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Does causality give man an excuse?

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EDIT: I want to add that having this view does not damage my happiness, pride or life in any way. So my actions are deterministic - big deal, so what? I am alive, I can think, I can feel. I have a nature, and I am happy to have it, and I accept it. You won't find any traces of cynicism or helplessness in my attitude towards life. I am not trying to justify some inaction. I am simply looking for the truth.

You can not know that you know not, and by denying the axiom of human volition, that faculty which is the most precious gift of our nature, you are claiming to do just that. You can not have pride in the unchosen or happiness with a life which holds you in bondage.

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EDIT: I want to add that having this view does not damage my happiness, pride or life in any way. So my actions are deterministic - big deal, so what?

It would mean that you are a passive assimilation of matter with no control over your life. It would mean morality doesn't apply, and pride is out the window. It would mean that you're up against a big contradiction.

But, let me put the point to you this way, the highest form of evidence is direct experience and you directly experience freewill. You can and do make choices. So, then, the problem would be to explain how it is possible. You know that it is, but how is it? The point I’m making is the freewill is the starting point, the really interesting question is how can it exist. Sure, neurotransmitters, axons and dendrites have to fit into the equation, but no one has figured out just how as of yet. We are not yet able to create a conscious being in a direct engineering sense.

Put another way, the solution to the problem of freewill is to not do a David Hume and try to rationalistically prove that which is the basis of proof, and then if you can’t prove it deny its existence. The solution is to accept that which is staring you in the face as the starting point.

I am alive, I can think, I can feel. I have a nature, and I am happy to have it, and I accept it. You won't find any traces of cynicism or helplessness in my attitude towards life. I am not trying to justify some inaction. I am simply looking for the truth.

I have no doubt you’re being honest (requires free will, btw), but incorrect views on such a fundamental issue will have a negative long term effect. Wrong conclusions have long term bad consequences to the extent you take them seriously. For instance, you will have a hard time judging a man as good or evil. This will influence the kind of laws you’ll support, the kind of friends you’ll keep and the kind of society you live in.

Just to be clear, I think your questions are very reasonable. I regard the issue of freewill to be one of the very hardest problems in philosophy.

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Ifat,

I think it would help to avoid dealing with ethical consequences and such until we get a handle on the epistemological aspects of the disagreement, because that is really what's important. The ethical, moral judgments can't be made until we know what man is in this respect. Here is the phrase that troubles me in what you said:

"When the robot makes a choice, it feels for the robot (and the feeling is in fact real) that it was the robot itself that had made the choice. ... The robot is like a human."

What this implicitly asserts is that free will is nothing more than a feeling. I do not think that is the case. Rather, it is a fact of oneself that one knows by introspection - consciousness that is conscious of itself. In epistemological terms, one cannot physically point to "that" and say "that is freewill". The observation is mental, internal, direct, and factual.

To attack this position requires attacking introspection as a valid means of self-knowledge. I want to examine this point in detail because it's critical. Either introspection is a valid means for man to know himself, or it isn't; if it is valid, then it cannot be dismissed as a mere "feeling" or apparition. What your argument suggests is that free will is not strongly supported enough by introspective evidence to withstand even barely encroaching arguments from the neurological sciences. That, I think, is where much if the disagreement here lies.

Edited by Seeker
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Ifat,

I think it would help to avoid dealing with ethical consequences and such until we get a handle on the epistemological aspects of the disagreement, because that is really what's important. The ethical, moral judgments can't be made until we know what man is in this respect.

Exactly what I was thinking to myself yesterday as well.

Here is the phrase that troubles me in what you said:

"When the robot makes a choice, it feels for the robot (and the feeling is in fact real) that it was the robot itself that had made the choice. ... The robot is like a human."

What this implicitly asserts is that free will is nothing more than a feeling.

What do you mean by that? It is not "nothing more than a feeling" - it exists, it is real (like I said in brackets).

If we go back to the robot example, before we added awareness to it's actions - Do you agree that the robot was capable of making choices and learning?

It was capable of changing it's principles, knowledge and decisions after more information processing would occur (because this is enabled by the robot's physical mechanisms). Then, if we add to the robot a perception of "self" and a perception of those thoughts, then the robot is now aware that it is he who is thinking, he who is deciding, he who exists. The perception of self is not an illusion, the perception that he is making choices is not an illusion - it is real. he is making those choices.

[i should have added, that the more advanced (as oppose to basic) algorithms that guided the robot were attained by the robot's own actions, suggesting that a human is not born with knowledge and principles, but those are developed according to some more basic set of algorithms]

To attack this position requires attacking introspection as a valid means of self-knowledge.

Why? my position does not attack introspection as valid means of knowledge.

BTW: Great post. I love it when someone is able to express themselves so clearly, and look straight at the root of the disagreement. I also appreciate your dedication to facts here.

BTW2: My time is pretty limited in coming few days. I still need to reply fully to RationalBiker's post (#52) - it will take time. David (Odden): I suggest that if you want to discuss the problem with hypotheticals that you start a new thread about the validity of hypotheticals, because it is less relevant here.

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David (Odden): I suggest that if you want to discuss the problem with hypotheticals that you start a new thread about the validity of hypotheticals, because it is less relevant here.
I don't dispute the validity of valid hypotheticals, as I have made abundantly clear. I only dispute the validity of invalid ones, such as the idea that "ten identical men" is not a self-contradiction. Since you are apparently not basing you argument on the notion of distinct non-distinct existents and aren't trying to claim that your position makes an empirically testable scientific claim, I don't think that would be necessary. But thanks for asking.
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Exactly what I was thinking to myself yesterday as well.

What do you mean by that? It is not "nothing more than a feeling" - it exists, it is real (like I said in brackets).

If we go back to the robot example, before we added awareness to it's actions - Do you agree that the robot was capable of making choices and learning?

No robot that exists today has the ability to make choices or learn, because they aren't sentient. They simply provide an output for an input in a very mechanical way. In a way, a robot is an extension of the programmer or creator. It's making "choices" by proxy through the creator who wrote the algorithms.

Now, if you're positing some future robot, then that won't be very helpful as an analogy, because we don't know how such a robot would work, and how it works is what gets to the heart of the matter.

BTW: Great post. I love it when someone is able to express themselves so clearly, and look straight at the root of the disagreement. I also appreciate your dedication to facts here.

Keep in mind that the Objectivist argument is that free will is axiomatic and self-evident.

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What do you mean by that? It is not "nothing more than a feeling" - it exists, it is real (like I said in brackets).

If we go back to the robot example, before we added awareness to it's actions - Do you agree that the robot was capable of making choices and learning?

It can choose and learn. The question is whether it can do so freely or is determined, however.

The problem is that you are defining free will in such a manner as to admit determinism, whereas the definition accepted here entails "not determined". Your robot example simply demonstrates that your idea of free will is compatible with determinism, not that it is the correct idea of free will, i.e. that which pertains to humans. By contrast, the idea of free will that I have is that I am not wholly determined by factors external to my conscious awareness. The robot in your example, if it is self-aware, is aware that it is determined. That's the difference.

Why? my position does not attack introspection as valid means of knowledge.

Then you have introspected and found yourself to be determined as opposed to free?

Keep in mind that the Objectivist argument is that free will is axiomatic and self-evident.

Agreed, but as I understand it, the reason why volition is considered axiomatic is because volition is an attribute of human cognition, to commitment to reason and truth, and to focus - so that because focus and cognition are implicit in an attempt to deny free will, free will also is. But to say that volition is therefore an axiom doesn't demonstrate the necessary ingredient which is the point at issue here - namely, that volition is an attribute of human cognition. That's a fact "available to any act of introspection" which precedes the understanding that volition is axiomatic. The basis for the specific point we are arguing is a fact determined by introspection. Because of this, pulling out the "axiomatic trump card" (to coin a phrase) is unlikely to persuade anyone who doesn't already accept volition as an attribute of human cognition.

Edited by Seeker
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Because of this, pulling out the "axiomatic trump card" (to coin a phrase) is unlikely to persuade anyone who doesn't already accept volition as an attribute of human cognition.

But then, axioms don't tend to persuade those who don't accept them anyway. People will argue that existence can't be proven either, and attempt to call into to doubt existence itself. You call something axiomatic because it is, not because you think it will persuade anyone. They will either accept it or they won't.

Thus, if one accepts the free will is axiomatic, attempting to prove it someone else would seem to me to be pointless. That is why I have tended to focus more on talking about the ethical implications of determinism. Good luck getting someone to accept an axiom they reject.

Edited by RationalBiker
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But then, axioms don't tend to persuade those who don't accept them anyway.

I can understand applying that reasoning to someone who denies that existence exists, but in the case of someone who accepts the Primacy of Existence, the Law of Identity, the Axiom of Consciousness, and the Law of Causality, yet differs on the subject of free will only I suggest that some additional effort may be warranted. In particular, the solution may be to clarify terms, or, as may be the case here, in presenting the concept in a particular way that facilitates a new insight.

Edited by Seeker
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Let me see if I can put this issue in more perspective regarding consciousness, volition, brains, synapses, and neuro-biochemistry.

Consciousness and volition (for man) are at the very base of the above hierarchical listing. And because one begins with this axiomatic knowledge of consciousness and volition, one cannot get beneath these epistemologically. No matter how much one learns about how the brain works one is learning this by volitionally using one's consciousness to identify what one is studying.

In terms of a skyscraper analogy, consciousness and volition are on the first floor, whereas brains are on the tenth floor, synapses are on the fifteenth floor, and neuro-biochemistry is on the twentieth floor. If you try to use your knowledge of the twentieth floor, neuro-biochemistry, to obliterate the first floor, consciousness and volition, then you are effectively destroying the proper hierarchy of knowledge.

Let's give a more down to earth example.

Privacy is a very high value and a right. If someone were to violate your privacy via force or fraud, you wouldn't give an argument that it was OK because they were using very high-grade spying equipment to undermine the fact that your privacy was destroyed. They may have been using the highest technology possible, but that is not more fundamental than your right to privacy. In other words, you wouldn't give a damn about how they did it in the technical details, you would just want them to stop. And if you told them that they ought to go stick a hot knife into their eyeball because they were spying on you, and then they claimed that you were violating their rights because it was you who initiated force, would you agree with that argument? Or would you say that the right to privacy is more fundamental than whatever it is you might say while being spied upon, say by nosey neighbors or others who you don't even know?

Similarly, any attempt to use the latest greatest technological knowledge about how the brain works to undermine your knowledge about consciousness and volition is making a wrong argument. Besides, you are not going to be able to point to a dendrite in the brain and say, "Look, I've discovered volition!"

You had to already have discovered volition and how to use it in order to be able to study dendrites.

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By all means, I'm not attempting to dissuade others from debating the issue. That is their choice (pun intended). :nuke:

Maybe I'll learn that you can prove an axiom to someone else.

PS: Technically speaking of course, arguing against Objectivism is not permitted in the main forum. I can't imagine but a few more topics that argue against the foundation of Objectivism more than attacking free will. However, since at least one other moderator and an admin have participated in this thread, far be it from me to call a halt to that. This is one of those threads where a user (Ifat)has been given some latitude. However, I would prefer that if she is going to be given that latitude, that she wouldn't make underhanded comments questioning the "mountains of integrity", objectivity, and dedication to facts of some of those who disagree with her. If that were to continue, I would take some action.

Edited by RationalBiker
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Perhaps it might help to explain how the basic choice to focus is not initiated by the brain, or perhaps to show that signals from the brain do not precede consciousness?

Edited by Tenure
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If you mean, how do we know that our will is free? The answer is introspection. Given that knowledge, the evidentiary burden lies on the proponent of determinism to demonstrate that the basic choice to focus is determined solely by physical brain activity such that our will is not free, which as far as I know has not been done - leaving us, in the context of our presently known facts, with the knowledge that our will is free.

Edited by Seeker
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Maybe I'll learn that you can prove an axiom to someone else.
Axioms can't be proved, so you must have had some other connotation. One thing about axioms, though, is that it can be shown that the opposite of the axiom leads to contradiction, so if there is a problem in showing validity of an axiom to a person, then the problem has to come from either accepting contradictions or from some confusion over argument or definition of the terms involved.

As far as showing the contradiction, Peikoff did it well in OPAR (pg. 71-21). I think it would be a good addition to this thread to add that passage, it's about half a page in the book, but I will summarize because I'm not certain if I can quote that much of the book, but I will add important quote, since it's small enough.

The base of his argument is that the claim "mind is deterministic" is a statement of knowledge, and as such it requires validation to know that such statement does describe reality. But in order to validate, a man must be able to do so correctly, but doing so isn't automatic for man. Peikoff continues with:

The determinist's position amounts to the following. "My mind does not automatically conform to facts, yet I have no choice about its course. I have no way to choose reality to be my guide as against subjective feeling, social pressure, or the falsifications inherent in being only semiconscious. If and when I distort the evidence through sloppiness or laziness, or place popularity above logic, or evade out of fear, or hide my evasions from myself under layers of rationalizations and lies, I have to do it, even if I realize at the time how badly I am acting. Whatever the irrationalities that warp and invalidate my mind's conclusion on any issue, they are irresistible, like every event in my history, and could not have been otherwise."

So, the conclusion is that when a determinist arrived to (what he thinks is) knowledge X, he can't be certain that he was pre-determined to use the correct method to arrive to objective knowledge. If he attempts to validate it, he has to do it correctly again, but again he can't choose to do so correctly against "subjective feeling, social pressure, or the falsifications inherent in being only semiconscious." He may or may not do it correctly, and because of his deterministic nature, he can never be sure if his knowledge was arrived by correct means.

If he attempts to check if he is certain or not by introspection, he is already pre-determined to a certain evaluation. Such evaluation aren't automatic, however, introspection still requires focus as opposed to evasion. So even here, he can't be sure that he was certain about something a moment ago, because he doesn't know if he was pre-determined to focus or to evade during his introspection, and he cannot act against what he was pre-determined to do.

When accepting free will all such problems disappear, since a man can choose his actions regardless of the influences, and that's what makes him sure: "Since I chose to focus and I chose to use reason, I know that I did focus and did use reason, thus the knowledge I have arrived at is correct within the context of my knowledge."

P.S. I think the above is the better persuasive argument.

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But to say that volition is therefore an axiom doesn't demonstrate the necessary ingredient which is the point at issue here - namely, that volition is an attribute of human cognition.

You have to show that it's a component of thought, and you do so by showing where in the process it is required. Is that what you're saying? Then you can say, well, notice that you do that when you think.

Anyway, my intent was to show how it's easy to fall into the rationalist's trap, of trying to prove something which isn't open to proof. This was my big problem when it came to understanding the concept of freewill.

Let me see if I can put this issue in more perspective regarding consciousness, volition, brains, synapses, and neuro-biochemistry.

Consciousness and volition (for man) are at the very base of the above hierarchical listing. And because one begins with this axiomatic knowledge of consciousness and volition, one cannot get beneath these epistemologically. No matter how much one learns about how the brain works one is learning this by volitionally using one's consciousness to identify what one is studying.

In terms of a skyscraper analogy, consciousness and volition are on the first floor, whereas brains are on the tenth floor, synapses are on the fifteenth floor, and neuro-biochemistry is on the twentieth floor. If you try to use your knowledge of the twentieth floor, neuro-biochemistry, to obliterate the first floor, consciousness and volition, then you are effectively destroying the proper hierarchy of knowledge.

Thomas, that's a great analogy. I'd never seen it put quite that way. It's a compact way of understanding the issue.

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Axioms can't be proved, so you must have had some other connotation.

Naturally they cannot be proved, but what you can do is show that they are axioms. To wit -

You have to show that it's a component of thought, and you do so by showing where in the process it is required. Is that what you're saying? Then you can say, well, notice that you do that when you think.

Yes, precisely. I wasn't going for anything more complicated than that.

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Thomas, that's a great analogy. I'd never seen it put quite that way. It's a compact way of understanding the issue.

Thank you.

I think rationalism is the biggest factor in these types of conundrums. The rationalist realizes that he must start somewhere, but he doesn't always know where to start and he usually starts somewhere other than perception or self-awareness; primarily on the grounds that perception is untrustworthy and that a rational non-perception starting point is better. So, they start with a "true idea" without knowing how it came about to be true (even if it is). Truth means man's mind (his ideas) corresponding to existence, but the rationalist is only interested in tying one idea to another in a deductive manner; and if this does not correspond to reality, well then he claims that ideas are superior to reality because man's mind is superior to reality -- i.e. clearer and more identifiable.

It was Plato who originated the idea that man's mind must be something other than matter or come from something other than matter, because matter is just too unformed to be able to have a mind; thus eventually leading to the Christian idea that we must have a soul which is not brought about by matter but only via spirit -- i.e. God breaths our soul into us, because only spirit can beget spirit.

As man's knowledge of his body grew, the rationalist came up with an argument that we must not have volition, since we are composed of matter. Something along the lines of:

Matter does not have volition

Man is composed of matter

Therefore man does not have volition

I'm not here trying to say that man's mind is matter, and thus an illusion of neuro-biochemistry, I'm saying that the premise that man's mind cannot come from matter needs to be checked. If we never find anything else there, no type of "mind stuff" from which our mind originates, then we must conclude that we have volition even though we are made of matter. In other words, it might be time to check that premise, "Matter does not have volition." Some material things (rocks) definitely do not have volition, but man definitely does; and as far as we know, we are made up of the same fundamental stuff everything else is made up of. It has a different configuration in us, but there is no "mind stuff" that anyone has ever found. "But maybe we haven't found it yet!" I hear someone scream. Well, when you find the evidence, get back to me.

In the mean time, I have to conclude that mankind, once again, has been sent down the wrong track by Plato. Both the rationalists who claim that we can't have volition because we are composed of matter, and the rationalists who claim that we must be composed of something else because we do have volition, are both barking up the wrong tree.

We have volition and we are composed of matter. Those are the facts that have to be taken into account by any rational integration of man's nature.

And actually, it was Aristotle who came up with the right and true formulation based on the evidence: We are so composed [by nature and nature alone] as to have the power of consciousness and volition.

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Still no time to go back to previous posts and reply.

I do have 2 important questions though. As I understand it the evidence you* present for free will is introspection and observation of other people's actions and nature.

However, by looking at the same things, I can see how the part of volition is perfectly clear, I just don't see how it is evident that it is not-deterministic. This last part is an addition that is not suggested by the acts of introspection or observation. So how on earth do you conclude the "free" in "free will", just from the available information?

* a general you to anyone who sides with non-determinism of the mind

Second question: As I understand Olex's post, he was making the claim that if man's mind was deterministic, then validating knowledge, or being sure one's knowledge is correct, would not be possible. This part is entirely not clear to me as well. The argument seems to me, at this point, completely arbitrary. Can anyone explain his (and also Peikoff's) argument? Please note that what Peikoff is referring to as the "determinists' position" is NOT my position.

And a request: If anyone wishes to reply to something I said, do not do it in the form of "the determinists' notion is...", "The common mistake of the determinists..." "Determinists start with the argument that...". Quote me and my position and reply to that.

Edited by ifatart
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However, by looking at the same things, I can see how the part of volition is perfectly clear, I just don't see how it is evident that it is not-deterministic. This last part is an addition that is not suggested by the acts of introspection or observation. So how on earth do you conclude the "free" in "free will", just from the available information?

Choose to vary your level of focus. Do you notice any external interference, or is the choice of your own accord?

Edited by Seeker
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And a request: If anyone wishes to reply to something I said, do not do it in the form of "the determinists' notion is...", "The common mistake of the determinists..." "Determinists start with the argument that...". Quote me and my position and reply to that.

Here's the problem. If you are going to be taking the position that your mind is deterministic, then the output of your mind -- your posts -- are neither true nor false nor arbitrary; they are just an output.

If one takes a look at, say, a very complicated action of a very large roller coaster, the action of the car following the track is neither true nor false nor arbitrary -- it's just an action that occurs due to the nature of the car following the track.

Similarly, if you claim that your mind is just the outputs of neuro-biochemistry, then the outputs can be neither true nor false nor arbitrary. It's just the result of a chain of chemical reactions.

And if that is the case, then why are you arguing so insistently for your position?

The epistemological positions of true or false or arbitrary can only come about if you have free will, and they wouldn't apply to a bio-bot no more than they apply to a computer output. A machine simply does what it does because of its nature; it's not making a decision.

So, if you are not making a decision to post to this forum -- if your posts are just outputs -- then they have no epistemological meaning.

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Choose to vary your level of focus. Do you notice any external interference, or is the choice of your own accord?

No, there is no external influence. But how does the fact that you can choose to vary your level of focus proves that this process is not deterministic?

Here's the problem. If you are going to be taking the position that your mind is deterministic, then the output of your mind -- your posts -- are neither true nor false nor arbitrary; they are just an output.

This seems like an arbitrary claim. When your calculator gives the result that 2+2=4, the output is true (just to give a simple example).

Similarly, if you claim that your mind is just the outputs of neuro-biochemistry, then the outputs can be neither true nor false nor arbitrary. It's just the result of a chain of chemical reactions.

Your argument is arbitrary. It is like saying "if the existence of a leg is a result of biochemistry, then it is just a physical object and nothing more". But in fact, this is a leg. Why deny it's nature, based on it's origin, or other attributes?

You can also say "If our vision is based on neuro-biochemistry, then you cannot see something, but in fact the process of seeing is just a bunch of chemical reactions, without any awareness".

The epistemological positions of true or false or arbitrary can only come about if you have free will

Arbitrary claim.

and they wouldn't apply to a bio-bot no more than they apply to a computer output. A machine simply does what it does because of its nature; it's not making a decision.

There is a need to clear up the concepts involved.

  • Decision - definition: "a position or opinion or judgment reached after consideration"
  • Consideration - definition: "the process of giving careful thought to something".
  • Thinking - definition: "Thought or thinking is a mental process which allows beings to model the world, and so to deal with it effectively according to their goals, plans, ends and desires. "

A computer program can reach a decision, if it has an ability of considering ideas and decision making. The act of considering something includes an ability to learn, integrate and abstract knowledge, and have awareness. If a machine can do this, then it performs the act of consideration (of knowldge), and decision-making.

I think this is also the beginning of my reply to RationalBiker's questions from earlier on, about the meaning I attach to the act of "choosing".

Edited by ifatart
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No, there is no external influence. But how does the fact that you can choose to vary your level of focus proves that this process is not deterministic?
Do you agree that one can choose to vary one's focus, or are you making a polemical point? If you do agree, then what exactly do you mean by "choose" in this context?
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