On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[hunterrose]

I think you could divide bad laws into two kinds, in terms of being reasonable. One ... fail to get it in terms of man's rights. The second group would be... the laws that are not based on the prerequisite that man is volitional.

Good point; I hadn't thought about that. My disagreement with Vladimir is more along reasonable qua the second line.

...actually, you've made me think about another thing. I don't know whether it's a right (or merely right-ish), but I don't think a determinist can (objectively) argue that a person has a right to not be punished for something he neither chooses to do or is responsible for controlling. To a determinist, there is no "choosing" or "controlling". In this context, my disagreement with Vladimir could also be framed in the first line of "reasonable laws".

Fortunately for civilization, it is not so common to find laws that treat people who involuntarily violate rights as indistinguishable from people who chose to violate rights.

Indeed. For my part, I suspect that Vladimir would say that it is unreasonable (or both reasonable/unreasonable in certain contexts...) to punish a man for some thief running his car/responsibility into a house. But he doesn't find it ironic to punish a man for some environment running his body/"responsibility" into a crime.

huterrose: I have no idea what you are asking me.

Okay, I'll put it another way.

Particles move in a deterministic way, humans do not.

I disagree. If you have any evidence that the human body in any way acts not according to it's physical properties (including the brain) please let everyone know.

But why should Marc K. present evidence (beyond the amusing slap experiment), when you haven't given evidence that humans are deterministic?

I'm saying much more than just a milliseconds correlation: I'm claiming there is an infinite accuracy in the time correlation between the mental experience and the process* in the brain. When I say that no mental experience can exist without a process happening in the brain I mean that this relation is ALWAYS true, at all times. Which means that there can never be any mental experience that would come before a physical process in the brain, not in a difference of a millisecond and not in any time difference.

I have been following your inquiry and reading your posts. How is your action-neural delay the above quote contrary to the idea that man's actions are not deterministic?

[Ifat Glassman]

First, you are mixing concepts in a way that makes it hard for me to understand your point. A "representation" is a mental object, an abstraction

First I would like to say, that for me, the relation between mental experiences and brain activity, has to be described using new concepts, for which a word does not exist yet. So I have to use other words that best fit to describe my understanding of this relation. "Representation" is the best word I could think of.

Now, I also don't see why "representation" has to be a mental symbol only. There is a statue, physical object that represents something spiritual, or there can be a mental symbol representing something physical... So I disagree that I have been misusing the word "represent".

Now, to explain what I mean by "The brain activity represents the mental activity": "The brain activity" I am referring to is the one that happens in the brain during the time that the person experiences some, certain, mental experience.

If you look at LEDs in a device that glow whenever a certain thing happens in the device, the the LED can be said to represent that process (or the state of the device). I was using "represent" in a similar way to describe the relation between mental experience (from now on will be referred to as ME) and brain activity (BA). What I mean by that is simply that the two things happen together, at precisely the same time.

If you would like to argue that we actually have anything substantial to say about the physical basis of mental representations, where we can say "This representation physically has this nature; that representation physically has that nature", then I say, bring it on. You cannot point to the physical basis of the representational difference between the phonemes "f", "s" and "sh" in English, Hebrew or any other language, in such a way that I can look at brain states and at all reliably say "yes, that is [f], and that is ".

Your mistake is that you take a few things that are unknown, and use them to say "nothing in the field is known".

In fact I have already showed you that the knowledge in the brain is cell-specific (at least it is in the examples I've provided). For example: simple and complex cells (in the visual cortex) represent certain shapes (shape of light that is hitting the eye).

Of course there are many other examples of cells which represent something specific, like a specific frequency of sound wave, or specific time difference between the time a sound-wave of specific frequency reached the left ear and the right ear. This has been verified and documented by recording the electrical activity of those cells.

You want evidence? Look up information on the function of cells in the visual cortex (or for information about simple and complex cells).

Another evidence for the specificity of cells (that different cells represent different information) is the fact that different regions of the brain are involved in different tasks. Of course that isn't a proof that there is a difference between the knowledge that is represented by individual cells of the same region, but it is certainly an indication that this is the case.

If you want another argument for why different cells must be "knowledge specific" for the brain to work, try to plan some electronic device with logic gates: you will see that the wires in the device represent information, that you cannot mix up a wire that means "the number in binary that the user has entered is 2" to a wire that represents "the number is 1". Both wires can have either a high voltage or low voltage, but the meaning of the voltage in each will be different, and the person planning the circuit has to keep this in mind in order for the device to function. You cannot randomly connect the wires and hope that this will work: an engineer has to keep in mind the information that each wire carries, it's meaning, and to plug it in a way that achieves the required task. In the same way the brain works somehow, we know it works: well it cannot work unless the different wires carry different information. You cannot expect a random pile of neurons to represent shapes, or calculate the time difference of sound between the ears. To calculate the time difference, you first must have one neuron that represents the time of the signal's arrival to the L ear, one for the R ear, and on top of this info, using these neurons the brain can calculate the relationship between their activity and come at meaningful conclusions.

To propose that the brain processes information without having different neurons represent different information (or events, in some cases) is against evidence. And it is also ridiculous.

So I might not know how "sh" is represented in the brain differently than "b", but I know of other cases in which a relation between functionality (the knowledge that a neuron represents) and electrical activity of that neuron are recorded and shown.

Do you have reason to believe that different neurons in the brain act against the evidence that there is a "knowledge specificity"? Show me that, and we can have a hat-buffet together.

Think about what "the same process" really means: it means, "in no way different, whatsoever". When I drop a dime (non-metaphorically), that event is unique in an absolute sense -- I can drop a dime on a different occasion, and I can even drop the same dime on a different occasion, and drop it in the same place. The notion "same", when dealing with actually different things, is an exercise in measurement omission.

A person might not have the exact same mental experience in both cases, even if the event is the same. He might recall his breakfast of blink his eyes or something which would make it different. So what? what are you trying to say here?

Now to bring this to brain physiology and mental correlates: are you proposing that for one brain, two essentially identical mental states or actions have essentially the same physics?

Yes. This is because different neurons represent different information. And it has been shown.

Are you proposing that we have scientific evidence that this is so?

Yes, of course. We don't have evidence for ALL the mental experiences and for ALL the cells in the brain: just for some: but it's enough to conclude that the rest of the cells in the brain are also the same.

Are you proposing that there is an a priori philosophical reason why this must be so? If yes to any of these questions, my follow-up question will be, what is your reason for saying this?

1) Observations on a large scale (different regions are active during different mental contents)

2) Recording from single cells that shows specificity for certain event or knowledge.

3) The fact that electronic devices process information by having components that represent different information (like a state machine) and there cannot be any information processing without first having components that represent different information.

Hunterrose: You are running way ahead of the horses that carry my carriage. I wish to present my thoughts on this subject in an orderly manner. Thank you.

Edit for spelling mistakes.

Edited December 14, 2006 by ifatart

[neolithic]

Hello All,

I don't mean to hijack this thread nor to engage in a one versus one or one versus many debate. I used to read these forums regularly but have not visited as often as I once did. I would like to read all 45 pages of this thread to catch up but that is in no way practical. I simply have some things that neither I nor my friends have been able to find any way around concerning determinism and would greatly appreciate your thoughts.

I find that I fall into neither the freewill nor the determinism camp. First let me be frank; I do not believe we have any choice what so ever. However, this does not mean we are predetermined, it simply means we have no say in the matter. This position is made possible by Quantum Mechanic randomness. I would also like to state however, that on a macro scale I do not believe Q.M. to cause anomalousness behavior in a statistically significant way (e.g. in a computer you won't see enough Q.M. randomness to cause a single bit to flip unpredictably) but still would mean that we are in essence, non-deterministic.

Why does this matter? While the Q.M. difference no longer matters on a large scale such as our brains, it once did. If you had a complete working knowledge of physics and all conditions were known right after the big bang (I'm not saying this is possible, but it is useful for this thought experiment) then you could not predict that I would be typing this right now, you could however assign a probability to it. If however you had the same knowledge of physics and all known conditions 10,000 years ago, you could with relative certainty. So this leads to a hybrid version of determinism, which admittedly is very much closer to pure determinism than free will, but still can not be called pure determinism because even though it is very unlikely we can still behave in a non-deterministic way.

First I'll tell you a little about my education and literature exposure so you don't promptly send me off to read OPAR et all. I'm a senior in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, and Electrical Engineering so in your responses feel free to use the language of Physics, Math, Theory of Computability, and Philosophy freely and often; I've had significant exposure to it all. My exposure to Objectivism is also considerable; I've read The Fountainhead and AS multiple times, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, The Virtue of Selfishness, OPAR, this message board, AynRand.org (including online lectures and nearly all of the op-eds), and most interviews Rand gave that are available online. If I have read all of this you may be asking yourself why I am confused. The answer is simple and will probably seem blasphemous to dyed in the wool Objectivists; I think Rand's proof of volition is glib. I think she fundamentally fails to analyze how a choice is made (but more on that later).

Any finally to my questions. I would very much like to find myself wrong and would appreciate you all destroying my points in scientifically sound manner.

1) The proposition of god notwithstanding, there was no choice in the big bang. It was a purely physical phenomenon happening under the restraint of physics. Then hydrogen clouds formed, condensed and produced stars, the factories that manufactured the heavier elements. This all continued until matter organized itself into a patterns known as cells and physics continued in a manner we have described as evolution. When then did the universe stop being behaving in a way that is completely dictated by physics? Is there a certain level of organization that is immune from physics? If so are the levels of immunity tiered or is it a plateau?

2) This question is very much the same as the first but from a different perspective. If there is a choice where does it take place? If it takes solely in the brain, how can it not be a physics subordinate? If it does not take place in the brain, then I am truly at a loss.

Now to my problem with Rand's logic. To her this entire post is moot because in order to investigate volition I had to choose to do so. However, a computer investigates how proteins fold but it has not chosen to do so, it is simply a product of software (in our case learned from experience) and hardware. Fundamentally and computationally we are no different from a computer. Now you say, but how did you learn those things? - you chose to do so. Even that is being a bit glib; evolution has hardwired me with goals that I am not completely aware of which intern has lead me to want to learn things. Because we are so complex our "software" is no very transparent, so admittedly this is difficult to do. I think you take a choice down to its most fundamental level you will see this too.

If this has been covered previously in this thread or elsewhere, kindly point me in the right direction and I'll come back when I'm flummoxed. I look forward to your considered responses. Happy Hunting!

Best,

Andrew

[JMeganSnow]

The answer is simple and will probably seem blasphemous to dyed in the wool Objectivists; I think Rand's proof of volition is glib. I think she fundamentally fails to analyze how a choice is made (but more on that later).

It is glib because philosophically identifying the fact that humans possess volition does not require knowledge of *how* it works any more than you have to understand how to build an engine in order to identify something as a racecar.

If you truly believe that you are run by "software" that was somehow programmed by "evolution" then there is no point to having this discussion at all. You have no choice about what you believe and nothing I do or say or don't do or say can change that.

How can you fail to be aware of the mental effort you exert every time you choose to do something? Things that happen automatically require no effort . . . does it take effort to keep your heart beating? Not knowing why you do or don't do something is not a proof of the nonexistence of volition. It means you have failed to introspect and discover how you have programmed your own subconscious.

[neolithic]

How can you fail to be aware of the mental effort you exert every time you choose to do something? Things that happen automatically require no effort . . . does it take effort to keep your heart beating? Not knowing why you do or don't do something is not a proof of the nonexistence of volition. It means you have failed to introspect and discover how you have programmed your own subconscious.

I know I'm new but I would appreciate it if we could avoid loaded questions; I hope we can keep it purely academic. I am certainly aware of the mental effort required in thinking and that is a perspective I have not considered. I would like to think it over to avoid a knee jerk reaction.

I think however that the race car analogy isn't quite right though. What I am saying is that if we have a choice it's not that we don't know how the mechanism works, its that there could be no mechanism at all because at least part of you would have to exist outside of reality in order to avoid its influence. It seems to me to be similar to *braces for impact* to the concept most people have of god in that it seems reasonable though is inherently inexplicable. Please note I'm not accusing anyone of being intellectually shallow but that was the only analogy I could think of.

Best,

Andrew

[JMeganSnow]

What I am saying is that if we have a choice it's not that we don't know how the mechanism works, its that there could be no mechanism at all because at least part of you would have to exist outside of reality in order to avoid its influence.

So you understand the workings of reality so well that you can tell me that volition is technically impossible? Why don't you have a Nobel prize now? History is full of scientists who declared that this or that was technically "impossible" . . . even in the face of observed facts. Volition is simply an observed fact: it is and must be part of and possible in reality. There are a number of explanations that could eventually account for it, such as the idea of an emergent property. Don't like my racecar analogy? Fine, then it's not necessary to know how gravity works (and as far as I know no one does) in order to observe that it exists. In fact, Leibniz considered Isaac Newton's theory of "forces" to be absurd, but he never attempted to deny that gravity existed. The idea that volition is somehow supernatural *is* absurd, but this is not an excuse to deny an observable fact.

If you want a 'purely academic' discussion I suggest you find some academics. I am not making fun of you, I am heaping scorn upon an inexcusably silly idea in the hopes that my hyperbole will help you to see why it is silly. I don't expect it to work but it is much less tiresome than the other method which is arguing with you until I am blue in the face and then giving up in disgust. Maybe if I make my disgust obvious from the outset you'll grasp why this topic is 45 pages long and find something better to do with your time.

Besides, I'm determined to try to get your goat, so why are you complaining at me? Oh, wait . . . because you have to. My bad.

[dbc]

Rand regards volition as axiomatic; that said, her (and Peikoff's) validation of volition is a tad more subtle than you let on.

Rand's point is that the moment you speak of validating an idea, you rely on the existence of volition. With no volition, there can be no appeal to employ one method of validation over another. If the way we think is determined, if the method we employ is inescapable, there is no need (and no possibility) of validating any idea. All you and I can do is accept our conclusions.

The moment you try and convince people of your position (or ask them to refute it), you are asking them to consider facts they may not have been aware of or use a method of validation they have yet to try. How could they ever accept this? The are programmed to believe otherwise.

To "convince" implies that a person can come to accept a conclusion they previously rejected.

Volition can be validated through the simplest act of introspection. Taking up JMegan's point, if you refuse to acknowledge your ability to choose the content of your thought (as well as the way you think and even when you think), there is nothing more to be said.

Dan

[prosperity]

Maybe I missed the explanation I'm about to give in the 45 pages of discussion about determinism vs. free will, but the answer is pretty simple. Determinism, in ALL it's forms, is self-contradictory and thus invalid.

I suppose I could give a simple example, because some people are making this WAY too complicated...

...suppose someone tells you that the reason you take such and such an action is because you have to, that you think certain thoughts because you have, and so on and that there is no such thing as "free will".

The problem with this theory becomes immediately apparent when you consider that this would mean that no piece of knowledge could claim greater plausibility over another. There would be no such thing as true or false, right or wrong...because everything that is done, said, and thought had to be done the way it was. There was no alternative. That means if someone puts 2 + 2 together and comes up with "5" and another individual puts 2 + 2 together and comes up with 4, both came up with the answers they came up with because they had to come up with them...it was necessary. Truth and falsehood are automatically ejected from the theory and any discussion of Determinism.

But this necessarily means that all knowledge - all "truths" - under this theory vanish and nothing is knowable...but if nothing is knowable this would include the claim that the theory of Determinism is "true" and that free will is "invalid". How could they (supports of Determinism) know they are right? They don't and they couldn't...and they never will.

Even if you try to rationalize or concede to the idea that everything is pre-determined, but that logic is still somehow part of the process, you still come up with a contradiction, because by what means are you applying logic when you simultaneously (and allegedly) have no alternatives to examine to come up with an answer to a problem?

[DavidOdden]

I know I'm new but I would appreciate it if we could avoid loaded questions; I hope we can keep it purely academic.

I think you don't understand the nature of the questions posed to you. You can't seriously be disputing that man has volition. In fact, you've confused philosophy and science: they are different things. So of course Rand did not provide a scientific theory of the physical nature of volition in man -- that isn't a philosophical question, and she has never claimed to be a scientist.

Also, if you want to keep the discussion academic, you ought to abide by the basic standards of academic discourse.

[Robert J. Kolker]

I just attended a meeting of the philosophical society on my campus, and the topic of discussion was free will vs. determinism. While the majority of the people there wanted to believe in free will, we were having quite a bit of trouble defeating the determinist argument that it may seem to us that we have the illusion of free will, but in reality we are completely determined.

This overlooks quantum indeterminism. Assume for the moment that we are entirely physical. Then quantum physics applies to our minutest and innermost parts. Totally mechanical determinism (a la Newton) is not a correct physical picture of the cosmos.

To assume we are completely determined would imply that our selection of what we had to eat this evening was determined and locked in place at the time of the Big Bang. I sure do not believe that.

Bob Kolker

Edited August 29, 2007 by Robert J. Kolker

[aequalsa]

When then did the universe stop being behaving in a way that is completely dictated by physics? Is there a certain level of organization that is immune from physics? If so are the levels of immunity tiered or is it a plateau?

This has been a subject of considerable interest to me for some time and if I understand you correctly, I know exactly where you are coming from. You are painfully close to the answer but not quite on. Your confusion reduces to a confusion of scale. The whole, while causally and maybe physically indistinguishable from the sum of the parts, is different from the sum, in terms of their functions. The race car analogy is not that far off, really. The car moves from place to place. That's its purpose. The alternator just spins a magnet and pistons are bounced up and down by exploding gas. Neither of those things signify locomotion in and of them selves.

This reminds me of Xeno's paradox(most things do ) ie An individual can never get from point A to point B, because he must move half way, and half way again, and half way again, forever. Fortunately though, we move in a linear and not a negatively exponential fashion.

A second factor you seem stumped by is the need for freewill to exist outside of the universe to be free. This implies to me that you are confusing causation with determination. To make a choice implies that you are making a choice about some 'thing(s)' Those things(reality) have a causal impact on the choice you make. For instance, I can't choose to drive my jaguar to work tomorrow because I have no jaguar. The free choices I make are all within the confines of reality and are impacted by that reality at every turn. Doesn't make it any less free.

The third thing that might help,(related to the second) is to sort out exactly what you mean by 'free'. I might be free to shoot at someone walking by my house in one sense but am not legally or politically free to do so.

[Marc K.]

However, a computer investigates

Computers don't investigate, only humans do.

Fundamentally and computationally we are no different from a computer.

You don't see a fundamental difference between computers and men? How about the fact that we are alive. Also, depending on what you mean by "computationally" I don't think our brains work like computers.

evolution has hardwired me with goals

Evolution is an observed phenomenon operating in insentient nature, it sets no goals, only a conceptual consciousness can set goals.

Because we are so complex our "software" is no very transparent

Actually if you describe software as you did above "(in our case learned from experience)" we know exactly of what our software consists.

[Robert J. Kolker]

This has been a subject of considerable interest to me for some time and if I understand you correctly, I know exactly where you are coming from. You are painfully close to the answer but not quite on. Your confusion reduces to a confusion of scale. The whole, while causally and maybe physically indistinguishable from the sum of the parts, is different from the sum, in terms of their functions. The race car analogy is not that far off, really. The car moves from place to place. That's its purpose. The alternator just spins a magnet and pistons are bounced up and down by exploding gas. Neither of those things signify locomotion in and of them selves.

Add a crank and a wheel and you have locomotion.

Systems are more than the sum of the parts, because the parts interact. The complexity of systems derives from the interactions of the components.

Bob Kolker