On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[Bold Standard]

There's something still confusing me about the terminology in this discussion. In speaking of "material consciousness", you seem to be setting up a dichotomy between the material and the supernatural.

But if "consciousness" were really "material", wouldn't that mean that if I imagined a green vampire with six eyes, there would then exist in physical reality a green vampire with six eyes? Isn't there such a thing as the non-material, non-supernatural realm of cognition?

To say that such a realm exists, and that it *is* human consciousness.. one needn't contradict the fact that this realm arises from physical matter- the brain. And one needn't contradict the fact that consciousness is still an existential phenomenon that is causal and has identity. It's just to say that human consciounsess is non-material, ie- mental. But not supernatural. Therefore, the functions of the human mind- being non-material, need not conform to the laws of physical determinism, but must conform to the laws of causality.. which, occuring in the human mind, which is by it's identity and nature governed by free will- "the fundamental choice to think or not to think", a principle that could not govern inanimate non-conscious matter, but that *must* govern human cognition.

Have I misunderstood something here?

Edited February 23, 2005 by Bold Standard

[TomL]

The above is the validation of the Objectivist axioms [of Existence, Consciousness and Identity]. "Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence. In this sense, one can and must validate every item of knowledge, including axioms. The validation of axioms, however, is the simplest of all: sense perception.

I will point out also that there are 3 methods of validation and no others (including imagination!). Further, concepts involving consciousness cannot be directly perceived. And, since axioms have no anticedant knowledge, then self-evidency is the only means of validating an axiom of consciousness such as volition. One cannot deduce or induce where no anticedant knowledge exists as fuel for the process, and your entire argument for an illusory volition relies on deduction.

Edited February 23, 2005 by TomL

[JMeganSnow]

An axiom must be certain, within the context of our knowledge, correct?

An idea cannot be certain if there exists a non-arbitrary, possible alternative, correct?

Illusionary volition is a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to volition, correct?

The idea of certainty presupposes a process of logical thought . . . it is the final step whereby a hypothesis becomes a demonstrated theory. You cannot be "certain" of axioms, you can either accept them or not.

However, you have implicitly accepted the validity of volition throughout the course of this discussion. It's axiomatic status is demonstrated in the fact that, in order to attempt to deny it, you must accept it. It is fundamental to ALL knowledge. If you don't "believe" in volition (i.e. accept the validation) you must forego all knowledge (of which volition is a base) all action, all thought, and essentially "close one's mouth, expound no theories, and die."

To do anything else is a contradiction. If you don't want to accept the axioms, fine, you don't have to accept them. However, it is the worst kind of hypocrisy to say that you don't accept them WHILE YOU ARE USING THEM.

I don't know why you are insisting that there is an "alternative" to volition. There is an "alternative" to existence, too . . . "non-existence", however, this "alternative" cannot even be grasped without first accepting the axiom of existence, and then postulating that some things don't exist, and then extrapolating that, in theory, everything that does exist could cease to exist.

What is "illusory" volition? A thing is itself . . . there is no halfway. So either "illusory" volition is NOT volition, or, it IS volition. Are you saying that something can perfectly mimic volition in all ways and all respects without, in fact, being volition? The very idea is absurd.

[IDC]

From "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand," pp. 8:

The above is the validation of the Objectivist axioms [of Existence, Consciousness and Identity]. "Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence. In this sense, one can and must validate every item of knowledge, including axioms. The validation of axioms, however, is the simplest of all: sense perception.

OK, I should have included direct perception as an instance of validation. But as it is just looking I didn't really consider it a process.

I think you may be misinterpreting this quote though. It seems to me you are saying: right, I have this perception of myself with free will, but how do I know I really have it? How do I know this perception is not an illusion? I need to eliminate all other possible causes of it except real free will.

So what you are working from is a model where there is real free will (or maybe not) in reality out there, and then your perception of it, and then you have to insert reason in between the perception and the real reality to validate it (the perception). So when Peikoff says "establishing the relationship to reality" you think this is what he is talking about. It is not, allow me to explain.

In the Objectivist model there is no separate/real reality out there against which perceptions are verified (through reason or any other method). The perceptions are reality. (see my short essay posted in the Epistemology section a few days ago for how to see this.) The process of establishing a link to reality that Peikoff speaks of means taking some reasoning of yours and reducing it to the perceptions, not to some other separate reality. Everything is always reduced to perception and no further.

This is because epistemologically, perception is the base. You might say that in the physical world there are earlier causes to the perception, and this is true. But epistemologically, that perception is a starting point of knowledge and can not be invalidated by anything less fundamental, such as a physical theory of atoms.

An axiom must be certain, within the context of our knowledge, correct?

An idea cannot be certain if there exists a non-arbitrary, possible alternative, correct?

Illusionary volition is a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to volition, correct?

If you answer yes to all of the above questions, then it necessarily follows that volition is not an axiomatic concept. Here's why (and an answer to the second part of your post):

Yes an axiom must be certain.

Yes an idea can not be certain once there is an non-arbitrary alternative, but this only applies to abstract conclusions, not the directly perceived. How can reality be uncertain? The concept doesn't apply.

No, you have not shown illusory volition to be non arbitrary. You have argued that based on our experience with other physical entities, the action of the brain is likely determined, but the brain is not consciousness. The brain is grey matter and neural nodes and electrical signals. Consciousness is awareness of existence. One may depend on the other for its existence, but they are not the same (just look at the descriptions). What the exact relationship between the brain and consciousness is is a question for scientists, there's no way to answer through philosophy alone. But many Objectivists believe consciousness to be a non-physical emergent property of the brain, whose attributes are learned through introspection.

[AisA]

Thus, it is critical to the acceptance of volition that all alternatives are shown to be impossible. Introspection must be discarded as this means of distinguishing between true volition and illusionary volition (which, I remind you, is not arbitrary), and so there must exist some other means of distinguishing. The validation vs. volition thing is, I believe, that means, and I'm hoping that when it's explained further it will allow me to reject illusionary volition as impossible.

"Illusionary volition" is indeed an arbitrary proposition. As I pointed out in my prior post, it is arbitrary by its very nature, because it postulates the existence of things (the determinants) that are defined to be outside of man's awareness -- they must be defined as outside man's awareness, otherwise man could become aware of them and no longer be determined.

That which is outside of man's awareness is outside the province of proof and validation. That is the essence of an arbitrary proposition -- it is a proposition that postulates the existence of something (or the occurrence of some event) outside the bounds of proof and validation -- like god, for instance -- something that can never be proved or validated in any way.

The fact that the mind of man is the only matter yet identified that gives rise to volition is not evidence that it cannot do so, and it is not grounds for discarding the evidence of our own introspection.

[The Trendy Cynic]

I'm quite impressed with (and appreciative of) your intellectual fortitude... were our positions reversed, I'd likely have thrown my hands up in the air or made liberal use of the head-banging emoticon and gone off to a less frustrating discussion.

I think breaking down my thinking into bite-sized questions is the best way to help you see exactly where I'm wrong, so that's what I'm going to keep doing. Basically, if you can do what IDC did by answering 'Yes' to my reasoning until I screw up, I think that will be most helpful. I am determined (pun intended) to understand this, and I'm going to keep at it until I do or there's no one left who's willing to talk to me

Anyways, please, if you're still willing, ask me to expand on a point or answer a question you'd like clarified or think I haven't addressed.

Here is a road-map to how I'm thinking. I'm breaking this down into sub-arguments; as I see it, each sub-argument is completely self-sufficient and should stand or fail only on its own merits:

Argument #1: Axioms As The Only Possible Alternative

I see a lot of people saying "it's perceptually self-evident; look and see, there it is." That's a very effective phrase, because it presents the only evidence that can exist in support of an axiom: It is a necessary condition of axioms. But is this truly a sufficient condition of axioms? Is the fact that something is evident to our perceptions truly enough to identify it as axiomatic, without having to consider possible alternatives?

If perceptual self-evidency is sufficient identification of axioms, then everything that appears to our perceptions must be accepted as it appears, axiomatically and inarguably. The stars are actually pinpricks of white light; that's perceptually self-evident: "Look and see, there it is." The sun actually spins around the Earth: "Look and see, there it is." Sticks actually bend when you put them into water: "Look and see, there it is." We actually do possess the faculty of choice: "Look and see, there it is."

To use introspection as your only evidence of volition -- and to stop there -- is no different from the Christians who persecuted Galileo for arguing against the self-evidency of the sun's passage around the Earth.

All knowledge, all axioms, are ultimately an explanation of perceptual evidence. For an explanation of perceptual evidence to be considered axiomatic, it must exist prior to any antecedent knowledge. To validate an explanation of perceptual evidence as 'true,' there can exist no valid (ie. possible) alternatives to explain that evidence. Why not? Because arbitrary and impossible alternatives can be dismissed without antecedent knowledge, but possible alternatives cannot, and to accept something as axiomatic one cannot make use of antecedent knowledge.

Existence, Consciousness and Identity are axiomatic, because only impossible and/or arbitrary alternatives exist -- all of which can be rejected without appealing to antecedent knowledge.

Obviously, 'look and see, there it is' is not sufficient to accept something as axiomatic. What else must we consider? The answer is obvious: Any and all possible alternatives (NOT imagined/random/arbitrary, NOT impossible) that would also explain the evidence presented.

Conclusion: To be axiomatic, a concept cannot possess possible (ie. non-arbitrary, non-impossible) alternatives.

Argument #2: Determinism Is Not Arbitrary (ie. Not Randomly Imagined)

We can use perceptual evidence we have gained about the observed referents of a concept as evidence in making conclusions about those referents we have not observed, correct?

Example: The concept of 'tree.' Through perceptual evidence, I have observed that trees are solid. The next time I see something that appears to be a tree, I am justified in applying the perceptual evidence I have observed about other trees to this new existent, this tree-like thing in front of me.

Let's apply this to the concept of 'macroscopic combination of matter and energy' (for brevity, I'm going to call those things 'physical objects'). Through perceptual evidence, I have observed that all physical objects can only give rise to mechanically determined existents. Thus, the next time I see a physical object, I am justified in applying this fact as evidence that it, too, can only give rise to mechanically determined existents.

A crucial sidenote here: I am not saying that this necessitates that physical objects can only give rise to mechanically determined existents, only that the perceptual evidence I've acquired from all other physical objects can be used as some evidence that any given physical object shares those characteristics.

The brain is a physical object and, so, I am justified in applying as evidence the fact that all physical objects I have observed can only give rise to mechanically determined existents.

Now, right here we reach the elimination of this idea that a deterministic consciousness is arbitrary. To be arbitrary, there can exist no evidence for it. But the exact same type of evidence I use to conclude that a given tree is solid is also being used to conclude that the brain can only give rise to deterministic consciousness: There is objective evidence to support this. Once again, this by itself is not conclusive -- it seems to me that some of you are presenting a false dichotomy between 'necessary' and 'arbitrary,' when all I am struggling to support is something in between: 'possible.'

So. Regardless of your conclusions based on introspection or anything else, the fact is that some evidence does exist to support the idea that the brain can only give rise to mechanical causality: It is a physical object, and all physical objects of which I am aware can only give rise to mechanical causality. I simply cannot see how this evidence can be completely, utterly dismissed, which is necessary if you want to identify this claim as arbitrary.

Here's a scenario that I think is analogous to the discussion we're having. Imagine all of us are in a forest, surrounded by trees (physical objects). We've come across one very odd looking, strangely shaped tree that's apparently covered in glass (that one physical object that's apparently giving rise to volition).

Me: "Hmm. Something's not right about this."

You: "What do you mean? Obviously, it's a tree. Obviously, it's covered in glass. Look, run your hands along it. Look and see."

Me: "Well, yes, I agree that it looks like glass, but shouldn't we at least consider that it might be something else, something that doesn't contradict what we know about all other trees, something, perhaps, like sap that LOOKS like glass?"

You: "What evidence do you have of this glass-like sap? That's entirely arbitrary! The fact that it is glass is self-evident. Look. Touch it. We have no evidence to support that this isn't glass or that the tree is incapable of growing it."

Me: "No, the idea that aliens have come down and tricked me into thinking this tree is here would be completely arbitrary, but we know that trees sprout sap, and I don't see anything contradictory about the idea of sap that resembles glass. Besides, how would a tree sprout glass?"

You: "Somehow. I'm sure we'll figure it out one day... but there's no way that anything could ever be found to contradict this self-evident fact that this tree is clearly covered in glass and that it somehow sprouted it."

Me: "But no other trees are covered in glass. Every other tree we know of can't grow glass out of its bark. Shouldn't we entertain the possibility that things aren't as they seem?"

You: "Nope. Just accept that it's glass, that the tree grew it, and let's move along, never to consider it again."

I can't see how this scenario could ever end with me following you guys out of the forest. I'd still be there with my pick and test-tubes, trying to figure out what it is about this tree or this glass that makes it so special, and I'm not going to be able to 'just accept it' when possible, non-arbitrary alternative explanations exist that DON'T contradict the evidence.

Anyways. At this point, following what I believe to be an unbroken chain of logic from inarguable premises, I have arrived at the conclusion that some objective evidence exists to support the idea that consciousness is mechanically determined. Please, please note the emphasis -- again, this is not to say that this is necessary, only that it is not arbitrary, such that it occupies that state in between of possible.

Conclusion: Determinism is not an arbitrary (or randomly imagined) assertion; some objective evidence exists to support it.

Argument #3: Determinism Is Not Impossible

For something to be impossible, there must exist contradicting evidence. Contradicting evidence is evidence that necessarily forbids the claim on the basis of the law of identity (A is A).

Introspection shows to us that we possess volition. Is that contradictory to determinism? Surely not, nothing about introspection necessarily forbids the claim of determinism.

In fact, the opposite is true: Determinism would necessarily forbid the idea of being aware of it.

Many of you have spent time showing the necessary consequences of accepting determinism. You are right: To accept determinism would result in a cerebral meltdown, nihilism and ultimate destruction. If determinism were true, then no determined species could possibly be aware of his deterministic consciousness because such awareness would, as you have shown, necessarily result in that species' destruction! Determinism does necessitate the invalidity of introspection. Introspection, on the other hand, does not necessitate the invalidity of determinism.

So. What else exists to contradict determinism? That's what I'm looking for. At this point, something other than introspection must demonstrate that determinism is completely impossible (ie. necessarily contradictory).

Conclusion: Some evidence, unrelated to introspection, must demonstrate that determinism is necessarily contradictory if volition is to be accepted as axiomatic.

Now, I think I am right with this conclusion. I think my error is in thinking that there does NOT exist some evidence, unrelated to introspection, to demonstrate the impossibility of determinism. I still don't understand the logic behind volition being a requirement of validation (I don't even understand it enough to disagree with it... the idea just makes me go 'huh...?').

[JMeganSnow]

Introspection shows to us that we possess volition. Is that contradictory to determinism? Surely not, nothing about introspection necessarily forbids the claim of determinism.

Introspection doesn't forbid determinism; VOLITION does. Heck, you just stated yourself that "I have volition . . . but I don't have volition."

Where are you getting this stuff?

You're pulling the "possible" alternatives stuff out of the air, too. You DON'T HAVE TO EXAMINE ALTERNATIVES in order to accept axioms. You must examine the evidence (which is readily available through any act of perception) and make your judgement based on that.

You are essentially saying that, because there COULD be gremlins on Venus that are controlling us with secret rays we can't detect, that we can't be sure we have volition, even though we OBSERVE we have volition and we have never observed gremlins on Venus with Mind control rays. Substitute any determinist factor for gremlins on Venus and you get the same result, and the same absurdity.

Placing the determinist factor outside reality (as AisA says, outside the realm of observation and proof) is a tactic similar to what theists use to defend the existence of god . . . i.e. argument from ignorance. "We don't know EVERYTHING, so you can't say for sure god doesn't exist . . ." Well, I can certainly say that god contradicts Identity, and hence is an absurdity. Ditto for determinism, which contradicts volition.

[Marc K.]

The Trendy Cynic:

You are avoiding the truth by evading my question.

The validity or invalidity of a concept would certainly exist without consciousness

The reason I have posed this question three times now is because it is at the root of many of your problems. Innumerable times you have ascribed the qualities of a volitional, conceptual consciousness to inanimate matter and existence itself, this is the fallacy of the stolen concept.

Let me help you by being explicit in the answer to the above question.

Concepts (or “ideas” in your usage) do not exist apart from a conceptual consciousness.

If you go back and apply this knowledge of the fallacy of the stolen concept to your posts many of your problems will be resolved.

I doubt you will however since you don’t even acknowledge the arbitrary nature of your claim. What you are asking us to do is: go to a magic show and when the magician makes a lion disappear, accept as a "possibility" that the lion actually did disappear.

By accepting “illusionary volition” you are not only denying volition but existence, consciousness, and identity also since these are concepts established by a volitional, conceptual consciousness, not a computer program. When Objectivists look at the world they see reality, when you look at the world you see some illusion.

...

Let me say, however, that the thoroughly arbitrary nature of your claim and complete lack of evidence have convinced me. I propose an experiment to prove it.

I (as part of this cosmic billiard game) command you to go lie down and never move again, never choose again. We will prove to these ignorant Objectivists that choice has nothing to do with life.

When you get hungry, ignore it, it is only an illusion conspiring against you to make you believe that you must choose to eat.

Don’t worry, you won’t die, as long as you believe strongly enough that the illusion is real.

Of course if you do die these overly rational Objectivists will cite this as evidence that you chose to die but you and I (well, you’ll be dead, so at least I) will know that your sacrifice served the greater purpose of the continued illusion of volition. God speed.

[Inspector]

Introspection must be discarded as this means of distinguishing between true volition and illusionary volition (which, I remind you, is not arbitrary)

Actually, the theory of illusory volition IS arbitrary. Just because you have evidence AGAINST mechanical volition does not mean that you have evidence FOR illusory volition. That took me some thinking to reach, so you may want to re-read a few times.

[Inspector]

Look at the tree example from my perspecive:

Suppose we are in a forest. We observe all the trees in order and every single one of them is brown. As we come to the last tree, we are both surprised to find that it appears red.

Me: "Wow, a red tree."

You: "No, there is no red tree. All trees have brown bark. There are unknowable gremlins on the far side of venus, shooting mind beams at us that cause us to see this last tree as red."

Me: "But that's totally arbitrary. We can see the tree is red, and in the absence of any other evidence, we must conclude it is simply different from all other trees."

You: "My claim isn't arbitrary, since the inductive evidence of all the other trees casts doubt on our perceptual evidence that this last one is red. After all, sticks seem to bend in water."

Me: "But the claim that sticks do not bend in water can be TESTED. Since we can NEVER test the claim that there are unknowable gremlins (since they are UNKNOWABLE), then it is ARBITRARY."

[AisA]

To be arbitrary, there can exist no evidence for it.

In the first place, the existence of unique phenomena is not an impossibility. There is no metaphysical law against it. The absence of volition in anything other than the human mind is not evidence of anything (other than the uniqueness of the human mind). An absence cannot be evidence of a presence, the presence of determinism.

Your analogy with the trees is faulty because the identity of man's mind, i.e. its biochemical and biophysical make-up, is indeed unique. There is literally no other matter in existence like it. It is not surprising that it possess unique properties. It is not surprising that of all living tissue masses, it is the only one capable of volition (that we know of so far).

In the second place, postulating the existence of determinants that are outside of man's awareness is inherently arbitrary, no matter what other evidence may exist. As Ms. Snow said, one may as well attribute our apparent volition to gremlins on Venus with mind control rays.

[IDC]

Is the fact that something is evident to our perceptions truly enough to identify it as axiomatic, without having to consider possible alternatives?

No. The perception tells us that it is self-evidently true, not that it is an axiom. You seem to be defining axiom as any piece of knowledge that is not dependant on antecedent knowledge for it's validity. That is not what "axiom" means in Objectivism. What it means is that a fact is presupposed by all subsequent knowledge. If you invalidate the axiom you invalidate everything.

So a perception of a table is self-evidently true, but not an axiom: everything else you know does not depend on what you know about that table. But everything you know does presuppose the facts of existence, identity and consciousness. If you invalidate one of them you know nothing. So they are both self-evident and axiomatic.

I have not been arguing that free will is an axiom, merely that it is self-evidently true. Though in fact it is a philosophic axiom (something presupposed by many philosophical concepts), that is a side issue to the fact of it's truth.

everything that appears to our perceptions must be accepted as it appears, axiomatically and inarguably

Yes. Now you're getting it.

To use introspection as your only evidence of volition -- and to stop there -- is no different from the Christians who persecuted Galileo for arguing against the self-evidency of the sun's passage around the Earth.

It is different. Galileo was offering a different explanation for the movements of the Sun, he was not saying there is no Sun.

You are thinking there is an appearance of choice but you have a different explanation for it. There's two things here: first, the appearance exists, therefore like everything else that exists it is what it is. That perception of choice, is choice. Second, explanations just explain things, they don't cancel them out. So any explanation you come up with would have to end "and therefore we have free will."

[The Trendy Cynic]

You guys type too fast. I've deleted and rewritten this post three times only to have to start again because I find more responses when I go to preview it

You are thinking there is an appearance of choice but you have a different explanation for it. There's two things here: first, the appearance exists, therefore like everything else that exists it is what it is. That perception of choice, is choice. Second, explanations just explain things, they don't cancel them out. So any explanation you come up with would have to end "and therefore we have free will."

"That perception of choice, is choice."

So any explanation you come up with would have to end "and therefore we have free will."

Wow. That's good. Very good. Okay. Before I leap on the bandwagon like I did a few posts ago, only to revert back and infuriate the lot of you, I need to think on that.

Let me apply what I believe that validation to be to the tree conversation (I really think I learn best by analogies, combined with explanations of the ways in which those analogies don't exactly relate to the original subject matter). In fact, I responded to Inspector's tree conversation, then read your post, and that let me type up the final bolded line that, as I see it, is very persuasive. However, even though I'm on the cusp of accepting this now, please let me know if the way in which I applied it to the tree conversation wasn't right (I want to make sure my logic is sound, not merely the conclusions I'm drawing).

Inspector: "Wow, a red tree."

Me: "Yes, it certainly looks like a red tree. Every tree I've ever seen is brown, though. I would like to consider the possibility that this is not really a red tree."

Inspector: "But that's totally arbitrary. We can see the tree is red, and in the absence of any other evidence, we must conclude it is simply different from all other trees."

Me: "But there is other evidence: The fact that all of the other trees I've seen aren't red. That is, at least, some evidence that trees aren't red, right? Am I not able to apply knowledge I know about things I have observed to draw general conclusions about all of those things? In this case, my knowledge about the trees I have observed says that trees are not red. Before I accept that this tree is actually red, can I not responsibly say that this may not be a red tree, based on that knowledge?"

Inspector: "(I still haven't gotten an answer from anyone that I could slip in here, and would really like one just to tie up those loose ends)"

Me: "If there is evidence that all trees aren't red, and this tree appears red to us, then something about its appearance must be deceptive. Thus, as there is evidence that all trees aren't red, then there is also evidence that this tree's appearance is deceptive in some way. Should we not even consider that possibility?"

Inspector: "No. Any and all possible alternatives to what we see are irrelevant. Our perceptions tell us that this is a red tree... considering that it might be something other, whatever its strange difference from other trees, is pointless, illogical and arbitrary, despite the evidence that all trees are brown."

Me: "But why, then, is this tree red when all of the others in the forest are brown?"

Inspector: "No clue."

Me: "You don't think that this tree deserves a little bit more study, a consideration of possible explanations for its incredibly strange nature? The evidence that I have gathered from other trees seems to support the possibility that trees are not red. If trees aren't red, then something must be making this tree appear red, right?"

(And that's where I ended it, expecting Inspector to have to re-evaluate his own argument to continue our back-and-forth. Here is the line I added after reading IDC's post:)

Inspector: "That may all be true. But regardless, it is a red tree. It is a tree and it is red. Whatever the nature of that redness, it is red. Martians could be painting it with interplanetary red-rifles, and that would be making the tree red, but the tree IS red. Any explanation of that redness will only serve to explain why the tree is red, such as pulse rifles, not that it 'really isn't.'"

Right?

Marc K: I debate on religious websites frequently, and I know how frustrating it is to ask a question repeatedly and have your opponent ignore you. I was not deliberately evading your question, I just did not see the relevance to the discussion at hand. Even so, I shouldn't have ignored you after you repeated yourself that second time, and I apologize. To answer your question: Of course, concepts cannot exist independent of a consciousness. To relate that to this discussion, however, you must show that either concepts or consciousness cannot exist without volition. Please do

That perception of choice IS choice. Very nice. That makes sense, at least for now. IDC, if I can't find fault with that by tomorrow, you've earned a place in my signature line with my profuse thanks

Edited February 23, 2005 by The Trendy Cynic

[JMeganSnow]

To answer your question: Of course, concepts cannot exist independent of a consciousness. To relate that to this discussion, however, you must show that either concepts or consciousness cannot exist without volition. Please do

I'm sorry, but this is nonsensical, both as a question and as a requirement to relate Mark's question back to the discussion. In brief: Are (some) animals conscious? Yes. Do animals have volition? No. Therefore consciousness can exist without volition. Volition presupposes consciousness. You may want to have a look at some of the ITOE discussion threads in the Premium Forums section.

Concepts cannot be formed (by humans) without volition, because man possesses a volitional consciousness; i.e. he must choose whether to use it or not, how to direct it, etc. Is there such thing as a non-volitional, conceptual consciousness? I have no clue. I don't even know how such a thing would work. It is outside the purvue of this conversation because we're talking about humans, here.

I would posit that, in order to be conceptual a consciousness must be volitional, otherwise it would be in the realm of percieving Aristotle's essenses directly, and, since no such essences exist (whether in objects or in some supernatural other plane), no such method of directly forming concepts would function. I'm not 100% sure about this conclusion, but I think I'll have to wait until I meet some space aliens with a non-volitional consciousness before I can say further.

Such a consciousness would also be outside the realm of philosophy; it would function automatically, infalliably (falliability meaning here an erroneous formation of concepts), it would need no process of logic (in fact, such a process would be impossible to it), no philosophy, no guide to action, it would perceive these directly from the concretes surrounding it.

So, I really think that such a thing is impossible.

[Inspector]

I'll try my best...

Changes in blue!

Inspector: "Wow, a red tree."

Me: "Yes, it certainly looks like a red tree. Every tree I've ever seen is brown, though. I would like to consider the possibility that this is not really a red tree because unknowable things may be making it appear red."

Inspector: "But that's totally arbitrary. We can see the tree is red, and in the absence of any other evidence, we must conclude it is simply different from all other trees."

Me: "But there is other evidence: The fact that all of the other trees I've seen aren't red. That is, at least, some evidence that trees aren't red, right? Am I not able to apply knowledge I know about things I have observed to draw general conclusions about all of those things? In this case, my knowledge about the trees I have observed says that trees are not red. Before I accept that this tree is actually red, can I not responsibly say that this may not be a red tree, based on that knowledge?"

Inspector: "(Such evidence is only valid when lacking any counterexample.)"

Me: "If there is evidence that all trees aren't red, and this tree appears red to us, then something about its appearance must be deceptive. Thus, as there is evidence that all trees aren't red, then there is also evidence that this tree's appearance is deceptive in some way. Should we not even consider that possibility?"

Inspector: "You don't actually have conclusive evidence that trees CANNOT be red. You only have a lot of brown trees. In fact, the exisence of a red tree INVALIDATES your claim that all trees are brown. If you had any EVIDENCE that this tree was not in fact red (such as discovering a martian), you'd be on to something. But you don't."

Me: "But why, then, is this tree red when all of the others in the forest are brown?"

Inspector: "No clue."

Me: "You don't think that this tree deserves a little bit more study, a consideration of possible explanations for its incredibly strange nature? The evidence that I have gathered from other trees seems to support the possibility that trees are not red. If trees aren't red, then something must be making this tree appear red, right?"

Inspector: "Of course I think it deserves more study... by the specific sciences. Philosophy, however, concludes that the tree is RED. Martians could be making it red, but not only ISN'T there evidence for that, but by definition, THERE CAN NEVER BE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THERE ARE MARTIANS, because they are not merely unknown, but unknowable martians. THAT is what makes your claim arbitrary."

Edited February 23, 2005 by Inspector

[IDC]

Inspector: "That may all be true. But regardless, it is a red tree. It is a tree and it is red. Whatever the nature of that redness, it is red. Martians could be painting it with interplanetary red-rifles, and that would be making the tree red, but the tree IS red. Any explanation of that redness will only serve to explain why the tree is red, such as pulse rifles, not that it 'really isn't.'"

Right?

Yes, correct.

[The Trendy Cynic]

Just a few more meanderings I've had on the subject, some of which may be interesting to those of you with a morbid curiosity on exactly how my logic derailed itself:

I now realise that it is impossible to know anything if your thoughts are determined by factors you are not aware of. To know something, you must accept as objectively true every single one of the causes that led to that knowledge (otherwise you cannot accept that knowledge as objective truth). But to accept something, you must be aware of it. Thus, it follows that to know something, you must be aware of every one of the causes that led to that knowledge. Volition, then, is necessary to validation not because volition is somehow implicitly inherent to the definition of validation (this is what I was trying, unsuccessfully, to nail down), but because any alternative to volition requires some lack of awareness about the methods of your own mind -- and such a lack of awareness immediately and inarguably contradicts any method of acquiring knowledge.

I also realise now that any assertion of illusionary volition is arbitrary. My stumbling block was in considering the brain alone. Yes, the brain is a physical object, and I can apply the evidence I have acquired about physical objects to the brain: Its component processes likely involve mechanical determinism; this statement is not arbitrary. But the relationship of the brain to consciousness is unprecedented. It does not follow that evidence that the brain is mechanically determined translates to evidence that consciousness is mechanically determined, because there is no set of perceptual observations that I have made about such a brain-consciousness relationship that would allow me to draw conclusions about it.

Another point I was concocting. It is fundamentally impossible to observe the nature of consciousness from the 'outside looking in;' one can observe the brain from the outside looking in, but one can only observe consciousness from the 'inside looking out.' It is impossible to make any statements of knowledge about a relationship between two existents (such as "the brain gives rise to mechanically determined consciousness") unless you are capable, in some way, of conceiving of that relationship from the same perspective. It is self-evident that there exists a fundamental difference between the perspective with which we observe the brain and the perspective with which we observe consciousness; there is a fundamental conceptual rift between the two. I don't consider this affirmation of the mind/body conflict, because the conflict is not between the existents or their natures -- the conflict is between our perspective of each existent and the nature by which we can conceptualize them.

Thanks so much to all of you. I'm stunned that you stuck with me this long, and with such willing patience to help me work through this -- I hope you understand my dogged insistence on understanding it fully before I accepted it and moved on to the next chapter While I told myself I wouldn't jump to conclusions without first sleeping on it, I'm fairly certain that I've figured out (and agree with) all of the objections and refutations of determinism you were presenting.

Onward ho, I say!

[TomL]

I missed most of the last part of this thread due to work. Darn.

I now realise that it is impossible to know anything if your thoughts are determined by factors you are not aware of.

A looong time ago in this thread, I told you that's where it would lead. It was about where I said "We're all just dust in the wind, dude."

any alternative to volition requires some lack of awareness about the methods of your own mind -- and such a lack of awareness immediately and inarguably contradicts any method of acquiring knowledge.

I also realise now that any assertion of illusionary volition is arbitrary....there is no set of perceptual observations that I have made about such a brain-consciousness relationship that would allow me to draw conclusions about it.

Oh thank goodness. I've been saying that all along, and I'm glad you've decided to live

Thanks so much to all of you. I'm stunned that you stuck with me this long, and with such willing patience to help me work through this -- I hope you understand my dogged insistence on understanding it fully before I accepted it and moved on to the next chapter

Onward ho, I say!

It was my pleasure (I won't speak for anyone else) I would like to state also that this kind of thing is exactly what I have been doing in my IRC channel, #objectivist on the Undernet IRC network. I'd like to extend a personal invitation to everyone who participated in this thread to come join us. If you don't have an IRC program or don't know how to use one, you can get into the chat channel from my website at http://www.objectivistchat.com/

I have been reading the other replies to "Cynic" and have noticed some incredibly good stuff from just about everyone, and I'd enjoy the company. I'm also looking for trustworthy channel ops

Just don't expect someone to be there talking all the time -- sometimes we're busy, so hang around as long as you can and we'll talk to you if we see you.

[nimble]

Im having a hard time coming up with refutations to determinist theories, without becoming a compatiblist....Can anyone help me and explain why causality and free will can co-exist and work?

[Inspector]

Big thread on that one already... pretty recent, too. Try a search.

[JMeganSnow]

Yes, right here.

[The Trendy Cynic]

Yes, right here.

Woo, I'm famous

Actually, returning to this issue and summarizing it will be useful to my continued grasp of the nature of volition and the rejection of determinism.

There were two main points brought to bear in the rejection of determinism outlined in that thread.

The first point is that free choice is absolutely necessary to knowing anything. Through introspection, you can see that you have free choice. Thus, if your consciousness is determined, then it's clear that this free choice you can sense must be illusionary: You are not aware of all of the causes that force you to think a thought or make a choice, otherwise you wouldn't be able to believe you're doing it freely.

Human minds are fallible, though. It is obvious that the inner workings of your mind are not a perfect means of observing reality. These causes, then, that you're unaware of, are likewise fallible -- and you have absolutely no way of judging or evaluating them, as you're unaware of them. Any attempt to judge anything, any attempt at thought, is pre-empted by these mysterious, unknowable, fallible causes that you are forced to follow. When you 'trust' knowledge, how do you know that you aren't being forced to trust it, forced to believe in something that's a lie, by these mysterious causes that exist beneath your awareness? The problem I had in grasping this first point was grasping the pervasiveness of this fact. Every thought is affected, when holding to this theory. No thought can be trusted, no shred of knowledge, however trivial, accepted with any confidence whatsoever.

The second point attacks the reason for considering that determinism is even possible. Determinism rests on the false assumption that one can make conclusions about the nature of consciousness by making inferences about the nature of the brain as a physical object. We look around us and observe all manner of physical objects, of which the brain is one. We observe that all physical objects operate under mechanical causality (cause-and-effect, like dominoes falling), and so we can infer that the brain behaves in the same manner, based on these observations. This is not an entirely unreasonable conclusion to draw, because we can immediately observe the similarities between the brain and other physical objects. The point to grasp is that all of this reasoning is based on our observation of these existents, and the conclusions we can draw based on the similarities between these observations.

The error is to then make another, similar leap of logic and state that because the brain likely follows mechanical causality, that consciousness does, too. This requires a separate evaluation of the similarities between our observations, this time among physical objects and the processes that arise from them. The problem here is that consciousness is utterly unique; our observation of the brain-consciousness relationship bears no similarity, even remotely, between any other relationship we have observed. All observations of consciousness are from the 'inside out,' as in, we are the consciousness and we are trying to grasp it from 'inside' it. You can never look at consciousness from the outside in, as you do with every other physical process. There's a clear, obvious rift between our observations of consciousness and our observation of the brain or other physical objects: Inside->Out vs. Outside->In. But any inference about the nature of consciousness from applying materialistic causality MUST be derived from similar observations about other existents, and there simply cannot exist any observations that are similar to those made of consciousness.

Thus, it follows that no observations made of any other relationship in reality can be applied to the brain-consciousness relationship. While it may seem intuitive to think that consciousness-from-the-brain is similar to Windows-from-your-computer, there simply exists no logical basis to justify such an intuition: We can never see Windows from the inside-out (by... somehow... 'being' Windows), and so it cannot be related to our observations about consciousness. The claim that we can apply knowledge about other physical processes to our knowledge of consciousness is arbitrary.

In order to doubt the self-evident, we need a valid objection that is supported by evidence. We can see, through introspection, that we possess volition. While it is not impossible that this volition is illusionary, it is also not impossible that an invisible leprechaun is sitting on your shoulder and making you imagine the words on your screen. We can safely dismiss both determinism and leprechauns on the same basis: There exists no logical evidence to support either.

I'm sorry if that was convoluted... I'm kind of hurrying with this so I can catch my bus home from work

[Inspector]

That was pretty good, especially if you're on your way to catch a bus!

[JMeganSnow]

It was okay. You tend to approach things from the negative instead of the positive, though . . . worrying about "what are the points against" instead of "what are the points for". It's easy to get tripped up that way.

[NIJamesHughes]

This is by a "satanic magister." The conversation was not public so their name will not be disclosed. That is also why the entire article is reposted, instead of a link.

********************

For some time I have suggested that I usually do not bother with any major efforts to influence large groups of people to make changes.

I usually have advocated that at the very least a Satanist would be wise to solve his own problems first through direct personal action rather than turn to groups to do it for him.

The herd, of course, prefers to shepherd you into joining a group, supporting a cause, and otherwise trying to change the minds of others to (commonly) legislate the solutions to a problem.

And this is the heart of political efforts – to cause people to band together and unite their efforts to make mass changes.

I have argued that it is illusory to believe that this is actually a viable way to get things changed and I realize this flies in the face of the entire governmental propaganda efforts of not years or decades but centuries.

The heart of my argument is that the political effort to make mass change relies upon the belief that reason and self interest will cause people to change their minds and therefore their actions.

I disagree.

I honestly do not think that most human beings are conscious, possess free will and are anything other than automaton robots that can be predicted in terms of what they will do with close to 100% accuracy as one would expect with any machine once you are familiar with the make up of the machine.

As one example I have attached a recent chart of what is known as the Commitment of Traders report on futures contracts for the S&P 500, also known as the COT report.

The COT report is mandated by the SEC to be published on the internet every Friday (except for holidays). It summarizes all of the money being placed on futures for the stock market as a whole (the SP500 is one of the largest indexes of the stock market).

On this chart you will see three groups represented.

The Commercials (the dark burgandy bars) are the multi-billion dollar companies that are buying futures contracts to hedge against their massive positions in the stock market. You might say that the Commercials are the stock market and when they move it has an effect similar to that of a whale in a swimming pool affecting the water.

The Large Speculators (the lgiht blue bars) are invested with millions of dollars and people like George Soros would fit into their group.

The Small Speculators (the yellow bars) are the herd. These are all the other people trying to make money in the futures for the stock market.

Now the chart I have attached is only covering a few months as each date represents a weekly report but you can go back and look over the last 18+ years and see the same thing.

What do you notice?

Look at how wrong the herd is over and over again.

Look how often they are positioned opposite to the “smart money” (the Commercials).

Doesn’t this strike you as interesting?

It is one of the most beautiful examples of mindless preprogrammed manipulation I am aware of in a mass setting.

The herd is not sometimes wrong. It is consistently wrong.

Just like a machine that is set to act in a predetermined way.

And yet every single one of those Small Speculators has “conscious” reasons for why they are investing the way they do.

The real reason they invest the way they do and can be wrong consistently is, I would suggest, because they are not conscious and they are not acting on the basis of reason or free will.

It is because they are unconscious machines that have to react to the manipulations of the Commercials.

They have no choice.

These are the groups you are trying to change.

Just a thought worthy of your consideration.

***************************

This from a philosophy that claims to have Ayn Rand as an influence and claims to be the only defenders of individualism and reason.

It doesn't take much to understand that if the true advocates of reason do not dismiss these claims, the above is going to be taken by those influenced by the times intellectuals as the possition of reason.

This is why I seriously think that these claims need to be refuted.

Edited March 3, 2005 by NIJamesHughes