Metaphysical Possibility: Does It Exist?

[DPW]

In the thread Rationality and Objectivity, Stephen Speicher wrote:

There is a distinction between that which is metaphysically possible and that which is epistemologically possible.

It is metaphysically possible for a pig to have wings of such a nature that the exercise thereof would enable the pig to fly. I suppose one might also say that, metaphysically speaking, it is possible that a pig could possess some other form of propulsion system.

But, if we include into our epistemology all things metaphysically possible, then, apart from axiomatic statements and perceptual knowledge, we can never be certain that any of our knowledge is, in fact, knowledge. Such a standard would ignore the objective nature of knowledge, in the manner in which I previously discussed truth as a relationship between a proposition and the facts of reality. Either we have knowledge, or we do not. We cannot impose a standard of omniscience upon knowledge, since man is man and not some ghostly god. All things metaphysically possible is not the same as all things epistemologically possible.

I want to first thank Stephen for raising this issue. He does make several crucial identifications, but I think he errors in distinguishing between the metaphysically possible and the epistemologically possible.

What Stephen has identified is not a distinction between metaphysical possibility and epistemological possibility, where “metaphysical possibility” must be excluded from our epistemology. Instead, he has identified a distinction between potentiality and the exercise of potentiality. A pig has the potential to have wings and fly – that is a proper identification based on the nature of the pig, the nature of wings, the nature of air, etc. But is it possible that pigs have wings and fly? No! There is no evidence to support that claim. It is completely arbitrary.

MinorityOfOne addressed this point in a blog entry concerning skepticism – skeptics jump from the observation that it is possible for man to error, to the conclusions that it is possible man is always in error. But that is a non sequitur – just because it is possible for man to error (i.e., just because he has that potential), is not evidence that he is in fact in error (i.e., that he has actualized that potential).

In the same way, it is possible for pigs to have wings and fly, but it is not possible that they have wings and can fly. There is evidence for the first proposition (the evidence being: knowledge about the relevant identities); there is no evidence for the second. In neither case are we permitted to retreat into the arbitrary.

This points to Stephen’s error: There is no need to exclude knowledge of potentialities from our epistemology. There is a vital need, on the other hand, to recognize that knowledge of a potentiality is not evidence that potentiality has been actualized.

[AwakeAndFree]

A pig has the potential to have wings and fly

I shall say not!

A pig has no proven potential of becoming a flying species.

What you mean to say is that a body similar to that of a pig in certain physical attributes has the potentiality to fly with a certain kind of mechanism attached to it.

You are actually not thinking at all about a pig - but about the requirements of flight.

Now to Stephen's point:

I don't think there can a difference between epistemological and metaphysical possibility. Possibility is level of reliability in human knowledge and therefore epistemological by its very nature.

The levels are:

1 - Wrong. Impossible.

2 - Arbitrary. No proof of possibility.

3 - Possible. Not contradicting anything I know, some clues to the exitence of this option.

4. Probable. Has more going for it that the opposite claim. This comes in various degrees.

6. Certain. All the facts of the case support this claim, it fits perfectly within the context of my knowledge, and no relevant questions or reservations come up.

Now to say that a pig has the possibility of flying - you would need some relevant data on this subject. Have other animals without wings ever grew wings and started flying? Are complex genetical mutations of this kind ever existed? Is some mad biologist working on creating flying pigs?

If not - it is not metaphysically or epistemologically possible.

What IS possible is the aerodynamic principle, that a body of such and such weight and size can be supported by a such and such wingspan, and will need this or that speed to lift off.

All it comes to at the end is imagination. Yes - it is imaginable that a pig will fly if it had proper wings. Good imagination is essential to creativity - and it is exactly to distinguish between the possible through knowledge, and the possible through creation.

For example - is it possible that there are men on Mars? no. Is it possible that we can bring men to Mars? Of course! It it possible for a pig to fly? No. Is it possible that men create a pig that flies? Someday, yes!

It's human imagination alone that can turn the arbitrary into the possible.

[Reason's Ember]

I will think about this more closely, but the danger is that you end up with a very conservative (with a little 'c') belief system.

What pushes you to discover more about reality in the absence of evident contradiction? You can obviously have pscyhological certainty, but be wrong about something. A lot of revolutionary science starts with the imagination and calling into doubt the obvious.

How do you respond to this person's points (note, you can dispute his definition of fact and still see what he is saying):

http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Science/TheArtOf...alThinking.html

CounterFactual Thinking in Physics

Counterfactual thinking involves treating as false a fact of the world. Now, a "fact" is merely a statement of empirical content that is accepted as true by the majority of a population or by at least a majority of experts in some field, or a personal truth about the world. It may seem at first that counterfactual thinking should have no value in physics, but soon you will see otherwise.

Some people have a real problem with the notion of counterfactual thinking, as though it is a sin against reason itself. Well, it depends on what it's used for. What about the person who sets his clock ahead by five minutes so as not to miss appointments. That's counterfactual thinking, and it works for some people. Consider this situation: An opponent of counterfactual thinking is sure she put her house keys on the table in the den, but she can't find it there now. Her friend tells her to imagine where she would have put the keys if she had not put them on the table in the den. She replies that she won't even consider it because to her it is a fact that she put the keys on the table in the den. However, her friend protests that she could be mistaken and asks what harm this subjunctive thinking will be. She replies with the platitude that such counterfactual thinking is a sin against reason. Yeah, right.

. . .

By the way, how many analogies were mentioned, in one form or another, in the above paragraphs? An here's another analogy from Einstein on his counterfactual thinking regarding the "true nature" of the electromagnetic field equations in empty space, arguing against the "factuality" of their linearality:

What can be attempted with some hope of success in view of the

presents situation of physical theory? At this point it is the experiences

with the theory of gravitation which determine my expectations.

These equations give, from my [formal] point of view, more warrant

for the expectation to assert something precise than all other equations

of physics. One may, for example, call on Maxwell's equations of empty

space by way of comparison. These are formulations which coincide

with the experiences of infinitely weak electromagnetic fields. This

empirical origin already determines their linear form; it has, however,

already been emphasized above that the true laws can not be linear.

Such linear laws fulfill the superposition-principle for their solutions,

but contain no assertions concerning the interaction of elementary

bodies. The true laws can not be linear nor can they be derived from such.

---- Einstein, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Vol 1,

Autobiographical Notes, p 89.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Clifford, Einstein, and Poincare argued that space is not factually "flat," as it had been assumed to be.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Let's play "What if?"

What if light is not a wave? thought Einstein.

What if particles are not a unwave-like? thought de Broglie.

What if the earth is not the center of the universe? thought Copernicus.

What if the earth is not flat? thought Columbus.

What if magnetism is not independent of electricity? thought Oersted and in a completely different way Einstein too.

What if stars are not just the peeking through of light from beyond the celestial sphere?

What if orbiting electrons in the atom do not continuously radiate energy according to classical electromagnetic theory? thought Bohr.

What if quantum mechanics is nonlocal? thought Bell.

What if parity is not conserved? thought Chen Ning Yang and Tsung Dao Lee.

What if position and momentum values cannot be simultaneously measured to arbitrary accuracy for subatomic particles? thought Heisenberg.

What if physical concepts are not uniquely determined by the facts of the world? thought Einstein.

What if atoms are not permanent? thought Marie and Pierre Curie.

What if we could treat extended bodies as though they were point particles? thought Newton.

[isaac]

I see a big problem here with abused language and dropped context. "Metaphysically possible" is a contradiction in terms. Speicher is using that to mean,

P is "metaphysically possible" iff:

There is no known evidence to contradict P, even if there may not be any evidence to support P.

IOW, by "metaphysically possible" he means "not certainly false." Since no one has yet searched the total universe and failed to find any flying pigs, and since a flying pig is at least conceivable (as opposed to a "loud red odor" which simply doesn't make logical sense) it's "metaphysically possible."

That's not a metaphysical assertion. As soon as you say "known evidence," then you're talking epistemology.

Metaphysically, there is no "known" and "unknown." There is no such thing as "evidence" until you're talking about minds capable of drawing conclusions.

Metaphysically, there are existents with properties. What is, is. That's it. "Possible" doesn't enter the equation - "possible" means "there is some evidence for P, but not much." Again, Mother Nature doesn't know what "evidence" is. Evidence is something that applies to minds in action, not to existence as such. (Except insofar as minds exist, and thus are a part of "metaphysical existence," yadda yadda yadda, rationalistic nitpicking, etc. Bah. If you think for half a second, you'll see what I'm saying.)

Either there are flying pigs, or there are not. Even if we were to say that it's a remote possibility, as far as metaphysics is concerned, it's one or the other without question - the concept of "possibility" only shows up when a mind considers the problem.

If one were omniscient, then the set of "certain" propositions would exactly equal the set of "true" propositions. Nothing would be "possible," or even "probable."

Then again, if one were omniscient, one wouldn't be volitional, because there would be no options without limited knowledge. (An omniscient mind would always think in the most effective way, but knowing everything, it wouldn't be possible to "focus" on anything - the answers would already be known certainly. It would be closer to a mindless database than a person.)

</$0.02>

Isaac Z. Schlueter

http://isaac.beigetower.org

[isaac]

Reason's Ember,

In all the "what ifs" you cited -- really, every single one of them -- there was reason to doubt the popularly held paradigms. There was either some evidence that did not fit into the predictions of the current theory (for example, the photoelectric effect is very strange if light is purely wave-like) or there were some conclusions to be drawn from the theory that seemed contradictory, or at least counter-intuitive.

In all those cases, from the POV of the scientist you mentioned, it was possible (by erandror's definition) that the popular paradigm was incorrect. Upon further investigation, it was found in many of those cases that the suspicion was well-founded, and science advanced.

This doesn't disprove objectivism's account of possibility -- rather, it bolsters its viability.

Isaac

http://isaac.beigetower.org

EDIT:

What if the earth is not flat? thought Columbus.

That's a myth. In Columbus's day, anyone with a halfway decent education (including, certainly, the Spanish royalty, Chris, most of his crew, and all the people who claimed that he would certainly fail) knew that the earth was round. The debate was over the earth's size, not its shape. Plato had actually measured the Earth's size using simple geometry, but Columbus thought it was much smaller.

Columbus was wrong. Plato was within a couple hundred miles of the actual diameter. Columbus did not hit the East Indies.

[stephen_speicher]

I am afraid that several have misunderstood what I said about metaphysical possibility, possibly confusing it with a much different discussion recently on HBL about things which may be known for which there is no metaphysical possibility of error. The issue mentioned here is much different, and much more simple.

Isaac claims: "'Metaphysically possible' is a contradiction in terms."

So then, it is not metaphysically possible for a ship on sea to be wrecked? Of course such a metaphysical possibility exists, and it is a purely metaphysical statement. This is a totally different statement from the epistemological issue as to whether or not there is any evidence for a particular ship to be wrecked. Note how Ayn Rand uses the term "metaphysically possible" in her letter to philosopher John Hospers.

"It is metaphysically normal and possible for man to travel; since man is not omnipotent, it is metaphysically possible for a traveller to be caught in a shipwreck; but if this last were the rule, not the exception, then man would have to abstain from travelling by sea." ["Letters of Ayn Rand," p. 551.]

DPW claims: "A pig has the potential to have wings and fly."

No, you have that backwards. There is nothing in the nature of a pig -- it is not part of a pig's identity -- for which there is a potential for flight (other than just being a physical existent). It is, however, metaphysically possible to graft a set of wings onto a pig and equip the pig with a source of power, in order to have a flying pig. But, doing so would change the pig's identity, so it is not the cultivation of a potential which enabled the pig to fly.

Erandror says: "Is it possible that men create a pig that flies? Someday, yes!"

Okay. But that is what I meant by metaphysically possible. Also, I would distinguish the metaphysically possible from the metaphysically impossible. For instance, it is not metaphysically possible for contradictions to exist. Or, it is not metaphysically possible to have a physical existent which is infinite in extent. Or ... well, I think you should get my meaning.

[stephen_speicher]

How do you respond to this person's points (note, you can dispute his definition of fact and still see what he is saying):

http://www.ajnpx.com/html/Science/TheArtOf...alThinking.html

There are much better sources than this if you want to explore that point. I have debated this person many times and I can say, as one who prides myself on the extent and depth of my knowledge of Einstein, relativity, and the history of both, that Reany is a very poor choice.

Einstein was an extremely prolific writer -- the Einstein Papers Project at Caltech will eventually publish 25 volumes of his writings, 8 of which are currently in print -- and his philosophical utterances varied greatly over the course of his life. The philosophical writings of young Einstein are quite different from those of his middle and later years. For instance, Einstein was much less allied to Kant in his earlier years ("Kant seems quite weak to me."[1]), when Einstein's main work was done, and more allied to Kant in his later years, after relativity had been created. Einstein explicitly rejected Kant's synthetic a priori[2], and it was only later that he began to embrace some aspects of the Kantian methodology.[3]

It is easy to cull quotations from amongst Einstein's varied work in order to make him appear to support differing scientific and philosophical views. Einstein himself has noted that as an epistemologist he can be seen alternatively as a realist, an idealist, a positivist, and a Platonist or Pythagorean.[4] It is important to identify in Einstein those ideas which weaved their way through his entire life.

I personally have no problem with "what if" scenarios, but let me state most emphatically that a proper identification of Einstein's methodology in the development of relativity is far from the fanciful way it is portrayed by some. Einstein once wrote: "If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists about the methods they use, I advise you to stick closely to one principle: don't listen to their words, fix your attention on their deeds."[5]

That is very sage advice, and when applied to Einstein one finds a proper inductive method to be at the root of the development of relativity. I have written about this elsewhere, and have documented the essential facts. This very issue will be a portion of a book I am preparing on Einstein and relativity.

[1]--Albert Einstein, letter to Paul Ehrenfest dated 24 October 1916, in "The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein," Volume 8, The Berlin Years: Correspondence, 1914-1918, _Princeton University Press_, 1998, Document 269.

[2] "The Advancement of Science, and It's Burdens," Gerald Holton, _Harvard University Press_, p. XXVII, 1986/1998.

[3] "Kant's Impact on Einstein's Thought," Mara Beller, in "Einstein: The Formative Years, 1879-1909," Einstein Studies Volume 1, Don Howard and John Stachel, editors, _Birkhauser_, 2000.

[4]--Albert Einstein, "Reply to Criticisms," in "Albert Einstein: Philosopher-scientist," Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, _Harper Torchbooks_, pp. 683-684, 1949/1951.

[5] Albert Einstein, "On the Method of Theoretical Physics," Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford on June 10, 1933, reprinted in Albert Einstein, "Ideas and Opinions," _Three Rivers Press_, 1954/1982.

[stephen_speicher]

Plato was within a couple hundred miles of the actual diameter.

You are confusing Plato with Eratosthenes. Aristotle was amongst the first to estimate the circumference of the Earth, but he was off by a large amount. It was not until many years after Aristotle that Eratosthenes provided a relatively accurate value. Depending upon how certain Greek values are defined (Eratosthenes made use of the distance in stadia between Alexandria and Syene), Eratosthenes' estimate for the circumference was indeed within a few hundred miles of the current value.

[stephen_speicher]

Sorry for the double post. Something strange happened.

[AwakeAndFree]

Okay. But that is what I meant by metaphysically possible. Also, I would distinguish the metaphysically possible from the metaphysically impossible.

So you are distinguishing that which contradicts the laws of the universe, which is impossible for man to achieve, and that which does not - which is possible for man to achieve.

I think you have to add "for man to achieve" in order to be completely understood. A pig that flies isn't metaphysicaly possible by itself. It is a metaphysically possible genetic creation of man.

The fact that X doesn't contradict the laws of the universe doesn't make it automatically possible IN EFFECT. It makes it theoretically possible FOR MAN TO CREATE.

How about that?

[stephen_speicher]

So you are distinguishing that which contradicts the laws of the universe, which is impossible for man to achieve, and that which does not - which is possible for man to achieve.

I think you have to add "for man to achieve" in order to be completely understood. A pig that flies isn't metaphysicaly possible by itself. It is a metaphysically possible genetic creation of man.

Which is what I clarified when I wrote:

"There is nothing in the nature of a pig -- it is not part of a pig's identity -- for which there is a potential for flight (other than just being a physical existent). It is, however, metaphysically possible to graft a set of wings onto a pig and equip the pig with a source of power, in order to have a flying pig. But, doing so would change the pig's identity, so it is not the cultivation of a potential which enabled the pig to fly."

And, which ties in to what I said in my original post:

"... when you reduce the knowledge you have of an entity to its nature -- to its identity -- that process itself excludes all things metaphysically possible. Identity trumps possibility."

The fact that X doesn't contradict the laws of the universe doesn't make it automatically possible IN EFFECT. It makes it theoretically possible FOR MAN TO CREATE.

I wouldn't go quite that far. For instance, it is metaphysically possible that some atoms become arranged to spell out IBM, which would not require man to create, just to read.

[MinorityOfOne]

Ember,

There's no problem with counterfactual thinking, and I don't know of any Objectivists who have claimed otherwise. In fact, this reminds me of Peikoff's lectures on "Understanding Objectivism." In one lecture, by way of elucidating the relationship of force and volition, he asks the audience to imagine a world in which coercion actually did have the power to change someone's mind -- i.e., I point a gun at your head and tell you to believe that 2+2=5, and somehow you actually come to believe it. Clearly that's not how the world is; but using counterfactuals can illuminate and clarify facts.

However, I firmly disagree with the definition of "fact" used in the quote you provide: "A statement of empirical content that is accepted as true by the majority of a population or by at least a majority of experts in some field, or a personal truth about the world." This is utter subjectivism. If I believe I am a banana, I am wrong -- it is not a fact. If I have somehow convinced everybody in the world (hey look, a counterfactual!) that I'm a banana, it's still not a fact... it's just a bunch of deluded people.

There's a distinction between using counterfactuals and coming to doubt previously accepted beliefs. I grant that there can be psychological similarity between the two, especially at an early stage, but they differ significantly in method.

[MinorityOfOne]

Stephen,

Re: your book on Einstein: when do you expect it to be finished, and who is the intended audience? When I was in fifth grade I read some Hawkings and decided I wanted to be a theoretical physicist. It didn't take me long to discover that philosophy was even *more* interesting, so I moved on... and on top of that, most of the books on physics I picked up after then were absolute nonsense. It's only recently that I've become interested in physics again, though now it's from a distinctly philosophical standpoint. (And, unfortunately, a distinctly layman standpoint: my background in science is pathetic.) Will your book be pretty accessible, or is it intended for people in your field?

[AwakeAndFree]

I think there is still a confusion regarding the "metaphysically possible". If something is possible it means it might be true RIGHT NOW, AS WE SPEAK.

What you mean, as you yourself said, is not that the existence of a flying pig is possible NOW, but that the CREATION of a flying pig is possible, or that the very existence of a flying pig does not, in itself, contradict the laws of existence.

I think adding the word metaphysical doesn't make this clear enough.

By metaphysical possibility you mean "does not contradict the basic laws of existence". But so are arbitrary claims such as: "there are three aliens who look like green monkeys dancing and singing the Rumba on the far side of Jupiter" (I think Peikoff gave a similar example in OPAR).

And besides - metaphysical does not necessarily mean only the basic laws of existence: it can also mean existence as such. And in real existence the existence of a flying pig is'nt possible except through human intervention which did not yet occur.

I would drop the metaphysical in this case, and simply say that something has a possibility of being created while another doesn't. I think this is a more useful and exact formulation.

[Old Geezer]

This may be off subject, but has anyone ever read any Douglas Adams? (Hitchhiker's guide to the galaxy etc)

a key quote about the sudden appearance of a sperm whale in the sky;

"Its not impossible, its just HIGHLY HIGHLY improbable"

lol

[DPW]

Stephen Speicher writes:

DPW claims: "A pig has the potential to have wings and fly."

No, you have that backwards. There is nothing in the nature of a pig -- it is not part of a pig's identity -- for which there is a potential for flight (other than just being a physical existent). It is, however, metaphysically possible to graft a set of wings onto a pig and equip the pig with a source of power, in order to have a flying pig. But, doing so would change the pig's identity, so it is not the cultivation of a potential which enabled the pig to fly.

Stephen,

First, thank you for the Rand quote. Second, my statement was wrong as stated. What I meant was, a flying pig is a potential that depends on the exercise of the relevant identities (a pig, wings, the man who puts them on the pig, etc.). It is a statement about potentials, not about levels of evidence. The reason I'm so adament about this can is...

I would distinguish the metaphysically possible from the metaphysically impossible. For instance, it is not metaphysically possible for contradictions to exist.  Or, it is not metaphysically possible to have a physical existent which is infinite in extent.

This come dangerously close to advocating the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. In fact, all false propositions are self-contradictions, as Peikoff explains in The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy. That's why I'm stressing that the distinction you are identifying is not between the contradictory and the non-contradictory, but between potentiality and the actualization of that potentiality (i.e., between a ship's potentail to wreck and a ship that has actually wrecked).

To make the point clearer, in the strictest sense, it is not metaphysically possible for reality to be anything other than it is. So, therefore, if there are no non-white swans it is not metaphysically possible for there to be white swans (barring your choice to toss a swan in paint). All that exists in reality is what is, including all the potentialities of what is. Possibilities are confined to our knowledge of what is including our knowledge of what will be.

[DPW]

erandror writes:

And besides - metaphysical does not necessarily entail only the basic laws of existence: it can also mean existence as such. And in real existence the existence of a flying pig is'nt possible except through human intervention which did not yet occur.  I would drop the metaphysical in this case, and simply say that something has a  possibility of being created while another doesn't. I think this is a more useful and exact formulation.

There seems to be a confusion because we keep mixing units. Let's consider some concretes:

(1) A ship

(2) A ship that has wrecked

(3) A square circle

(4) A pig

Now let's go through the list and pin down some facts before we worry about words.

(1) A ship. A ship has the potential to wreck. To claim, "It is possible for this ship to wreck," is a claim that requires evidence. If the captain is following the correct route which he knows well, paying careful attention, the weather is good, etc. it isn't possible he will wreck. The ship, in other words, has the capacity to wreck under certain conditions - conditions that do not obtain since the captain is following the correct piloting procedures.

(2) A ship that has wrecked. A ship that has actualized its wrecking potential. Now let's suppose Cindy waiting for the ship to dock so she can kiss a sailor, but four hours later it has not shown up and she cannot reach it by radio. Now it is possible the ship has wrecked (but note that the fact of the ship being wrecked simply is, as the men aboard the shipwrecked boat would be happy to tell Cindy...and if they ever get the chance to do so she will then be certain the ship wrecked).

(3) A square circle can't exist. It involves a contradiction.

(4) A pig. Here's where it gets tricky. Does a pig as such have the potential to fly? No. A flying pig, then, would be a contradiction (see Peikoff's A-S Dichotomy on this point). But, does man have the potential to strap wings on Porkey that will enable him to fly? Yes. Okay, one more question: Has this potential been actualized? Stephen, I believe, would say it is metaphysically possible but not epistemologically possible. In my view, that tears the question out of the realm of evidence. The correct answer is - it is not possible this potential has been actualized. Period. Why? Because there is no evidence.

Notice that in identifying all these potentialities - of ships, of pigs, of squares, and of man, we are adhereing to the evidence even in cases that did not describe actual existents. In other words, when we were discussing flying pigs, we were dealing with our knowledge of what pigs are, what man is, what wings are, how flight is achieved, etc. We were not engaging in arbitrary speculation.

But once we start talking about the actualization of potentialities, we need more evidence than simply the existence of those potentialities, just as the skeptic needs more evidence to accuse me off error than the mere fact man has the potential for error. Evidence of actuality is the precondition for possibility.

To put it another way - knowledge of potentialities depends on knowledge of identity; knowledge of actualities depends on knowledge about the referents of a concept. In other words, I can learn man's potential for error from any set of men. To learn that Immanual Kant is in error, I need knowledge of a particular man (Kant), and his actual errors (not all of them, to be sure...I'm not, after all, a masochist!).

In both cases, I'm going by evidence. In neither case am I dealing with "metaphysical possibilities" that I must keep out of my epistemology. In fact, "possibility" applies in both cases, but only in the epistemological sense...because that's the only sense there is!

Now, let's take one last example, because this one is tough. "All swans are white." First, I would submit this cannot be proven with certainty - not because certainty demands omniscience, but because certainty demands integration, and the fact is, I know that birds come in all sorts of colors. I know that genetic deformities occur. I know that no species exists in statis - they change over time. But second, if all swans are white, then it is NOT possible for a swan to be non-white, and it is certainly not possible that I will discover a non-white swan. But is it impossible for me to find a non-white swan? NO!!!! Since I don't know that all swans are white, any claim about what I will find is...arbitrary.

(Let's be clear, I'm not arguing against contextual certainty. I'm saying in this case it doesn't apply since the proposition cannot be induced with certainty given our context of knowledge.)

Let me summarize then:

In order to keep us focused on evidence (i.e., reality), we must distinguish between potentialities and the actualization of potentialities (including the different kinds of evidence required to establish each), and to retain the concept "possibility" solely in its epistemological sense.

[Reason's Ember]

Just to be clear, the definition of "fact" was offered by this other person. It is not mine, nor were those "What If?" scenarios.

on knowledge about the referents of a concept

I take it Objectivists would say that no meaningful distinction exists between the "sense" and "reference" of a concept? That would seem to jive with what I'm picking up here.

This is how that distinction is sometimes made: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense_and_reference.

[Reason's Ember]

-- i.e., I point a gun at your head and tell you to believe that 2+2=5, and somehow you actually come to believe it. Clearly that's not how the world is; but using counterfactuals can illuminate and clarify facts.

That's also a very powerful scene in George Orwell's 1984, where Big Brother tries to accomplish just that, which is imagined to be the system's greatest accomplishment. The best way to argue with influential neo-pragmatists like Richard Rorty is to point them to Orwell. Pragmatists do not believe the distinction between subjective and objective is meaningful. They think calling something "objective" is giving it a rhetorical pat on the back.

Rorty would claim that facts are just social constructs that make life agreeable and society cohesive, yet he also prides himself on being a lover of human rights and free thought. He thinks both beliefs go together. If you have never heard of him, you can find some of his sophistry here: http://www.stanford.edu/~rrorty/. He is very influential, especially among post-modernists who are embarassed by their bad grammar and want a role model who actually writes fluid prose. When someone mentions this scene from Orwell to pragmatists, they get very defensive and start saying, "that's not what I mean." Or, if they are intellectually honest and stick to their guns, they quickly reveal their absurdity.

Bernard Williams did that to Rorty in a recent book, Truth and Truthfulness (http://pup.princeton.edu/titles/7328.html). I highly recommend the book, even though I imagine Objectivists will rightfully disagree with many of his practical conclusions (e.g., he says something to the effect that the marketplace of ideas has to be controlled by competent experts who filter out the noise that can overrun the system and make rational communication difficult).

[DPW]

I take it Objectivists would say that no meaningful distinction exists between the "sense" and "reference" of a concept?  That would seem to jive with what I'm picking up here. 

Objectivism recognizes a distinction between your knowledge of the meaning of a concept and your knowledge of that concept's units. A concept means its referents. You know what a concept means if you can identify its referents. But your knowledge of the referents is more specific - it means your knowledge of the actual particulars the concept refers to.

So, for example, a doctor and I both know the meaning of the concept man to the same degree, but the doctor knows much more about the referents. He knows all kinds of facts about man I do not know.

Does that help? Rand discusses this issue, by the way, in the appendix of ITOE.

[dondigitalia]

Does that help?  Rand discusses this issue, by the way, in the appendix of ITOE.

The appendix you are talking about isn't published with all editions of ITOE. Just wanted to make that clear for anyone who couldn't find it.

Mine has it. It's the one with the purple & white cover.

Also, Peikoff's paper on the Analytic-Synthetic dichotomy (I think DPW mentioned it earlier) can be found at the end of ITOE, before the appendix. It pretty much clears up this whole issue.

[Reason's Ember]

I now have ITOE to work from.

I do not see an explicit discussion of sense / reference.

If you follow my previous link, you can see some ways the distinction is applied.

To keep the conversation local and interesting, I will take a very pertinent example from the history of philosophy.

Quoting Peikoff who is Quoting Rand (p. 97):

"Concepts 'represent classifications of observed existents according to their relationships to other observed existents.'"

How would this definition function in relationship to the concept of an omniscient being?

You and I have a concept of an omniscient being. When we say "omniscient being," we mean the same thing. We are communicating with each other. We are not just talking gibberish. The concept of an omniscient being has an intelligible sense.

The concept of ominiscient being, however, has no "referent(s)" / reference. Its meaning--as a concept--does not correspond to any observable facts of reality, in any context.

Furthermore, there are no existent beings that share the characteristics of an omniscient being, because its defining characteristic is precisely its omniscience.

You could say that the ominiscient being is a theoretical fiction contrived from other real things: namely, beings like men who have knowledge of this or that part of reality. The "ominiscient being" is an abstraction from our concept of knowledge, which is part of our concept of the capabiliites of men, etc.

However, this solution to the paradox begs the question. Why? Because the essential component of an omniscient being is precisely its difference from us and the knowledge we are capable of. I "know" of an omniscient being--I understand the concept--when I can conceive of how unfamiliar he is from any other being I've encountered. Until then, I have not "grasped" the concept; I am only talking about a confused concept of a quasi-man by another name.

Medieval philosophers used to turn this line of analysis into a sophistry proving the existence.

Believer: God has a "sense." Ergo, God has a "reference." Ergo, God exists.

Non-Believer: I think you skipped a few things.

Believer: Nope, if you believe in chairs, then you believe in God.

Non-believer: That's silly. You and I both see chairs. We cannot see a God.

Believer: Where's the chair?

Non-believer: Over there.

Believer: That's just a collection of atoms in space.

Non-believer: No it's not; it's a thing we sit on and supports our weight.

Believer: And God is an omniscient being who understands everything, always has, and always will.

Non-believer: But God has no referent.

Believer: Then you don't see a chair. etc., etc., etc.,

[dondigitalia]

How would this definition function in relationship to the concept of an omniscient being?

If you have an edition of ITOE that includes the appendix, Rand discussess the idea of an omniscient being (God) directly, along with two other invalid concepts: "infinity" and "nothing."

Check pg. 148

Omnisciense is an impossibility that does not exist in reality. Since all concepts must in some way be derived from percepts of reality, the concept of an omniscient or omnipotent being is not valid qua concepts.

Furthermore, a concept is "a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted."

God is not two or more units, but a single unit (provided you believe in his existence), and cannot be regarded as a concept.

[Reason's Ember]

I'll think about this more closely. At first glance, the problem is that your formulation, or Rand's in this case, denies a very a real fact: the fact that when you and I talk about omniscience, we both know what we are talking about.

Though omniscience or infinity may not be valid concepts "qua concept," they have a determinate sense and use in language. I can use omniscience in a sentence and make meaningful contrasts with it--for example, a contrast with my own knowledge of the universe.

Talking in this way is different than talking about some nebulous sensation I feel, which I might arbitralily name a"#!@$$#." It is also different than talking about a squared circle, which is literally inconceivable. God-talk may not be valid talk "qua concept," but it is not non-sensical in the way of talk about #!@$$# or squared circles.

Consequently, the definition of concept you provide seems to be leaving something out, because it does not allow me to make meaningful distinctions between things like omniscience and things like squared circles.

By contrast, an epistemology that made a distinction between things that have sense and things that have reference would allow me to make the distinction. In this case, omniscience has sense, but no reference. A squared circle has neither sense, nor reference. This distinction has analogues to ones that we regularly make in ordinary, non-technical discourse.

This is important for more than academic reasons. Failure to note the sense-reference distinction can gives theists an escape caluse. They can say,

"If you can conceive of a perfect being, and you can conceive that one of its attributes is existence, then God has to exist. Otherwise, your conception of God could not be right. If it were not right, then none of your other conceptions could be right, because they look the same as a form of consciousness, even if they have different content. You must either give up your other certainties or admit that God exists. Crippling skepticism is a high price to pay for atheism. Ergo, God exists."

The sense and reference contrast allows me to invalidate this argument without invalidating the fact that I do have a conception of a perfect being. Rand's definition of concept would not allow me do to this. Since I cannot honestly say that I do not conceive of a perfect being, Rand's concept leaves me stuck me with belief in God's existence (in theory).

[Note: for those familiar with Anselm's ontological argument for God's existence, I am stretching its form a little to try to make it fit the context of this discussion. The real argument can be found here: URL=http://www.princeton.edu/~grosen/puc/phi203/ontological.html. My form of the argument has a prudential component--"if you don't want give up your other certainties"--that Anselm's argument does not strictly have. Therefore, it is kind of like a mix of Anselm, Pascal's wager, and Descartes' evil demon. That, if you will pardon the pun, is an ungodly mix.]

[dondigitalia]

"If you can conceive of a perfect being, and you can conceive that one of its attributes is existence, then God has to exist.  Otherwise, your conception of God could not be right.  If it were not right, then none of your other conceptions could be right, because they look the same as a form of consciousness, even if they have different content.  You must either give up your other certainties or admit that God exists.   Crippling skepticism is a high price to pay for atheism.  Ergo, God exists."

This statement implies that the mind of man can create reality. We know that this is not the case.

For the sake of argument, I'll assume omniscience is a reality.

I would define it as: a state of consciousness in which all knowledge is present

This gives us a genus (state of consciousness) and a differentia (all knowledge is present)

The reason you have no physical referents is that omniscience (however fantistical it is) is a concept of consciousness; such concepts are given a special category precisely because they have no physical referents. Take emotions for example: you cannot reach out and grab love, hate, joy, or anger, because they only exist in the mind. The referents of the concept "emotion" are the percepts we have whenever we are loving, hating, joyful, or angry.

I suppose the referents of omniscience would be fantasies of omniscience, which exist only in the mind of man.

P.S. I am still just beginning to grasp all of this myself, so if any of you "veterans" out there see any flaws in my reasoning, please lend a helping hand.

P.P.S. The definition I provided for "concept" is Rand's full definition. The use of any other is not applicable to her epistemological theory.