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On the question of free-will vs. determinism

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Do we in fact have deductive evidence that the behavior of ALL material objects are deterministic? Has science definitively proven that there does not exist the possibility that the living cells within our brains might use some sort of quantum mechanics to posess volition on a material basis? I'm not an expert here, but I think that your "evidence against" might be challenged on that basis.

I wholeheartedly agree -- let's explore this, because it's an angle we haven't looked at in this thread yet. Is it, then, the Objectivist stance that consciousness could be material and volitional; namely, that there does not exist a fundamental contradiction therein? But doesn't Objectivism make the omniscient statement that all material things 'could not be otherwise?' To say that 'all material things... except consciousness... could not be otherwise' is quite a narrow exception to make and must inevitably lead to questioning the validity of that exception.

Regardless, to claim that consciousness is truly volitional requires the acceptance of an incredibly specific exception. Either everything in existence is material, except consciousness, or all material things are metaphysically absolute, except consciousness.

Does Objectivism not recognize the gravity of such an exception, especially when there exists a not-impossible alternative that would eliminate the need for that exception?

If introspection says that we have volition, then the claim that it is illusion is just as arbitrary as the claim that the physical world is illusion. In the exact same way and for the exact same reason.
Not at all. There is no evidence that the physical world is illusion; the claim is arbitrary. There is evidence that volition is illusion, because there is evidence that consciousness is material, evidence that material volition is contradictory, and evidence that the only possible alternative to this contradiction is illusionary volition. Sure, this evidence isn't conclusive, but it is evidence enough to raise the concept of some alternative to true volition (and the only one is illusionary volition) out of the intellectual vacuity of arbitrariness.

(EDIT: I mis-typed 'arbitrary' in place of 'illusionary' in the above paragraph... not enough coffee...)

Oh, and what about non-material, non-volitional consciousness?

Good point; that's another alternative. This one is arbitrary, though, as no evidence suggests it. The only thing limiting volition is the limit of the material, and without that (by claiming non-material), there is no evidence to then limit volition.

Edited by The Trendy Cynic
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Then the crux of the matter is the question: where did you arrive at the conclusion that ALL material was necessarily determined? I think when you see that, you will see that it is not in fact evidence against volition as you are thinking it is.

You're right; that is the crux of the matter.

By 'determined,' I mean that all aspects of the determined existent were necessitated by antecedent factors. In other words, the nature of that material demands of it a metaphysical absolute: That it could not have been something else, because everything that it is is necessitated. Objectivism, with omniscience, makes this statement about ALL material, does it not?

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Not at all. There is no evidence that the physical world is illusion; the claim is arbitrary. There is evidence that volition is illusion, because there is evidence that consciousness is material, evidence that material volition is contradictory, and evidence that the only possible alternative to this contradiction is illusionary volition. Sure, this evidence isn't conclusive, but it is evidence enough to raise the concept of some alternative to true volition (and the only one is arbitrary volition) out of the intellectual vacuity of arbitrariness.

The proposition that volition is an illusion is by its very nature arbitrary. It postulates the existence of factors (the determinants) that are, by definition, beyond man's awareness -- otherwise, if man could be aware of them, he could escape their influence and not be determined.

That which is beyond man's awareness is outside the province of proof and is thus arbitrary.

Separately, I would note that the law of causality does not state that all entities or phenomena must have a cause. It states that all actions are actions of entities and are dictated by the nature of the entity. Thus, the law of causality does not state that consciousness must have a cause. It only states that the processes of consciousness, inasmuch as they are actions, must be consistent with the identity of the entity doing the acting -- namely, man, the being of volitional consciousness.

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The proposition that volition is an illusion is by its very nature arbitrary.  It postulates the existence of factors (the determinants) that are, by definition, beyond man's awareness -- otherwise, if man could be aware of them, he could escape their influence and not be determined.

In the same sense, then, the proposition of a non-material consciousness is arbitrary -- it postulates the existence of some alternate state that transcends the material nature of our brains. So is the proposition of a material, volitional consciousness, as it postulates the existence of some method by which metaphysical absolutes can transcend their identites AS metaphysical absolutes and move beyond 'could not have been something else' to reach 'could have been this thing or another thing.'

The point behind all of this is that, using evidence alone, we have a contradiction. Our understanding of our consciousness is that it is seated in our brain, which is material and thus metaphysically absolute. But our introspective analysis of consciousness implies volition, which contradicts 'could not have been something else.'

No solution to this contradiction can be presented without supposing some existent ("illusion of volition," "non-material consciousness," "transcendent material consciousness") that we know nothing about. My point is that selecting one of these arbitrary suppositions over another is arbitrary and unfounded, and the only proper conclusion is 'We Don't Know.'

Separately, I would note that the law of causality does not state that all entities or phenomena must have a cause.  It states that all actions are actions of entities and are dictated by the nature of the entity.

And the nature of material is that it is metaphysically absolute, which means alternatives are not possible. Our consciousness presents alternatives. Thus, either material is not always metaphysically absolute, or our consciousness is not material, or our consciousness is not presenting alternatives. Is there another, fourth alternative? If not, how does Objectivism, with 100% certainty, choose one of those three alternatives over another?

It only states that the processes of consciousness, inasmuch as they are actions, must be consistent with the identity of the entity doing the acting

But it is material things that are doing the acting, and the identity of material things implies 'could not have been something else.'

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In the same sense, then, the proposition of a non-material consciousness is arbitrary -- it postulates the existence of some alternate state that transcends the material nature of our brains.

The existence of a non-material consciousness is a contradiction because it postulates an existence without an identity.

So is the proposition of a material, volitional consciousness, as it postulates the existence of some method by which metaphysical absolutes can [i]transcend[/i] their identites AS metaphysical absolutes and move beyond 'could not have been something else' to reach 'could have been this thing or another thing.'


The point behind all of this is that, using evidence alone, we have a contradiction. Our understanding of our consciousness is that it is seated in our brain, which is material and thus metaphysically absolute. But our introspective analysis of consciousness implies volition, which contradicts 'could not have been something else.'

No solution to this contradiction can be presented without supposing some existent ("illusion of volition," "non-material consciousness," "transcendent material consciousness") that we know nothing about. My point is that selecting one of these arbitrary suppositions over another is arbitrary and unfounded, and the only proper conclusion is 'We Don't Know.'

And the nature of material is that it is metaphysically absolute, which means alternatives are not possible. Our consciousness presents alternatives. Thus, either material is not always metaphysically absolute, or our consciousness is not material, or our consciousness is not presenting alternatives. Is there another, fourth alternative? If not, how does Objectivism, with 100% certainty, choose one of those three alternatives over another?[/code]

The only thing that volition postulates is that a certain arrangement of brain cells, under the right conditions, gives rise to a volitional consciousness. There is nothing arbitrary in this, inasmuch as we have not proposed the existence of something outside the realm of proof. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of the metaphysically absolute: the biochemical and biophysical nature of the mind are such that they give rise to consciousness -- and things could not be otherwise.

Or, to put it another way, given the identity of man's mind, it [i]must[/i] give rise to a volitional consciousness; "it could not have been something else."

There is nothing in the nature of matter to suggest that it cannot combine in such a way as to give rise to a volitional consciousness. Indeed, we all have the first-hand experience of introspection as proof of the fact that matter [i]can[/i] and [i]has[/i] combined in an arrangement that does precisely that.

The fact that the mind of man is the only matter identified (so far) that gives rise to volition is not grounds for dismissing one's own first hand observations. We cannot say that since no other combination of matter has this property, the mind of man cannot have it either.

Thus, Objectivism does not claim that volition transcends the properties of matter. It claims that volition [u]is[/u] a property of matter, in a certain arrangement and under certain conditions.

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Thus, either material is not always metaphysically absolute, or our consciousness is not material, or our consciousness is not presenting alternatives.

Objectivism, I believe, explicitly accepts the first definition. Read "The Metaphysical and the Man-made" in "Philosophy: Who Needs It?"

The second is rejected on the grounds that existence exists and the third is rejected on introspection.

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Thanks to you all -- I had an enjoyable "eureka" moment while reading through the last few posts, in that I realised that there was nothing about the identity of matter that explicitly forbids the emergence of a volitional consciousness; in other words, there is no fundamental contradiction in the existence of a material consciousness.

While the scope of our current knowledge of matter implies mechanical causality, (and here's my eureka moment) the error I was making was implicitly accepting this fact as an axiom. Not realising I was doing this, I avoided performing those checks one normally performs to validate an axiom (undeniable, lacks alternatives, etc, etc). Upon doing so, it is clearly evident that there is nothing fundamentally contradictory about the idea that matter can give rise to other forms of causality, including consciousness. I realise all of this was said in previous posts; I suppose I just needed time to integrate it all into a cohesive understanding I could adopt.

Anyways. Having invalidated the contradiction of matter vs. volition that was serving as the only evidence in favor of an illusionary volition, the concept of illusionary volition is demonstrably arbitrary and adopts the same logical validity of illusionary reality -- ie. none.

Thanks again for all your help; it certainly aided me in better understanding this concept, and I'm happy to be able to drop the nightmarish idea that my thoughts aren't my own :) I'll definitely be sticking around in hopes that you'll be able to work with me on more of my questions as I study OPAR.

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the error I was making was implicitly accepting this fact as an axiom. Not realising I was doing this, I avoided performing those checks one normally performs to validate an axiom (undeniable, lacks alternatives, etc, etc).

But you still have much work to do on your definition of "axiom". After all, you seemed able to deny and come up with alternatives for an axiomatic concept, so this isn't the proper way to identify them. The feature that identifies an axiom is that it must be accepted and used in the process of any attempt to deny it.

In addition, this isn't the only error you made. Your posts in this thread are littered with contradictions and illogic -- one of which I pointed out, many of which others exposed. A good exercise for you might be to go back and identify every self-contradictory phrase or premise you posed so that you don't make those errors again.

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A good idea; I'll do that. At the moment, the only error in my thinking that I've identified and accepted as an error is the one I just mentioned. Hopefully understanding that error will give me the perspective I need to better evaluate any other errors I made.

After all, you seemed able to deny and come up with alternatives for an axiomatic concept, so this isn't the proper way to identify them.

A good point; I was able to come up with alternatives, which would invalidate volition as being axiomatic. I suppose I still do not see how 'illusionary volition' is fundamentally impossible. It would have to be if volition is to be accepted as axiomatic, correct? Not merely dismissable on the basis of being arbitrary, but fundamentally impossible. Alternatives to the other axioms are fundamentally impossible, after all.

If I am incorrect in my definition of an axiomatic concept, could you perhaps relate volition to, say, existence or identity and demonstrate what characteristics identify them as axiomatic concepts? For one, I do not agree that volition is necessary to deny volition. Programmed appropriately, a computer can deny that 2 + 2 = 5, can it not? That the computer is incapable of choosing to evade that knowledge does not change the fact that it is capable of judging the validity of an objective claim.

Edited by The Trendy Cynic
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I suppose I still do not see how 'illusionary volition' is fundamentally impossible. It would have to be if volition is to be accepted as axiomatic, correct? Not merely dismissable on the basis of being arbitrary, but fundamentally impossible. Alternatives to the other axioms are fundamentally impossible, after all.

In order to accept "illusionary volition" you must make a leap of faith just like you do with any other arbitrary claim. Believing in illusionary volition is just like believing in god, ghosts or leprechauns. You must take a step out of the known, observable facts of reality to accept it.

For one, I do not agree that volition is necessary to deny volition. Programmed appropriately, a computer can deny that 2 + 2 = 5, can it not? That the computer is incapable of choosing to evade that knowledge does not change the fact that it is capable of judging the validity of an objective claim.

Programming a computer with an algorithm that evaluates mathematical expressions is not comparable to volition. A computer is not choosing to do anything; it is just following a set of logical instructions (and it is a huge abstraction to even claim that it is doing that). Volition is free will. In order to reject free will, you must use your free will.

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At the moment, the only error in my thinking that I've identified and accepted as an error is the one I just mentioned.

Let us start with my previous example:

The validity or invalidity of a concept would certainly exist without consciousness

Are you saying that concepts exist apart from a conceptual consciousness?

Do you understand your error in the above example?

For one, I do not agree that volition is necessary to deny volition. Programmed appropriately, a computer can deny that 2 + 2 = 5, can it not?

I’m sure you must know that a computer, following a program, is the exact opposite of a volitional consciousness. Be that as it may, you answer your own question in the next sentence:

That the computer is incapable of choosing to evade that knowledge does not change the fact that it is capable of judging the validity of an objective claim.

Judgment and validation are concepts applicable by volitional beings only. So here you accept volition in an attempt to deny it.

May I also say that you are living up to your name. What cynics believe is that nothing is certain, and therefore, that no knowledge is possible. In this way cynicism is a form of nihilism. Should I thank you for the warning implied by your name?

Edited by Marc K.
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I would just like to add that the idea of proof presupposes volition. If man has no volition, "illusory" or otherwise then proof, validation, and reason are all useless; no one has any choice about what he believes, there is no chance for him to change his mind, and discussion is pointless.

In asking for volition to be proved, Trendy Cynic, you are presupposing that you have volition! This is called, I believe, the fallacy of the "stolen concept" . . . treating as primary ("proof") something that presupposes other condtions ("volition") and using that as a basis for attacking the previous position. It is a logical fallacy.

It is perfectly acceptable to ask for a validation of volition. Validation presupposes volition, also. However, it is not acceptable to attempt to contradict this validation by using the thing validated. (I.e. if you want to invalidate volition, you may posit no proof . . . because proof presupposes volition.)

An "illusory" volition would not be volition, just as a mirage in the desert is not water. It would not serve as volition, and examination of it would reveal instantly that it was not volition. (I.e. a "Turing" test, such as given to computers, invariably reveals that, no matter how cunning their programming, they are not possessed of volition.)

Also, to answer your earlier statement about computers producing validation, but not having volition: computers produce numbers. They can check those numbers against other numbers, things like this, i.e. perform calculations, but they do not create information, they merely process it. The validation goes on necessarily within the mind of someone possessing a volitional consciousness.

And the three states of knowledge are not "Impossible" "Possible" and "Arbitrary". They are "Possible", "Probable", and "Certain". If you are going to declare that it is "possible" that man has no volition you need positive evidence to support it, not doubt; i.e. you cannot present the fact that you are personally not certain as evidence that an alternative exists.

There is no such evidence, AND there is a great deal of evidence that contradicts the idea that man has no volition. So, discard your doubt; it is obviously doubt for the sake of doubt, skepticism with no foundation, a house of cards with no cards at the bottom.

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Thanks again for all your help. In the interests of saving a lot of back-and-forth, I've printed out this thread and will study it intently, alongside the first two chapters of OPAR. Hopefully that will serve to clear up a lot of my logical errors. When I'm done that, I'll post here again with whatever loose ends I was unable to tie up on my own.

Sound good?

Another thing: While my knowledge of Objectivist ethics is even more vague than my knowledge of Objectivist metaphysics/epistemology, I want to make sure that I'm not being immoral in coming here and picking your minds without, say, helping you understand something in return. I realise this isn't the ethics forum, but I just want to be sure I'm not blissfully courting immorality in the same way I blissfully courted materialistic determinism.

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Another thing: While my knowledge of Objectivist ethics is even more vague than my knowledge of Objectivist metaphysics/epistemology, I want to make sure that I'm not being immoral in coming here and picking your minds without, say, helping you understand something in return. I realise this isn't the ethics forum, but I just want to be sure I'm not blissfully courting immorality in the same way I blissfully courted materialistic determinism.

This is an Objectivist message board, its purpose is to exchange Objectivist ideas. There is absolutely nothing wrong with coming here, asking questions and trying to gain knowledge. That's why I'm here B)

As long as your intentions are honest, most everyone here is more than happy to help you learn.

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So. I've re-read OPAR chapters one and two, and gone over the replies in this thread with a fine tooth comb (and highlighter, and pen...). Alas, I'm afraid to admit that my findings have taken me back to square one. I suppose the best thing to do is state, specifically, what problems I'm still having.

Illusionary Volition Is Not Arbitrary And Not Impossible

We know that all macroscopic combinations of matter and energy -- all combinations of which we are aware -- adhere to mechanical causality; heck, the sciences wouldn't exist but for this fact. The brain is a macroscopic combination of matter and energy. Thus, there is evidence that it, too, follows mechanical causality. To say otherwise, to claim that there is no evidence that the brain follows mechanical causality (no evidence at all) is to completely obliterate the conceptual level of consciousness!

Don't believe me? Concepts rely on similarity; it is a fundamental component of conceptualizing perceptual concretes into concepts. To conceptualize something, you must draw conclusions based on what you have directly experienced, then apply those conclusions to things you have not experienced. Every single time you see a tree, you do not have to independently validate every characteristic you think you know about trees. In the same way, every time we see macroscopic combinations of matter and energy, we cannot be expected to independently validate every characteristic we think we know about them! We know that every macroscopic combination of matter and energy we see adheres to mechanical causality. To say that this cannot then serve as some evidence in support of the brain (a macroscopic combination of matter and energy) being bound by mechanical causality is patently ridiculous. I'm not saying it's conclusive, of course not. But it's certainly evidence. In that sense, the idea that the brain is mechanically caused is not arbitrary.

Is illusionary volition arbitrary?

We cannot deny the evidence of introspection: It presents us with the undeniable evidence of true volition. In other words, if the brain is mechanically caused, then it is necessary that this brain misrepresents itself as true volition. We have evidence that the brain is mechanically caused and, so, it follows that we have evidence this brain is misrepresenting itself as true volition.

To use an analogy, if I'm walking along the beach and I see footprints in the sand that are twice as long as I am tall, and I know that all things that make footprints I've ever seen are nowhere near that big, is the idea that these footprints are fake (including the necessary idea that someone went to all the trouble to create them) completely baseless and arbitrary? Sure, it's not necessary that someone made them, but I certainly don't think the concept is arbitrary.

Is illusionary volition impossible?

By definition, illusionary volition would present itself as true volition. Any attempt to determine the difference between the two via introspection is, thus, invalidated -- there can be no contradiction presented between introspection and illusionary volition, because the latter trumps the former.

Now, the only evidence I have seen to contradict illusionary volition that doesn't rely on introspection is the assertion that volition is a requirement of validation. I have a feeling that this may be your best bet at solving my problem, so I'll devote a li'l section to it:

Volition As A Requirement For Validation

Obviously, if I can be made to accept this point, then my problem is solved -- I completely agree that it is necessary to validate determinism, and so, if you can show me precisely why volition is necessary for validation, then I'll see exactly how determinism is self-defeating.

Validation is a method of determining the truth or falseness of an idea. One cannot choose what is true and what is false; truth and falseness simply are. Validation, as defined by Dr. Peikoff, "... subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality" (OPAR, pp. 8). A computer, then, validates when it runs a mathematical algorithm: It uses a process to establish an idea's relationship to reality, and by definition, such a process is subsumed under the concept of validation. The computer lacks volition. The computer performs validation, as defined by Peikoff. Is the computer's conclusion rejected immediately merely because the computer does not possess volition? Of course not. But that is exactly what you are doing to the determinist; he is the computer, he is validating an idea in the same way a computer does, and yet you are rejecting the conclusion drawn from that validation because... because... what?

It would be like staring at '2 + 2 = 4' on a computer screen and saying "No, not true, because the computer doesn't have a choice in the matter." But the claim the computer is making is one of objective truth. Isn't dismissing an objective truth about existence solely on the basis of the nature of whatever is stating that truth the evasive, evil opposite of the primacy of existence?

The choice to focus or not to focus has no bearing on the effectiveness of validation, not does any other choice. The validation is either objectively correct if it does not contradict a fundamental axiom, or objectively wrong if it does. There is no gap therein, no need or dependence on volition to somehow validate the method of validation.

Actually, the way I see it, validation is axiomatic. It is the necessary fundamental on which all other knowledge must be based. Before any conclusions can be drawn, about anything, they must be validated -- Peikoff admits that all knowledge must be validated. Validation is the one thing, the only thing that is fundamentally necessary to all knowledge.

Here are some specific problems I had with Peikoff's OPAR:

pp. 63: "The man who is completely out of focus has abdicated his power of choice; he is capable of nothing but passive reaction to stimuli."

So, then, how does one choose to focus, having abdicated the power of choice? How can one "apprehend the need to initiate a thought process" (OPAR p. 61) if one needs to be in focus to have an idea?

pp. 69: "If man's consciousness were automatic, if it did react deterministically to outer or inner forces acting upon it, then, by definition, a man would have no choice in regard to his mental content; he would accept whatever he had to accept, whatever ideas the determining forces engendered in him."

The implication is that the ideas "engendered in him" could not have an impact on what he is being forced to accept, as if they were futile voices screaming from behind the prison bars of determinism. But those ideas would themselves be caused, inner forces, not imprisoned by determinism but part of it. There is no 'voice' inside the determinism; determinism isn't a prison binding consciousness, it is that consciousness. By definition, the opposite to what Peikoff says is true -- the determined consciousness would be unable to dismiss 'whatever ideas' he had. They would be a part of that consciousness, and by definition of determinism, the consciousness would necessarily respond to them in some way.

pp 69: (continued) "In such a case, one could not prescribe methods to guide a man's thought or ask him to justify his ideas; the subject of epistemology would be inapplicable. One cannot ask a person to alter or justify the mentally inescapable, any more than, in physical terms, one can ask him to alter or justify his patellar reflect."

One could prescribe methods, absolutely -- and the man's consciousness would be inescapably bound to evaluating those methods in some way, like a computer checking the validity of 2 + 2 = 4, then adopting or rejecting it in the same way a computer says 'Yes' or 'No.' Peikoff seems to arbitrarily decree what is a cause to a determined consciousness and what is not. Epistemology, like everything else, would be a cause -- upon learning of an epistemology, that consciousness may adopt it or reject it. If it adopted it, then epistemology WOULD be applicable because that consciousness would then use it (inescapably).

The above quotes reflect a disturbingly short-sighted trend in the Objectivist approach to determinism. It seems that the consensus is that determinism is a prison restricting the consciousness it binds. But determinism is that consciousness; this impression of imprisonment is akin to saying that a billiard ball is 'imprisoned' by what it is, restricted from floating into the air by something that is apart from it. Determinism IS consciousness, not some binding force holding it in place. While determinism limits the identity of consciousness, there is no 'someone' lurking within it, pining for escape, otherwise capable of adopting validation or epistemology or justification but for the pesky iron bars around him.

Regardless of the conclusions Objectivism draws about volition and determinism, it's at the very least clear to me that they are poorly described in OPAR. For one, Peikoff spends six lines on the necessity of volition to validation -- and he doesn't explain it, he just states it as if it were self-evident. That's it. Given that this fact is the only evidence that truly contradicts illusionary volition (which he refers to as the definition of determinism on another page), I would have expected quite a bit more explanation of this, especially since his definition of validation on page 8 makes no mention at all of volition.

Edited by The Trendy Cynic
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We cannot deny the evidence of introspection: It presents us with the undeniable evidence of true volition. In other words, if the brain is mechanically caused, then it is necessary that this brain misrepresents itself as true volition. We have evidence that the brain is mechanically caused and, so, it follows that we have evidence this brain is misrepresenting itself as true volition.

I think you may be reversing the hierarchy of knowledge here. We directly observe ourselves choosing, this is directly percieved, it is right at the base of knowledge. Our knowledge that there is a physical world, and that it consists of atoms, and that they behave with billiard ball deterministic causation is much later knowledge. It is an abstract physical theory.

Now the nature of validation is proving your abstract ideas by comparison to the directly given. When an idea contradicts the given it is false. And yet what you seem to be doing here is reversing that: your abstract theory contradicts with the perceptually given, so you keep the theory and throw away the given.

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the brain follows mechanical causality

Also note that one thing about the universe is emergent properties. One example of this is water. Water consists of H and O atoms. Now neither of these has the property of "wetness" so would you say water can not possibly be wet? After all, the water is the H and O.

No - the answer is that in this universe it seems to be possible for wholes to have properties not possessed by any of their parts. Likewise with the brain - it does not automatically follow that because the individual atoms don't have a certain property that the whole can't. It may be true, but it doesn't automatically follow.

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We directly observe ourselves choosing, this is directly percieved, it is right at the base of knowledge.
Yes, but all knowledge must be validated. Too move from 'we observe ourselves choosing' to 'we choose,' one must demonstrate that 'we choose' is necessitated by 'we observe ourselves choosing.' Existence, Identity and Consciousness are all necessitated by our perception of them, as no possible alternative to explain our observation of those facts exists. With volition, however, a possible alternative does exist (illusionary volition). To accept volition, then, that possible alternative must be rejected in some way. The purpose of my last post was to show that the alternative of illusionary volition is neither arbitrary nor impossible, and so it cannot be rejected without further study. This study would qualify as antecedent knowledge, eliminating volition as an axiomatic concept (preceding all knowledge).

Likewise with the brain - it does not automatically follow that because the individual atoms don't have a certain property that the whole can't. It may be true, but it doesn't automatically follow.

I never said that it automatically followed; if it did, then determinism would be an inescapable conclusion. I said that our conceptual knowledge of macroscopic combinations of matter and energy (and the brain is such a beast) as universally exhibiting mechanical causality serves as some evidence that the brain does too. That's all -- it's just enough evidence to elevate 'the brain is mechanically caused' above arbitrariness, thus necessitating some kind of contradicting evidence to be able to identify it as impossible, to reject it, and to accept the alternative as axiomatic.

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Yes, but all knowledge must be validated.

The only knowledge we need to validate is that which comes at the end of a process of reasoning that could have been flawed. The directly perceived does not need validation, and in fact is the standard for knowledge that does. Therefore I see no difference between the two statements 'we observe ourselves choosing' and 'we choose'. I don't consider the second an inference.

And even if there was an inference to validate, I don't think your method would do it. What you are doing is coming up with the best list of explanations you can and then eliminating them one by one. But how do you know you thought up an exhaustive list in the first place?

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The only knowledge we need to validate is that which comes at the end of a process of reasoning that could have been flawed. The directly perceived does not need validation, and in fact is the standard for knowledge that does. Therefore I see no difference between the two statements 'we observe ourselves choosing' and 'we choose'. I don't consider the second an inference.

From "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand," pp. 8:

The above is the validation of the Objectivist axioms [of Existence, Consciousness and Identity]. "Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence. In this sense, one can and must validate every item of knowledge, including axioms. The validation of axioms, however, is the simplest of all: sense perception.

An axiom must be certain, within the context of our knowledge, correct?

An idea cannot be certain if there exists a non-arbitrary, possible alternative, correct?

Illusionary volition is a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to volition, correct?

If you answer yes to all of the above questions, then it necessarily follows that volition is not an axiomatic concept. Here's why (and an answer to the second part of your post):

While sense perception is listed as the method of validating axioms, the relationship of that sense perception to reality must be established (as that is the defined nature of validation in the passage quoted). To do that, one must consider the nature of that relationship: What is that sense perception telling you about reality? To be axiomatic, there can be only one non-arbitrary, possible answer to that question -- otherwise, antecedent knowledge is required to choose between the multiple answers and antecedent knowledge cannot exist for axioms. In other words, the existence of a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to an axiom instantly invalidates that concept as axiomatic.

There exists no non-arbitrary, possible alternative to Existence, Identity and Consciousness. There does exist a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to Volition, which necessarily invalidates Volition as an axiom.

To accept volition as axiomatic, all alternatives must be shown as either arbitrary or impossible. There exists evidence that the brain is mechanically caused, and so the alternative of determinism is not arbitrary. Thus, it is critical to the acceptance of volition that all alternatives are shown to be impossible. Introspection must be discarded as this means of distinguishing between true volition and illusionary volition (which, I remind you, is not arbitrary), and so there must exist some other means of distinguishing. The validation vs. volition thing is, I believe, that means, and I'm hoping that when it's explained further it will allow me to reject illusionary volition as impossible.

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From "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand," pp. 8:

The above is the validation of the Objectivist axioms [of Existence, Consciousness and Identity]. "Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence.

Note that Peikoff says, correctly, that perceptual self-evidence is a means of validation, all by itself.

See that volition? There it is. Look and see!

An idea cannot be certain if there exists a non-arbitrary, possible alternative, correct?

There does exist a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to Volition, which necessarily invalidates Volition as an axiom.

Wrong. Your "possible" alternative to volition is entirely arbitrary, having no basis in reality whatsoever. There are no objective facts of existence which could suggest the possibility. The only "evidence" you have to present to suggest it is a wild concoction of anti-consciousness from your imagination. If you want to say it isn't arbitrary, we need evidence, and you will have to come up with it without using volition!

There exists evidence that the brain is mechanically caused, and so the alternative of determinism is not arbitrary.

You are equivocating on 'brain' and 'volition'. The two terms are not the same thing. The physical brain gives rise to volition, as a sum of its parts, in the same way that a mass of metal, plastic, and rubber, properly arranged into a car, can propel one at hundreds of miles per hour. The propulsion is not the car. It is no more mystical a process just because we do not currently understand the mechanics of it.

Volition is not something you see, hear, taste, touch, or feel with your fingers. Your brain is. The fact that one causes the other, and the fact that the method of that causation is unknown, doesn't negate the fact it it so.

Look and see. It is the only way to answer the question "Can I choose, or not?" Even in asking that very question, you must choose to ask it! And that is why it is axiomatic -- you must use volition in order to question volition. In fact, every miniscule fiber of thought you have involves a choice -- the choice to continue thinking. So, if you must choose to continue thinking, or think at all, then isn't volition at the root of all reason? And if volition is at the root of reason, it is anticedant to all thought.. including the idea of postulating alternatives to volition.

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