On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[AshRyan]

I didnt really take offense to it.

Okay. I really don't think either Betsy or Stephen intended any offense, and generally it is better in this kind of forum if everyone tries not to be offended too easily. I'm glad that's all worked out then.

[stephen_speicher]

Okay.  I really don't think either Betsy or Stephen intended any offense, and generally it is better in this kind of forum if everyone tries not to be offended too easily.  I'm glad that's all worked out then.

Betsy is a pussy cat. I, on the other hand, can dish it out with the best of them. However, I reserve that for where it is deserved, and where it is more appropriate than a forum such as this.

But, I am passionate about ideas, with an equal passion for what is right. I do hope that no one mistakes such passion for an attack.

[stephen_speicher]

But Stephen, this leaves no room for consciousness to have causal efficacy in the brain!

Why? Even non-conscious entities have causal efficacy. Doesn't the interaction with a rolling boulder cause the tree to fall?

[stephen_speicher]

The brain processes and the processes of consciousness ARE often the same phenomena - but viewed from different perspective that are not reducible.

It is true that conscious processes are not reducible to neural processes, and vice versa. However, conscious processes and neural processes are different in kind. That neural processes accompany conscious states does not make them the same phenomena, viewed from different perspectives.

Extrospection is a process of cognition directed outward - a process of apprehending some existent(s) of the external world. Introspection is a process of cognition directed inward - a process of apprehending one's own psychological actions in regard to some existent(s) of the external world, such actions as thinking, feeling, reminiscing, etc.

A very nice quote, but how is this supposed to be related to the issue regarding conscious and neural processes?

[jimmay]

But Stephen, this leaves no room for consciousness to have causal efficacy in the brain!

Why? Even non-conscious entities have causal efficacy. Doesn't the interaction with a rolling boulder cause the tree to fall?

Sure, but what caused the boulder to roll?

When referring to non-conscious entities, a chain can be established going both forward and back from the incident in question. The rolling boulder came from a cliff, which is being eroded by wind and water, and which was formed by sedimentation in an ancient ocean and then uplifted by geologic processes driven by tectonic movement etc. Similarly, you can go forward and observe the wood beetles etc that eat the wood, resulting in a burst of growth of small plants etc. There are states of matter, and events that change matter from one state or form, to another.

This is what has bugged me for a long time with "consciousness is a type of causation"; that's half the answer. That consciousness is an attribute of certain arrangements of matter, those we call brains, is a given. The existence of physical processes than can cause consciousness to cease or be distorted (Alzheimer's etc.) show that consciousness is clearly *subject* to being affected or "steered" by physical causes. So how then, do we get from there to "we CANNOT reduce consciousness to the neural processes of the brain", WITHOUT granting the mysticist idea that there exist some sort of extra-physical, non-determinate "*" which is doing the steering? After all, if physical processes are deterministic, then all that proceeds from them must also be determinate, no? If not, then how is that reconciled with physical determinism?

By the statements given so far, consciousness must then be "more" than just physical processes. It can't *be* one, by definition, if it is not deterministic. And yet, both in terms of that which gives rise to it and in terms of what is caused by it, it is clearly *enmeshed* in said physical processes, to the point that it cannot exist without them.

One idea that I have in mind is that the brain does not *cause* the mind, but creates the physical circumstances in which conscious causation can occur. In this vein, it is a prerequisite, but not a cause pe se. But that doesn't address the question of whether everything happening inside this "vessel" is physical or not, and whether it is therefore deterministic or not.

As should be clear, this goes beyond the question of the precise mechanisms of consciousness; it pertains to exactly what and where indeterminacy can enter into a deterministic universe. Are such phemonena non-physical? What exactly would that mean, if yes?

[stephen_speicher]

Sure, but what caused the boulder to roll?

When referring to non-conscious entities, a chain can be established going both forward and back from the incident in question. 

But this is not a problem, right? I mean, since "causality is the law of identity applied to action" (Galt's speech), we are not surpised that entities act in a causal manner and that causal connections extend from the indefinite past to the indefinite future.

This is what has bugged me for a long time with "consciousness is a type of causation"; that's half the answer.

What is the question?

That consciousness is an attribute of certain arrangements of matter, those we call brains, is a given.  The existence of physical processes than can cause consciousness to cease or be distorted (Alzheimer's etc.) show that consciousness is clearly *subject* to being affected or "steered" by physical causes.  So how then, do we get from there to "we CANNOT reduce consciousness to the neural processes of the brain", WITHOUT granting the mysticist idea that there exist some sort of extra-physical, non-determinate "*" which is doing the steering?

I do not understand the question. Clearly consciousness is not physical, and our consciousness is volitional, not determinsitic. Why is this mystical?

By the statements given so far, consciousness must then be "more" than just physical processes.  It can't *be* one, by definition, if it is not deterministic.  And yet, both in terms of that which gives rise to it and in terms of what is caused by it, it is clearly *enmeshed* in said physical processes, to the point that it cannot exist without them.

Yes, our consciousness is volitional and it depends on the brain for its existence.

After all, if physical processes are deterministic, then all that proceeds from them must also be determinate, no?  If not, then how is that reconciled with physical determinism?

All physical processes are deterministic -- the actions of entities are caused and necessitated by their nature, and bounded by the nature of that with which they interact. In any given set of physical circumstances, there is one and only one action possible to an entity, and this is what is meant by a physical process being deterministic.

But, since consciousness is volitional, and since consciousness has causal efficacy over the brain in which it resides, and by extension causal efficacy over the actions of the body in which the brain resides, then any given physical process caused by our consciousness, could have been otherwise. But, granted a specific action of consciousness, then the physical processes which follow are fully determinstic; physical processes have no choice when it comes to action.

One idea that I have in mind is that the brain does not *cause* the mind, but creates the physical circumstances in which conscious causation can occur.  In this vein, it is a prerequisite, but not a cause pe se.  But that doesn't address the question of whether everything happening inside this "vessel" is physical or not, and whether it is therefore deterministic or not.

There is consciousness, and there is matter, and neither one is reducible to the other. I do not see the problem.

As should be clear, this goes beyond the question of the precise mechanisms of consciousness; ...

God, but I wish the question or the problem was clear to me.

I find it very difficult to discern just what your questions and problems are. I would love to help more than I have, but I am truly unclear as to just what the difficulty here is.

... it pertains to exactly what and where indeterminacy can enter into a deterministic universe.  Are such phemonena non-physical?  What exactly would that mean, if yes?

Consciousness is not physical, but it has causal efficacy over the brain in which it resides, and, as far as we know, our consciousness, which possesses volition, is the only actor which can choose among alternatives.

What's the problem?

[Capitalism Forever]

In any given set of physical circumstances, there is one and only one action possible to an entity, and this is what is meant by a physical process being deterministic.

[...]

any given physical process caused by our consciousness, could have been otherwise.

This is where I see the contradiction. "One and only one action possible" is not compatible with "could have been otherwise." And I do not mean a point in time after consciousness has acted; I mean at a point before it acts.

A set of physical circumstances is given. Consciousness has yet to act. Physical determinism prescribes one and only one possible outcome from these set of circumstances. So how can consciousness have a choice ?

In the analogy with the boulder affecting the tree, the boulder is a part of the physical circumstances. This cannot be applied to conscious action, since consciousness is not a physical entity, so it cannot be part of the physical circumstances.

[AwakeAndFree]

Stephen,

The quote I gave just came to show the two different kinds of concepts: concepts of consciousness, and conscepts of existence.

But as to the phenomena being the same: as I see it, the brain is the subconscious. It stores the memories, it raises the emotions, it saves the concepts, and deals with physical actions. The conscious part cannot be reduced or to or found in the brain. But consciousness is identification. Once an identification is made, the rest of the process is automatic: storing memories, raising emotions, giving orders of actions.

So I do believe phenomena like love, or memory - are in essense both physical and mental. Mental - because consciousness has a direct INTERNAL experience of them. Physical - because they take place in the brain.

[stephen_speicher]

This is where I see the contradiction. "One and only one action possible" is not compatible with "could have been otherwise." And I do not mean a point in time after consciousness has acted; I mean at a point before it acts.

There is no contradiction.

First, when I wrote "one action possible to an entity" I meant it in the context of a physical process, as can be seen by the words which follow the quote. My point was to underscore that, for a physical process, there is no choice involved regarding an entity's actions.

However, the "one action possible to an entity" even applies to the primary choice of volition. The irreducible choice to focus, or not, is caused by the nature of his mental and physical being -- in any given set of circumstance the "one action possible" to a volitional consciousess is that it choose.

Do not confuse the fact that man must choose, with what he actually chooses. The "could have been otherwise" refers to the consequences of the choice; things went one way because the choice was to focus, but things could have gone another way, if the choice was not to focus.

A set of physical circumstances is given. Consciousness has yet to act. Physical determinism prescribes one and only one possible outcome from these set of circumstances.

And the action of a volitional consciousness changes the physical circumstances. That is what is meant by consciousness having causal efficacy over the brain in which it resides.

So how can consciousness have a choice ?

It is hard to know what to make of such a question. In one sense it is like asking: "How can existence exist?" Consciousness does exist, and the volitional aspect of our consciousness is an irreducible primary, just as is existence. We cannot explain "existence" in terms of anything more fundamental, and we cannot explain "volition" in terms of anything more fundamental. You can choose to think that consciousness does not have a choice, but that would just be contradictory, and contrary to what you can perceive directly through introspection.

In the analogy with the boulder affecting the tree, the boulder is a part of the physical circumstances. This cannot be applied to conscious action, since consciousness is not a physical entity, so it cannot be part of the physical circumstances.

Then you are just denying the causal efficacy of consciousness, which is really patently absurd. Just watch: I am now going to write a filthy four-letter word. ... Did you read it? No? The reason that you did not read it is because I chose not to write it, and my choice had causal efficacy over my physical actions. Do you seriously deny this?

[Betsy]

This is where I see the contradiction. "One and only one action possible" is not compatible with "could have been otherwise."

Yes it is, if the ""One and only one action possible" is choosing.

We can say a lot about how consciousness works and why based on what we know: it depends on the nervous system, it is a property of a living thing, it directs the organism's actions, etc. We can also show, both based on introspection and the fact that denying choice leads to the Fallacy of the Stolen Concept, that the way human minds work is undeniably volitional. That is certain.

As to how it does so, that is a question for science.

[stephen_speicher]

Erandror, you are mistaken about this. Concepts are in consciousness, not in the brain. I know you do not intend to do so, but you are really promoting a sort of mechanistic view of consciousness. You might want to read my many posts on this in several different threads.

[Capitalism Forever]

Assume it is 10:00am. The physical circumstances at 10:00am are such that at 10:01am Stephen will have to choose whether or not to write a filthy four-letter word.

At 10:01am, Stephen faces the choice, and he chooses not to write a filthy four-letter word, but rather to write "Did you read it? No?"

At 10:02am, as a result of Stephen's choice, his fingers beat against the keyboard, typing "Did you read it? No?"

The fact that this outcome was chosen by Stephen means that it could have been otherwise. Given the set of physical circumstances at 10:00am, this was not the only possible outcome. The physical circumstances allowed for TWO possible outcomes: 1) your fingers typing a filthy four-letter word, and 2) your fingers typing "Did you read it? No?"

If there hadn't been at least two possible outcomes, the outcome wouldn't have been a choice.

(I hope you will see from my use of the conditional mood that I do believe in volition. My question "So how can consciousness have a choice?" was in the context of the hypothesis that physical processes are deterministic, in order to show that that hypothesis contradicts the fact of volition, and is therefore false.)

[stephen_speicher]

(I hope you will see from my use of the conditional mood that I do believe in volition.

Well, that's a relief!

My question "So how can consciousness have a choice?" was in the context of the hypothesis that physical processes are deterministic, in order to show that that hypothesis contradicts the fact of volition, and is therefore false.)

You have shown nothing of the kind. There is no contradiction.

I choose to raise my arm. My arm is raised.

Once consciousness initiates the action, the physical process of my arm being raised is completely deterministic, a series of neuro-chemical actions coupled to a bio-mechanical system. Each step of the physical process is neccessitated, there is only one possible action that can be performed by each of the physical/chemical entities involved.

That is what is meant by consciousness possessing causal efficacy over the brain in which it resides. Consciousness is not like anything else in existence -- it is unique. The best analogy I can give you, as loose an analogy that it is, is likening volitional choice to the turning of a key in a car ignition. Once the ignition is activated, the engine and all its component parts have no choice but to perform whatever physical processes that their nature determines, under the physical circumstances they are in. Once the ignition is turned on, all of the following physical processes are completely determinstic.

(It occurs to me, as an afterthought, that perhaps you are confusing physical deterministic behavior with the psychological/philosophical theory of determinism. These are two different things. As a psychological theory determinism states that all mental actions are caused (pre-determined) by prior actions and states, and therefore the existence of a volitional consciousness is an illusion. Clearly a theory which we reject. But, on a physical level, the physical actions of entities are fully deterministic; there is only one action possible, that action which is consistent with their nature and with whatever physical conditions apply. That is what is meant by physically deterministic behavior, not to be confused with psychological determinism.)

[Capitalism Forever]

Once consciousness initiates the action, the physical process of my arm being raised is completely deterministic, a series of neuro-chemical actions coupled to a bio-mechanical system.

Yes, we are in full agreement on that: once consciousness initiates the action, there is only one possible outcome.

However, until consciousness acts, there are TWO possible outcomes, right?

[stephen_speicher]

If you agree, then I am at a complete loss to understand why you think, as you said, that physically deterministic behavior contradicts volition.

However, until consciousness acts, there are TWO possible outcomes, right?

Not as far as any action of the arm is concerned. At any instant there is only one possible action that the arm will make, that which is determined by its nature and the physical circumstances within which it acts. That is true about the arm whether or not a volitional consciousness acts.

The arm has a natural position determined by the anatomy of its constituent parts, muscles, ligaments, bones, tendons, etc., and it interacts with its environment. If a volitional consciousness acts for the purpose of moving the arm, complex neuro-biomechanical process are initiated which result in the arm physically moving. If consciousness did not act, then the arm would just physically interact with whatever else occurs in its environement.

The causal efficacy of consciousness does not contradict the physically deterministic behavior of matter, and there is only one action possible to matter in any given circumstance.

[Capitalism Forever]

At any instant there is only one possible action that the arm will make, that which is determined by its nature and the physical circumstances within which it acts.

Yes, at a given instant, there is only one possibility as for what the arm will do at that instant. But what I am concerned with is the possibilities as for what will happen at a future instant. The key to finding where I see the contradiction lies in distinguishing the point in time at which the possibility is said to exist and the point in time at which the action will possibly occur.

Referring back to my "10:00am" example: at 10:00am, there exist two possibilities in regard to what you will do at 10:02am : 1, that you will write a four-letter word and 2, that you will not. Both of these outcomes for 10:02am are physically possible at 10:00am ; it is at 10:01am, when you make your choice between them and cause the second one to be actualized, that the first one ceases to exist. From then on, only possibility #2 exists. As you said, the physical process is deterministic once consciousness has acted--but, as I add, not before.

I hope this will help you understand my position. In addition, to view the same issue from another angle, consider the claim made by Isaac on the Volition thread:

The nature of the world today was set in stone (well, not stone, but set in something) at the moment of the big bang.

Putting aside the reference to the--in my view--nonsensical "big bang," the claim essentially goes like this: "At any instant t1, there is one and only one possibility for what the world will be like at any instant t2." In other words, everything that happens is PREdetermined. It is this claim that I disagree with. Do you agree with my disagreement?

[stephen_speicher]

Yes, at a given instant, there is only one possibility as for what the arm will do at that instant. But what I am concerned with is the possibilities as for what will happen at a future instant. The key to finding where I see the contradiction lies in distinguishing the point in time at which the possibility is said to exist and the point in time at which the action will possibly occur.

I need more than a "key" to understand your point -- I need an explicit argument. You continue to assert that there is a contradiction between physically deterministic behavior and a volitional consciousness, but you have yet to identify just where this supposed contradiction exists.

Referring back to my "10:00am" example: at 10:00am, there exist two possibilities in regard to what you will do at 10:02am : 1, that you will write a four-letter word and 2, that you will not. Both of these outcomes for 10:02am are physically possible at 10:00am ; it is at 10:01am, when you make your choice between them and cause the second one to be actualized, that the first one ceases to exist. From then on, only possibility #2 exists. As you said, the physical process is deterministic once consciousness has acted--but, as I add, not before.

Without belaboring the details of your example, does the following encapsulate what you are trying to say: Since a volitional consciousness has causal efficiacy over the brain in which it resides, and by extension over the actions of the body in which the brain resides, then the physical consequences which ensue from the actions of that volitional consciousness could have been otherwise, had the volitional consciousness chosen otherwise.

If that is the point you are trying to make, then yes, that is true. But that fact does not contradict anything else that I said about volitional consciousness and all physical processes being deterministic, so perhaps you really mean something else. I wish I could understand your concern.

I hope this will help you understand my position. In addition, to view the same issue from another angle, consider the claim made by Isaac on the Volition thread:

Putting aside the reference to the--in my view--nonsensical "big bang," the claim essentially goes like this: "At any instant t1, there is one and only one possibility for what the world will be like at any instant t2." In other words, everything that happens is PREdetermined. It is this claim that I disagree with. Do you agree with my disagreement?

Leaving aside the supposed Big Bang, then Isaac is correct if there are no entities with volitional choice. In a world without volition everything is predetermined, in the sense that everything which unfolds could not have been otherwise. But, if volitition is included, then it is correct to disagree. The existence of choice means that things which ensue could have been otherwise.

But, again, none of that shows, as you have claimed, that there is a contradiction between the existence of a volitional consciousness and physical processes being deterministic. Physical processes have no choice, but volition does.

[sS -- Edited 3:15 pm -- removed three extraneous words.]

[amagi]

Apparently, some here hold the idea that the brain acts in an entirely deterministic manner--that it's actions are every bit as fixed in advance as a computer's--unless and until a conscious act of volition intrudes and sets the brain on a novel course. Thereafter, everything that occurs in the brain is the deterministic effect of that volitional act, until a new volitional act intrudes.

My question for those who hold this view is this:

How does the mind engage in those volitional conscious acts? How does the thought (or process of thought) that the volitional decision consists of occur?

In other words, what mechanism allows volitional acts to occur? Basic statements like, "volitional acts have causal efficacy on the brain," are obviously true, but explain nothing about how such volitional acts occur in the first place.

For any volitional act to affect the brain, the act itself must have occured by some process. There must be something to account for that thought. It seems that on the view I have described above, that process cannot involve any physical process in the brain--it can only occur independently of the brain, and then affect the brain from outside of it. The above view does not merely say that thought occurs in the mind and not the brain--which is true. It implies that thought--at least an act of volition--initially occurs independently of brain action, and only later causes a mechanistic brain response.

Can someone explain this to me?

[Betsy]

How does the mind engage in those volitional conscious acts?  How does the thought (or process of thought) that the volitional decision consists of occur?

Nobody knows what happens physiologically, but there is a great deal that we know about volition introspectively.

Consciousness always has SOME content as long as we are not UNconscious. We have the ability to select that content. Even if something is immediately in front of us, we can turn away from it. Even if a thought comes to mind of something is in our immediate line of sight, we can ignore it and mentally change the subject. So mental content is self-chosen.

In addition, when faced with a difficult mental task, we can expend mental effort to understand something and/or solve the problem or we can not bother and leave it unknown and unsolved. The level of effort we expend is self-chosen.

In addition, and related to both subject and effort is the issue of purpose. Consciousness in living organisms that possess it, guides the actions and movements of the organism toward the values that sustain its life. Our minds can do that too -- but they don't have to. The purposefulness of mental activity -- restricting subject matter to that which will gain and keep a value AND expending the mental effort necessary to achieve it -- is self-chosen.

Observe that this is inherent in the nature of thought AS SUCH. Thought MUST have SOME self-chosen content, SOME self-chosen level of effort, and SOME self-chosen degree of purposefulness.

[Capitalism Forever]

In a world without volition everything is predetermined, in the sense that everything which unfolds could not have been otherwise. But, if volitition is included, then it is correct to disagree.

OK, now it's my turn to be relieved, for that's exactly what I think.

I now see that by "physical processes" you mean processes where no volitional being is involved, or where volition has already acted. I agree, of course, that such a process is completely deterministic.

Just to make sure that I understand you correctly, let's consider the following scenario:

John asks Cindy out for a date. Cindy has to choose whether to say yes or no. She makes her choice and says yes.

In this scenario, the sound waves traveling to Cindy's ears and the chain of electrochemical reactions triggered by them in Cindy's brain are a physical process and as such, they are fully deterministic. After Cindy has made her choice, the electrochemical reactions that make her various muscles move so that she emits the word "Yes" are also a physical process, and therefore deterministic. However, the event as a whole--the process that starts with the sound waves of John's question reaching her ears and ends with the sound waves of her "Yes" being generated by her speech organs--is not a purely physical process, since it involves a volitional decision, and is therefore not deterministic. Only the subprocesses that are purely physical are deterministic.

Have I got that right?

[Neurosophist]

What theory does the objectivist solution of the mind-body problem come closest to?

[stephen_speicher]

However, the event as a whole--the process that starts with the sound waves of John's question reaching her ears and ends with the sound waves of her "Yes" being generated by her speech organs--is not a purely physical process, since it involves a volitional decision, and is therefore not deterministic. Only the subprocesses that are purely physical are deterministic.

Have I got that right?

We seem to agree, in essence, about the general idea. I prefer the formulations in my prior posts because I think they are more precise.

Physical processes are deterministic, period. The volitional actions of a consciousness are not determinisitic, period. The causal efficacy of consciousness means that consciousness can have a physical effect in the brain, and, by extension, in the body within which the brain resides. But, from the perspective of a physical process the effect of consciousness is just one of the many conditions which determine what the physical process does.

So, when you say "the event as a whole," that is fine as long as we clearly distinguish the conscious volitional action from the physical action. They are really two different sorts of things. The actions of a volitional consciousness are quite unlike the physical actions of an entity. You can mentally combine them as an "event as a whole," but that "event as a whole" is really comprised of two radically different, independent yet causally connected processes.

[stephen_speicher]

What theory does the objectivist solution of the mind-body problem come closest to?

Objectivism.

But, in the sense in which I think you ask the question, that position is closer to dualism than materialism. The materialists either outright deny the existence of consciousness -- we are matter -- or, in one sense or the other, deny that consciousness has causal efficacy. Cartesian dualism recognizes both consciousness and matter, but sees them as two distinctly separate things. Similar to how some Ancient Greeks held the soul as being trapped inside the body, but still a completely separate entity.

The proper form of dualism, which I think is reflected in the Objectivist position, is the recognition that consciousness and matter do exist, that the existence of the former is dependent on the latter, that neither are reducible to the other, and that consciousness has causal efficacy over matter through the brain and by extension to the body in which it resides.

[DavidOdden]

The proper form of dualism, which I think is reflected in the Objectivist position, is the recognition that consciousness and matter do exist, that the existence of the former is dependent on the latter, that neither are reducible to the other, and that consciousness has causal efficacy over matter through the brain and by extension to the body in which it resides.

This leaves open the possibility that consciousness can exists outside of or in lieu of a brain in man (no criticism intended: infinite precision is not usually required). Those last two words are important, and recognising that, because of man's nature, consciousness is not possible without a brain, can resolve a lot of the confusion about the mind-brain dichotomy.

[stephen_speicher]

This leaves open the possibility that consciousness can exists outside of or in lieu of a brain in man (no criticism intended: infinite precision is not usually required). Those last two words are important, and recognising that, because of man's nature, consciousness is not possible without a brain, can resolve a lot of the confusion about the mind-brain dichotomy.

You got me!

I also failed to mention that I should probably only be considering the post 500 cc Homo habilis brain, but I was saving that for my dissertation.