On the question of free-will vs. determinism

[AshRyan]

Good point, CF.

[isaac]

My understanding of potentiality... hm.

I read that post, and here's what I found that was on-topic and relevant to this discussion:

My question is this: is it fair to say that potentiality is essentially a negative concept, which just means something along the lines of, "that which does not contradict the nature of the entity in question"?

A potency in its proper sense will always emerge into activity, when the proper conditions are present and nothing prevents it,

Therefore the authoritative definition of the primary kind of potency would be a source of change in something else, or as something else.

He calls it a source, an arche. Thus, he considers it something that is there, not just something that is logically possible

Smart guy, that Joe Sachs. And Aristotle, too. But that has little bearing on this discussion. I apologize for mixing my terms. What I meant was not "potential" but rather "possible." Although the terms are related and similar, that do not have exectly the same meaning.

Leonard Peikoff discusses "possible," "probable," and "certain" in OPAR, from page 174 to page 180, in the chapter on "Reason."

The first range ofthe evidential continuum is covered by the concept "possible."  A conclusion is "possible" if there is some, but not much, evidence in favor of it, and nothing known that contradicts it.  This last condition is obviously required - a conclusion that contradicts known facts is false - but it is not sufficient to support a verdict of "possible."  There are countless gratuitous claims in regard to which one cannot cite any contradictory fact, because they ar detached from facts; this does not confer on such claims any cognitive status.  For an idea to qualify as "possible," there must be a certain amount of evidence that actually supports it.  If there is no such evidence, the idea falls under a different concept: not "possible," but "arbitrary."

In the passage that you said, I merely pointed out that terms like "possible" refer to a location on the evidential continuum. As such, you cannot properly discuss the term "possible," without specifying (explicitly or implicitly) according to whom? All knowledge is knowledge of some conscious entity, correct? And thus, the "evidential continuum," along with the terms "certain," "probable," and "possible," only have meaning if we're refering to some conscious entity that has the knowledge that constitutes the known facts, the evidence.

Consider this example.

3:00 AM. Two shots are fired, and then two men run out of a restaurant. Inside, there are two dead bodies. Who are the possible/probable suspects?

The man who lives upstairs was out walking his dog. On the way back, he saw the two men who ran out of the restaurant through the front door. They are both possibly the killer.

The police investigator knew that one of the men was an undercover cop. with this added knowledge, the other man probably fired the shot, but the victims were stabbed, not shot.

The undercover cop had his back to the event. He only knows that a bullet hit his shoulder, and that he shot back at the man with the gun, and then got out of there. He knows that the informant who ran out with him certainly did not kill either of the victims. (And was probably the target!)

The informant sees a tall blond man and a short man with dark hair. He doesn't see who kills who, however, since he was not paying attention. He is certain that the killer is one or both of those two.

The forensics investigator finds the same fingerprints on both victims, and sees drops of blood leading out the back of the restaurant that fell from at least 6 feet. Working with the rest of the police force, they dig up even more evidence about the angles of bullets and whatnot, and are eventually certain that both victims were killed by the short man with dark hair, and that the shot was fired by the tall man, who was then shot by the undercover cop, and they testify in a court of law that they are certain of this.

In all these cases of possibility, probability, and certainty, note that we're talking about epistemological states. In reality, only one event happened, and it happened the way that it happened. There is no "possible" about it - the term has no meaning unless we are talking about a particular context of knowledge.

The same principle - that the evidential continuum only has meaning when talking about a context of knowledge - applies to future events, as well. Our knowledge of the future is necessarily limited, generally far moreso than our knowledge of the past or present. All actions are actions of entities, and any entity will always behave according to its particular nature. Take this example. Let's say that I'm holding an acorn. I know about acorns in general that they grow into oak trees, under the proper conditions (i.e., water, soil, sun, etc.) I take this acorn, and I plant it in the proper soil, supply it with water, and so on. I can say that the acorn will probably grow into an oak tree.

What I don't know about *this* acorn is that it is defective in some way, and thus does not grow. Had I detected this defect, I could have said that it certainly will not grow. In other words, knowledge of the future actions of an entity implies knowledge of the nature of the entity.

If one were to claim that the acorn would grow into an oak tree, knowing nothing of oaks and acorns, then the claim would not be possible or certain or probable: it would be arbitrary. While true, it has no place on the evidential continuum, as it is not supported or contradicted in any way.

If you say that something is "possible," rather than "definite," but you remove that term from any connection to a particular context of knowledge, then I have no idea what you're talking about. That is the meaning of my claim that "'Possible' is not a metaphysical term, but rather an epistemological one."

Of course, an argument that relies on the assumption of predetermination is not a valid one when you are trying to prove predetermination.

Yes, indeed! As predetermination is so close to the axioms in its supporting argument, it certainly must look like I'm starting out accepting it. However, I must refer you to the argument earlier in this thread. The only things that I'm starting out accepting are, identity and causality, existence exists, and consciousness exists and has identity. I'll make no effort to support those three, as I believe that there is no need to do so.

[LucentBrave]

The theory of un-determinism is a theory revered by subjectivists. I browsed a subjectivist site last night for a good laugh. I don't even know why he used a subjective theory to defend his argument of free will in an objectivist forum. Actually, a lot of jonkc's arguments are based upon the raw subjectivist theories that I had a good laugh over.

I did glance at the article. I agree with Ash when he says that the fallacies included in it are numerous to say the least. What they are doing to their test subjects is known as cognitivie conditioning, or loosely as a form of it. It's a psychological technique that is just short of brainwashing.

The example he uses at the beginning of this article is a strange one. While my mind does "wander" (consiously thinking of something else), in the safety of my room or work when I willingly ALLOW it to wander. It's along the lines of wheather putting your pants on, after doing it repetively and for so many years,is conscious or not. I can't magine it not being as such. While it takes little concentration yo do so, it doesn't mean that I'm not at all concentrating on the task of getting dressed.

In actuality, this scientist, is tricking his subjects into thinking that they have no free will. It's like training a dog to sit when you tell it to preform that action without it thinking at all. Only the sensory perception of hearing the word "sit" prompts the dog to do so. I know using a dog as an example is not the best, as they have no concept of free will, but it was the only thing that I could come up with.

Edited March 15, 2004 by LucentBrave

[Tom]

Determinism is the position that all events are inevitable consequences of antecedent sufficient causes.

Classical free-will is the position that man can make choices unconstrained by external agencies.

Rand's position is that can choose among alternative courses of action because of the nature of his cognition.

Is Rand's concept of free-will incompatible with the fact that cognition obeys the law of identity?

Let's check.

We know from cognitive science that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain. We also know that the brain can decide among perceived alternatives.

How can we reconcile these facts?

By treating every emergent property of every system as a cause in its own right.

Every cell of every living organism is composed of molecules. Every single one of those molecules is composed of atoms. Every single one of those atoms is composed of subatomic particles.

Does this mean the biologist must study quarks in order to understand living organisms? No, the biologist need only study living organisms and their components. Why? Because the behavior of every living organism is an emergent property and the behavior of emergent properties cannot be understood purely on the basis of ultimate constituents.

You cannot understand human behavior by studying quarks. You must study *human* behavior.

Just as every chemical reaction is a cause in its own right, just as every living organism is a cause in its own right, so too is consciousness a cause in its own right.

[Tom]

Now the free-will vs determinism dichotomy is out of the way, we can finally talk about whether Rand's conception of volition is axiomatic.

An axiomatic concept is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e. reduced to other facts or broken into component parts.  It is implicit in all facts and in all knowledge.  It is the fundamentally given and directly perceived or experienced, which requires no proof or explanation, but on which all proofs and explanations rest.

Volition is not irreducible. It is dependent upon the existence of consciousness to perceive and choose among alternatives and the existence of alternatives to perceive and choose from.

However, it's implicit in any decision to believe something after studying empirical data.

Is the existence of volition directly perceivable or experienced? The fact that we can choose among perceived alternatives can be grasped through introspection, so it's directly perceivable in that sense.

On the whole, volition is NOT axiomatic. Its relationship to consciousness is similar to that of a corollary to a mathematical proposition.

[Capitalism Forever]

Now the free-will vs determinism dichotomy is out of the way

Do I understand it correctly that you think free will vs determinism is a false dichotomy? That the two are compatible?

[LucentBrave]

I think that Tom is right.

While we have the to choice either accept the impulses of conscious influences, we can do no more. We are forced to either choose to do something or not, based upon what we think is moral or immoral. You cannot do anything other than this, nor can you do both at the same time.

Take smoking for instance. Someone can value smoking for certain reasons, and commence to do so. Smoking is an addictive drug. If you do it long enough, it becomes addictive. It has a strong influence on that individual. Does that mean that you have to accept that influence and smoke only for that reason? No. Does that mean that you can't quit, even though you want to? No, because you have the faculty to do so at any time you wish. However, these are the only two choices you are permitted. Quit smoking, or to continue to do so. You cannot do both at the same time, and no other options are available for you to choose.

Morever, something had to influence the individual to quit, or something had to influence individual to start. You have to accept these influences or not at all. Meaning that both choices were influenced by something.

Furthermore, objectivists accept proven and validated statements without question. Can anyone, without making an utter fool of themself, disagree with or argument proof? Or axioms for that matter? No, you must accept it without choice. To make choices without these influences is compulsion and nothing more than a whim. Compulsion and whims are definately not volition.

By stating the above in this way, volition is dependent upon existence, consciousness, values, and proof. All of these are inflential when making a choice. In looking at it in this way, volition is limited and is not axiomatic.

[Tom]

> Do I understand it correctly that you think free will vs determinism is a false

> dichotomy? That the two are compatible?

Both positions are false, but they are NOT compatible.

The proponents of classical free-will believe that will is unconstrained by nature, that consciousness possesses no identity and therefore can act however it pleases and choose among alternatives.

The proponents of determinism believe that will is constrained by man's nature, that he can only act within the bounds of nature and the nature of his brain. However, they make the unwarranted conclusion that choice is an illusion.

Formalizing the dichotomy:

1. If consciousness has no identity, then man has a choice.

2. If consciousness has an identity, then choice is an illusion.

Whenever you see a conflict like this, check the premise before you doing anything else. If it's correct, study the connection between IF and THEN and ask yourself if the conclusion follows from the premise.

Analyzing number 1, I would say the premise is false and therefore we can't conclude anything. Contrary to the premise, consciousness DOES possess identity, and man should adhere to it if he wishes to live as man.

Analyzing number 2, I would say that although the premise is correct, the conclusion does NOT follow from the premise. Simply because the brain acts a certain way doesn't preclude decision-making. Besides, it's obvious to me from introspection that I can choose to think, refrain from thinking, or default on the choice.

To quote Galt, man is a being of volitional consciousness. He has no choice about the fact that he can think. He has no choice about the fact that he should think if he wishes to live as man. But he does have a choice about whether to think.

[Tom]

Lucent said:

We are forced to either choose to do something or not, based upon what we think is moral or immoral.

I wouldn't say you're forced. I would say that if you choose to live, then you enter the realm of morality and your decisions are subject to your values.

Supposing you were in the middle of nowhere, thirsty and starving. You come across a log cabin stocked with water and food, but nobody's home. If you don't break in, you will die because you have no alternatives. Would the moral course of action be to sit down and die? No, because you would lose your life, which is a major value. In such an emergency, it is permissible to break in and live, provided you answer for your crime.

But emergency situations are rare. Man doesn't ordinarily have to resort to crime as a way of life. Therefore, if you actively seek to put yourself in emergency situations for the purpose of surviving at the expense of commiting crimes, then you're rationalizing and acting immorally.

[LucentBrave]

In the above exaple that you've provided:

What was the reason or influence that caused the man to choose his life over his death?

His morals.

He didn't want to die. Why? because his morals, which are aquired through learning, dictated- along with other factors- his ultimate conclusion.

So, did he make the decision? Or did his morals influence or "force" him to do so?

Even if we are fully conscious at all times of utilizing our morals to reason out what we believe is the right choice- to the point of carrying out that choice, it's still difficult for me not to ask the above question.

I still would like to know if I was correct when I stated that we have no other choice than to accept, not accept, or to do nothing- and if so, does that make volition limited?

[Young]

I was wondering if anyone could provide a succinct objectivist argument against determinism.

[Young]

Seeing as how there has been no response in this topic, perhaps I'd stir the hornet's nest, purely as a selfish endeavor to find out if and how I am wrong from a seemingly intellectual community. To serve these purposes I will now provide an example, the one which, offhand, would provide the most controversy.

Ayn Rand was a person of great reasoning ability. Her ability to reason is inherently contingent upon her identiy as a conceptual individual. This is a property which in many cases divides humanity from nearly everything else in the universe. This quality, it seems to me, is based on our interpretation of her cognitive abilities and the the interpretation of the fruits of her intellect as rational items, truths if you will.

Unlike an animal, or at least those which show we commonly interpet to have no conceptual ability, Ms. Rand was endowed with a functional nervous system, particularly a strongly developed cortex. This structure, I believe, could be construed as the source of her intelligence. This biological system, like all others developed in the course of evolution from single cellular life, and before that non-living material.

Temporal connections imply that there is reason behind interactions in the physical world, when we find an element, a planet, et cetera, we examine the origin behind that phenomenon. In a way all things we perceive are mere reactions from an initial action, for the purpose of this argument we will say the big bang, or infinity, or what have you.

Ostensibly, the basis behind relations in the real, existent physical world, carry out under a consistent system, id es logic. If this is true, how can it be false that those relations will continue in the non-living elements of the individual, meaning that there would be logic, a consistent manner of governance, everywhere but in the mechanism of choice? Can it be that logic/reason exists everywhere but in our remarkable mechanism for "choice"? It would appear that to leave out this conclusion from logic would mean that logic itself could not exist and we would be thrown into a world of subjectivism and disorder, where we would assume nothing more than our empirical past, effectively ruling out time, conceptually, and reason by definition, chaos in short.

Therefore I state that there is no merit behind any individual's "choices" as they are merely shadows of some nebulous original state, eons past. Ayn Rand was destined, fated, determined to say every word she did before she was born, the laws of protecting the rights of conscious entities is ultimately arbitrary, as consciousness and choices that it allows are no more meaningful than the origin of the earth upon which the individuals lived, or the creation of the earth, because individual choice has already been decided. Please prove me wrong.

[Richard_Halley]

What you call "logic and reason" is nothing of the sort, it is causality. What causality amounts to is this: when an action takes place, each affected objects react according to its nature (i.e. its identity).

Assuming this is what you meant, your logic flows something like this:

If there exists an entity which, by its nature, may choose in what way it wants

to react, then all other entities do not have identities. So it is not possible for

anything to have a choice.

You are going to have to provide better logic than this.

By the way, your first two paragraphs were completely useless, they provided no substance to the discussion here, and I wonder what you intended to accomplish by putting them there.

[Young]

What you call "logic and reason" is nothing of the sort, it is causality. What causality amounts to is this: when an action takes place, each affected objects react according to its nature (i.e. its identity).

My argument does flow from this point, thank you for simplifying it to this:

When an action takes place in the physical world, objects react to it according to their nature

My brain is an object in the physical world

When an action takes place, my brain will react to it according to its nature.

This is significant to determinism, that all physical and even mental phenomenon have grounding in the physical world and are not inspired by something greater than that, ie soul.

Basically, each neuron in your head must react in a way according to its identity when presented with an action, and since the sum total of your neurons output is the concept of "mind" it would be impossible for those neurons to react in a way besides what their identity dictates.

[Richard_Halley]

You are failing to consider that a an entity may have, as part of its indentity, the ability to choose which way to react.

You misunderstand causality to mean this: every action is caused by another action, what it really means is this: every action causes all affected entitys to react accord to their nature.

Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation.

Leonard Peikoff, "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy"

[Young]

An entity may have, as part of its indentity, the ability to choose which way to react.

every action causes all affected entitys to react accord to their nature

These statements are not entirely in accordance with one another, if an object must react according to its nature (and could not react in any other way) how is it possible that the object can, by its nature, be able to violate its nature?

That you are human/conscious does not imply the first statement, an identity is either one thing or another, it is at all times p OR at all times q, it is not AT SOME TIMES p AND OTHER TIMES q.'

You can not will yourself into existence or out of it, it must be accomplished by causality, what is your basis for your first statement?

[Richard_Halley]

Ok, I haven't been wording this the correct way...

Causality goes like this. If I hit you (nothing personal here), you will react in accordance with the laws of physics, you will fall back (I am hitting you pretty hard). That is cause--my hit--and effect--your fall. Now, if you stand up and run to hit me back, that is not an effect of my cause, you are iniating a new cause (or a series of causes).

Human volition is a type of cause, not an effect; it is a decision, not an automatic; it is man made, not metaphysially given.

That you are human/conscious does not imply the first statement, an identity is either one thing or another, it is at all times p OR at all times q, it is not AT SOME TIMES p AND OTHER TIMES q.'

Firstly, by my definition of human, volition is the defining feature... it is implied. A thing which has the ability of volition (p) does not become something else (q) by using that volition. Part of my nature allows me to choose whether I want to type this message to you... I am keeping with--not changing--my nature by making a choice.

[Young]

It IS the effect of your hitting me, though of course not solely, the action you carry out on me will result in me undergoing one reaction. Of course this isn't the only thing causing me to fall back (gravity) or be angry (my psychology informed by the structure of my brain). It will very much SEEM like I could undergo many actions following your action, what psychologists would call an internal conflict or moral dilemma, etc., but that too was predetermined, having been instilled in me by a moral system. My ultimate action will be dependent on the strongest of forces in my mind (tied to my biological makeup).

"Man" is equal to a certain genetic code with minor variations from that code. We realize this usually derived from what we see and how we interpret their intelligence. What man makes is quite the same as what any other creature of similar genetic codes makes, which is not a "choice" but carrying out of its nature, anymore than a rock falling from a high cliff.

Of course you are keeping with your nature, you can not simply decide that now is time for you to negate previous experience or the structure of your brain so that you could do something not in your nature.

[Richard_Halley]

You are attempting to negate volition without the trouble of giving evidence.

A close look at your argument will discover that it may be reduced to: there are no causes, only effects. This is obviously contradictory, effects cannot exist without causes...

As a result, I am now going to choose not to continue this discussion with you until you provide me with some reason to suppose that I have no such choice.

[Young]

As you have been determined to...

While it is quite difficult to conceptualize how all things can originate from one cause, ie the big bang, which in itself is difficult to determine the cause of, that does not mean that I'm eliminating causality, the examples given were all of a causal nature, at no point was it assumed that your "choice" didn't have immediate causes. What you are now questioning is the reality of a primary cause, which is a very difficult thing to imagine or discuss.

I hope you do not continue to "choose" not to further discuss, as I'm really looking for an answer.

[Richard_Halley]

Now you are saying that there are causes--i.e. things which were not metaphysical effects--but you argue that only one such cause ever existed. Yet again, you have given no basis for such a claim.

From here on, if I do not respond to a post of yours after a while, you can assume that I am still waiting on the evidence. If you think you have given me evidence, you should make a post to state and label it; that way I will know exactly where you are confused.

[y_feldblum]

young -

"if an object must react according to its nature (and could not react in any other way) how is it possible that the object can, by its nature, be able to violate its nature?"

The answer is in the statements you questioned. Here is the answer, in form paraphrased from elsewhere: an entity must react in some way, but may react - according to its nature - in any way.

Richard_Halley -

Causation goes like this: an entity acts in accordance with its nature. Meaning: an entity cannot do something while being, at the same time, not able to do it. As I just realized in formulating the law this way, it is exactly the law of identity applied to action.

[Richard_Halley]

Richard_Halley -

Causation goes like this: an entity acts in accordance with its nature. Meaning: an entity cannot do something while being, at the same time, not able to do it. As I just realized in formulating the law this way, it is exactly the law of identity applied to action.

Is this supposed to be somehow contradictory of something I said before. If it is, I fail to see how.

[Young]

Evidence

Volition-An act of willing or resolving

Volition is based on previous conditions

Previous conditions are dictated by physical laws

Volition is based on physical laws

When you come to the point in time where you are allowed to make a choice (every moment of your life) you are carrying out the effects of previous causes.

[y_feldblum]

Richard_Halley -

Not at all. Have I been known to argue with anyone but RadCap? However, I was restating Causality in terms of its essentials. Your formulation, in postulating a reacting entity, assumed an acting entity. But Causality does describe entities individually, even when they act without the context of other entities.

I noticed that your formulation reflected the nihilist view of causation, where event/action B was necessarily caused by an antecedent event, event A. You inserted the entities into it where they were sorely lacking and gave it validity. But the Objectivist view of causality does not describe the relationship between any two acting entities, but the identity of each entity.

The identities of various entities does determine the relationships possible between them, and by observing relationships between entities one can determine their identities and the attributes with govern the relationships. But identity is primary to relationship.