reality is structured ontologically; it's a pure ontology that has nothing to do with any epistemology or ways of looking, reading or understanding it. That you find some things 'fantastical' or 'imaginative' is your lack of knowledge and understanding (and even your disintegrative tendency), rather than what reality holds for all people, regardless of what they actually see or want to see.

The Model, as I describe it with heuristic theory of nested concepts (based on Rand's theory of concepts) includes sensation, perception, and conception in every element. Moreover, there are infinite possibilities between each pair, so this is not dualism as such.

All you've shown with your reply is that you are not interested in objective reality. Instead, as most people, you are only interested in your own perception of reality, which is structured by your subjective epistemology. The Diagram, based on the Model, shows different types of consciousness and how they are mapped to the Model (referring to reality). Now, just because you do not see any hints at epistemological integration in the Model does not mean that it is meaningless. It's only meaningless to you because you are not interested in understanding it, or even unable to understand it, based on your type of consciousness.

As an addendum to those interested: I have yet to find a person who understands both the Model and the Diagram. I know someone who understands the Model and someone else who understands the Diagram (more or less), but nobody besides me who understands both.

Edited by Ilya Startsev

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10 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

Her problem is that she saw 'nothing' beyond existence.

I think SL missed that 'nothing' was in quotes. I did that too at first.

But then this doesn't make sense. Why would she think 'nothing' is beyond existence? You need quotes.

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3 hours ago, Eiuol said:

I think SL missed that 'nothing' was in quotes. I did that too at first.

But then this doesn't make sense. Why would she think 'nothing' is beyond existence? You need quotes.

I think IS, is stating that Rand's problem was that "she saw nothing beyond existence", implying she should have seen "something" beyond existence (all that which exists).

IS (IMHO) is not stating that Rand's problem was that she thought there was a "nothing" which is beyond existence.  Such a claim would be factually inaccurate, she did not think or see such a "nothing" since she knew (as Parmenedes solved MILLENIA AGO) that there is no "nothing", no thing that exists which is the "nothing".

In the end, as for (nothing) versus ("nothing"), given a proper sane understanding of reality, quotes here mean (pardon the conceptual pun) nothing.

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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

I think IS, is stating that Rand's problem was that "she saw nothing beyond existence", implying she should have seen "something" beyond existence (all that which exists).

IS (IMHO) is not stating that Rand's problem was that she thought there was a "nothing" which is beyond existence.  Such a claim would be factually inaccurate, she did not think or see such a "nothing" since she knew (as Parmenedes solved MILLENIA AGO) that there is no "nothing", no thing that exists which is the "nothing".

Well, Ilya seems to think that Rand saw the -concept- of nothing as beyond existence, e.g. as apart or separate from existence thus making it nonreal. And he says Rand is wrong about this, given that in his eyes Rand seems to reify 'nothing' in order to prove its "nonreal"ness.

Rand doesn't think that anyway. 'Nothing' exists qua existent insofar as it depends on the concept 'existence'. She says "non-existence" identifies the negation of a fact, suggesting that the concepts 'nothing' and 'non-existence' are about reality, not some intuitive sense of being "nonreal". Stating it this way, this easily explains why the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is a bad one.

http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/non-existence.html

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14 hours ago, New Buddha said:

Gee.  I wonder why?

Yes, why? That's a good question. I prefer a serious discussion, however.

As for the discussion on 'nothing' in Rand, that's interesting, especially how Eiuol is trying to understand what I meant when I said 'nothing' beyond existence. SL, however, is correct that the quotation marks don't mean a thing except to emphasize the 'nothing' part. This part is repeatedly mentioned by Objectivists and also by Rand (in the quotes linked she seems to even try to 'explain' nonexistence away -- also here -- but without relating it to existence, which is impossible, as it always recurs in thoughts) when a discussion involves questioning her metaphysics. The problem is that indeed you are reifying 'nothing' in order to support the dogma of her metaphysics. This reification, however, is implicit, since you do not question what you are actually saying, that is, you do not try to understand your words and thus do not mean explicitly 'nothing' when you are saying it. You say 'nothing' but give no thought to nothing. In psychology, this is known as 'ironic process theory.' In other words, the content of your words just as the content of your thoughts at the moment of saying there is 'nothing' beyond existence is precisely that - 'nothing.' Hence you are not avoiding the question but merely suppressing it.

What Objectivists or Rand seem not to understand that logically (and thus also verbally) there indeed need to be a category that means 'nothing,' namely nonexistence. The point in this, however, is not to 'reify' nonexistence but to show (as I have shown) that existence logically depends on nonexistence in order for existence to be TRUE. To ignore the logical proof of the factuality of existence is to, basically, conform to dogma. Academia doesn't and never will accept Rand in this case. My purpose is to find a way to get academia to accept Rand, but you are not helping. You are merely perpetuating the gap that she and her followers created between academia and general public, which is reflected in that non-communicative barrier between Democrats and Republicans, leading the US to a civil war (about which I've warned you in 2014).

The reason I am on this forum is not because I am your enemy but because I am your friend. I am honestly critiquing Rand, trying to find the spot that will be acceptable to academia, a point that can be discussed academically. I always think of communication first, regardless of what others may believe in contrast to my attitude.

To say that 'something comes from nothing' is an obvious ontological contradiction. The point is to lead to identity (something), but not contradictorily. The following is a non-contradictory way to come to identity.

logical_square.jpg

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5 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

The point in this, however, is not to 'reify' nonexistence but to show (as I have shown) that existence logically depends on nonexistence in order for existence to be TRUE. To ignore the logical proof of the factuality of existence is to, basically, conform to dogma.

Existence does not logically depend on anything to be true. Before the academic philosopher tries to prove existence, he must first exist. Logic is not the blueprint or cosmic equation from which the universe springs from and conforms to; it's your method of grasping what the senses tell you about the world.

5 hours ago, Ilya Startsev said:

The point is to lead to identity (something), but not contradictorily. The following is a non-contradictory way to come to identity.

Neither existence nor identity can be arrived at by inference of any kind. The validation of existence and identity is sense perception. You're trying to validate identity by means of a method (logic) that already makes use of the law of identity. Or perhaps you using Hegelian logic or some other type of logic?

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10 minutes ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Existence does not logically depend on anything to be true. Before the academic philosopher tries to prove existence, he must first exist. Logic is not the blueprint or cosmic equation from which the universe springs from and conforms to; it's your method of grasping what the senses tell you about the world.

Neither existence nor identity can be arrived at by inference of any kind. The validation of existence and identity is sense perception. You're trying to validate identity by means of a method (logic) that already makes use of the law of identity. Or perhaps you using Hegelian logic or some other type of logic?

All true... but know that the mind(s) you can reach with your eloquence do not include the author of the OP. 

I would say you are wasting your time, but others (presumably) are reading... and in that sense it is not a waste to speak truth.

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15 minutes ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Before the academic philosopher tries to prove existence, he must first exist.

Actually, Existence does not depend on the existence of 'the' academic philosopher, unless you follow their subjectivist philosophy, that is. Any body, however, even that of your philosopher, is a part of the whole that is shown to be structured by Existence and Nonexistence.

16 minutes ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Logic is not the blueprint or cosmic equation from which the universe springs from and conforms to; it's your method of grasping what the senses tell you about the world.

This sounds like Kantian logical epistemology. I connect logic to metaphysics, not epistemology, so this is going in opposite directions, hence you cannot understand what I am writing. I am writing based on Aristotelian ontological logic, connecting it to metaphysics through Rand's Existence is Identity axiom. If you prefer our senses to follow logic differently, then please refer to Critique of pure reason. And then also consider my illustration of its epistemology.

The logical square is the logical structure of my ontology, but your 'method of grasping' cannot grasp my ontology because ontology is not a 'method of grasping'. It's a description of reality based on the 'method' of the logical square, or logical metaphysics, which does not depend on consciousness, as it isn't in our consciousness per se, just as consciousness is not within thought. In other words, metaphysics, as provided here and partially in Rand, is beyond thought and cannot be reduced to thought, although it includes all thought, whether physical or not, as considered by most philosophers.

20 minutes ago, KyaryPamyu said:

The validation of existence and identity is sense perception.

No, you are getting it backward, like in Kant, by thinking that metaphysics needs to be validated as knowledge (i.e., needs to be epistemological). The ironic thing is that neither Kantian metaphysics, nor Rand's, can ever be so validated, although academic philosophy surely believes Kant's epistemology. I agree with Aristotle and Rand that metaphysics is NOT epistemology, and in fact, it does not serve epistemology like it does in Kant and many, many others.

In order for there to be anything to perceive, like ontology, there had to be an a priori structure for it to exist, regardless of how we perceive it, but as long as we do we can grasp it, however partially. Thus, understanding is epistemological, but ontology and metaphysics is not understanding per se. This a priori actually precedes any Kantian structures, even Kant himself, or any validation of knowledge that can ever be. The metametaphysics I am showing here doesn't depend on philosophical knowledge but is derived from science and structures our consciousness. The structure of my consciousness, which allows me to understand all this, is different from others.

The beautiful thing that I describe with the square is actually an axiomatic 'proof' (a new axiom), showing that Rand's metaphysics is not completely wrong, but instead it is incomplete. The reason it's incomplete is that Rand started from existence as her primary axiom (i.e. existence exists, or existence is identity, or everything is something). Existence can only be 'validated' logically, if you can even think of this as 'validation' which has epistemological overtones to its connotation anyway. On the other hand, knowledge from perception is validated epistemologically.

These two -- logic and epistemology -- are separate ways of understanding in my philosophy (epistemology in my philosophy is not considered the absolute or completely accurate way of understanding). The first does not completely apply to percepts but applies to concepts already derived from them. The second only applies to how we read knowledge presented, thus subjectivizing or internalizing such knowledge.

To dig in this point further: epistemology, in my sense, is not science but philosophy. Epistemology can only be subjective, or it's not an epistemology. This, by the way, is also the academic view. Logic, as ontology and metaphysics, on the other hand, are not subjective but objective in the sense that they are independent from our subjects (this doesn't include symbolic logic developed by Kantians). However, logical proofs, as we see here, are not all self-evident, but instead they are true regardless of whether we understand or respect them or even regard them in any way.

I claim that logical proofs of metaphysical nature are axiomatic and can be discovered in Aristotelian fashion, just as knowledge is verified in philosophy and discovered in science. Now, this point is debatable only to the extent of my usage of the term 'proof', since this generally doesn't apply to metaphysics or to the square of opposition (see below). However, this proof only shows that Rand's axiom cannot be the only one but instead other axioms exist to complete it. If you don't like my usage of this term, then consider it a heuristic.

29 minutes ago, KyaryPamyu said:

Or perhaps you using Hegelian logic or some other type of logic?

I am using Aristotle's ontological logic, as shown below. However, one way to understand its nature, which works for me, evidently (as I understand -- as far as I can -- what I am talking about), is to understand Aristotle's philosophy: how potentials as forms actualize in our consciousness as essences.

19 minutes ago, StrictlyLogical said:

All true... but know that the mind(s) you can reach with your eloquence do not include the author of the OP. 

I would say you are wasting your time, but others (presumably) are reading... and in that sense it is not a waste to speak truth.

Based on my examination of what KyaryPamyu wrote, SL's evaluation does not seem to be logical, at all. Instead he likes to think himself being logical in the dogmatic sense conveniently provided by Rand.

The issue is not that only those theories that could be understood by Objectivists are true or whether what I am presenting is not true because it's not understood by you. The issue is that what we think of as 'understanding' is not metametaphysical or ontological in the broadest sense. Understanding is subjective and should not be confused with logic, even though we surely follow different logics based on how we think.

square.jpg

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1 hour ago, StrictlyLogical said:

All true... but know that the mind(s) you can reach with your eloquence do not include the author of the OP. 

I would say you are wasting your time, but others (presumably) are reading... and in that sense it is not a waste to speak truth.

KyaryPamyu

I retract the last sentence of my last post.

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