Thoughts on Ayer's elimination of metaphysics?

[Hal]

This definition of "information" amounts to saying that facts are only facts if they are non-obvious, i.e. only if they are not self-evident. It also means that a statement offered with proof of its truth is not information.

Well, I think the best way would be to say that information isnt intrinsic to sentences. Instead, a sentence is informative to a particular person, in a particular context if it tells him something that he didnt already know. The statements "there is no largest prime number" and "the sun is hot" provide me with no new information, but these statements could be informative to a different person (perhaps someone who didnt know basic mathematics or physics). Similarly, a highly theoretical statement like "every riemannian manifold can be isometrically embedded in euclidean space" might be highly informative to a mathematcian, while providing the majority of people with no information since they dont understand it, and couldnt distinguish it from random word salad.

But, its hard to imagine any context where "existence exists" could provide someone with new information.

I don't seem to have any problem in distinguishing 'primacy of existence' and 'primacy of consciousness'. For example, of someone advances the argument "if you can't know that X exists, then X doesn't exist", you don't have any problem in knowing whether the person is a POC or POE advocate.

Well, I meant that they didnt follow from the axioms. I got the impression that "existence exists" was meant to imply that primacy of consciousness was false.

You can have existence without consciousness, but not the other way around. Given that, can anyone seriously hold that consciousness is primary?

Well if consciousness is an existent, then by definition "consciousness exists" implies "there is something that exists (namely consciousness)" which implies "existence exists". But a philosophical idealist could happily accept that this is true, while still claiming without contradiction that only consciousness exists. The primacy of existence surely means that something exists outside consciousness. But this does not follow from the axioms.

Edited November 21, 2005 by Hal

[DavidOdden]

A statement known to be true carries information when the listener can conceivably imagine alternatives.

Well, first, using "information" in your information-theoretic way, this isn't true because it doesn't depend on whether the statement is true, or known to be true. What's important is that it be unknown. Moreover, an appeal to "conceivably imagine" is a poor test. I can "conceivably imagine" that 4 > 4 even though I don't believe for a second that it's true. If you want me to constrain my imagination to just those things which I don't know to be utterly false, then I cannot conceivably imagine that I am not sitting by the fireplace typing this into my laptop. You don't have the same constraints on your imagination, for good reason. To me, it would not be information, but to you, it would be.

Anyhow, I think your emphasis on "information" is non-productive. The statement "existence exists" is a fact, and it has meaning. Information, in the information-theoretic sense, is of no relevance except as an information-theoretic excercise. When combined with other facts and set forth as a philosophical system, the statement has definite value in creating information, even though it is self-evident taken out of context.

[Hal]

Although the statement "existence exists" is so obvious that it's almost ridiculous to even say, David had it right when he said: "It was a dramatic way to make a point about relations between certain philosophical principles (basically a way of saying that existence is the philosophically fundamental fact that needs to be grasped, rather than consciousness as Kant and Descartes felt)." In response to Kant, it is entirely appropriate and important to make the point that existence exists independent of our consciousness.

But Kant wouldnt have denied this (nor would have Descartes). Kant was an empirical realist; he never at any point denied that "existence exists". He would just have said that although the noumenal world (and hence 'existence') certainly exists independent of consciousness, the phenomenal world which we have access to is how our consciousness represents the noumenal world. Similarly, even when Descartes was in his alleged state of extreme doubt, he never implied at any point that 'existence didnt exist'. Indeed the specific examples he gives (dreaming, hallucination, being deceived by a demon) all imply that something has to exist. Kant and Descartes questioned how we could come to know a mind-indepedent reality, not that one existed.

But this is the whole point; if we had a long tradition of philosophers denying that existence exists, then it would indeed be important to reassert that it did. But noone, to my knowledge, has ever came close to denying this.

edit: note the contrast here with the axiom “consciousness exists”. This statement does, at first, also seem to be completely uninformative. However, we sadly do have a fairly influential philosophical tradition in the 20th century which does deny (or come close to denying) this obviously true claim. Hence reasserting it becomes important.

edit2: actually, I'm not sure if my above claim about Kant is correct. "Reality" was one of Kant's categories of pure reason (quality) so by definition it would be senseless to predicate it of the noumenal world. I dont know enough about Kant to say with any real certainty what precisely he meant by the category of 'reality' (whatever that is in German), or how he related it to existence/being, so I wont pursue this further. I know that a lot of philosophers going back to Aristotle (at least) have had the idea that there are different 'levels' of reality/being, so its not entirely obvious what Kant meant.

Edited November 21, 2005 by Hal

[gags]

I too have a relatively limited knowledge of Kant. However, it's my understanding that he did believe there was reality (the noumenal world), just that we could never really know it. Man was limited to the phenomenal world, which represented reality according to our consciousness. Later philosophers followed Kant but modified him by saying that if we can never know the noumenal/real world, why should we believe that it even exists?

I'm planning to read more on the subject.

[Hal]

I too have a relatively limited knowledge of Kant. However, it's my understanding that he did believe there was reality (the noumenal world), just that we could never really know it.

Well, there's significant problems within the Kantian tradition when it comes to applying common sense categories to the noumenal world. For instance, Kant claimed that everyone 'had' a noumenal transcendental ego, which was responsible for unifying their conscious experiences and making them an individual person. The key part of this claim is that it implies there are multiple transcendental egos in the noumenal world - one ego per person. But as a later philosopher (Fichte I think, but dont quote me on that) pointed out, the concepts of 'number', 'unity' and 'multiplicity' were all meant to be categories of pure reason which were imposed on the world by our consciousness, and hence they could not be applied to the noumenal world which is by definition consciousness independent and hence 'untouched' by our categories and concepts. So it is literally senseless for Kant to say that theres more than one transcendental ego. This was partly what motivated later Kant-inspired writers like Hegel and Fichte to posit things like the Absolute ego.

A similar problem arose with Kant's treatment of casuality. Kant claimed that casuality was not a feature of the noumenal world, but rather that it was a priori imposed on this world by our cognition (this was the essence of his answer to Hume). But he also claimed that the noumenal world somehow causes our 'sense-impressions' (the phenomenal world). And this seems like a contradiction.

I think that there could be shades of a similar problem which it comes to Kant claiming that the noumenal world exists. If 'reality' being a category implies that 'existence' is also a category (and I've no idea whether it does), then Kant couldnt claim that the noumenal world either does or doesnt exist without invalidating his entire system.

Edited November 21, 2005 by Hal

[AisA]

Well, I think the best way would be to say that information isnt intrinsic to sentences.

If you mean a sentence might be false, I agree. A sentence is not automatically true.

Instead, a sentence is informative to a particular person, in a particular context if it tells him something that he didnt already know.

I agree. "Informative" and "information" are two different concepts.

The Encarta dictionary defines information as: "1) definite knowledge acquired or supplied about something or somebody; 2)the collected facts and data about a particular subject. The notion that a statement contains information if and only if one can "imagine" the opposite is false, and creates the problems I mentioned in my last post.

But, its hard to imagine any context where "existence exists" could provide someone with new information.

It is true that it is self-evident. However, its corollaries are not self-evident apart from the principle at their root, i.e. they are not self-evident apart from "Existence exists". Since the corollaries are of crucial importance (including their corollaries), it is entirely necessary to make this self-evident truth explicit by putting it into words. See page 15 of OPAR for a good discussion of the nature of corollaries.

Well, I meant that they didnt follow from the axioms. I got the impression that "existence exists" was meant to imply that primacy of consciousness was false.

Well if consciousness is an existent, then by definition "consciousness exists" implies "there is something that exists (namely consciousness)" which implies "existence exists". But a philosophical idealist could happily accept that this is true, while still claiming without contradiction that only consciousness exists. The primacy of existence surely means that something exists outside consciousness. But this does not follow from the axioms.

Primacy of consciousness is the denial that existence exists independent of consciousness. It is the belief that the universe is the product of consciousness; it is a failure to grasp the difference between the content of one's mind and the external world.

From the Lexicon (page 381): "This crucial distinction is not given to man automatically; it has to be learned. It is implicit in any awareness, but it has to be grasped conceptually and held as an absolute."

"Existence exists" is self-evident -- it does not have to follow from anything other than one's own direct perception -- and it invalidates the notion of primacy of consciousness . But everone must grasp that fact for himself. Nothing can prevent philosophers (or anyone else) from making the contradictory assertion that only consciousness exists, just as nothing can prevent you from ignoring the evidence of your own senses.

[jrs]

Galt compounds his error by continuing with "If nothing exists...", for if nothing exists, Galt doesn't exist, and neither does his argument.

If it is an error for Galt to say "If nothing exists ...", then is it not an error for YOU to say "... for if nothing exists, Galt does not exist, ..."?

A statement known to be true carries information when the listener can conceivably imagine alternatives.

.....

An exception could be made for complicated mathematical theorems that are not obvious; ...

Why are complicated mathematical theorems an exception?

Why is mathematical "information" different?

[Park Zoo]

If it is an error for Galt to say "If nothing exists ...", then is it not an error for YOU to say "... for if nothing exists, Galt does not exist, ..."?

He's using it as a (presumably conceivable) alternative to his statement. I'm showing that his alternative is self-refuting and inconceivable, nullifying his proof.

Why are complicated mathematical theorems an exception?

Why is mathematical "information" different?

Because all theorems are tautologies (they are true under all conditions) but not obvious because of the limited abilities of the human mind. That is how mathematical information differsfrom empirical observations. It is the analytic/synthetic dichotomy.

However, Objectivism rejects the analytic/synthetic dichotomy, treating mathematics as an empirical science, and claiming that states of nature are as determined as the laws of mathematics. (Am I wrong?) Thus there are no "other worlds", only ignorance of this one. With the obvious difficulties of quantum uncertainty, chaos resulting from human actions, and the sketchy idea that human brains are material yet nondeterministic, it's an interesting point I'm not finished pondering.

I can "conceivably imagine" that 4 > 4 even though I don't believe for a second that it's true.

I absolutely refuse to accept that you, or anyone else, can conceive of 4 > 4.

I would simply say that it doesn't imply anything, it asserts something..."Existence exists" does not itself contain any new information, the combination of that plus the other elements in Galt's speech does.

It doesn't imply anything, but when combined with other statements, yet more statements are arrived at? That is how I define implication. Null statements whose only meaning are "I am taking his conversation seriously and not goofing off" cannot be made to imply anything else, in whatever hierarchy.

The first meaningful statement made after "Existence Exists" in Galt's speech is "If that which you claim to perceive does not exist, what you possess is not consciousness." It could be taken as an empirical observation about consciousness, or a trivial definitional rule, describing the way he intends to use the term.

Edited November 29, 2005 by Park Zoo

[hunterrose]

What result or experience could I interpret as disproving or falsifying "Existence exists"? (An experiment that can only conceivably turn out one way doesn't really qualify as an experiment.)

I thought about what you've said, and perhaps if "existence exists" were changed a bit you would have no problem considering it verifiable, and metaphysics relevant

IMO the reason "existence exists" might be said to be meaningless is because it doesn't say what it means to exist. Or in other words, contexts are critical. Here, "exists" means "to have identity."

"Existence exists" doesn't carry a single bit of data.

"Existence has identity" or "existents have identity" is a much better metaphysical statement for the purposes of "experiments."

Would this different structure not carry empirical information about reality?

[DavidOdden]

I absolutely refuse to accept that you, or anyone else, can conceive of 4 > 4.

That's your right. In your opinion, does "I absolutely refuse to believe..." constitute a valid general form of arguing? Your criterion for "information" has to do with imagination, which is bad enough, but now you're saying that you even know what is in our imaginations? Neat!

It doesn't imply anything, but when combined with other statements, yet more statements are arrived at? That is how I define implication.

I wish I could help you there. That's not how "implication" is defined.

[Park Zoo]

That's your right. In your opinion, does "I absolutely refuse to believe..." constitute a valid general form of arguing?

Claiming to be able to conceive of 4 > 4 is as bad as claiming to be able to conceive of nothing existing, or of A not equalling A. It shows that you're no longer taking the discussion seriously.

"Existence has identity" or "existents have identity" is a much better metaphysical statement for the purposes of "experiments."

Would this different structure not carry empirical information about reality?

Is it conceivable that something could exist and lack identity?

[DavidOdden]

It shows that you're no longer taking the discussion seriously.

I can't take seriously a discussion that involves one side relying on the arbitrary, undefined notion "conceivable".

[hunterrose]

Is it conceivable that something could exist and lack identity?

No, but it is conceivable that something could not exist and lack identity.

IMO "existents have identity" is falsifiable, though I could be overlooking something.

[DavidOdden]

IMO "existents have identity" is falsifiable, though I could be overlooking something.

There is no existent which has no identity, so you cannot show that "existents have identity" is false, so the statement isn't falsifiable.

[Park Zoo]

There is no existent which has no identity, so you cannot show that "existents have identity" is false, so the statement isn't falsifiable.

Then I'd have to conclude that it is clarifying the working definition of identity; letting it be known that Objectivism shall apply it to all existents, in presumable distinction to other philosophies that might use the term "identity" to something which only applies to some existents.

[EC]

Identity not only applies to everything in existence. Existence is identity. I.e., to be is to be something.

Edited November 30, 2005 by EC

[hunterrose]

There is no existent which has no identity, so you cannot show that "existents have identity" is false, so the statement isn't falsifiable.

True, but it seems to me that there is a difference in saying there is no falsifing example and saying it isn't falsifiable.

There are no immortal men, yet that's not to say that "all men are mortal" isn't falsifiable.

Or does "falsifiable" mean that a falsifying example must exist?

Then I'd have to conclude that it is clarifying the working definition of identity; letting it be known that Objectivism shall apply it to all existents, in presumable distinction to other philosophies that might use the term "identity" to something which only applies to some existents.

That sounds right to me

[Park Zoo]

I don't approve of moderator Felipe's highly personal and seemingly arbitrary standards for locking threads, so I won't be posting here anymore. Nevertheless, this exchange was entertaining, educational, and thought-provoking. I thank you for it.

[DavidOdden]

There are no immortal men, yet that's not to say that "all men are mortal" isn't falsifiable.

Or does "falsifiable" mean that a falsifying example must exist?

This is what's wrong, at the very core, with the notion of "falsifiable". The relevant notion is "testable" -- you can do something to determine whether it is true or false. "Falsifiable" is a miscreant concept bubbling up out of an epistemology that glorifies ignorance. The concept of "question begging" is well established in logic, and the felt need for a statement to be "falsifiable", to the extent that that is a valid concern, simply means that you should not bury your conclusions in the premises. No true statement can be shown to be false, so no true statement is falsifiable. But many true statements do not beg the question.