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I can definitely say that we're not going to be able to progress past this point because we have very different understandings of what 'choice' is.

 

For a simple computation, like checking if one object is larger than another, two choices are possible: true or false.  A is being compared to B. The computation is A > B based on object height. If A is 5 inches tall, and B is 2 inches tall, this returns true every time. As long as the computation isn't random, this will always happens, even though a choice is made. The only way it might return false is if the thing doing the computation is broken, or no method at all is used. Even if you add in an "I don't know" choice, -that- choice still follows a definite method. Despite the simplicity here, this is applicable to -any- decision procedure.

 

The problem is, as DonAthos pointed out, you're using the word choice where it is not applicable. The computer is not making a choice. It is not making a selection between two possible alternatives. Only one alternative for the computer is possible. A>B is the ONLY possible solution for the computer to return. Dr. Peikoff defines volitional:

 

"“Volitional” means selected from two or more alternatives that were possible under the circumstances, the difference being made by the individual’s decision, which could have been otherwise."

 

Could the computer's solution to your proposed example have been otherwise? No, it could not have been. From Galt's speech:

 

"A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior."

 

The computer in your example, being mechanistically determined, DOES have an automatic course of behavior. It's simply wrong to say that the computer has a choice. The computer's computation is merely the flipping of switches, each of which can act in one way and one way only- no other way is possible. Computers are not volitional beings.

 

 

The presence of an identity requires that only one action WILL happen in a given context. Otherwise, you're saying I might find the doctor saying I have the flu 80% of the time - and not because the doctor learned more.

 

 

This keeps being asserted and I see no valid evidence being given. Why does identity imply that only one action will happen in a given context? I repeat, identity requires that an entity be finite and delimited, not that it must act in one and only one way under the same circumstances. Man, having the ability to choose (ie. able to make a selection that, under the same circumstances, could have happened in another way), can focus his mind or let his mind drift. His identity requires that he choose, but it does not necessitate the choice he makes. Choosing, therefore, is not an exception to causality. It is an expression of causality in that it is an expression of man's identity.

 

Rand says: "Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation."

 

You keep describing choice as probabilistic, but what does that mean? It means only that you cannot know in advance how man will choose. It does not mean that his identity is probabilistic- his identity is determined- he MUST choose. If an entity's identity were probabilistic then it would be in violation of the law of identity. It simply wouldn't have an identity. Yet you're conflating an entity's identity with the specific action it takes. Identity determines only what actions are possible for an entity to take, not what singular action it will take.

 

 

5) If the logical end of my argument amounts to determinism, point out where.

 

The part where you said that computers following flow charts are making choices.

Edited by CriticalThinker2000
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A selection is a choice. Indeed, my example was two possibilities. So what? Two or two million possibilities - the principle is the same. In terms of volition, I mean a lot more than two. The point is, methods and procedures are used. When methods are used, the consequences can be otherwise, but once it starts, there will be exactly one answer.

Of course, volitional consciousness is not automatic. Part of what I said is that, for whatever reason, an active (i.e. complex and more deliberate as well as conscious) is necessary to make wildly complex decisions, orders of magnitude above what today's computers are able to do. But just because you are using a DEFINITE method with DEFINITE choices every time does not deny your need to actively choose. Think of what you do when solving a calculus problem.  There are specific ways to find derivatives, but you need to guide the whole process along. If you look for the derivative of x^2, the answer is 2x. If I gave you the problem again immediately, you'd still say 2x. The answer is not "automatic" at all. In a sense, the process is "deterministic" but still requires volitional consciousness.

All I'm doing is refusing to appeal to a "special" causality. I don't know why volitional consciousness is needed, but saying two or more outcomes in an IDENTICAL context is invalid - it is an implicit denial of the law of identity. Since I can't turn back time, I'll never know what else has this special "multiple outcome identity", and I'd be reaffirming Humean causality because all I'd know is history but not if tomorrow the other outcomes start happening.

Computers choose, but not in the human sense. I'm being as clear as I can that there are volitional and nonvolitional choices, where computers are still making choices. If you prefer, say "selection" for nonvolitional choice.

 

Peikoff quote:

"“Volitional” means selected from two or more alternatives that were possible under the circumstances, the difference being made by the individual’s decision, which could have been otherwise."

I wonder if circumstance here means TOTAL context or just being faced with different times to think about a choice. If I tell you what I want for dinner today, the answer will be different tomorrow. The circumstance is going to be the same tomorrow, but the context is new. My choice can be otherwise every single time because total context will be new every single time. But choosing what I want to eat? That isn't changing.

This brings me to the thought experiment. I'll start really simple.

Suppose you made a decision to work overseas for a year to work on a new business startup in China. You leave a fulfilling job because you think the new opportunity is exciting. It turns out that the startup failed, and your old job is now taken. Two years of your life ended up nowhere.

Now suppose you find a time genie as you pack up to move back to the US. He offers to send you back in time to the moment you decided to go overseas. The catch is, you won't remember anything from the past two years. You'll relive the moment fresh. So you decide to go back in time.

The question now is: would you make the same decision? Why or why not?

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I can definitely say that we're not going to be able to progress past this point because we have very different understandings of what 'choice' is.

I agree.

 

http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=17686

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A selection is a choice. Indeed, my example was two possibilities. So what? Two or two million possibilities - the principle is the same. In terms of volition, I mean a lot more than two. The point is, methods and procedures are used. When methods are used, the consequences can be otherwise, but once it starts, there will be exactly one answer.

 

So if the computer is making a choice, then you've equated man with a computer. You have stripped the word choice of all meaning. When a complex series of switches are flipped the switches didn't 'choose' to flip anymore than a rock 'chooses' to fall to the ground when I drop it.

 

Computers choose, but not in the human sense. I'm being as clear as I can that there are volitional and nonvolitional choices, where computers are still making choices. If you prefer, say "selection" for nonvolitional choice.

 

The only difference I can see you drawing is one of complexity. Computers supposedly make 'choices' and humans are supposedly complex computers. How is this not determinism?

 

All I'm doing is refusing to appeal to a "special" causality. I don't know why volitional consciousness is needed, but saying two or more outcomes in an IDENTICAL context is invalid - it is an implicit denial of the law of identity.

 

Despite discussing this for a while, it is still completely unclear to me why an entity acting as a cause is a denial of the law of identity. 

 

 

Since I can't turn back time, I'll never know what else has this special "multiple outcome identity", and I'd be reaffirming Humean causality because all I'd know is history but not if tomorrow the other outcomes start happening.

 

It's really not difficult to figure out what entities are capable of making a choice- entities with volitional consciousness. It's not like I'm sitting here wondering whether my pizza is going to start floating into the air.

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Computers supposedly make 'choices' and humans are supposedly complex computers. How is this not determinism?

 

It's not behaviorism (which is what I think you're implying) because it recognizes the fact that people think.  If you mean "determinism" as a rejection of metaphysical indeterminacy- not merely as extended to, but especially when applied to consciousness- then it is.

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It's not behaviorism (which is what I think you're implying) because it recognizes the fact that people think.  If you mean "determinism" as a rejection of metaphysical indeterminacy- not merely as extended to, but especially when applied to consciousness- then it is.

 

The fact that an entity containing the faculty of volitional consciousness can act in two different ways (focus or unfocus), under the same circumstances, is not metaphysical indeterminacy. It's range of actions is still delimited. Man must choose. Consciousness is still finite. It still maintains identity. I can only chalk this up to a misunderstanding of causality or a misunderstanding of identity. I am not saying that this is behaviorism. I'm saying that it is determinism- the application of the mechanistic causality that pertains to unconscious, non-volitional entities to volitional consciousness.

 

 

 

Given the distinction between the metaphysical and the manmade, what does it mean to ask "why" the Soviet Union fell or "why" anyone does or thinks anything?

 

According to the determinism being argued for here, there is no difference between the metaphysical and the man-made. When Rand draws the distinction, she draws it to show that that which is man-made did not have to be so. But according to the idea that man is mechanistically determined to make the choices that he does, there is no distinction. So I ask you and Louie the question, what is the point of drawing that distinction if free will doesn't exist?

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So if the computer is making a choice, then you've equated man with a computer. You have stripped the word choice of all meaning. When a complex series of switches are flipped the switches didn't 'choose' to flip anymore than a rock 'chooses' to fall to the ground when I drop it.

I didn't equate man with a computer. Personally, I use the word "choose" for both, but I specified the difference of the -way- choices happen. People need volition, computers don't. For this conversation, selection is what matters. Rocks don't select anything, they lack information processing. Computers process information, so they select all the time. People process information, too. So the point is, we can't treat computers like rocks; the presence of switches is not relevant, as all that means is physical mechanisms are required for anything to happen.

 

Computers supposedly make 'choices' and humans are supposedly complex computers.

Anything that processes information does so by computation via specific methods. Some methods are automatic. All modern day computers use automatic methods. Some human methods are automatic, like perception or emotions. Some human methods are not automatic because they use volition, like concept formation. My only argument is that volition primarily differs as a psychological process, while non-volition is non-psychological.

 

Despite discussing this for a while, it is still completely unclear to me why an entity acting as a cause is a denial of the law of identity.

Reply to my thought experiment first.

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I didn't equate man with a computer. Personally, I use the word "choose" for both, but I specified the difference of the -way- choices happen. People need volition, computers don't. For this conversation, selection is what matters. Rocks don't select anything, they lack information processing. Computers process information, so they select all the time. People process information, too. So the point is, we can't treat computers like rocks; the presence of switches is not relevant, as all that means is physical mechanisms are required for anything to happen.

 

Anything that processes information does so by computation via specific methods. Some methods are automatic. All modern day computers use automatic methods. Some human methods are automatic, like perception or emotions. Some human methods are not automatic because they use volition, like concept formation. My only argument is that volition primarily differs as a psychological process, while non-volition is non-psychological.

 

OK, so if humans are not complex computers because they need volition, I still don't know what you mean by volition. What is the difference between a human and a computer?

 

Your thought experiment was:

 

Suppose you made a decision to work overseas for a year to work on a new business startup in China. You leave a fulfilling job because you think the new opportunity is exciting. It turns out that the startup failed, and your old job is now taken. Two years of your life ended up nowhere.

Now suppose you find a time genie as you pack up to move back to the US. He offers to send you back in time to the moment you decided to go overseas. The catch is, you won't remember anything from the past two years. You'll relive the moment fresh. So you decide to go back in time.

The question now is: would you make the same decision? Why or why not?

 

Yes, I probably would make the same decision. But the key is, I could choose to do otherwise. That's what it means to make a choice- neither option HAS to be selected.

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OK, so if humans are not complex computers because they need volition, I still don't know what you mean by volition. What is the difference between a human and a computer?

That selection occurs as a consequence of psychological, active process. Namely, it "feels like" something. Why are the processes active? I don't know, all I know is that it allows for extremely complex selections relating to concepts and long-term planning.

 

Yes, I probably would make the same decision.

What would lead you to make a different decision? I didn't ask if it was metaphysically possible in general to make a different choice. If you can't think of a reason, then you'd be admitting that you are so indeterminate you can't know how your own choices will occur. If you can think of a reason, then the method of decision making is so indeterminate that you don't know what methods you would use. Part of my argument is that at any -particular- moment, one method (process) will use one set of information (inputs) to make one decision (output).

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That selection occurs as a consequence of psychological, active process. Namely, it "feels like" something. Why are the processes active? I don't know, all I know is that it allows for extremely complex selections relating to concepts and long-term planning.

 

Am I correct in understanding that you don't see there being any difference between a human and a computer, besides the complexity of mechanical processes and that man's thinking 'feels like' something?

 

You also said:

 

 

My only argument is that volition primarily differs as a psychological process, while non-volition is non-psychological.

 

Does 'psychological process' essentially mean, it occurs in the brain? So far, the only differences I can see you drawing between man is a computer are that: man's mechanical processes are more complex than the computers we have, his mechanical processes occur in the brain, and that his processes are active (meaning it feels like something). If those are the only differences, and there is not an essential difference, then what you're saying is that man's choices are just as determined as a computer's selections. They could not happen any other way. The man-made vs. the metaphysical distinction is meaningless.

 

 

What would lead you to make a different decision? I didn't ask if it was metaphysically possible in general to make a different choice. If you can't think of a reason, then you'd be admitting that you are so indeterminate you can't know how your own choices will occur.

 

What would lead me to make a different decision is whether I chose to make a different decision. My choice is the cause. As Ayn Rand said, "Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation."

 

 

If you can think of a reason, then the method of decision making is so indeterminate that you don't know what methods you would use. Part of my argument is that at any -particular- moment, one method (process) will use one set of information (inputs) to make one decision (output).

 

Yes, I get that you are ascribing a mechanistic form of causality to choice. You're saying (and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think this has gone on long enough that I'm pretty sure I'm not misinterpreting) that if I make a choice, the fundamental choice I make (whether to focus or not) must be necessarily determined by external factors. That is the essence of determinism.

 

One other point. You keep using the phrase 'metaphysically possible', and I think we're using it in two very different senses, just as we used the word choice in two different senses. I also think that the way Rand uses the term agrees with how I'm using it but not how you're using it. In your above example, the computer is programmed to select the higher of two integers. It cannot, by the nature of its programming, select the lower integer. Now suppose it's presented with A=5 and B=2. Are you saying that it's metaphysically possible for it to return B as the answer? In my understanding of 'metaphysically possible', it is NOT metaphysically possible, as it would imply a contradiction in its nature, being a non-volitional, mechanistically determined entity.

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Am I correct in understanding that you don't see there being any difference between a human and a computer, besides the complexity of mechanical processes and that man's thinking 'feels like' something?

The difference is massive, on the level of comparing dogs to viruses. The difference is complexity, and that complexity leads to various new ways of behaving. Part of volition is that it "feels like" something, along with requiring active choices that only happen by an active process. I don't know why this is so, but it is just a very basic premise that I don't need to posit a strange new form of causality for volition. Things operate by a definite nature, meaning it is possible to know how and why anything happens without resorting to saying "I don't know why you want to eat dinner every day". Clearly, it may be hard to say for sure, but I can figure out why, and even why people may be irrational instead. We can know because methods of acting/thinking other people use lead to definite behaviors. However, even if we MUST use a method that processes parameters, the fact that you don't know what you will do until you make your choice and complete the method makes it so volition is a crucial distinction between selections that are deductive and lack any awareness as in modern computers. Modern computers don't reason.

It is metaphysically possible to say A > B is false or true from an epistemic standpoint - the answer can't be 'pineapple' for a computer. A and B are given values to find an answer. Merely stating A is 5 and B is 2 STILL doesn't say whether A > B is true. Despite metaphysical possibility, in the end, one selection will be made since there are a finite number of methods to employ to get the right answer. If more than one method is equally appropriate and there is no preference in a context, then the system is indeterminate. That goes for people too - insofar as people process information (if people DON'T process information, well, I think it's an absurd premise). By reasoning at all, you are giving preference to a method.

That brings me to the thought experiment again that you avoided answering further: What would lead you to in reality pick anything else than what you did the first time?

"mechanistic form of causality to choice"

I'm not saying that, I mean that any manner of information processing is not at all mechanistic, if mechanistic means causality like why a rock falls or why a ball rolls.

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Simple question:

 

Universe configuration A1, includes person B, in the limit of just before time T1, when person B "chooses" something:

 

At a later time T2 we have Universe configuration A2

 

 

 

IS there only one metaphysically possible A2 given the identity of A1 and B in the limit of (at) the decision at time T1? i.e. is there only one metaphysically possible "choice" that B can make given the law of identity (for at the instant at T1) for A1 and B?

 

Your answer will determine whether you repudiate or validate volition.

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The difference is massive, on the level of comparing dogs to viruses. The difference is complexity, and that complexity leads to various new ways of behaving. Part of volition is that it "feels like" something, along with requiring active choices that only happen by an active process. I don't know why this is so, but it is just a very basic premise that I don't need to posit a strange new form of causality for volition. Things operate by a definite nature, meaning it is possible to know how and why anything happens without resorting to saying "I don't know why you want to eat dinner every day". Clearly, it may be hard to say for sure, but I can figure out why, and even why people may be irrational instead. We can know because methods of acting/thinking other people use lead to definite behaviors. However, even if we MUST use a method that processes parameters, the fact that you don't know what you will do until you make your choice and complete the method makes it so volition is a crucial distinction between selections that are deductive and lack any awareness as in modern computers. Modern computers don't reason.

 

Dogs and viruses are fundamentally different things, yet the differences you have offered between a human and a computer are not fundamental with respect to the type of causality at play, which is what we're discussing. When I say types of causality, I do not mean different laws of causality, of which there is only one: entities act in accordance with their identities. Rather, I am referring to a difference between inanimate entities, which can act in one way and one way only given the context they are in, and entities with volitional consciousness, which can choose between two fundamental options (focus or unfocus) in a broad range of contexts. To equivocate the two types is to equivocate volitional consciousness entities with inanimate unconsciousness entities.

 

 

It is metaphysically possible to say A > B is false or true from an epistemic standpoint - the answer can't be 'pineapple' for a computer. A and B are given values to find an answer. Merely stating A is 5 and B is 2 STILL doesn't say whether A > B is true. Despite metaphysical possibility, in the end, one selection will be made since there are a finite number of methods to employ to get the right answer. If more than one method is equally appropriate and there is no preference in a context, then the system is indeterminate. That goes for people too - insofar as people process information (if people DON'T process information, well, I think it's an absurd premise). By reasoning at all, you are giving preference to a method.

 

This is a very different understanding of 'metaphysically possible' than I and Ayn Rand have. Maybe you disagree with my interpretation of Rand but I think a re-reading of The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made would change your mind.

 

 

That brings me to the thought experiment again that you avoided answering further: What would lead you to in reality pick anything else than what you did the first time?

 

I did not avoid answering it and the fact that you posed the above question, "What would lead you to in reality pick anything else than what you did the first time?", indicates to me that you still don't understand my position, and the position that I think Rand held. I choose whether to focus or not, and based upon this fundamental choice there are factors which cause me to pick certain things. Ultimately, it is me- the human entity- that leads me to pick or not to pick again what I did the first time. That is, my choice is a type of causation which arises by the identity of my nature. That you think my fundamental choice must be necessitated ('lead me to pick', as you state) by antecedent factors, as implied in your question and belief that I'm evading, proves to me that you are a determinist, despite your explicit claims to the contrary. In any event, I don't see this discussion really going anywhere. I did learn a lot by thinking my ideas through and discussing this with you and Harrison, but we might just have to agree to disagree on this topic.

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Dogs and viruses are fundamentally different things, yet the differences you have offered between a human and a computer are not fundamental with respect to the type of causality at play, which is what we're discussing.

I told you a fundamental difference:

Part of volition is that it "feels like" something, along with requiring active choices that only happen by an active process.

 

Ultimately, it is me- the human entity- that leads me to pick or not to pick again what I did the first time.

You DO choose in a deep and volitional way, that's my point. Also, what you DO choose would, as far as I see, not ever be anything else. So I'm asking you, why would you choose differently? I'm not denying your volition, I'm only asking why you would choose anything else. I'm not implying you don't choose, my position is only that you would always end up making the same choice if the context is absolutely identical.

 

This is a very different understanding of 'metaphysically possible' than I and Ayn Rand have.

The answer is true or false. Only one of the two is selected. It is possible to answer true or false. It COULD answer true or false, but it WILL answer only true or only false. The essay you're talking about discusses the metaphysically given, not the metaphysically possible. As far as I know, Rand didn't ever say metaphysically possible.

 

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is there only one metaphysically possible "choice" that B can make given the law of identity (for at the instant at T1) for A1 and B?

Yes.

 

Firstly, the evidence against that- this appeal to introspection- is fallacious.  Since we are discussing future "possibilities", which have not happened yet, to say that we can know of them introspectively is to say that knowledge of the future is automatically and infallibly (self-evidently) available within ourselves, which is an assertion of our own prescience.

 

If this introspective awareness of such futures was subject to distortion and error (as I believe) then that would invalidate any attempt to accept them as irreducible primaries.

 

Secondly, what goes for 'human causality' also goes for the causality of everything else; while various entities may behave in very different ways, there is fundamentally only one "causality".   To say that there may be multiple versions of causality, operating at the same times and in different ways, is essentially no different from saying there can be multiple versions of truth and falsehood (at the same time and in the same way); it is a direct rejection of identity.

 

Finally, it may be argued that everything in the universe operates with some degree of "metaphysical freedom", to which I care only to mention that such an argument leads directly to a Humean epistemology (since by definition one can NEVER know why anything ever happens).

 

Hume once made the point that there is no good reason to believe that food will nourish us at any point in the future, no matter how many times it has in the past.

I would like to ask- if we assume that volition is metaphysically real- on what basis you can claim to know what a volitional creature "meant" by choosing to arrange this string of symbols.

 

How does the concept of "purposeful action" relate to the causeless?

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
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  • 5 weeks later...

The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that we cannot know certain things about subatomic particles, because of the nature of our perception.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

 

Many have taken this principle to mean that such things are really, causally indeterminate.  However, Leonard Peikoff at one point responded to that with:

"Even if it were true that owing to a lack of information we could never exactly predict a subatomic event- and this is highly debatable- it would not show that, in reality, the event was causeless."

 

It must be asked: what could possibly show that something in reality is causeless?

---

 

We have evidence of things which do not behave predictably according to our average, commonsensical ideas about them.  Whenever we find such things which simply do not seem to behave, we can conclude either that such irregularities stem from our own ignorance, or that they are hardwired into that entity's actual behavior, in reality.

 

In short, when something seems random, we can attribute that to a lapse of causality itself or a lapse in our knowledge of it.

 

My question, which sounds infernally simple, is which should be used.

Harrison,

 

The equation is both simple and clear:

 

On the left side, the normal calculus of time-position is modified by probability. or 'd'.

On the right side comes the h-slash divided by two, because the distance of a wave is double the energy.

 

H-slash is the Planck #, or the energy of a single photon.

 

The interpretations are many, including the metaphysic that the improbable behavior of quanta somehow says something about the certainties of our plain, old Newtonian world. 

 

Several more interpretations allow for the velocity of particles to vastly exceed the speed of light, as well as the measurement of particles down to the h-slash level. These two have been historically important within physics.

 

In any case, none of this has anything to do with the limits to our perception. Rather, the issue is the natural impossibility  to observe the movement of a photon with another, as the act of observation will alter the trajectory of the observed.

 

As far as as our hard-wiring goes, yes, this is pure Kant. What we know is limited by our sensory capacities. On the positive side, our innate ability to generate maths makes scientific measurement possible.

 

Andie

Edited by andie holland
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Truth is propositional; whether a certain arrangement of concepts corresponds to the actual arrangement of their referents, in reality.

"There was a naval battle, yesterday" is a proposition which is either true or false, depending on the actual arrangement of its referents (in this case, the actions of certain things in the past).

"There will be a naval battle, tomorrow" is another proposition which is either true or false, depending on the actual arrangement of its referents- assuming that there are future referents.

 

If that statement is either true or false then the future is real in the same sense that the past is, which contradicts libertarian volition.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_future_contingents

 

Let's assume this is false, as Aristotle did (according to Wikipedia); that nothing is either 'true' or 'false' until it happens; that "there will be a naval battle" is something hanging in epistemological limbo.  The same would then hold for statements like "the sun will rise," "gravity will exist" or "food will not be poison," which leads us directly to Hume's causality, which leaves no possibility of human survival if applied consistently.  However, if we restrict that epistemological limbo to exclusively human actions then we become capable of reasoning about the future of almost all entities; we also arrive at Rand's distinction between the metaphysical and the manmade.

This means that "food will not be poison" has some future referent, but "I will not murder you in your sleep" has none; it is neither true nor false.

 

"I will honor my contract" is neither true nor false, regardless of who says it (nor can it be more or less likely to be true or false); it simply cannot be evaluated, period.  Neither can the statement "I will do C after B after A" be evaluated, within your own mind; that would be a declaration of knowledge about your own future; no plan of any sort has epistemological weight, even to the planner himself.

 

Without the ability to plan (and to weigh alternative plans)* you cannot live.

---

 

Indeterminacy is wrong (in every form and variety) because it contradicts the law of identity.

When we say that "food nourishes" we mean that it has, does and will nourish us; that our knowledge of its past nature dictates something real about its future.  To be is to continue being.

 

*

 

In any choice you make, you could have chosen otherwise- IF you had conceived of that choice differently.  This is a true counterfactual; a statement about what would have been the case, if something else was different from reality.  The statement "if food did not nourish" is a perfectly valid and coherent thing to express, and of great cognitive value because of the fact that food has always and will always nourish.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world

 

Everything that is, is necessary.  That means that everything which will be, is necessary.

 

A contingent fact is a contradiction.

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
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Truth is propositional; whether a certain arrangement of concepts corresponds to the actual arrangement of their referents, in reality.

"There was a naval battle, yesterday" is a proposition which is either true or false, depending on the actual arrangement of its referents (in this case, the actions of certain things in the past).

"There will be a naval battle, tomorrow" is another proposition which is either true or false, depending on the actual arrangement of its referents- assuming that there are future referents.

 

If that statement is either true or false then the future is real in the same sense that the past is, which contradicts libertarian volition.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_future_contingents

 

Let's assume this is false, as Aristotle did (according to Wikipedia); that nothing is either 'true' or 'false' until it happens; that "there will be a naval battle" is something hanging in epistemological limbo.  The same would then hold for statements like "the sun will rise," "gravity will exist" or "food will not be poison," which leads us directly to Hume's causality, which leaves no possibility of human survival if applied consistently.  However, if we restrict that epistemological limbo to exclusively human actions then we become capable of reasoning about the future of almost all entities; we also arrive at Rand's distinction between the metaphysical and the manmade.

This means that "food will not be poison" has some future referent, but "I will not murder you in your sleep" has none; it is neither true nor false.

 

"I will honor my contract" is neither true nor false, regardless of who says it (nor can it be more or less likely to be true or false); it simply cannot be evaluated, period.  Neither can the statement "I will do C after B after A" be evaluated, within your own mind; that would be a declaration of knowledge about your own future; no plan of any sort has epistemological weight, even to the planner himself.

 

Without the ability to plan (and to weigh alternative plans)* you cannot live.

---

 

Indeterminacy is wrong (in every form and variety) because it contradicts the law of identity.

When we say that "food nourishes" we mean that it has, does and will nourish us; that our knowledge of its past nature dictates something real about its future.  To be is to continue being.

 

*

 

In any choice you make, you could have chosen otherwise- IF you had conceived of that choice differently.  This is a true counterfactual; a statement about what would have been the case, if something else was different from reality.  The statement "if food did not nourish" is a perfectly valid and coherent thing to express, and of great cognitive value because of the fact that food has always and will always nourish.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_world

 

Everything that is, is necessary.  That means that everything which will be, is necessary. 

 

A contingent fact is a contradiction.

Yes, quantum mechanics contradicts the law of identity. In this respect, perhaps I might refer you to 'Bell's inequality'  and the refutation by Aspect's experiments. If you read up on it and have questions,. i'll be happy to explain.

 

Otherwise, Physics seems to be happy living in the Newtonian world of necessity for objects said to be larger than 'elementary'. 

 

Andie

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There are interpretations of QM which do not contradict the law of identify, essentially claim it is a theory which only predicts outcomes and does not describe things at every moment in time ... of course this leaves our description of the world lacking.

When, around 1927,  Born reformulated the Heisenberg equation into canonical math, the lack of identity became fairly clear to anyone with even a basic knowledge of math. Fundamentally, it reads that not only is xy NOT equal to yx, but varies with h, or the Planck coefficient. This was even written on his tombstone!

 

In other words, quantum measurements are not commutative, rather depending upon the order of observation. Yet I suppose that one could make an argument that quantum A is A because of our inherent inability to factor out the process of observation.

 

Nancy Cartwright is the go-to in Philo-Sci who contends that we only measure capacities by virtue of predicting successful outcomes in our experiments. Indeed, for her a 'complete' science would involve the yet-discovered 'how's of phase transitions. 

 

Andie

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QM is identification up to the point of ignorance.  At the point of ignorance, some interpretations of it violate the law of identity.

 

 

When a QM physicist says a physical system in state |Q> = a|q1> + b|q2>  he is stating THE state it is in.   It is a single state ... and although expressed in terms of probabilities of out come (statistically speaking)... the system is claimed to be a single state.  It is what it is.  Not what it is not.

 

The measurement may turn out to be q1 or q2 with probabilities depending upon how the system is measured but the system is not in state q1 or q2 before hand, that would be something different, it is in state |Q>.

 

|Q> identifies a state up to a point of ignorance about whether q1 or q2 will be measured... and until q1 or q2 are measured we cannot (currently cannot) say anything about which will be measured, and until there is a measurement/interaction/interference the thing is and will remain in state |Q>. 

 

Now someone can  see |Q> as logically implying or logically necessitating that (because we don't know whether q1 or q2 will be measured) Q is somehow indefinite or lacking identity.  But that ignores what |Q> means and that it is what it is, a statement about potential outcomes IF measured.

 

Now if you ask well what about the q1-ness or q2-ness of |Q> BEFORE it is measured... on some level this question is meaningless and unfair, it poses problems because it asks something of |Q> which is not literally IN Q, q1 and q2 are only possible OUTCOMES of doing something to |Q>.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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 Yet I suppose that one could make an argument that quantum A is A because of our inherent inability to factor out the process of observation.

Is this "inability" a bad thing?  How would things be different if we could "factor out the process of observation"?  What would this change?

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Is this "inability" a bad thing?  How would things be different if we could "factor out the process of observation"?  What would this change?

Bohr's 'Copenhagen solution' (answer to Einstein) states that QM would not exist without the participation of the unit of measure, hence the observer.

 

Again, thisis suggestively confirmed by aspects' experiments. Either there's 'communication' between particles at ad infinititm distances or the observer is the ultimate distance itself.

 

There is no locality.

 

Andie

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