Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Is the "stolen concept" truly a fallacy?

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

In "The Cult of Ayn Rand," jrs said:

I add the limitation "to the extent that it is true" because it definitely contains at least one major error -- the idea that there is a fallacy of the stolen concept.  There is no such fallacy.

Could you elaborate on this claim? I for one am very interested in why this is not a fallacy, because all this time I have understood why it is one.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • Replies 150
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

I too would like to see this. Stolen Concept certainly is a logical fallacy, a very astutely observed one thanks to the Ayn Rand's circle in the 60s.

Perhaps, I'm misunderstanding you here, but I don't think it was Ayn Rand's "circle" that identified the fallacy of the stolen concept - it was Ayn Rand. Reference to the fallacy goes back to Galt's Speech, I believe. It was Ayn Rand who grasped that knowledge is hierarhical. Consequently, she identified that a violation of the hierarchy is a conceptual fallacy.

Edited by Gabriel_S
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I too would like to see this. Stolen Concept certainly is a logical fallacy, a very astutely observed one thanks to the Ayn Rand's circle in the 60s.

The "stolen concept" fallacy is simply the application of Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction, which holds "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect." (Metaphysics, Book IV, Part 3. Translation by W.D. Ross.) In his Jan. 1963 Objectivist Newsletter article, "The Stolen Concept," Nathaniel Branden refers to Proudhon's "All property is theft" as an example of this fallacy. Yet the internal inconsistency of Proudhon's statement can be refuted just as easily by reference to Aristotle: the subject "property" cannot at the same time and same respect be both "rightfully owned" and not "rightfully owned."

Edited by Tom Robinson
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm unclear how the fallacy of the stolen concept ("FSC") is simply the application of the Principle of Non-Contradiction ("PNC"). Would you mind elaborating on that?

I'm also a bit confused on another matter. First, you say that the FSC is merely an application of the PNC, then you say that Proudhon's statement can be refuted just as easily by the PNC alone. Which is it? Is the FSC pretty much just the PNC, or are they distinguishable? If so, how in your view?

BTW, I'm not following how Proudhon's statement as given is internally inconsistent. Nor, for that matter, do I think that the FSC is merely an instance of internal inconsistency, as your statements seem to imply. Rather, the FSC is a violation of hierarchy, which is not the same thing.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The "stolen concept" as described by Nathaniel Branden is simply another way of stating Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC, for short). Branden says the stolen concept "consists of using a concept while ignoring, contradicting or denying the validity of the concepts on which it logically and genetically depends." But this is simply a wordy reiteration of the truth of Aristotle's principle. If one ascribes Attributes A and B to Subject X, and B contradicts A, then one is violating the principle that "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect." That is what is wrong with Proudhon's dictum, "All property is theft." As Branden says, "If no property is rightfully owned, that is, if nothing is property, there can be no such concept as theft." And Branden is right. But Proudhon would have been refuted by reference to Aristotle's PNC: An object (X) cannot be both property (A) and theft (B or non-A). Another example of the fallacy that Branden mentions is that "Reason rests ultimately on an act of faith." Again, we can refute this via the PNC: The Subject (Reason) cannot have the attributes of both A (knowledge by means of evidence and demonstration) and non-A (acceptance of ideas without evidence or demonstration). Thus, the "stolen concept" does not add any truth to the principle of logic already identified by Aristotle.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Why can an object not be both property and illegitimately owned? There is no explanation out side of an account of the hierarchy of both concepts. If certain concepts do not depend logically on certain others, there is no reason to say that property doesn't itself amount to illegitimate ownership, which was Proudhon's point. The reason this is a contradiction is because a higher level concept is being used to destroy a concept on which it depends.

Edited by Atlas51184
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Why can an object not be both property and illegitimately owned? There is no explanation out side of an account of the hierarchy of both concepts. If certain concepts do not depend logically on certain others, there is no reason to say that property doesn't itself amount to illegitimate ownership, which was Proudhon's point. The reason this is a contradiction is because a higher level concept is being used to destroy a concept on which it depends.

All property cannot be both A (legitimately owned) and non-A (illegitimately owned). The statement “All property is theft” implies that all property is illegitimately owned. But if all property is illegitimately owned, there can be no theft, since theft can only occur when there is rightful ownership. Thus, following Aristotle, "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect."

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The “stolen concept” as described by Nathaniel Branden is simply another way of stating Aristotle’s Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC, for short).  Branden says the stolen concept “consists of using a concept while ignoring, contradicting or denying the validity of the concepts on which it logically and genetically depends.”  But this is simply a wordy reiteration of the truth of Aristotle’s principle.  If one ascribes Attributes A and B to Subject X, and B contradicts A, then one is violating the principle that "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect."  That is what is wrong with Proudhon’s dictum, “All property is theft.”  As Branden says, “If no property is rightfully owned, that is, if nothing is property, there can be no such concept as theft.”  And Branden is right.  But Proudhon would have been refuted by reference to Aristotle’s PNC:  An object (X) cannot be both property (A) and theft (B or non-A).  Another example of the fallacy that Branden mentions is that “Reason rests ultimately on an act of faith.”  Again, we can refute this via the PNC:  The Subject (Reason) cannot have the attributes of both A (knowledge by means of evidence and demonstration) and non-A (acceptance of ideas without evidence or demonstration). Thus, the “stolen concept” does not add any truth to the principle of logic already identified by Aristotle.

On the one hand, all (most?) logical errors reduce ultimately to a violation of the PNC. That's not in dispute. However, the FSC adds a richer understanding of the contradiction involved. Often, it enables us to grasp that there is a contradiction, an error which might otherwise be obscured (even if intuited). It accomplishes this by expaining that the contradiction in question is one of conceptual hierarchy. A violation of conceptual dependency allows us to see that there is a contradiction but one not revealed by simple definitional analysis alone (at least not at first). To say that the FSC is just a wordy reiteration of the PNC reveals that you fail to grasp the hierarchical nature of knowledge. As another poster pointed out, your demonstration of Proudhon's contradiction by definitional analysis is wanting and ultimately unconvincing ("that's just your definition"). It begs the question. You'd be better served with an analysis employing the principle of conceptual hierarchy (per Branden per Rand), which allows a deeper, and therefore more convincing, understanding of the error involved.

Edited by Gabriel_S
Link to comment
Share on other sites

All property cannot be both A (legitimately owned) and non-A (illegitimately owned).  The statement “All property is theft” implies that all property is illegitimately owned.  But if all property is illegitimately owned, there can be no theft, since theft can only occur when there is rightful ownership.

Ultimately it implies that. It does so after you've been given the answer by Ayn Rand. You're really stretching "implies" here. In fact, if you stretch it far enough you'll get an FSC. That's the point. In other words, in this case the implied violation of the PNC is specifically the FSC, but you don't get to the understanding that there's a PNC violation until you see the FSC. Of course, at that point it seems obvious (or at least more obvious) there's contradiction!

Edited by Gabriel_S
Link to comment
Share on other sites

All property cannot be both A (legitimately owned) and non-A (illegitimately owned).  The statement “All property is theft” implies that all property is illegitimately owned.  But if all property is illegitimately owned, there can be no theft, since theft can only occur when there is rightful ownership.

The reason why this is a contradiction is hierarchical. You can't just look out at the world and see 'property-ness' and 'theft-ness' and then say 'Oh! They contradict.' Having a full (non-rationalistic) understanding of property and theft requires that you perform a reduction of the concepts, and that is where the contradiction lies. "Property" is a concept that needs to be formed before "theft" can. Thus, using "theft" to refute "property" is like trying to stand taller by chopping off your legs.

Also, Gabriel is entirely right. Any fallacy is, ultimately, going to involve some form of saying A and non-A. Flushing out fallacies involves much more than stating the law of identity. All fallacy is contradiction, the stolen concept is one specific type of contradiction - a hierarchical contradiction.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Thus, the “stolen concept” does not add any truth to the principle of logic already identified by Aristotle.
What truth does the "ad hominem" fallacy add to the principle of logic identified by Aristotle?

It seems to me, judging from your posts in the past week, that you are rather quick to try and find faults with Objectivism. If you approach the philosophy with different intentions, I suspect that your evaluation of it will be markedly different. For example, identification of logical fallacies does not "add" any "truths" to logic, it is merely an identification of common rhetorical devices in which something appears as a valid syllogism (all fallacies are deductive), but actually is not. Thus, by this proper standard of evaluating what qualifies a logical fallacy, "all property is theft" certainly does commit a logical fallacy, because on the first glance it appears to create a valid logical syllogism, and a terrible one at that. Upon trying to figure out what error that statement commits, one comes to realize that it relies, like all other fallacies, upon a certain misuse of logical principles, and yet that variant of fallacy has never been identified yet, until Ayn Rand. You would come to a conclusion much similar to this, had you approached Objectivism with inquisitive and benevolent intentions, and which I'm now seriously beginning to doubt that you have at this point.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

On the one hand, all (most?) logical errors reduce ultimately to a violation of the PNC. That's not in dispute. However, the FSC adds a richer understanding of the contradiction involved. Often, it enables us to grasp that there is a contradiction, an error which might otherwise be obscured (even if intuited). It accomplishes this by expaining that the contradiction in question is one of conceptual hierarchy. A violation of conceptual dependency allows us to see that there is a contradiction but one not revealed by simple definitional analysis alone (at least not at first). To say that the FSC is just a wordy reiteration of the PNC reveals that you fail to grasp the hierarchical nature of knowledge. As another poster pointed out, your demonstration of Proudhon's contradiction by definitional analysis is wanting and ultimately unconvincing ("that's just your definition"). It begs the question. You'd be better served with an analysis employing the principle of conceptual hierarchy, which allows a deeper, and therefore more convincing, understanding of the error involved.

If I had failed “to grasp the hierarchical nature of knowledge,” then I could not have argued for Aristotle’s PNC, for his vital principle rests on the idea that a conclusion cannot rely on contradictory premises -- a hierarchy of knowledge if there ever was one. If by “begging the question,” you mean that I simply assumed the validity of the claim I was making, then in fact I did not beg the question, for I showed by logical argumentation that Proudhon cannot have it both ways: if all property (ownership) is illegitimate, there can be no theft; if there is theft, then some property must be legitimate.

Ultimately it implies that. It does so after you've been given the answer by Ayn Rand. You're really stretching "implies" here. In fact, if you stretch it far enough you'll get an FSC. That's the point. In other words, in this case the implied violation of the PNC is specifically the FSC, but you don't get to the understanding that there's a PNC violation until you see the FSC. Of course, at that point it seems obvious (or at least more obvious) there's contradiction!

First of all, it was Branden, not Rand, who wrote the criticism of Proudhon. Secondly, the contradiction of implied premises in Proudhon’s statement should be obvious to any student of basic logic; it does not require the illumination of someone with official Objectivist credentials. Finally, one does not have to be formally acquainted with the Branden-Rand critique of the stolen concept to recognize self-contradictory premises in the arguments of others.

In 1922, four years before Ayn Rand left the Soviet Union, Ludwig von Mises published his magisterial Socialism: A Economic and Sociological Analysis. In it he dealt with Karl Marx’s famous claim that all human thought is the product of the material forces of society -- the technological processes of production. For example, said Marx, Descartes saw man as a machine because Descartes saw “with the eyes of the manufacturing period.” Mises demolished this claim by pointing out that technological processes are themselves the result of human thought. Thus, following Aristotle, two attributes (A) merely obeying material forces and (non-A) creating material forces, cannot at the same time belong to the same subject (mankind in a given period) and in the same respect." Sure, there’s a “stolen concept” in the Marxian premise that material forces can exist independently of human thought. But it did not take Branden’s essay of 1963 to identify it to Mises in 1922. He was merely following both Aristotle and good old common sense.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

What truth does the "ad hominem" fallacy add to the principle of logic identified by Aristotle?

If I am guilty of it, please present evidence.

It seems to me, judging from your posts in the past week, that you are rather quick to try and find faults with Objectivism.

I admire Ayn Rand and her works. In fact, I regard her as the greatest woman to defend capitalism in the 20th century. Yes, like other contributors to this forum, I have some disagreements, but I was not aware that, on this forum, disagreeing with a person on issues was equivalent to an ad hominem attack on that person

If you approach the philosophy with different intentions, I suspect that your evaluation of it will be markedly different. For example, identification of logical fallacies does not "add" any "truths" to logic, it is merely an identification of common rhetorical devices in which something appears as a valid syllogism (all fallacies are deductive), but actually is not. Thus, by this proper standard of evaluating what qualifies a logical fallacy, "all property is theft" certainly does commit a logical fallacy, because on the first glance it appears to create a valid logical syllogism, and a terrible one at that. Upon trying to figure out what error that statement commits, one comes to realize that it relies, like all other fallacies, upon a certain misuse of logical principles, and yet that variant of fallacy has never been identified yet, until Ayn Rand. You would come to a conclusion much similar to this, had you approached Objectivism with inquisitive and benevolent intentions, and which I'm now seriously beginning to doubt that you have at this point.

I am inquisitive. I am benevolent. If I have suggested that I am not inquisitive or benevolent toward Ayn Rand, then I deeply regret it. I believe that I have not in any way suggested that the Rand-Branden identification of the “stolen concept” is erroneous. I merely pointed out that it is a variant of Aristotle’s PNC (see posts above).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

For example, identification of logical fallacies does not "add" any "truths" to logic, it is merely an identification of common rhetorical devices in which something appears as a valid syllogism (all fallacies are deductive), but actually is not.

Not all fallacies are deductive. Rand's some most important logical discoveries are issues of conceptual fallacy (the package deal, the anti-concept, frozen abstraction, floating abstraction). All of those are errors in concept formation, not deduction. There are also inductive fallacies, like hasty generalization, and the stolen concept is a propositional fallacy.

If I had failed “to grasp the hierarchical nature of knowledge,” then I could not have argued for Aristotle’s PNC, for his vital principle rests on the idea that a conclusion cannot rely on contradictory premises -- a hierarchy of knowledge if there ever was one. If by “begging the question,” you mean that I simply assumed the validity of the claim I was making, then in fact I did not beg the question, for I showed by logical argumentation that Proudhon cannot have it both ways: if all property (ownership) is illegitimate, there can be no theft; if there is theft, then some property must be legitimate.

The fallacy of the stolen concept is a propositional fallacy. It involves an error in conceptual hierarchy. The hierarchical view of knowledge is more that just that some knowledge follows from some other. It has its basis in Rand's theory of abstraction from abstraction. As I said before, the reason this is a contradiction is because of the hierarchy of the two concepts. If there is no conceptual hierarchy (as many philosopher argue), then there is no contradiction.

As to the Mises-Marx story, well sure. If you see a stolen concept and it looks fishy, you don't need Rand to point out that something doesn't make sense. But any philosopher of minimal competence (along with Marx) will tear you to shreds simply by arguing that concepts are either arbitrary or innate and that conceptual hierarchy is non existent because of this. If so, then there are no rules of proper concept formation or application and Proudhon is not committing a fallacy because 'property' and 'theft' are just two innate/arbitrary concepts that have no logical relationship to each other. "Property is theft" is not the same as saying "I am fat and thin" because "property" and "theft" are not on the same hierarchical level; one presupposes the other, while "fat" and "thin" are direct opposites. You need Rand and the stolen concept fallacy (and the entire theory of concepts that it presupposes) to answer the objection that there are no rules of concepts. If you want to give it a go, I'll play devil's advocate and you can try to refute "Property is theft" using only the PNC.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Tom Robinson wrote: "I believe that I have not in any way suggested that the Rand-Branden identification of the “stolen concept” is erroneous. I merely pointed out that it is a variant of Aristotle’s PNC."

I too would like to see Tom Robinson answer the question that has been directed to him 2 or 3 times in this thread: Yes, the fallacy of the stolen concept is variation of Aristotle's PNC. ALL fallacies are variations of the PNC. The various fallacies are just categorizations-by-technique of commonly-heard contradictions. What was your point, beyond that?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Free Capitalist said "Stolen Concept certainly is a logical fallacy ...".

Tom Robinson said "The 'stolen concept' fallacy is simply the application of Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction ...".

On the contrary, the idea that there is such a fallacy is effectively the NEGATION of the Principle of Non-Contradiction.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

What is a "stolen concept"?

"The fallacy consists of the act of using a concept while ignoring, contradicting or denying the validity of the concepts on which it logically and genetically depends."

- Nathaniel Branden, "Objectivist Newsletter", vol. 2, no. 1

"The fallacy consists in using a higher-level concept while denying or ignoring its hierarchical roots, i.e., one or more of the earlier concepts on which it logically depends."

- Leonard Peikoff, "Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand", p. 136

"... 'the stolen concept' is the other side, the reverse, of 'petitio principii.' If this last is 'begging the question' or 'assuming that which you are attempting to prove,' then 'the stolen concept' is 'begging the answer' or ' assuming that which you are attempting to disprove.' ..."

- Ayn Rand, "Journals of Ayn Rand", p. 704

"...use our concepts while denying the roots and the existence of the concepts they are using."

- Ayn Rand, Galt's Speech in "Atlas Shrugged", p. 955 of the 35th anniversary edition

"...concept stealing...attempting to negate reason by means of reason..."

- Ayn Rand, "Introduction to The Objectivist Epistemology", p. 61

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Is the "fallacy of the 'stolen concept'" actually a fallacious inference or is it merely the recognition of a contradiction?

This is not a distinction without a difference. It is very important! It determines how you should act when you encounter a "stolen concept" in your thinking.

1. fallacious inference: In this case, one merely has to reject the "stolen concept" and all subsequent steps of the argument which depend upon it. No further action is required.

2. recognition of a contradiction: In this case, one must examine the chain of reasoning leading to the "stolen concept" and find at least one false premise or fallacious inference (other than the alleged fallacy of the "stolen concept", although it might be the same step). Then one must reject those false premises and fallacious inferences and all subsequent steps which depend on them.

In my opinion, the correct answer is that "stolen concept" is the recognition of a contradiction. This requires more work, but it is necessary to clean up the flaws in your thinking. Otherwise, you may continue to commit similar errors.

Notice also that Ayn Rand appears to be using the "fallacy" to try to abolish "reductio ad absurdum", one of the standard techniques of Classical Logic.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Nathaniel Brandon's first example of a "stolen concept" is "All property is theft." from Pierre Joseph Proudhon's book "Qu'est-ce que la propriete?" (What is property?). Unfortunately, I have not yet found a good English translation of this book.

However, it is not hard to imagine, in summary form, an argument which could be used to support this by an anarcho-socialist like Proudhon:

<<Before any substance or place becomes property, it exists in a state of nature. As such, it is freely available to be used by any person to satisfy his needs. If someone declares that this thing is now his property, then he is saying that he (and the government acting on his behalf) is prepared to use force against any other person who tries to use it. Thus his action has deprived other people of freedom of using the thing, i.e. he has stolen it.>>

According to Nathaniel Brandon:

"'Theft' is a concept that logically and genetically depends on the antecedent concept of 'rightfully owned property' — and refers to the act of taking that property without the owner's consent. If no property is rightfully owned, that is, if nothing is property, there can be no such concept as 'theft.' Thus, the statement 'All property is theft' has an internal contradiction: to use the concept 'theft' while denying the validity of the concept of 'property,' is to use 'theft' as a concept to which one has no logical right — that is, as a stolen concept."

But N.B.'s argument is too glib, it dismisses the result without dissecting the anarcho-socialist argument to find out where it went wrong. In particular, they may be using a definition of "theft" which does not presuppose "rightfully owned property":

<<"Theft" means depriving a person of the freedom of using a thing which he previously was free to use without his consent.>>

So you would have to show why that was not a proper definition of "theft".

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Could you please answer my objections though? What does any other fallacy, such as "excluded middle" add to the logic? Aren't all fallacies violations of the PNC?

Principle of Non-Contradiction: A cannot be B and not be B.

Principle of Excluded Middle: A either is or is not B.

If Proudhon had said, “Property is neither legitimate not illegitimate,” he would have violated the Principle of Excluded Middle.

Edited by Tom Robinson
Link to comment
Share on other sites

But N.B.'s argument is too glib, it dismisses the result without dissecting the anarcho-socialist argument to find out where it went wrong. In particular, they may be using a definition of "theft" which does not presuppose "rightfully owned property":

<<"Theft" means depriving a person of the freedom of using a thing which he previously was free to use without his consent.>>

So you would have to show why that was not a proper definition of "theft".

This is an argument against Branden's style of presentation, not the fallacy as such. A full and thorough exposition of the fallacy would involve a reduction both concepts, as well as an explicit formation of definitions of both concepts. Definitions can be true and false. If the anarcho-socialist is using the true definition of theft and the true definition of property, then he is committing the stolen concept fallacy. If he is using a false definition of either or both concepts, then he is committing a different fallacy. Either way, you need a proper theory of concepts (Rand's theory of concepts) to fully refute this. As I said before, any half-competent philosopher is going to tell you that "definition is a free move," i.e. arbitrary.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Um, since logic is the "Art of non-contradictory identification", and fallacies are examples of improper use of logic (i.e. NOT non-contradictory identification, or CONTRADICTORY identification) then ALL fallacies must ultimately fail the test of non-contradiction, of A is A. So, I agree that this discussion is rather pointless.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Um, since logic is the "Art of non-contradictory identification", and fallacies are examples of improper use of logic (i.e. NOT non-contradictory identification, or CONTRADICTORY identification) then ALL fallacies must ultimately fail the test of non-contradiction, of A is A.

In fact, logic is not an “art” but a science. I would suggest a definition provided by a scholar to whom Rand gave her approval. As H.W.B. Joseph wrote, “Logic, then is the science which studies the general principles in accordance with which we think about things, whatever things they may be." (Introduction to Logic, Second Edition Revised.)

So, I agree that this discussion is rather pointless.

Not pointless. If Proudhon's statement is indeed an example of a fallacy, discovering exactly what form of fallacy it is, is completely appropriate within the Aristotelian system.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Not pointless.  If Proudhon's statement is indeed an example of a fallacy, discovering exactly what form of fallacy it is, is completely appropriate within the Aristotelian system.

It's pointless to argue about whether fallacies demonstrate contradictions or not. Clearly they do. Identifying the particular form of something is nice, because it means that in a conversation you can say to someone "You're doing this, stop it," instead of having to sit there and patiently explain to them how they are contradicting themselves. But you don't have to know the fallacies in order to think logically; knowing that you can't contradict yourself is fine.

It's like how you don't HAVE to know the Law of Sines to do basic trigonometry, it just saves you the effort of having to prove it every time you want to solve a problem.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest
This topic is now closed to further replies.
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.
×
×
  • Create New...