Do Objectivists Believe in Categorical Imperatives?

[Dismuke]

Well, I knew it was only a matter of time before someone said, "Go read x by Ayn Rand or Peikoff." These questions are being asked because the text isn't clearto us. If the text is clear to you, then you should be able to explain to the rest of us what is being stated.

Actually, there is nothing wrong at all with referring people to source material. It took Ayn Rand and Dr. Peikoff thousands of pages to discuss and describe the philosophy. It is simply unreasonable to expect people in a discussion forum to spend time regurgitating it for you.

A discussion forum such as this one presupposes that one has already read or at least has an interest in the Objectivist literature. If a person hasn't or doesn't - well, they don't really belong here, do they?

A discussion board about Objectivism cannot and should not be a substitute for studying and reading the Objectivist literature. Therefore, it is NOT inappropriate for people to refer you to specific passages or essays that make the point in greater detail than they are able to do in a discussion forum. It is not reasonable to expect a person to sum up in one short paragraph the same exact point that it took Ayn Rand or Dr. Peikoff ten pages to explain and demand that the paragraph be just as persuasive to boot.

Now, I do agree that "read this" or "read that" is not a substitute for a specific argument. But, quite frankly, a lot of arguments that are made here with regard to a certain issue do presuppose an understanding of and agreement with more fundamental aspects of the philosophy - and, very often, those more fundamental aspects cannot be convincingly argued for in a brief posting. You can't discuss calculus to someone who is still having trouble grasping certain basic points of algebra. It is entirely appropriate for a person to give a brief summary of the more fundamental issue involved and direct a person to the source material for elaboration. If one's motive is to merely argue against a point about Objectivism without being interested in learning what the Objectivist position actually is and the more fundamental points it is based on - well, I would say that the person is being somewhat disingenuous when he posts here and expects people to take the time to put up intelligent replies.

If a person is new to the philosophy and is just learning it - well, there are a lot of perfectly honest and valid questions and objections which may occur to him along the way which simply cannot be answered in brief discussion forums by others who may or may not be all that knowledgeable about the philosophy themselves. Either you decide that there is enough value in what you have read so far to make the effort to study and understand the philosophy in greater detail or there isn't. If you decide that there is - well, there is no online equivalent of Cliff's Notes via a discussion board that is going to get you there. You have to study the material for yourself. And if a person has already studied the material - well, references back to what they should already have read in the first place should not be a problem. If the referred to passage does not provide the answer one is seeking, all one has to do is say so and explain why - and demand either a more specific passages to be quoted or a better explanation provided.

[Inspector]

Thank you Dismuke.

I'd just like to add that even if the person being given the reference has already read the text in question, it can be helpful to be referred to a specific passage after having discussed the concepts in a thread. So, Nimble, while you might already have read the passage in question, it is being suggested that after having spoken with us here it will perhaps make more sense to you if you re-read it now.

[~Sophia~]

Now, if someone would answer my initial question as to why it is never, ever in my interest to violate rights, please do so.

Nimble, the answer to this question is very complex. Tara Smith wrote an entire book about it "Viable Values". I can not possibly summarize here an entire book worth of material in one of even a few posts. Tara Smith does answer your question. Everything below is directly or indirectly taken from that book.

The free-rider problem (thinking that it is in ones interest to sometimes depart from moral principles when you can get away with it) is based on mistaken concept of the basic nature of morality and on a mistaken view of how a person best promotes his interest.

The answer to why it is, in fact, never in ones interest to violate moral principles, does not lie in the fact that one risks alienating potential allies, or that a person can not be sure that it will be to his benefit to disobey since events can always take an unexpected turn, and it does not depend on the likelihood of violations being discovered. This mistaken view of morality is socially based, wrongly fixated with others attitudes and actions, in which the main problem to be overcome by morality is other people. It is the threat that others pose that inclines one to make rules and it is the prospect of transgressions being found out by others that advises strict adherence to them. This approach treats interest as best realized when a person is free to do whatever he likes.

It is only if morality is conceived as constraining a person's interest that departures from morality could be expected to leave a person better off. The more burden the morality is, the more of a sacrifice the compliance presents, the greater the incentive to cheat. In such case, the ideal scenario, one that best serves ones interest, is when regular defiance of morality goes undetected.

The answer to your question lies in the nature of interest. The need for objective principles and the need for disciplined adherence to them is a direct outgrowth of the nature of interest.

The long-range character of human needs heightens the probability of any single action's carrying effects on person's flourishing (which means filing one's needs in optimal fashion) - it expands the group of actions that are significant. Discrete actions can affect an interwoven assortment of person's ends (material and psychological), short and long range, stretching across decades. Since a person's actions can carry many effects and since a person's end can be affected by all sort of events, rational decisions designed to promote ones interest demand that tremendous volume of information be evaluated. The fact that we cannot always easily know what it is best to do for our overall well-being is precisely what necessitates a moral code.

When interest is measured by the same standard as all value - life - it becomes a sophisticated judgment of long-term, all-things-considered ramifications that an event carries on a person's ongoing flourishing. An objective standard of human being is always ill-served by departures from objective moral code. Authority of objective principles are rooted in their practicality. Disciplined adherence to objective moral code of actions is the most effective course for promoting ones interest since principles' instruction is based on the comprehensive assessment of myriad factors affecting ones well-being. Fidelity to life promoting principles is what rational selfishness truly means.

The claim that something obtained by departing from life-promoting principles could serve a person's interest ignores the interlocking layers of a person's life and the sophisticated evaluation that a verdict about interest represents. Deviation from correct principles can not possibly be in your interest.

Further, the belief that a person can best advance his interest by sporadic adherence to correct principles - complying sometimes, cheating sometimes - is false as well. The violation of moral principles is an interruption of a person's progress along a life-promoting path. Since life requires actions along that path, self-interest requires cultivation of a disciplined virtuous character. Our actions naturally train our cognitive and motivational muscles and condition us along particular path tracks. These effects remain open to later revision, but the more deeply entrenched a person's pattern of action, the more difficult change will be. The more ingrained a person's life-diminishing habits, the further from flourishing life he drifts. By living properly, as a life-based moral code directs, a person is thus advancing his life both externally and internally, strengthening inclinations to act in life-enhancing ways.

[LaszloWalrus]

I thought Objectivism endorsed viture ethics, not consequentialism or deontology.

[RationalBiker]

I thought Objectivism endorsed viture ethics, not consequentialism or deontology.

The only "duty" or "moral obligation" according to Objectivism is to one's self (if one chooses to live). However, nothing obligates a person to choose life obviously. So yes, it is an ethics of virtue, not duty.

[Inspector]

The only "duty" or "moral obligation" according to Objectivism is to one's self (if one chooses to live). However, nothing obligates a person to choose life obviously. So yes, it is an ethics of virtue, not duty.

That's why I cringe whenever someone like Nimble (not to pick on you, Nimble) who studies formal philosophy tries to pidgeon-hole Objectivism into one of their terms, like "consequentialism" or "deontology." I have seen that most of those terms are package-deals that cannot be used to describe Objectivism.

Also, there is the constant barrage of "Well, you don't expect me to believe that all academic philosophy is wrong, do you?"

Yes, we do. Because it is wrong. Deal with it.

[LaszloWalrus]

The only "duty" or "moral obligation" according to Objectivism is to one's self (if one chooses to live). However, nothing obligates a person to choose life obviously. So yes, it is an ethics of virtue, not duty.

That's what I thought. If I remember correctly, the three broad ethical theories are consequentialism (most often associated with Mill, and concerned with "utility"), deontology (most often associated with Kant and concerned with doing one's "duty") and virtue ethics (most often associated with Aristotle and concerned with self-perfection and wordly happiness).

[~Sophia~]

Thirdly, self-interest IS benefits outweigh the cost.

The risk vs. reward analysis is usually the one in which you are considering to take an action which is NOT in your rational long-term self interest but you are tempted to do so anyway because the of the appeal/promiss of the short term reward. By performing such analysis one is trying to see if one can afford it - if the short term benefit is worth the risk. It is incorrect to say that if a person decides to go ahead with it that he/she is acting in their rational self interest. It would be a contradition of terms.

Edited December 3, 2006 by ~Sophia~

[DavidOdden]

If you are denying the existence of deontological ethics, I encourage you to open any modern ethics anthology.

Well, I knew it was only a matter of time before someone said, "Go read x by some unnamed collection of unnamed authors making no particular point." This point is being raised because those anthologies don't understand that they are being inconsistent or incomplete.

[y_feldblum]

Objectivism understands that the proper question for the science of ethics is the question of value, and Objectivism's answer centers around the specific choice of value, one's own life. I don't think Objectivist ethics can be classified as deontological, consequentialist, or virtue, although virtue-ethics comes closest (the question of how to achieve a given value is the closest question to the question of values as such, whereas consequentialism denies principled action and deontology denies reality-based action).

[KendallJ]

I've read and own OPAR, Atlas Shrugged, Fountainhead, ITOE, Return of the Primative, We the Living, Anthem, Capitalism, and Philosophy Who Needs It--I've been in multiple Objectivist campus organizations, and no one has been able to adequately answer my question without referring to some odd psychological argument, which simply doesn't hold in a discussion about philosophy.

Maybe you should consider that your question commits errors, which the unravelling of, do not actually directly answer your question. The unraveling of your characterizations will in effect unravel the question, not provide you with a direct answer to it. That is what I tried to posit to you earlier. You've already had people suggest that your characterization is incorrect, maybe pigeon holed was the term used, and that the answer is not straight forward. I would say the answer doesn't exist because it doesn't leave your question intact.

We've established that Objectivism doesn't allow for categorical imperatives, but is instead consequentialist. Thank you for clearing that up. Now my question is, how do you go from saying anything is justified so long as it is in my RATIONAL self-interest long term (benefits outweigh the costs for the entirety of your life), to saying that it is never morally permissable to violate rights, please refer to my scenario.

Then let me suggest another way to put it. Since within the framework of Objectivism the main emphasis as Lazlo suggested is positive virtues, and this is how OPAR develops the argument, why don't you start with your shop stealing senario, and tell us, given your broad knowledge of Objectivism, how anyone could argue, from Objectivist principles, that it is in your rational self interest to to steal the candy bar.

If you buy the development of the virtue ethics of Objectivism, then you must realize that the characterization of initiation of force as a negative virtue is only a derivative characterization of what the Objectivist virtues are not. That they (the virtues) do not make a direct argument for why you shouldn't do something, but that out of all the possible responses in your senario the ones that do not have the characteristic of being virtuous all involve the initiation of force. This is a very succint characterization which Rand gets credit for.

To really look at how Objectivism works out the problem, you have to look at the positive side of the argument, which is what the quote on reason as an absolute I gave you earlier is attempting to do. I think that is pretty darn clear in OPAR, and so I'm asking you to do a little of the lifting rather than just sit with your question that must have an answer and ask us to do it for you.

Please note that the question I emphasized in your quote above has a WRONG characterization of "rational". You accept utlitarianist characterization "of life the a standard of value", and hence rationality. So your question assumes the error. If you follow that line, you'll get to "stealing the candy bar" is virtuous, because you throw out the Objectivist ethics in the process. You are essentially saying:

Rationality as an absolute ---> Rationality as long term cost/benefit success --->??? any particular situation must be evaluated on the basis of long/term cost/benefit

You're right, you can't do that math, and I'm not going to attempt it for you. It leaves you with no way to unpack the principles into a specific action. Someone as studied as you "ought" to get this. (Damn Spartans... )

Objectivism builds the argument such:

Life as a standard ---> Rationality is man's absolute ---> The Objectivist Virtues stemming from reason ---> analysis of a particular situation against the virtues

The virtues allow you to unpack the standard into particulars. Objectivism does not say "Dont steal the candy bar because that one action it will do you some sort of harm that will outweigh the benefits in the long run", and anyone who represents that argument to you is not basing it on Objectivist fundamentals. That may be a consequence of acting this way, in general. Answering the question from this perspective is clunky and the best way I can think to answer it this way is: "there is nothing in your senario (candy bar stealing) that won't be true tomorrow and the next day and the next, but surely you'd agree that stealing in the long run will be determental to your well being, and you have other options, so don't even start."

If you evaluate it according to the virtues, then stealing doesn't even come up in the list of options, which is the better way to think about it.

Objectivism understands that the proper question for the science of ethics is the question of value, and Objectivism's answer centers around the specific choice of value, one's own life. I don't think Objectivist ethics can be classified as deontological, consequentialist, or virtue, although virtue-ethics comes closest (the question of how to achieve a given value is the closest question to the question of values as such, whereas consequentialism denies principled action and deontology denies reality-based action).

I agree, this classification is a poor one. Objectivism could be said to be all three and neither.

Edited December 3, 2006 by KendallJ

[DavidOdden]

I have a choice: to exist, or to not exist. I choose to exist, but I cannot merely “exist” abstractly, I must exist as something, having an identity. As a man, I choose to exist qua man. What, then, is man’s nature? Unlike chameleons which change color to survive, or grizzly bears which use awsome strength or cheetahs which use awesome speed to survive, man survives by reason. An essential part of the faculty of reason is the conceptual faculty, which allows man to discover general principles rather than live in a concrete-bound, case-by-case fashion. If I choose to exist, then what my self-interest is, is existing, which means existing according to my nature. This means existing as a man, which means existing by reason, which, more specifically, means living by principle.

Anyhow, that's my story and I'm sticking to it.

[Vladimir Berkov]

That's it???

I'm not even sure how your first quote is relevant to the request since it is a part of a phrase taken out of context, in a paragraph beginning "There is another derivative virtue to consider.." Hmm Peikoff keeps his essential arguments hidden in the discussions on derivative aspects of topics. I might think that he'd covered it better under the discussion of primaries which ought to come before this, eh.

To get to the 2nd quote you skip over the Chapters on "The Good", and "Virtue", and take this one out of the subsequent chapter on "Happiness". (which by definition ought to deal with some psychological factors, one might think). Are you suggesting that nowhere in the first 2 chapters does Peikoff give a basic reasons against intiation of physical force, considering that is where he develops the arguments.

I always marvel at your selection of passages.

If you have a counter-argument or better passages, go ahead and cite them. I explained that I don't have time to search through the entire OPAR book to find the absolute "best" quotes to support my argument. If you think the quotes don't conform with Peikoff's views, then find some you think do.

[J.L. Mackie]

I disagree. The fact remains that it is not in a person's self-interest to support or provide moral sanction to persons, ideas or institutions which seek as their objective policies that lead to his own destruction, however slow that process of destruction might be. The fact that the impact of his sanction is very small in the grand scheme of things does not change this one bit - any more than the fact that it is NOT in your self-interest to cast a vote for an Adolf Hitler in an election is somehow undercut by the fact that the odds of the election being decided by your single vote are next to nill.

You are saying that he should act so that he could bring about the best possible circumstances, no matter how unlikely they are to occur. This doesn't seem very "rational" to me. It was as if you argued that everyone should invest all their money into the lotto because they would be happier and better off if they won. True enough, but most people would end up miserable in fact. Similarly, even if capitalism is in my best interests, it does not follow from this that I should "invest" in capitalism if the chances of "winning" are low. You are saying that the agent should sacrifice his well-being for the sake of an unlikely prospect. It's almost a "call to duty". If he benefits from this sacrifice, I would like to know how.

[RationalBiker]

You are saying that he should act so that he could bring about the best possible circumstances, no matter how unlikely they are to occur. This doesn't seem very "rational" to me. It was as if you argued that everyone should invest all their money into the lotto because they would be happier and better off if they won.

You present a false alternative which in no way characterizes what he said. There a many other very lucrative occupations that provide a high probability of success besides being an IRS agent. This accomplishes both the immediate and long term goal of making money and acting on the principle of not sanctioning a right's violating government agency. Refusing to sanction harmful entities does not necessitate sacrifice or long shot crap shoots.

[RationalBiker]

If you have a counter-argument or better passages, go ahead and cite them. I explained that I don't have time to search through the entire OPAR book to find the absolute "best" quotes to support my argument. If you think the quotes don't conform with Peikoff's views, then find some you think do.

It's your responsibility to provide substantive support for your position, not someone else's responsibility to shoot it down. If you don't have time for that, that don't make the assertion to begin with.

[Dismuke]

This means existing as a man, which means existing by reason, which, more specifically, means living by principle.

And I think "living by principle" is really the part that people new to the philosophy often have the most difficult time understanding.

Because of today's cultural climate, a lot of people come to Objectivism with the implicit view that there are only two alternative approaches to ethics: categorical imperatives/commandments on one hand and range-of-the-moment expediency/pragmatism on the other. They then assume that Objectivism must fall into either one camp or the other and they essentially demand that the Objectivist literature prove its validity using the assumptions of that particular camp.

Therefore, the person who falls into the camp of categorical imperatives freaks out when he reads about the Objectivist position on emergency situations. He considers the Objectivist trapped in a blizzard who saves himself by breaking into an unoccupied hunting cabin and helping himself to the firewood and food to be a hypocrite. He trespassed. He stole. He will then claim that Objectivism is full of bs because a truly ethical person would rather die on the edge of the highway than to trespass or steal. Or, he might, instead, claim that Objectivism is full of bs because the only alternative in that situation is to die by the highway or to trespass and steal thereby proving that ethics, as such, is impractical.

And the person who falls into the camp of range-of-the moment expediency/pragmatism considers every immorality and crime that goes unpunished to be a repudiation of the Objectivist ethics. An employee embezzles a large sum of money from his employer who never even realized the money was there in the first place let alone that it is missing. Because of that money, the employee was able to quit his job, go into business for himself and now has lots of really cool toys and a Barbie doll girlfriend. Lightening did not come and strike this man down. Nor does this guy spend time on a psychiatric couch. He is just as much of a jerk as he has ever been and everything seems to always go his way. Therefore, since Objectivism is unable to point to any visible negative consequences of the man's immoral behavior, the pragmatist considers it to be proof that morality is nothing more than a collection of useless commandments.

The notion of thinking in principle without resorting to dogmatism is one of the things that makes Objectivism unique and very radical. Because such an approach is utterly foreign in today's mainstream intellectual climate, it is an aspect of Objectivism that can be very difficult for a newbie to pick up on and to understand. I know it was something I sure had difficulty grasping - and there are occasional instances when I discover that I still have difficulty with it. There are others out there who seem to absorb Objectivist principles almost by osmosis and are very good at regurgitating them and throwing them back in people's faces - but what they absorbed was not principles that they considered critically and understood but principles which they accepted and hold as what amounts to a form of dogma. Understanding Ayn Rand's unique approach of thinking in terms of principles is crucial to understanding and fully appreciating her philosophy - and since such an approach is not something that is self-evident or easy to make obvious, properly grasping it is something which requires a decent amount of study and familiarity with the Objectivist literature and a great deal of critical thought.

Cheating, stealing and violating other people's rights are wrong on principle. The fact that some people get away with such behavior in the short run does not change this or invalidate the principle. Nor is the principle invalidated by the fact that there might exist certain extreme contexts - such as a life or death emergency or being forced to act at gunpoint - in which the principle is simply not applicable. My major point here is this: until someone fully and properly understands what Objectivists mean when they say that something is wrong on principle, it is simply not going to be possible to have a full understanding and an appreciation for the Objectivist ethics.

[J.L. Mackie]

You present a false alternative which in no way characterizes what he said. There a many other very lucrative occupations that provide a high probability of success besides being an IRS agent.

Do I really need to modify the hypothetical so as to remove these alternatives? How many times must I qualify the hypothetical until the actual issue is discussed? You cannot conceive of a situation in which the IRS agent has no alternatives? It doesn't take much imagination.

In any case, everyone agrees that (in the unmodified hypothetical) there are alternative occupations. Suppose our man is skilled enough to be employed at a given sum. If you argue that our man should quit the agency (a risk) and pursue a job which pays about just as much (but is non-rights-violating), then you have to explain how this risk benefits him. It is not true that, in doing so, he is increasing the likelihood of dramatic political and economic change in the U.S. (which would benefit him greatly). It is true that changing jobs entails a financial risk. On what grounds is it justified (in respect to his rational self-interest)?

Refusing to sanction harmful entities does not necessitate sacrifice or long shot crap shoots.

It is not the case for the ordinary American citizen, who lives in "a land of opportunity" - where people protest their government and middle-aged men change vocations. I hope you are not under the impression that resistance is the most convenient and beneficial mode of action in other places. As a former citizen of the USSR, I can attest to the falsity of that supposition.

[Dismuke]

You are saying that he should act so that he could bring about the best possible circumstances, no matter how unlikely they are to occur. This doesn't seem very "rational" to me. It was as if you argued that everyone should invest all their money into the lotto because they would be happier and better off if they won. True enough, but most people would end up miserable in fact. Similarly, even if capitalism is in my best interests, it does not follow from this that I should "invest" in capitalism if the chances of "winning" are low. You are saying that the agent should sacrifice his well-being for the sake of an unlikely prospect. It's almost a "call to duty". If he benefits from this sacrifice, I would like to know how.

I think you are missing my point.

I don't deny that there are occasions when a person has no choice but to engage in certain behaviors which are unsavory. My point is simply that does not necessarily follow that such behavior is in a man's self-interest in the sense that Objectivism defines self-interest.

If you live in Communist Cuba and are drafted to go out into the fields and help bring in the sugar cane harvest (this happens there) your choice is to comply or to be jailed or tortured - or even worse, perhaps it will be your loved ones who will be jailed or tortured. In such a situation, you may very well decide that the best option open to you would be to comply and properly conclude that a protest in the name of your values would accomplish nothing and merely result in your sacrifice. But that doesn't change the fact that, even though it may be the best of two horrible alternatives, working in the sugar cane fields is NOT an example of working in your self-interest. In Communist Cuba, you are not allowed to pursue your self-interest.

As to instances where one is not under compulsion, my overall point about self-interest not being subjective is valid as well. Objectivism does not define self-interest by range-of-the-moment "the truth is what works" pragmatic expediency. That a particular criminal may get away with a particular crime and derive enjoyment from its proceeds does NOT mean that the crime was in his self-interest - though it is true that he derived material benefit from it. The Objectivist view is that man's actual self-interest is based on an understanding of certain specific principles regarding the nature and requirements of human life and holds that a certain specific set of virtues must be practiced as a matter of principle over the long-term range of his life. (For a related elaboration on principles, see the posting I put up just before this one).

The error in your postings is that you essentially equate "self-interest" with pragmatic expediency. Objectivists mean something entirely different when they use the term and regard pragmatism or any other form of range-of-the-moment behavior to be ultimately self destructive.

Edited December 3, 2006 by Dismuke

[RationalBiker]

Do I really need to modify the hypothetical so as to remove these alternatives?

I'm not concerned with how much you modify the hypothetical, I simply addressed the mischaracterization you made of what Dismuke said and that's what my post addressed.

I don't care where you come from, there IS opportunity here in the US. Whether or not people take advantage of that opportunity by proactive means, whether they wait for it to come to them, or if they simply squander it at ever opportunity is another matter. However, opportunity alone does not make for guaranteed success. Nothing does. Living a principled life merely gives one the best possible chance at a fulfilling, happy life.

Are there circumstances where people find themselve with little to no choice? Yes. The question then becomes, how much are they responsible for their own lack of options?

I hope you are not under the impression that resistance is the most convenient and beneficial mode of action in other places. As a former citizen of the USSR, I can attest to the falsity of that supposition.

I'm not sure why this is a concern. Nothing I said would logically lead to that conclusion or implication.

I think Dismuke properly identifies the problem here in explaining why some people just don't understand what it means to "live by principle".

Edited December 3, 2006 by RationalBiker

[y_feldblum]

I have a choice: to exist, or to not exist. I choose to exist, but I cannot merely “exist” abstractly, I must exist as something, having an identity. As a man, I choose to exist qua man. What, then, is man’s nature? Unlike chameleons which change color to survive, or grizzly bears which use awsome strength or cheetahs which use awesome speed to survive, man survives by reason. An essential part of the faculty of reason is the conceptual faculty, which allows man to discover general principles rather than live in a concrete-bound, case-by-case fashion. If I choose to exist, then what my self-interest is, is existing, which means existing according to my nature. This means existing as a man, which means existing by reason, which, more specifically, means living by principle.

If I wanted to answer the question succinctly yet thoroughly, I would answer it just like this.

[Dismuke]

Vladimir - I somehow overlooked your previous reply.

I am mainly worried that there is slippage at the edges of the justifications. There seems to be a risk/benefit disparity in holding that the initation of force always has great practical detriments to the initiator due to its degradation of society.

While it is very true that it does result in a degradation of society, that is not the basis of the Objectivist position on the issue. Objectivism argues that the moral is the practical - and Dr. Peikoff does demonstrate at some length the negative consequences that come from not living a virtuous life. His position is NOT that using force is against your self-interest on grounds of "what if everyone did that?"

Thinking back, I recall a previous exchange you and I had on this subject where I might have given you reason for thinking that this was the Objectivist position. If so - then I did a very poor job of explaining the position and it only goes to show why it is so important that one base one's understanding and opinions of the philosophy on source material and not what someone on a message board says, no matter how well-meaning he might be.

There also seems to be a lot of risk in holding that psychological harms will always exist. Neither Rand nor OPAR provide any psychological evidence for their conclusions, it is based entirely on the opinions of lay-persons.

First, such psychological harms have to be considered in context. It is sort of like taking a certain type of poison that the body has difficulty getting rid of and accumulates over time. If enough accumulates, it will make you sick or it will possibly kill you. But it is entirely possible to ingest a small dose and see no discernible consequences. Over time, however, those small doses build up and do have noticeable consequences.

If you shoplift a stick of gum from Wal-mart - well, if you are morally capable of doing that in the first place, chances are your existing psychology will remain intact and you will probably not even have a guilty conscience. No lightening bolt from heaven is going to strike you down. But what you are doing is undercutting the values and virtues which are necessary to live a happy life - which hopefully will last many decades beyond the immediate moment.

This brings me to the second point regarding the psychological evidence that Ayn Rand and OPAR provide. First off, "psychological harms" in this context is your term and not Ayn Rand's or Dr. Peikoff's. I agree, however, that a psychological component is very much involved and that such harm does occur. But the psychological aspect of the issue is derivative. Rand and Peikoff provided a philosophical argument not a psychological one - though it does indeed have pretty significant psychological implications which they do address.

The evidence that you assert is not provided is, in fact, provided in the writings of both Rand and Peikoff that discuss the fundamental requirements of human life. The psychological aspect comes into play with the moral purpose of one's life which is: one's happiness. Happiness is obviously a psychological state. And, as you should already know, Objectivism does not equate happiness with mere short term satisfactions or hedonistic pleasures. Objectivism holds that happiness cannot be achieved at random or in any old fashion. It requires that one live long-range in accordance to the demands of reality and of his nature - i.e. that he live the life of a rational being. In order to live such a life, Ayn Rand, argued, one must practice certain specific virtues - rationality, independence, integrity, honesty, justice, productiveness, pride. Objectivism says that to practice such virtues requires more than lip service or adherence whenever it is convenient for range-of-the-moment expedience. It requires that one take such virtues seriously and make their application a way of life. Why? Because that is what is necessary in order to live the life of a rational being and to achieve the reward that can result only from living such a life: happiness. Lying, deceiving, cheating and stealing are NOT in your self-interest regardless of whatever range-of-the-moment gain you may achieve from them because to engage in such behavior is to undercut the virtues which are necessary for your long-term success and happiness. To the degree you continue to undercut those virtues in the name of expediency you are no longer taking them seriously and no longer living them as a matter of principle. You are merely acting on them as a matter of short-term convenience whenever the mood strikes you - i.e. you are not really living by them at all. It is sort of like the old saying goes, the person who tells the truth most of the time is still a liar. To the degree that you undercut practicing those virtues as a way of life, you are undercutting your prospects for long-term happiness - and there are psychological consequences for those who are not happy and they are not particularly pleasant. Look at Peter Keating in The Fountainhead. Look at any person you know in your own life who has, over a long span of time, demonstrated himself to be dishonest, evasive and parasitical.

Too, the psychological harms (even if all true) seem to stem from the violation of societal norms, not from the violation of rights. IE, if you had a society in which what we could call "rights" were routinely violated yet this society did not consider this a moral wrong, you would likely have none of the psychological harms.

I have absolutely no idea where in the Objectivist literature you would get that from. All one needs to do is read The Fountainhead to see how highly Ayn Rand regarded "societal norms" and to see that she did not consider living outside of those norms as necessarily causing psychological harm. The only time I recall hearing Objectivists say positive things about societal norms was in regard to such narrow matters as the rules of etiquette, the rules of dress, the rules of grammar - i.e., in contexts where such norms are necessary in order for everyone to be on the same page so as to make objective communication possible. Ayn Rand most certainly did NOT argue that morality is a matter of social convention.

Edited December 4, 2006 by Dismuke

[Vladimir Berkov]

It's your responsibility to provide substantive support for your position, not someone else's responsibility to shoot it down. If you don't have time for that, that don't make the assertion to begin with.

I did provide substantial support. What I am saying is that if KendallJ thinks my support is wrong, that is fine, it would then be easy to disprove with other quotes from Peikoff's book. The problem is that KendallJ seems to be saying I have mischaracterized Peikoff's position without saying how or what he thinks Peikoff's position actually is.

[Inspector]

And I think "living by principle" is really the part that people new to the philosophy often have the most difficult time understanding...

Dismuke,

That was a wonderful post. It needs to be a sticky in the Ethics section. We're really playing whack-a-mole with ethical questions from each side of the dichotomy, just as you described.

[Dismuke]

Dismuke,

That was a wonderful post. It needs to be a sticky in the Ethics section. We're really playing whack-a-mole with ethical questions from each side of the dichotomy, just as you described.

Gee -thanks!