My first step into the [...] world of objectivism.

[Bold Standard]

Now you might say that this is proof that you can't assume that your sensory input is 100% valid. But how do you know that? Only through other sensory output.

No, you know it from abstracting from your sense perceptions. You need a conceptual faculty. The senses give you all the (100% valid) data, which your conceptual faculty integrates into information which, if your methods of induction and deduction are proper and your logic is rigorous, will be 100% valid, in a given context.

Some modern empiricists of the school called "sensualism" (i.e., David Hume) held that sense perceptions are valid, but that they are all we have. They denied the conceptual faculty. Objectivism does not deny the conceptual faculty.

[LaszloWalrus]

Technically speaking, the senses are NOT valid; they are the standard of validity. Or, as Dr. Binswanger said, they are "new and improved valid."

[Bold Standard]

is that your translation of Greek logos, Latin ratio, or German Vernunft? I want to know what we're talking about.

I'm pretty sure reason = ratio.

Technically speaking, the senses are NOT valid; they are the standard of validity. Or, as Dr. Binswanger said, they are "new and improved valid."

That's an interesting idea-- can you give a reference to where he talks about that?

[Felix]

No, you know it from abstracting from your sense perceptions. You need a conceptual faculty. The senses give you all the (100% valid) data, which your conceptual faculty integrates into information which, if your methods of induction and deduction are proper and your logic is rigorous, will be 100% valid, in a given context.

Some modern empiricists of the school called "sensualism" (i.e., David Hume) held that sense perceptions are valid, but that they are all we have. They denied the conceptual faculty. Objectivism does not deny the conceptual faculty.

Okay, I didn't word that one right. Thanks for the clarification.

[LaszloWalrus]

That's an interesting idea-- can you give a reference to where he talks about that?

It was in one of the lectures he gave at the last OCON in San Diego, in a "Q and A" period. I forget which lecture it was (he gave three: two on Ayn Rand's sysem as a whole, and one on a book he's writing).

[JMeganSnow]

Philosophy without metaphysics is logical positivism, btw; look it up.

[Bold Standard]

Of course even logical positivism rests on metaphysical assumptions. But they are the most explicit end result of the trend of rejecting discussion of metaphysics on principle. At least, there is a relatively high degree of probability that they are.

Edited June 25, 2006 by Bold Standard

[Shading Inc.]

I'm sorry if I took so much time replying to y'all. I just have been so busy enjoying my first few days of vacation...

DavidOdden: I would agree with you that opinions don't change the nature of a thing, but ultimately, I'm going to have to say I don't know what think of such a claim, as it is a metaphysical one, and metaphysics is always speculative. But more on this later.

Further, I couldn't possibly believe that identity is in the thing, instead of in what we make of the thing. For your reference, identity as a word has very old etymological roots, most important for this discours being the Latin idem, which today we still know to mean 'the same'. A possible substitute for 'identity' would then be 'sameness': A thing's identity then, is the sum of it's quantity and quality of being the same (or not) as some other thing. This illuminates the fact a thing could never have an identity in itself, but only in relation to other things. This way however, each thing would still have a great many identities; it's sameness would quite fully depend on what other thing(s) you compare it to, or, its identity would depend on us, who choose which of it's identities to adhere to - and thus it follows that I should care a great deal about what other people think. But that's not the end of it. In the end, ultimately, I end up caring only about the things I think, which, by the way, are the only part of reality I ever perceive. So yes, I care about reality too.

And well, not to DavidOdden in particular, about metaphysics: In my book it is a futile project. If we practice metaphysics, we're really only trying to ascertain things we can't be certain about - and then by certain I mean supported and not contradicted by arguments - and the only kinds of viable arguments I know of are logical ones and empirical ones. I think metaphysics is supported by neither, since it seeks to make claims about things that lie beyond the realms of empirism and logic; and here it is where you people and me seem to clash. I will try to clarify my point of view:

I think metaphysics, if it is a search for final grounds, for objectivity, is like trying to go beyond a horizon: Once we're there, we'll only find new horizons. I just don't see a way we could ever take an objective point of view: We can't escape the totality we're part of. And if we could, we'd only find ourselves in another totality. That's an infinite regression there: We can't take an objective point of view over our subjective ones, because if did, we would need another objective point of view to make sure our first objective point of view really is objective, and so on. We can devise this infinite regression to be like a circle, so it wouldn't be some infinite regression - but then it obviously would be circular. Not the kind of objectivity objectivism (for as far as my grasp of it goes), or Aristotle, for that matter, promises.

Well so much for my rant. I'm off to bed now.

Jan.

P.S. Objectivism's claims don't yet seem very plausible to me, but I will continue my investigation. Any help still is greatly appreciated!

Edited July 2, 2006 by Shading Inc.