Life as an End in Itself, a Standard, and Ultimate End

[IAmMetaphysical]

His choice is obviously not to live as long as possible, but to sustain his existence in order to fullfill a particular goal.

Here you've admitted that his goal is not life, but that he uses his life as a means to another end, the end which can only be DEATH. That is what happens when you put your life in the service of anything else, you have to sacrifice it. So your dictator is NOT CHOOSING life, but choosing death, and using the value which is his life (the only thing that are useful are values) to achieve death.

[Freddy]

His choice is obviously not to live as long as possible, but to sustain his existence in order to fullfill a particular goal.

You seem to agree that to choose life as ones ultimate value is the choice to maximize ones life expectancy. Now, The choice not to maximize a quantity is not equivalent to the choice of minimizing that quantity, so not chosing to maximize ones life expectancy doesn't imply suicide, it only imply that you choose to achieve something else than maximal life expectancy. If you want to call this chosing death I'm fine with that, If I hade the choice of lying 150 years in a bed hooked up to a life expectancy maximizer or 80 years of enjoying myself building an empire I would gladly chose death, that is, building the empire. I just don't see anything wrong with this choice, and I don't see that you calling it choosing death has any value significance.

[IAmMetaphysical]

Well, I certainly did not mean to imply that choosing life means choosing life quanitity, but I also don't agree that there need be a dichotomy. Building a dictatorial empire is only choosing death in as much as making the use of force a staple of one's life is choosing death. Building a productive rational business "empire" would be choosing life, even if it meant forgoing an extra year or so of "surviving" at the end. Living life qua man does not mean mere survival, nor does it mean "living however you decide to define 'qua man' as". Living qua man means to live a productive life, where you produce value, the end in which is the enjoyment of that value and of your ultimate value (which makes all the others possible) which is your life, your existence. It would be a paradox of sorts if one chose to place their life or the enjoyment of it in the service of some "higher ideal". For instance, it would not make sense to sell one's eyes, ears, hands, and legs for a million dollars. What type of value would the million dollars have for you after you've left yourself with no way of enjoying it? For the same reason, it is self-defeating to place your life at the service of an ideal which demands your sacrifice, the sacrifice of that which makes valuing possible. I once was daydreaming about dying in my gf's arms and telling her "go on, live your life, try to find a way of enjoying it without me, don't give up, but live it, and enjoy it." Then I realized that it wouldn't really matter to me after I am dead if she killed herself or became a crack addict, or whatever, and the most I could say is " I love you, thanks for existing along with me."

But the alternative to sacrificing your life to another (higher)value need not be to sacrifice your values for the sake of your life. What makes life "good" is the fact that it allows you to value, so in a way it is non-sensical to think of a life without values. It is not living to simply feed yourself in order so that you experience disvalue, or in order that you be able to sacrifice. Doing so would be living while acting on the premise of death, and since there can be no contradictions, you would be slowly dying, not living at all.

EDIT: to change a ambiguity.

Edited November 24, 2006 by IAmMetaphysical

[Freddy]

Well, I certainly did not mean to imply that choosing life means choosing life quanitity, but I also don't agree that there need be a dichotomy. Building a dictatorial empire is only choosing death in as much as making the use of force a staple of one's life is choosing death. Building a productive rational business "empire" would be choosing life, even if it meant forgoing an extra year or so of "surviving" at the end.

And this goes to the heart of the argument because it doesn't seem to square with Rands meta-ethical argument. The basic premise is existence or non-existence, life or death. And if this is used as a criterion for morality it would imply that the moral way to behave is to maximize ones life expectancy. If you want this criterion to imply that it is permissible to enjoy yourself at the expense of your existence, then you must somehow make existence encompass this by making exist mean something like "exist as a happy person". But what is your standard for redifing existence so your (pre-concieved?) conclusions will follow? The problem is that Rands meta-ethical argument dosen't help us anymore, it only concludes that existence is good. If existence is taken literally, then it really is a criterion (albeit an absurd one), if the argument leaves the question of what is is to exist open then it amounts to nothing. What's the point of framing the question of ethics as existence or non-existence if it leaves the content of those terms to be decided? Then we need a second meta-ethical argument to establish a criterion for what it is to exist.

[IAmMetaphysical]

Existence is good because it allows for the pursuit of values. It is a value to exist, but to exist is not the only value, but the STANDARD of value. That means that all other pursuits are measured against the standard, not sacrificed to it. Something is judged as good based on whether or not it promotes life, or promotes death. Biologically, this can mean things that promote life processes like food or water, but on more sophisticated levels of existence, like consciousness and conceptual consciousnesses, this means things like happiness, mental health, self-esteem, etc.

The thing to understand is that being conscious of nothing but disvalues is not good, because it negates the good of being conscious, which is to perceive values. Consciousness' role in human life is to enable man to percieve and devise ways of achieving values, values used for the furtherance of his biological processes yes, but also values in order to feed his desire to live, or his enjoyment of that life. And the enjoyment of that life serves a purpose of making him want to live, to want to feed himself, to want to exist. Where no values are present, there is no point for the mind, for his life, for man to exist.

One's enjoyment should not come at the expense of one's capacity for enjoyment, that would negate the whole thing. But in the same respect, one should not sacrifice all the values to be attained by life, for that life, because then the distinction between existence and non-existence becomes the difference between torture and oblivion, torture being a disvalue, and oblivion being a non-value. In that choice, the non-value is the greater value and one should choose to die.

The criterion of life-vs-death is not arrived at in a vacuum, arbitrarily, but because of the nature of value, of good and evil. Life is good because it makes valuing possible. Death is bad because it makes nothing matter, it makes existence unconditional, hence there are no values to be pursued. That state of having no values to pursue is that state that one reaches when one sacrifice's one's capacity for enjoyment, for valuing, in order to "live." That state is akin to death.

EDIT FOR TYPO(i really should read these before posting.)

Edited November 24, 2006 by IAmMetaphysical

[Freddy]

Existence is good because it allows for the pursuit of values.

I don't think this is the Objectivist position. This seems to be a version of the argument that since you have to be alive in order to value your existence is your ultimate value. But this is a non-sequtir, the only thing it tells us is that if we want to become dictators then we should not start with commiting suicide and proceed from there. We can't however use it to establish whether becoming a dictator is a good thing. Leonard Peikoff also sais about this position:

The distinctively Objectivist viewpoint here...is not that life is a precondition of other values -- not that one must remain alive in order to act. This idea is a truism, not a philosophy. Objectivism says that remaining alive is the goal of values and of all proper action.

It is a value to exist, but to exist is not the only value, but the STANDARD of value.

But what does this standard tell us, how it is derived? That is the question without an answer, and we cannot proceed without the answer. If we take existence to mean existence in the literal sense of the word the meta-ethical argument seem to imply that existence is the good thing (no matter what) and that all our actions should be dedicated to remain in existence. The Peikoff quote also seem to support this order of reasoning. However, to avoid absurd consequences the definition of existence seems to change, and that move renders the meta-ethical argument non-responsive because it dosen't give a criteria for what it is to exist. Thus, the charge that Rands is just defining her conclusions into her premises seems justified.

[IAmMetaphysical]

You are not understanding what I am saying, and I don't have any idea how to present it more clearly. I have shown how it is a false dichotomy to posit these two extremes as the only options: to sacrifice happiness/pleasure/enjoyment for the sake of living, and sacrificing living for the sake of happiness/pleasure/enjoyment etc. You seem to be ignoring that point and take it for granted (much like altruists take for granted the evil of selfishness) that these are the only two options.

The Peikoff quote is an argument against sacrificing your life to your "pleasure," not an argument for sacrificing your pleasure for your "life." Life and value go hand in hand. One should not sacrifice either for the other, because in doing so, one sacrifices them both.

One should not be concerned with "maximizing life expectancy" at the cost of values within experience, nor should one "maximize the experience of values" at the cost of life-time. One should try to maximize both.

[Freddy]

I'm not ignoring your argument, but I'm not seeing the connection to the fundamental alternative of existence or non existence which is the basic premise of the meta-ethical argument, I'm concerned with this connection. You seem to take enjoyment as an end in itself which can be balanced against survival, and I am of course sympathetic to this position but it doesn't seem to square with the fundamental alternative as the root of values.

If I had the choice of 80 years of empire building or 150 years in bed hooked up to machines, how would I be helped in this choice by knowing that the fundamental alternative in which underlie all valuese is existence or non-existence? You seem to say, pick the one you enjoy the most, but what does that have to do with existence? Of course you have to be exist in order to enjoy yourself, but beside this trival fact, how do you tie the choice to the fundamental alternative? One of my points is that this fundamental alternative is not fundamental at all from a value perspective (only in the sense that you have to be alive in order to value), and this is for the reasons you give, enjyoment as an end in itself. Therefore enjoyment (and other ends-in-themselfs) can trump existence and that is what is happening if you choose building an empire to the life in bed above. But according to the Piekoff-quote this doesn't seem permissible, becuase lying in bed is more conductive to remaining alive than building an empire.

One should not be concerned with "maximizing life expectancy" at the cost of values within experience, nor should one "maximize the experience of values" at the cost of life-time. One should try to maximize both.

What is a value, or more precisly, what is valuable? That question is the one we expect the meta-ethical argument to answer, and that is what I am wondering. I don't see how you tie values to existence, you said before that existence was good becuase it allows for values (which leaves the question of what is valuable unanswered), but I belive that is the opposite of the Objectivist position which seems to say that existence is the only end in itself and a value is valuable to the degree it keeps you in existence.

[IAmMetaphysical]

You seem to take enjoyment as an end in itself which can be balanced against survival, and I am of course sympathetic to this position but it doesn't seem to square with the fundamental alternative as the root of values.

That is what you are misunderstanding. I am not saying that one should sacrifice one's life span for pleasure/enjoyment. I am saying that it is not necessarily a sacrifice(of one's life span) to enjoy one's self. Enjoyment is fuel for the mind, it makes one want to live. Wanting to live helps you to live, it is needed for your survival. Do you see that connection?

Values are that which one acts to gain or keep. Life is the precondition of all valuing, because in order to act to gain or keep anything, one must be alive. Therefore life is a value, because one can act to gain or keep it (and one should), but it is not the ONLY value. But, being the STANDARD of value, life must be held as the ultimate value, a value that must not be sacrificed for any other, because in the act of sacrificing life, one is sacrificing all values. For example: a million dollars would be worthless(to me) if I had to let myself be killed for it. So keep in mind what gives life its value. Life is not valuable "in itself." Life is only valuable (to a consciousness) in as much as it gives that consciousness an alternative, or the ability to act toward or keep values. Thus a "life in bed" (excluding the fact that this hypothetical ignores the necessity to procure food for oneself) would not be a life at all, since one would be simply staring at the ceiling, not acting to gain or keep anything. Life (for man, qua man) does not mean feeding only his body, and keeping his metabolism and bodily functions functioning. It does not mean staying alive long enough to be aware of as many things as possible. A valuable life is a life filled with values, not experience for the sake of experience. Experience must be geared toward an end which is the furtherance of his "life-qua-man," "Life-qua-consciousness," "life-qua-valuer," etc.

SO.... an 80 year life of being an empire builder is far more valuable than 150 years vegetating in a bed, so is a span of 50 years of rational non-life-sacrificial enjoyment much more valuable than total ecstasy from heroin for 3 years.

Your positing a dichotomy between hedonism and asceticism, and ignoring the essential characteristic that makes man man, his rational mind. That is the meaning of "qua man."

[Freddy]

I try to frame my concerns again because I feel that my question is at a more fundamental level than your answer. What we want to know is what we ought to do. We want to know what ends we should pursue, this is the most basic question that have been around as long as there have been humans. Now, Rand says that she can shed light on this issue.

Rands meta ethical argument is the place where she claims to answer this question. She claims to tie values to existence in some way that has implications for what we ought to do. Her definiton of values is a bit unfortunate because not all values are values so to speak. You can pursue a end that is a disvalue, but according to Rand this is a value just because you pursue it. So we call the values we ougth to purse objective values. So, we expect the meta ethical argument to give us a criteria for those objective values.

She says that the most fundamental alternative (from a value perspective) is existence or non-existence. Now, What does this mean? According to you it means that we have to be alive in order to value, but how does this help me knowing what an objective value is? It is, as Peikoff says, a truism, it doesnt't tell us if it is good to be a dictator, it says that if you value becoming a dictator then killing yourself is not a good means to this end, and I am certain Mao, Hitler and Stalin already knew this. This simply cannot be the central insight of Rands meta ethical argument. There have to be something else, something that have implications for what we ought to do.

What she seems to say to me at least is that existence is the only end in itself, and all our actions ought to be conductive towards the end of keeping us in existence. And if one accepts the argument, then this really is a usable criteria for guiding our actions. The problem is that no one accepts it becuase it is so obviously absurd, which suggests that something is wrong with the whole argument. So when we are done with the meta ethical argument we still don't have a criteria for objective values. Or do we? This is where I need enlightment.

That is what you are misunderstanding. I am not saying that one should sacrifice one's life span for pleasure/enjoyment. I am saying that it is not necessarily a sacrifice(of one's life span) to enjoy one's self. Enjoyment is fuel for the mind, it makes one want to live. Wanting to live helps you to live, it is needed for your survival. Do you see that connection?

It is of course true to a degree, but if you believed the most joyful life also implied the longest life then could accept the life span maximazation standard and claim that enjoyment is a means to this end. But you don't accept this standard so I suppose you agree that there could be a split, it is possible to enjoy yourself at the expense of existence, this is especially true if you derive enjoyment from risky ventures. Also, read my posts about the life expectancy maximizer further back in the thread.

A valuable life is a life filled with values, not experience for the sake of experience. Experience must be geared toward an end which is the furtherance of his "life-qua-man," "Life-qua-consciousness," "life-qua-valuer," etc.

My question comes in before this, I want to know how I can know what an objective value is, and I want to see the connection to the fundemenatal alternative. If you claim that the criteria has nothing to do with existence or non-existence but is instead buried inside the "qua man"-appendix, then you have to tell me what the point of the meta-ethical argument is.

Your positing a dichotomy between hedonism and asceticism, and ignoring the essential characteristic that makes man man, his rational mind. That is the meaning of "qua man."

Rationality doesn't help us without a criteria for what we ought to purse, What is rational is wholly dependent on this criteria, if the criteria is to live as long as possible, certain actions are rational, if the criteria is to earn as much money as possible then other actions are rational, if the criteria is to live as a ratinoal man should live then we are just stuck in a circle.

Edited November 26, 2006 by Freddy

[IAmMetaphysical]

Objective values are those things which when pursued by a lifeform will further its life or aid to further its life, those things when which pursued will end its life, or promote the death of its life are objectively bad. This means different thing to different living organisms. Water is objectively good for a plant, and man, and most living organisms. Carrion is good for hyenas, but pretty bad for man. Antibiotics are good for man, but bad for bacteria. It is not only the fact that one exists with life that makes value possible, so "surviving" is not a good enough criteria for which to act upon, one must know something about the nature of the lifeform one is, so one can know how to survive "qua-(that species)." If man survived by relying on his instinct, or feeling, or by being a social animal then communism and dictatorship would be objective values. Since man is not those things, and instead must rely on his mind to live, to create the values his body needs to keep him "in existence," he must follow a different morality in order to live successfully, his objective values change. Since it is his mind that creates his values, it is good for him to develop his mind, to think and to discover the proper way of thinking. His must accept reason as an absolute and not substitute anyone else's thinking for his own, and he must deal with other's by means of pursuasion, not force. He must appeal to their minds, not their fears. Since man is a rational animal and must survive based on his rationality, it opens up a whole bunch of "ought" and "musts" based on this aspect of his nature.

Since man's mind is such a value to him (because it enables him to survive) feeding his mind is just as important as feeding his body. Enjoyment and sadness are the pleasure/pain mechanism for the mind, they let one know when one is acting in accordance with one's rational nature, they let one know when one is taking the necessary actions to further one's life. That is why (rational) enjoyment and life are not opposites and one need not be sacrificed for the other. Thrill seeking, like jumping out of a plane with a parachute, is reveling in the hormonal reaction of almost dying. I wouldn't call that rational enjoyment.

[Freddy]

Objective values are those things which when pursued by a lifeform will further its life or aid to further its life, those things when which pursued will end its life, or promote the death of its life are objectively bad.

And if we for clarity insert existence instead of life and ask ourselfs whether we should choose 150 years in bed hooked up to a life expectancy maximizer (biding our time solving Sudokus) or whether we should pursue 80 years of empirebuilding then the above tells us to choose the former. Again, if you want to choose the latter, then how do you tie this choice to existence or non-existence?

If man survived by relying on his instinct, or feeling, or by being a social animal then communism and dictatorship would be objective values. Since man is not those things, and instead must rely on his mind to live, to create the values his body needs to keep him "in existence,".

That is, in order to maximize his life expectancy man must use his mind. But you don't accept life expectancy maximazation as the ultimate end (where qua man is a method to this end) so I don't understand your focus on existence, using his mind is conductive to whatever end man wish to pursue, be it survival or becoming a dictator. Let me put the question this way, why is not life expectancy maximization the implication of the fundamental alternative?

[IAmMetaphysical]

(biding our time solving Sudokus)

Why????.......

The answer to that is the whole key here.

Let me put the question this way, why is not life expectancy maximization the implication of the fundamental alternative?

In a way it is. But you have to realize that for man, life is not just keeping his bodily functions fed, he must keep his mind fed as well, because his mind is his only tool for survival. A man has a choice, to live or not, and if he chooses to live he has only one choice to live successfully, as a man, which means: as a rational being who produces his own values(sustenance, material or "spiritual").

Life is the end, but "life" does not mean mere survival. Man has to live as a man, and when that is not possible, or not chosen, he will be better off dead. That is why a man, if he chooses to live, must not be a dictator or a vegetable in a bed hooked up to a "life expectancy maximizer."

One should try to have as long a life as possible, and once you see that "life" is more than keeping your bodily functions going, this will be more clear to you how the choice to eb a dictator or a parasite would not be choosing life. If I spent 150 years in a bed, I would really only be "living" a very very short time of that. I would be "living" like a parasite, not as a man.

I have no idea how to make this more clear, and I apologize. Maybe I am not fully understanding the problem you have with this issue. Maybe someone else can help.

[Seeker]

The problem I think Freddie has is that Rand's metaethical argument doesn't equate flourishing with existence in so many words. It requires knowledge of man's nature that Rand doesn't explicitly supply in TOE (though VoS does include an article entitled "The Psychology of Pleasure" that makes the case explicitly). Rand didn't go into great detail concerning the nature of man's psychological needs because she couldn't. And indeed, at the level of the individual, Rand couldn't have hoped to answer that essential question for everyone because everyone is different. That's why in TOE (I'm paraphrasing) she simply says that every man has to discover his own purpose in life for himself.

Yet the fact that Rand's ethical foundation only rises so far does not make it any less sound. It is up to us to build upon it by applying it to ourselves and find out what our nature requires of us.

Now Freddie would probably respond, "but Hitler's nature required of him that he be a ruthless killer, so Rand couldn't have meant that." I disagree. Rand might very well say that Hitler's nature was bad but that he was an exception to be dealt with by force; in the main, men's needs do not conflict but can co-exist in harmony.

Edited November 27, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

Yet the fact that Rand's ethical foundation only rises so far does not make it any less sound. It is up to us to build upon it by applying it to ourselves and find out what our nature requires of us.

As I asked before, how would Aristotle be helped if he had access to Rands meta ethical argument? That's an important question. The argument obviously leaves the meaning of the relevant terms open to be decided and that's the whole problem. You can only reach your conclusions by redefining existence (and in doing so you will probably be accused of defining your preconcieved conclusion into your premises), and the process of finding out what existence means is the process of finding out a criteria for ethics, the very question we wanted answer to in the first place and hoped the meta ethical argument would answer. Is the question of what is to exist easier than the origianl question of what a proper way for man to behave is? Well, if existence is taken literally it is, if existence is not taken literally it seems to be a very tough question. How do you go about finding out whether you exist or not? Also, the redefinition of existence will spawn inconsitencies in the argument as well. For example you said before that "The realm of non-existence is nothing" which is obviously not true if existence means "live as a man ought to live".

Thath's why I submit that I don't see the point of Rands argument, it's either absurd (if existence is taken literally) or it amounts to a redefinition of words that allow us to rephrases the original question in a very odd manner, but does nothing to answer it.

[Seeker]

Rand states that Aristotle failed to identify the why of ethics, and she proceeds to do so (VoS, p. 14).

It's not redefining the word "exist" to incorporate "as oneself". Everything that exists, exists as itself. That's axiomatic.

My reference to "nothing" was only meant to refer to non-existence, meaning non-existence as a particular thing. So if you fail to exist as you, then most assuredly you do not exist, and are nothing. I did not intend to speculate as to the existence of the writhing, miserable creature that would exist in your stead, or to pose it as a "viable alternative".

Personally I have no difficulty whatsoever in accepting the natural import of Rand's argument. It makes perfect sense. It starts with the fundamental alternative of existence or non-existence and applies it to increasingly narrower abstractions: from living organism, to plants and animals, to man - and finally, at the concrete level, to oneself. At this level, survival means happiness - the moral purpose of your life.

Does this leave you with the incredibly difficult task of discovering the facts of your nature? Of course it does. You have to discover what you specifically are good at, what your unique abilities are, what productive work is best for you, what makes you truly happy, etc. These are facts about yourself that you have to discover and validate by self-examination, experience, and effort. It is not a recipe for living according to emotional whims: your task is to define your central purpose across the whole of your lifespan, ensuring that it is objectively valid, and proceed to make smaller decisions and choose goals accordingly. That's a big task. It could take a long time to sort out depending on your state of psychological health, but it's crucially necessary. Your life as a moral being - as you - depends upon it.

I also was surprised and a bit disappointed at first that Rand couldn't give me all the answers I needed straight away, that one would have to undertake a searching self-examination (in my case, to validate objectively what I thought I already knew about myself - which is where most people probably are in the process - very few have no idea at all what their major purpose in life ought to be, at least I hope it's very few). That doesn't mean I reject the basis of Rand's ethics, to the contrary: I accept the responsibility it places on me, as a being of self-made soul, to discover and live as the best that I can be. That's not only rational, it's very inspiring and is a tremendous contribution by Rand.

Edited November 27, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

Rand states that Aristotle failed to identify the why of ethics, and she proceeds to do so

I don't believe Aristotle would have objected to that ethics is a guide for living, quite the contrary. And he would not have argued against that this guide has something to with what man is and that the purpose of the guide is to attain happiness. But how would he be helped in forming his conclusions by being told that there is a fundamental alternative of either existing "as a man" or not existsing "as a man". Is this a criteria in accordance to which he could validate and/or rectify his ethical conlusions? I can't see how. So what makes Rand's method for determining ethics better than for example Aristotles?

And what is Rands method for objectively validate what man is so her conclusions follow? If she had meant survival in the literal sense then we could more or less objectivly decide what would follow, but when the central term existence looses its firm reference, then the normal objective method looses the criteria to work against, so I cannot see how he reaches her conclusions other than to just assert that some things are "qua man" and others are not.

It's not redefining the word "exist" to incorporate "as oneself". Everything that exists, exists as itself. That's axiomatic.

An immoral person therefore exists as himself, because whether he exists simply cannot be a matter under debate. You cannot say that Hitler didn't exist between 1914 and 1945 becuse he were immoral between those years, it's just a very, very odd strech of words. You might say that he didn't exist as a moral person during those years, you might also say that he did not existed as a carpenter, but you just cannot say that he did not exist. If there is a hidden "qua man" appended to existence in the fundamental alternative, then why did Rand not spell it out? She could then just have said that for man the fundamental alternative is to live as a man or not, that is, to live as man ought to live or not. But how could she then derive what man ought to do in relation to a criteria that already included what man ought to to? That't why I wonder how she made use of her meta-ethical argument.

[Seeker]

The following is my understanding of what Objectivism has to say about this. Others are free to agree or disagree.

I think the crux of what you are asking is two-fold: first, what attributes of an entity are the "essential" ones, the process of preserving which is the standard of value (in the most personal and fundamental way possible, "who are you?"), and second, by what process is that to be determined?

The answer to the first clearly depends upon the nature of the entity in question, and it reduces to that which is necessary for the process of life to continue. As an organism, this entails physical survival; as a man, this entails mental survival (i.e. of the rational mind); as you in particular, it involves the maintenance of your ongoing happiness. With these, "you" are capable of taking action to perpetuate your existence. But behind that word "happiness" is an immense complex of factors that you have to understand and serve.

For that, you must "know thyself". In objective terms, you must undertake a searching self-examination to discover what your happiness requires, what your mind requires, what your body requires. The first is a complex psychological question that requires an orderly process of introspection to determine the objective facts of your psychological nature.

Again, the question is essentially one of the nature of the entity in question. If Hitler was acting immorally, then he was acting against what his own nature required of him and was engaged in a slow process of death. He lost his happiness, his mind, and finally his body. But he was not fully existing after the first stage of death. By existence I mean full existence, in all of man's essential aspects as I outlined.

As to odd stretches of words, I would urge you to consider the validity of the underlying concepts and accept valid results regardless of whether they fit preconceived ideas of oddness. I am sure that to many people unfamiliar with Objectivism, much of what it has to say seems odd at first. It should be evaluated for its validity, not its oddity or lack thereof.

Edited November 28, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

So if we sum up, there is a hidden addendum to the term existence in in the fundamental alternative which contains an ideal of man that man ought to converge towards, that is, the term existence already in itself encompass the ethics. We can further conclude that the fundamental alternative in this incarnation would nothelp Aristotle, so we wonder then if Rand has any methodological advanteges over Aristotle. The method Aristotle used was a mixed bag of observing wise and noble men, oberving what men in general strived towards, some reasoning of what man is, a lot of preconcieved biases and some other tools. Quite common sense and quite reasonable conclusion (I think), but in the end, not much of a justification and a lot of room for disagreement. He also concluded that we cannot demand high precision in ethics.

Now, since Rand cannot improve on this with reference to her meta ethical argument (because the argument by definition already contains all her conclusions), does she state an objective method other than Aristotles that will yield her conclusion? I can't see that she has, her method seems to be to work out the ethics with the fundamental alternative as a criterion (and this would work if existence had it's normal welldefined meaning, albeit the conclusion wouldn't to reasonable), but since the meaning of the terms in the criterion is dependent on the very ethics she wants to derive with the criterion, this won't work.

[Seeker]

You lost me. She doesn't say to work out the ethics - the ethics have been worked out. What remains to be worked out is the facts of your specific nature, to determine how to fulfill your purpose using your life as the standard of value. What part of it doesn't work? I thought I gave a fairly reasonable explanation of how to discover and validate what you need to do to achieve your purpose in the context of fully existing, i.e. in all the aspects necessary for you to sustain your life across the whole of your lifespan.

Edited November 28, 2006 by Seeker

[Freddy]

First of all, man is many things and has lots of capacities. Lets's say we accpeted the life span maximization standard, then we would focus on capacaties of man in relation to this specific goal, and this can be done quite objectively. Man has to eat certain things in order to maximize his life span and so on. This is an ordinary objective method for establishing means to an end, but we need a welldefined criterion to guide our investigation (and we expect the meta ethical argument to provide this). The problem is that in the incarnation where existence means "exist as man ought to exist", the very criteria that should guide our investigation of the relevant facts about man is in itself in need of this investigation. That's why I said Aristotle wouldn't be helped by (this incarnation) of Rands argument, becuase he already asked himself what man was and what he ought to do. So Rand isn't helped by her meta ethical argument either, it dosn't provide her with something that Aristotle didn't had acess to. But when she works out her ethical conclusions, she does argue as if she actually used her meta ethical argument, and for reason I mentioned it dosn't work. Her conclusion cannot follow from the argument, they must be preconcieved.

I thought I gave a fairly reasonable explanation of how to discover and validate what you need to do to achieve your purpose in the context of fully existing, i.e. in all the aspects necessary for you to sustain your life across the whole of your lifespan.

The method is very vague, and when we go down the path of actually working out the ethics with the method I think it will be obvious that in the end we have to resort to methods that are not objective in the scientific sense of the word. Let's say that you had an argument with a person who had the conviction that there ought to be a law against torturing cats for fun. When he examines himself, what is required for his happiness, well being, when he asks his moral convictions, when he asks himself in what kind of society he would best thrive, they will point to the conclusion he argues for. He might then conclude that he is a person that approves of a law against torturing cats. And you will try to convince him that it is really not him to approve of such a law, he isn't existing in the full sense of the word when he argue for the law etc. He would probably say that he knows himself best, and that it is you who don't exist in the full sense of the word when you argue against the law. I submit I have a hard time seeing that your method objectively solves the problem.

[Seeker]

The example is inapt because to enter the field of laws, i.e. the sphere of principles governing the preservation of man's rights, imposes rational constraints. You are in effect suggesting that the person is irrational. That possibility is cut off at a higher level of abstraction than the individual as himself: it is cut off at the level of abstraction of man, who is defined as a rational animal. Could there be examples of men with diseased, irrational minds? Of course there could, but those are the exceptions, to be dealt with as such. A rational man may despise cat torture, but cannot rationally support a law against it if such a law were irrational (I won't get into that discussion per se, but assume for the sake of this topic that it is). His only task then is to examine the idea that is the source of his irrational desire for such a law and correct it. That is, in fact, an essential feature of a mind devoted to rationality: the continuous detection and correction of contradictory and mistaken beliefs.

Also, where you say "preconceived", I would say "metaphysically given". It is facts that concern us, not preconceived whims.

[Freddy]

No, I'm not suggesting he's irratinoal, our catman would suggest that you beg the question at all possible levels. First he would say that rationality isn't initself a criteria for anything, even though building an atomic bomb in order to terminate mankind requires very heavy use of the brain it is not regarded as rational from an ethical point of view. If man ought to maximize his lifespan, then a certain set of ethical conclusions are ratinoal in relation to this standard, but without the critera, we are at loss. For example, what is a rational preference for colors? Unless we have a clear standard the question lacks an answer. To just assert that green is not a rational color won't do, and to claim that a color is rational if it conforms to the standard of rational colors is empty, circular and, well, somewhat irrational..

Now, the catman would point out to you that you still lack a criteria for ethics (in the same way we lack a criteria for determinig what colors are rational), since you have redefined existence to mean "exist as man ought to exist", and you do not have a criteria for determining how man ought to exist. To solve this, you've proposed that he should solve ethical problems by asking himself what he is (and what his fellow men is I supppose), and he does, and you don't approve of the answer becuse it is irrational. But he would say that there is no way you could proove his answer irrational for the reasons given. And he would chase you all way back to the fundamental alternative, not accepting that you just asserted conclusions along the way such that that man has rights that would forbid such a law.

Also, where you say "preconceived", I would say "metaphysically given". It is facts that concern us, not preconceived whims.

If I say that man is an animal that ought to value having kids, is that a metaphysically given fact about man? Most men (and women) would like to have kids, but not all. Without a clear method for processing such inquiries about man, those are immensly difficult questions, asked for thousands of years. If we have a critera like lifespan maximization, then we can select proporties and capacities that will yield oughts (given that you accept the critera, which in the case of literal existence few will).

What I've been trying to show is that if we accept the redefinition of existence, then Rand did not have any tool that Aristotle did not have, and was on equal footing with Aristotle when she asked herself what man was in order to find out what he ought to do. Now, Aristotle did have a method, albeit not a perfect one and it is a bit circular. Ayn Rands method was to relate her conclusion to a criteria that was left to be decided (that is existence defined as "exist as man ought to exist"). Such a conclusion is not obviously metaphysically given.

[Seeker]

The part that seems to cause trouble just when you are headed in the right direction is that determining the metaphysically given facts of man and reality is hard. But that, I submit, does not invalidate Rand's ethics. It just means we have to put effort into learning what man is (and you have to put effort into learning what you are), so that the correct oughts can be derived from what is. On this subject I would certainly recommend reading or reviewing (or re-reviewing) Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, because it offers much clarity.

You continue to pose what I think is a false choice, in effect, between survival and flourishing. When I say false choice I mean exactly that: there is no tension between the two, they do not deviate, they are one and the same. And the reason they are one and the same is that who you are is a flourishing being, and if you don't flourish, then you don't exist. Not fully. Not as you. Not as the you that you truly are. That's how I think you should look at this. Don't start with existence as an organism as your standard of value and question why happiness should be added, start with you in your highest, happiest, most glorious and productive potential and say "this is who I am, and my most solemn purpose is to preserve myself in this radiant, wonderful state. This is what the fundamental choice means for me: to exist or not as this." Do that, and everything else will follow.

Beyond that, I'm afraid I can't help. If you insist upon choosing something other than your life as your standard - if you choose to live as an organism hooked up to a machine, not as the person you are, then I cannot stop you, but I can tell you, in no uncertain terms, that it is not Objectivism that compels that result.

[Freddy]

The part that seems to cause trouble just when you are headed in the right direction is that determining the metaphysically given facts of man and reality is hard. But that, I submit, does not invalidate Rand's ethics. It just means we have to put effort into learning what man is (and you have to put effort into learning what you are), so that the correct oughts can be derived from what is. On this subject I would certainly recommend reading or reviewing (or re-reviewing) Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, because it offers much clarity.

The problem is the same as with colors. If you claim that green is an irrational favourite color that is not in accordance with the metaphysical given facts about man and colours, then that might sound fancy and all that, but if you do not clearly state the standard for judging colors (in a non circular way with no hidden standards attached) and the method by wich you arrived at the standard, it might very much seem that you are trying to give support to preconcived beliefs with colorfull rethorics. Also, knowing that problem has been debated for 2500 years (the moral problem of deriving oughts from what man is), dosn't exactly add to the confidence that you posess the method.

And as I've tried to point out, Rand didn't intend to derive her ethics the way you do in my opinion, Rand was asking what man was in relation to the goal of survival as to find out effective means to this end (rationality is our only tool for survival and the like), and this would put her on an advantage over her predecessor (if survival really meant survival that is, and if the end could be validated), but your way of deriving the ethics is to redefine all relevant terms (existence redefined as "exist as man ought to exist") and then try to find out what existence means. Those are not the same questions.

You continue to pose what I think is a false choice, in effect, between survival and flourishing. When I say false choice I mean exactly that: there is no tension between the two, they do not deviate, they are one and the same. And the reason they are one and the same is that who you are is a flourishing being, and if you don't flourish, then you don't exist. Not fully. Not as you. Not as the you that you truly are.

Existence dosn't mean flourish. The only role existence play in your argument is that you want to keep it becuse it's present in Rands argument, but you could for the sake of economy, clarity and communicational smoothness get rid of it, becuse it's not a criteria for anything in your argument. It's not the criteria of existence that leads you to believe that happiness is good, it's your belief that happiness is good that makes you add it to your concept of existence, that is totally backwards. The identifications you make are probably that you prefer happiness and that the rest of mankind seem to prefer happiness, and therefore we can add happiness to existence. In this case your investigation is guided by preference, and existence play no role in it. That's what I belive anyway, correct me if I'm wrong.

I of course also believe that men in general strive for happiness and that it is generally a good thing to be happy. This leavs us with two problems. First we need a standard for happiness. In Rands argument happiness was supposed to follow if we took the path that best ensured our survival, but since survival by virtue of definition now encompass happiness that leaves us with a circularity problem. I further believe that happiness is a perfectly fine critera to guide our actions in our private sphere, but on the general level it's not a good idea to reduce morality to happiness (read Utilitarianism), it's simply to elusive to yield universal conclusions.

That's how I think you should look at this. Don't start with existence as an organism as your standard of value and question why happiness should be added, start with you in your highest, happiest, most glorious and productive potential and say "this is who I am, and my most solemn purpose is to preserve myself in this radiant, wonderful state. This is what the fundamental choice means for me: to exist or not as this." Do that, and everything else will follow.

Since you now included that to exists you have to be as productive as you can (not only productive to a degree that suffices to support yourself and your family), then can you please make a reduction to what man is to proove that this is true. That would be illuminating.