What is the difference between existent & entity?

[iouswuoibev]

I thought I had grasped the difference between an existent and an entity, but a passage on OPAR lead me to question my understanding of the terms.

By my current understanding, an existent refers to "anything that is part of reality", be it an object, concept, attribute, emotion, action... etcetera. An entity on the other hand refers only to things, as distinguished at the perceptual level.

The passage that lead me to question my understanding is as follows:

"When studying the unit-perspective, it is essential to grasp that in the world apart from man there are are no units; there are only existents-seperate, individual things with their properties and actions."

Here Piekoff defines "existent" the way I (and the AR lexicon, apparently) defined it (EDIT: defined "entity"). What's going on?

Edited April 4, 2005 by iouswuoibev

[Hal]

Perhaps he mean that existents are, in a (non-subjectivist) sense, a product of consciousness? For instance, is a broom one existent or two - the handle and the brush (or even the billions of individual atoms)? Is a book one existent, or 400 existents (its pages)? And is an individual page one existent or 3 - a rectangle, the colour white, and the printed words?

Although the broom and the book exist apart from humans, it only makes sense to talking about them "existing as brooms and books" from a human perspective.

Edited April 4, 2005 by Hal

[iouswuoibev]

Perhaps he mean that existents are, in a (non-subjectivist) sense, a product of consciousness?

I doubt that, and it doesn't explain the contradiction in definition.

[Bryan]

The building-block of man's knowledge is the concept of an "existent"—of something that exists, be it a thing, an attribute or an action.

...

The (implicit) concept "existent" undergoes three stages of development in man's mind. The first stage is a child's awareness of objects, of things—which represents the (implicit) concept "entity."

An existent is simply something that exists, it could be anything. An entity is sub-category of the broader concept of existent, referring specifically to concrete objects.

[iouswuoibev]

An existent is simply something that exists, it could be anything.  An entity is sub-category of the broader concept of existent, referring specifically to concrete objects.

Which is what I said. So it would seem that the OPAR quotation is wrong?

[dondigitalia]

I don't understand why that particular quote is confusing you. Could you please elaborate?

An existent is just that: something which exists. It can be any aspect of reality, and is an existent regardless of whether there is a human mind which percieves it. I've always thought of entities as particular groupings of existents. Most entities are physical in nature, and we percieve them as such. Some products of consciousness are non-physical entities, however (concepts are this kind of entity).

What Dr. Peikoff indicates is that units as such do not exist apart from a human consciousness. A unit isn't an entity qua entity, but rather it is an entity regarded in a certain way, i.e. as one of a group of two or more similar entities.

Edited to add: What I wrote above is a little unclear. A unit doesn't necessarily have to be an entity, but it may be an entity. A unit can be any existent, when regarded as one of a group, blah, blah, blah....

[iouswuoibev]

What Dr. Peikoff indicates is that units as such do not exist apart from a human consciousness. A unit isn't an entity qua entity, but rather it is an entity regarded in a certain way, i.e. as one of a group of two or more similar entities.

I understood the passage. I question LP's definition of "existent". He defined "existent" as "Seperate, individual things with their properties and actions." In other words, he delimited his definition with the qualifier "with their properties and actions". In other words, by his definition, an "existent" can only refer to things which posess properties and actions, which would exclude properties and actions themselves.

An "existent" can stand for any thing that exists, be it an atom, thought, taste, and: property and action. By saying that an existent possesses properties and actions (I quote again: "Seperate, individual things with their properties and actions") the definition excludes properties and actions - which are inclusive in the definition of "existent"...

This is the basis of my objection.

[Richard Roark]

Could you please put the page number that this quote is found on so I can read the entire passage and get the proper context?

[iouswuoibev]

Could you please put the page number that this quote is found on so I can read the entire passage and get the proper context?

I did, where I quoted it the first time. Page 78.

[Gabriel_S]

I understood the passage. I question LP's definition of "existent". He defined "existent" as "Seperate, individual things with their properties and actions." In other words, he delimited his definition with the qualifier "with their properties and actions". In other words, by his definition, an "existent" can only refer to things which posess properties and actions, which would exclude properties and actions themselves.

An "existent" can stand for any thing that exists, be it an atom, thought, taste, and: property and action. By saying that an existent possesses properties and actions (I quote again: "Seperate, individual things with their properties and actions") the definition excludes properties and actions - which are inclusive in the definition of "existent"...

This is the basis of my objection.

Why do you assume that Dr. Peikoff is offering a definition of "existent" in the passage you quoted?

[iouswuoibev]

Why do you assume that Dr. Peikoff is offering a definition of "existent" in the passage you quoted?

Because that's what it looks like he's doing.

[Bryan]

I understood the passage. I question LP's definition of "existent". He defined "existent" as "Seperate, individual things with their properties and actions." In other words, he delimited his definition with the qualifier "with their properties and actions". In other words, by his definition, an "existent" can only refer to things which posess properties and actions, which would exclude properties and actions themselves.

An "existent" can stand for any thing that exists, be it an atom, thought, taste, and: property and action. By saying that an existent possesses properties and actions (I quote again: "Seperate, individual things with their properties and actions") the definition excludes properties and actions - which are inclusive in the definition of "existent"...

This is the basis of my objection.

It appears in the passage that he just used the word existent where he could have used the word entity. Since entities are existent, this is ok. As Gabrial_S implies, I don't think Dr. Peikoff meant this is an all inclusive definition of existent.

Here's an example, I see a big dog and say, "That's one big animal." It's ok for me to say this because dogs are animals.

[Gabriel_S]

Because that's what it looks like he's doing.

Well, let me ask again: why does it look like he's doing that?

I think your initial error was to think that Dr. Peikoff was offering a formal definition in that passage. He wasn't, and so there really isn't a problem.

[dougclayton]

Here Piekoff defines "existent" the way I (and the AR lexicon, apparently) defined it (EDIT: defined "entity"). What's going on?

Let me offer a different interpretation than those already offered. It is possible he is elaborating on what existents are: namely, they are "separate, individual things [entities], [along] with their properties [attributes?] and actions." From this point of view, he is saying that existents are entities, properties and actions--not that existents are just entities. Otherwise, why would he add "with their properties and actions" to that sentence? Why not just say "separate individual things" and be done with it?

One reason for stating it the way he does is to highlight that entities are primary--but because there are entities, there are also necessarily properties and actions "along for the ride," so to speak.

[Bryan]

Let me offer a different interpretation than those already offered.  It is possible he is elaborating on what existents are: namely, they are "separate, individual things [entities], [along] with their properties [attributes?] and actions."

Doug, you're a lexical genius!

[dougclayton]

Doug, you're a lexical genius! 

Thanks, but I don't think I can quit my day job just yet.

[iouswuoibev]

Here Piekoff defines "existent" the way I (and the AR lexicon, apparently) defined it (EDIT: defined "entity"). What's going on?

Let me offer a different interpretation than those already offered. It is possible he is elaborating on what existents are: namely, they are "separate, individual things [entities], [along] with their properties [attributes?] and actions." From this point of view, he is saying that existents are entities, properties and actions--not that existents are just entities. Otherwise, why would he add "with their properties and actions" to that sentence? Why not just say "separate individual things" and be done with it?

One reason for stating it the way he does is to highlight that entities are primary--but because there are entities, there are also necessarily properties and actions "along for the ride," so to speak.

Okay, that makes sense.

[shane]

I am trying to figure out how to categorize entity. Entity would be an object that is an existent and that we percieve directly. i.e. man, chair, ball, atom, etc. But Existent also includes qualities, quantities, etc and therefore would be a broader term (broader than entity).

I am thinking that existent is simply something that exists, and that an entity is something that we percieve directly?

A red ball would be an entity and an existent, but the concept red would not be an entity but an existent.

Where am I going wrong or right here?

[Capitalism Forever]

Where am I going wrong or right here?

I think you're going just right.

[DavidOdden]

I am trying to figure out how to categorize entity. Entity would be an object that is an existent and that we percieve directly. i.e. man, chair, ball, atom, etc.

Since you mentioned "atom", what do you mean by perceiving directly? My eyes aren't that good, and I'm betting yours aren't either. Another problem with trying to define entity in terms of perception is that you can perceive attributes such as red, even if you can't perceive what the thing itself is that's red (i.e. a big red screen with no visible edges or features). While it's true that no attribute exists free of the entity that it's an attribute of, no entity is free of attributes.

Here's a quote from ITOE at the beginning of ch. 2, about forming a concept: "The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought (but which can be broken into its component units whenever required)." Notice that the product of this mental integration is an entity. That puts your account, where the concept red is not an entity, at Rand's, where concepts are entities. Instead, I think it's better to look at entity as being a "thing".

[shane]

Since you mentioned "atom", what do you mean by perceiving directly? My eyes aren't that good, and I'm betting yours aren't either. Another problem with trying to define entity in terms of perception is that you can perceive attributes such as red, even if you can't perceive what the thing itself is that's red (i.e. a big red screen with no visible edges or features). While it's true that no attribute exists free of the entity that it's an attribute of, no entity is free of attributes.

I brought in atom in that case exactly for the reason that it is percievable with the use of tools, so that I know it exists as an entity, and a "mental integration." I can see now that my error is that you can percieve existents out out of context, but you cannot perceive an entity out of context. That which makes it an entity is its existents and their unique relationship to each other. I am really glad you brought in ITOE, because I immediately remembered reading about this. on pg 264 AR says "What is an entity? It is a sum of characteristics."

Here's a quote from ITOE at the beginning of ch. 2, about forming a concept: "The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought (but which can be broken into its component units whenever required)." Notice that the product of this mental integration is an entity. That puts your account, where the concept red is not an entity, at Rand's, where concepts are entities. Instead, I think it's better to look at entity as being a "thing".

At first glance it almost seems as if entities are concepts, but they are not. Do you think the only difference is that an entity becomes a concept when it has been mentally integrated according to our context of knowledge?

Edited July 19, 2005 by shane

[JMeganSnow]

At first glance it almost seems as if entities are concepts, but they are not. Do you think the only difference is that an entity becomes a concept when it has been mentally integrated according to our context of knowledge?

David was pointing out that concepts are entities, i.e. that something doesn't have to be a physical object in order to be an entity, it can also be a mental object. Dictionary.com describes an entity as "something that exists as a particular and discrete unit". That sounds like a good definition to me.

[Hal]

Here's a quote from ITOE at the beginning of ch. 2, about forming a concept: "The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought (but which can be broken into its component units whenever required)." Notice that the product of this mental integration is an entity. That puts your account, where the concept red is not an entity, at Rand's, where concepts are entities. Instead, I think it's better to look at entity as being a "thing".

Ayn Rand also admits this is meaningless if taken literally, rather than as a cognitive metaphor (IOE 157)

AR: But I kept saying incidentally, that we can call them 'mental entities' only metaphorically or for convenience. It is a 'something'. (...) When you have formed the concept of "concept", that is a mental something; it isnt a nothing. But anything pertaining to the content of a mind always has to be treated metaphysically not as a seperate existent but only with this precondition, in effect; that it is a mental state, a mental concrete, a mental something. Actually, "mental something" is is the nearest to an exact identification. Because "entity" does imply a physical thing.

[Hal]

I brought in atom in that case exactly for the reason that it is percievable with the use of tools, so that I know it exists as an entity, and a "mental integration." I can see now that my error is that you can percieve existents out out of context, but you cannot perceive an entity out of context. That which makes it an entity is its existents and their unique relationship to each other.

I'm very confused about what you mean here, can you try to clarify please?

I think its misleading to talk about atoms as being perceivable; the observation of them is highly theory laden - 'observing' an atom isnt like looking at bacteria through a microscope. Strictly speaking, we dont ever perceive particles - we perceive certain macroscopic effects which the current theories of physics claim are caused by certain unperceivable entities. In other words, particles are hypothetical entities postulated by physical theories in order to give a systematic explanation of the world. This becomes more pronounced when you start talking about things which are 'less observable' (= have fewer direct unarguable effects), such as quarks.

At first glance it almost seems as if entities are concepts, but they are not. Do you think the only difference is that an entity becomes a concept when it has been mentally integrated according to our context of knowledge?

Entities arent concepts, nor do they 'become' concepts (just like the Eiffel tower doesnt become a painting when I draw a picture of it). The passage DavidOdden quoted is referring to 'mental entities', which (as I said above) is only a metaphor - concepts and other 'mental entities' arent really entities in a metaphysical sense.

To be honest, I'm not quite sure what Ayn Rand meant by 'entity'. I find most of her writings on this particular topic to be frustratingly vague, mainly because she doesnt really have a rigorous theory of parts and wholes which I think is necessary in order to make Aristotlean metaphysics coherent. As far as I can tell, an entity is anything that exists on its own (although I'm not sure precisely what this means). The legs of a table arent entities while they are connected to the table, but when you cut them off, they become entities. In a sense, parts of an objects are 'potential entities' (not ARs terminology) in the Aristotlean sense of potentiality.

But then on IOE 268 she says that a mountain is an entity while a pile of dirt isnt ("We call an entity that which is welded together physically and about which we can learn something, to which we can ascribe properties, as a whole"). But then 'entity' becomes a purely epistemological concept rather than a metaphysical one. This is supported on IOE 269 where AR explicitly says "The concept of entity is an issue of the context in which you define your terms (...) what you regard as an entity in any given statement or enquiry depends on your definitions", and says that you can "from an epistemological viewpoint, regard any part of an entity as a seperate entity in that context". The example she gives is calling a square inch of ground an entity - the ground as a whole is one entity, but if we wish to examine a particular inch of it for some purpose, then that inch is also an entity ("in the context of your examination, its a specific entity, that particular inch, even though metaphysically, in reality, its part of many many other inches like it"). So in a way entities only exist relative to some given context, yet in another sense ("metaphysically, in reality") they are somehow absolute. I've no idea how this distinction is to be drawn in practice. It gets even worse on IOE 273 where we are told that entities "are not all equal metaphysically", and that a mountain is a primary entity whereas a valley isnt.

ARs most extended discussion (that I know of) is IOE 264-274 which is what I've been quoting from so you might want to check that out and see if you have better luck than I did.

Edited July 19, 2005 by Hal

[DavidOdden]

Do you think the only difference is that an entity becomes a concept when it has been mentally integrated according to our context of knowledge?

I don't think that entities become concepts at all, but I do think that the nature of entities is grasped, and can be integrated into concepts. The entities remain, unchanged. I know it looks like I'm picking on you over wording, but it's an important distinction.

I brought in atom in that case exactly for the reason that it is percievable with the use of tools, so that I know it exists as an entity, and a "mental integration."

Okay, then I'd say just drop the "directly" part.

I can see now that my error is that you can percieve existents out out of context, but you cannot perceive an entity out of context.

I have problems understanding what that means for two reasons. First, entities are existents, so if you say that you can perceive them out of context, then as a kind of existent, you should be able to perceive entities out of contexts. Do you mean "existents other than entities"? But second, I don't know what it means to perceive something out of context.

There's no question that perception is important in defining existents, but since we're talking epistemology, perception is important for everything.