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Identical situations create identical outcomes?

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Kjetil

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"What he means is that the human actor was empowered in the moment of decision, and given the singular input to produce from among more than one possible outputs."

I really don't think he meant that.

Then on this score, we are at a temporary impasse, for this is certainly what Peikoff means in both of the quotes I've provided, and it is a view consonant with the Objectivist position on volition.

 

"However, if you give a human being 3, you may get back 7... or you may get back some other number."

Okay, so how? Besides appealing to "because free will means you can".

I can explain how volition functions as well as I can explain how consciousness functions -- which is to say, I can not explain it. Neither can I explain how it arises. I only know that it exists and that I experience it. I trust you do as well.

Here's a portion of Rand's "The Metaphysical and the Man-Made" which I find interesting, and relevant to this conversation:

 

The attribute of volition does not contradict the fact of identity, just as the existence of living organisms does not contradict the existence of inanimate matter. Living organisms possess the power of self-initiated motion, which inanimate matter does not possess; man’s consciousness possesses the power of self-initiated motion in the realm of cognition (thinking), which the consciousnesses of other living species do not possess.

Rand draws a distinction between "man's consciousness" and that of "other living species," which she calls "[t]he attribute of volition." What is this attribute? She holds it to be "the power of self-initiated motion in the realm of cognition." What does she mean by "self-initiated"? What is that opposed to?

From the same essay, drawing the titular distinction:

 

Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different.

Why does she say that there's (apparently) a difference between "the metaphysically given" -- that which could not have occurred differently -- and "the man-made," which could? What does that mean? Couldn't anything have been different, per your view, given a different initial context? So what's the distinction that Rand seeks to draw between these two categories? What does she find exceptional about "human action," as opposed to everything else?

Eiuol, by your arguments, there is no difference between the metaphysical and the man-made, save that you cite man's process of converting inputs into an output as being more complicated than that of a computer program or a domino. You argue for a difference of degree (of complexity). Rand argues for a difference of kind.

 

Free will is real, but I don't think it entails you really might get some other answer by virtue of will alone as its own mental power with primacy over the mechanisms that allow you to calculate an answer.

So if "free will" is real, and if people possess it, what do you think it allows us to do?

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So... there's a 20% chance you'll eat Italian and you won't know why, and in principle there isn't even an automatized reason? I mean, maybe it'll be a silly or strange reason, which is still a reason. But are you suggesting that all things being equal there are cases where you'll have no reason you know of to pick either?

 

I'll address this when I have more time.  I think your distinction between could and would is interesting... because I do not necessarily believe EVERY decision probabilistic.  Like the photon in a particular context (and I am not literally comparing people with photons) some decisions given a particular context and identity, will always be the same.  I see no reason why this is not the case.  Some decision, I have no probability of making.  For example given the present situation of the universe running through my office window to my death.  The present situation does not contain a "free will" of mine which possesses differing probabilities for doing that and deciding to live. The probability of choosing to kill myself spontaneously that way is 0.  This does not imply determinism only that identity in this context gives rise to single valued causation.(which is really only a subset of multivalued causation where the number of outcomes is simply one)... more later, but I think some of this is akin to what you are saying but I do not go so far as to embrace all encompassing (each and every interaction/causation) determinism.

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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Then on this score, we are at a temporary impasse, for this is certainly what Peikoff means in both of the quotes I've provided, and it is a view consonant with the Objectivist position on volition.

Your interpretation is more specific than what the quote says. The quote doesn't make or work out any questions of decision-making procedures, it only points out a metaphysical possibility to choose among options. Whether a person really would bother picking another option is an open question. If your reasons to do X is {R} reasons, then only a change of context would change {R}. It's not about the usual determinist questions where only context leads to X without a causal mental state in between. This mental state part opens up to the man-made/metaphysical distinction, as the metaphysical is not brought about by mental states ("any event which occurs without human participation").

By asking "how" you'd be able to give back some number other than 7, I'm not asking about the neuroscience or anything. From your day-to-day experience, what process do you use to make decisions about what type of salad to get for lunch? If you go back to the same place tomorrow, what will make you want to order a different salad? Yes, there is a choice, a possibility, to do otherwise! But once you develop your reasons, it's pretty much set in stone. If you're still developing reasons, then it's not set in stone as "decided". It's not like a domino takes time to calculate how to fall - it just falls without needing to develop anything. The development of reasons is human participation!

It takes conceptual consciousness to develop reasons, and even animals have reasons of some kind (in the sense a dog barks because he sees the mailman). Perception is probably the different of kind you are asking me for between computer programs and humans.

I think I answered what I think free will allows us to do in the second paragraph.

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The development of reasons is human participation!

Yes, and tipping over in the wind is domino participation, yet we don't talk about "the metaphysical and the domino-made."

So what is it about "human participation" that you think is distinctive from all other forms of causality? What is this distinction, such as Rand recognized and argued for, between the metaphysical and the man-made? Or do you believe that there is any such distinction?

I'm not alone asking as to what is the criteria for distinguishing them (edited to add: e.g., that there are mental states, or that this involves "the development of reasons"), but what is the purpose? What is it about human action that is distinctive? What is it about human action that you believe demands to be treated differently from the metaphysically given (i.e. moral evaluation)?

Edited by DonAthos
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But it is true of all things that, given a different context, different results would follow, and it collapses any sensible distinction between "the metaphysical and the man-made."

Yes and no.

No, I think that one's own actions are still worth morally evaluating because they stemmed from the same- mental circumstances, if you will- that are still driving one's present choices.

Suppose a hard-line determinist does something stupid. Looking at the situation in retrospect, they can identify their actions as damaging to themselves; they feel shame, which they will remember the next time they find themselves in that situation (perhaps preventing them from repeating such decisions).

If they were fated to make that evaluation and subsequently learn that lesson, the evaluation would still be a necessary part of the learning.

But yes, it does obliterate any reason to distinguish OTHER peoples' actions from metaphysical events. Perhaps that's not a bad thing.

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Suppose a hard-line determinist does something stupid. Looking at the situation in retrospect, they can identify their actions as damaging to themselves; they feel shame, which they will remember the next time they find themselves in that situation (perhaps preventing them from repeating such decisions).

I don't mean to be flippant -- I'm asking this sincerely -- but why should a hard-line determinist feel shame for having done something he had no choice but to do?

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And if he was powerless to do anything other than rob the store, then upon what grounds would we hold him morally responsible for this "decision" (which I hold cannot truly be a decision in any meaningful sense)?

We don't; at least not in the usual sense.

Just as I judge my own actions morally, in order to learn from them (regardless of whether it was metaphysically possible to act otherwise, or not), I may also judge his actions by way of introspective analogy- in passing. I would not bother to proclaim moral judgment unless I considered it both possible and worthwhile to help him learn by giving him something to reflect on.

Politically, we wouldn't hold people 'innocent' or 'guilty' as we tend to think of them now. This does not mean that there could not BE any politics, though, because a criminal is a danger regardless of our moral appraisal of them.

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We don't; at least not in the usual sense.

Just as I judge my own actions morally, in order to learn from them (regardless of whether it was metaphysically possible to act otherwise, or not), I may also judge his actions by way of introspective analogy- in passing. I would not bother to proclaim moral judgment unless I considered it both possible and worthwhile to help him learn by giving him something to reflect on.

Politically, we wouldn't hold people 'innocent' or 'guilty' as we tend to think of them now. This does not mean that there could not BE any politics, though, because a criminal is a danger regardless of our moral appraisal of them.

We will continue to disagree on the question of volition -- for now, at least -- but I respect that you do not shy from the label of determinism, and that you are honest in working out the consequences of such a view in other areas.

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As for 3, that is sheer nonsense. "No action is determined by anything" is ridiculously chaotic. There would be no recognizable universe; we would exist in the Wonderland of Kant's Noumenal world. It WOULD literally mean an electron could turn into Hegel or Hume and then into a Ducati Superbike. . .

. . .

Now observe even if only one kind of particle or system behaved in a non-deterministic fashion, all the future being a complex result of a complicated web of interactions would not ever be "the same way twice".

My thoughts, exactly.

I really have nothing to add to nor rebut about those statements; that's part of what I've been trying to convey. Thank you.

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
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I'm not alone asking as to what is the criteria for distinguishing them (edited to add: e.g., that there are mental states, or that this involves "the development of reasons"), but what is the purpose? What is it about human action that is distinctive? What is it about human action that you believe demands to be treated differently from the metaphysically given (i.e. moral evaluation)?

Mental states for animals/humans. Creativity and conceptual consciousness for humans uniquely. I don't see how this is different than an explanation of purpose... I'm not rejecting free will, I asked you questions to make it clearer.

You still didn't answer what I said about picking salad, picking numbers, etc. I asked SL the same type of questions at the start about painting. And when he did get to it, he said that he may make some decisions for literally no reason at all, i.e. probability. I reject that -any- decisions are by probability alone. To say probability exists at a metaphysical level and maintain it is identity makes no sense to me - if it made sense, I could say "the identity of A is not A 20% of the time"; "the identity of my reasoning procedure is that there is no reasoning procedure 20% of the time". To make it sensible, I'd have to say "sometimes, I act arbitrarily, and there's no way to say how the decision was made". If so, then I will never know if I am controlling anything! In which case, yes, a repeated situation is never going to end up the same way. Do you agree or disagree with SL?

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I think where you think there is inconsistency in 2 is not in that some things behave one way and others behave in other ways, but in that you perceive a certain arbitrary distinction (rather than empirical) division between the some things.. from the other things... the particular one chosen perhaps by Binswanger.

Sort of.

Ultimately, I think that every fact should square nicely with every other fact. I mean in a noncontradictory way, obviously, but also something more than that. The belief that there can ultimately be only one kind of 'thing' is close to what I mean but that's not exactly it, either.

I'm sorry, I don't know quite how to name or define it yet; I'll try to elaborate as I'm able.

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Mental states for animals/humans. Creativity and conceptual consciousness for humans uniquely. I don't see how this is different than an explanation of purpose...

I am not satisfied that this answers my question. Perhaps you don't yet understand my question? (Or perhaps I do not yet understand your answer. :) )

We can agree that different things are different. That animals and humans have "mental states" and perhaps that only humans are "creative" or have this "conceptual consciousness."

But so what?

What is it about a "conceptual consciousness," or human action more generally speaking, which inspired Rand to write an essay for the purpose of identifying a fundamental difference between "the metaphysical" and the "man-made"? Why is the human mode of action -- the human expression of causality -- distinguished from everything else?

Specifically, I'd like you to address this quote from that essay:

 

Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different.

Rand here does not mean that things "could have been different" given a different initial context; for that is equally true for "any event which occurs without human participation," and thus does not speak to the distinction she is drawing.

So what exactly do you understand her to be saying in that quote?

 

I'm not rejecting free will, I asked you questions to make it clearer.

You still didn't answer what I said about picking salad, picking numbers, etc.

You'd like to know how I pick a salad to eat? I take what data I have and I make a decision on that basis (the relevant data often including cost, expected flavor, nutritional value, the extent of my hunger, and so forth). Supposing two salads, each which have some group of "reasons" why I might order either one, I pick between them. It is the act of decision, itself, which motivates my action, and which makes one group of reasons (or singular reason) have motive power, as opposed to the others. This is true regardless of my decision.

If you'd like to know what's under the hood, I don't know that I have a lot to say on that score. I know that Rand argued that volition is ultimately down to a fundamental choice of focus -- but it's beyond my introspective power to speak to that matter with any confidence. I have had the experience before of mulling over menu options and picking one out, and I expect you have, too. I don't expect that our experiences in salad ordering have been very dissimilar.

 

I asked SL the same type of questions at the start about painting. And when he did get to it, he said that he may make some decisions for literally no reason at all, i.e. probability. I reject that -any- decisions are by probability alone. To say probability exists at a metaphysical level and maintain it is identity makes no sense to me - if it made sense, I could say "the identity of A is not A 20% of the time"; "the identity of my reasoning procedure is that there is no reasoning procedure 20% of the time". To make it sensible, I'd have to say "sometimes, I act arbitrarily, and there's no way to say how the decision was made". If so, then I will never know if I am controlling anything! In which case, yes, a repeated situation is never going to end up the same way. Do you agree or disagree with SL?

I can only speak for myself, and as I've stated a couple of times now, I can't explain to you how volition works, just as I can't explain how we've come to have a conscious experience of the universe, or even how life itself has come from non-life (though I've heard that scientists are close on that count, or maybe that they have solved it).

I also don't understand SL's contention well enough to say whether I agree or disagree, strictly, but I don't think that I make my choices based on what I understand about "probability," and I don't see that there's a direct relationship between quantum mechanics and free will, if that speaks to the issue.

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I don't mean to be flippant -- I'm asking this sincerely -- but why should a hard-line determinist feel shame for having done something he had no choice but to do?

Whether he could literally have done otherwise or not, the events in question could not have occurred without him. He caused them. Even if we're using "cause" in the same sense that the falling of one domino "causes" another to fall, and nothing more, he is the cause of his own actions.

Unless we're discussing a Hegelian or Marxist sort of determinist, of course (which I really should've specified), in which case he wouldn't evaluate any of his own actions at all; that's the entire purpose behind those varieties of determinism.

That's what I think of as "free will".

Regardless of whether it's remotely comparable to Rand's concept of it or not, though, I think it does in the very least provide a similar basis for morality.

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Rand here does not mean that things "could have been different" given a different initial context; for that is equally true for "any event which occurs without human participation," and thus does not speak to the distinction she is drawing.

Well, no, a falling domino, in the context here, cannot have been different. Not in this context. Rand's essay wasn't about metaphysical possibility, but decisions/thinking/reasoning where there are options. Dominoes don't have options. I mean, you are already granting that a domino falling could have been otherwise! But I didn't bother with that since we're discussing decision-making where some events fail to occur. The word "could" is imprecise as it is and not what the essay was about. It's not about that word. The essay itself, as I recall, doesn't even get into procedures of reasoning, or whether all actions have reasons, or if some actions are only probabilistic. Really, it's a simple point of acknowledging and maintaining that reasoning allows for different results than the given: creativity.

Recently, I read a book on Buddhist thought. Some Buddhists, or at least the Dalai Lama, take causality as true and on the broadest level, all things are that way. Then there's finer distinction. One was what SL describes as mechanistic causality,  another was "karmic causality" where mental states of sentient beings affect the progress of the universe so to speak, a non-mystical take on karma. Both are types of causality and don't operate on unique planes of identity. Mental states make for depth on a level that is incommensurable to rocks, but is causal as a rock. Creativity is deeper still.

"It is the act of decision, itself, which motivates my action, and which makes one group of reasons (or singular reason) have motive power, as opposed to the others."

To me, this is all I'm saying. What motivates you to make a decision? One group of reasons! Also, it's active, not a passive reaction. Picking a salad is like that. If your reason was "it's a salad that starts with M", and the rest didn't, well, you'd pick that salad into eternity. Unless, as SL said, sometimes you pick arbitrarily without any reasons.  

For what it's worth, I can't answer any better now about what creativity is. But it's why I am pursuing a PhD in psychology. How, both in philosophical terms and psychology, does creativity happen? I'm still working on an answer philosophically.

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The word "could" is imprecise as it is and not what the essay was about.

I strongly agree with the gist of your argument. In fact, when Don and I initially started discussing this, I also insisted (along very similar lines) that my beliefs didn't constitute 'determinism'. While I've since realized that the term is perfectly applicable, in its technical sense (that only one course of action is metaphysically possible), its connotations still don't feel appropriate.

But since the "Metaphysical versus the Manmade" is about necessity and contingency, doesn't that make it about exactly what we mean by "could"?

I personally consider that essay to be Rand's single largest error because it splits an otherwise flawless metaphysics into two compartments, which function according to two contradictory forms of causality.

Regardless of its ultimate validity or value, though, can we all at least agree that it's relevant?

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
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Sometimes philosophical discussion (as well as scientific and mathematical discussion) as you know turn to "hypotheticals". 

 

In this way we can think about things such as:

 

What IF Mount St. Helen's HAD erupted with twice the power, or what IF the distribution of matter and antimatter in the early universe WERE different... etc.

 

I think we all understand your point that literally no two different things (in space and/or time) can be in "identical situations".  The discussion however is a hypothetical one which in fact does deal with the core issue of determinism, free will, and whether "God could play with dice"... 

 

 

It's like you are replying... "but Mount St. Helen's DIDN'T erupt with twice the power".... or "but the distribution of matter and antimatter in the early universe could not be different from what it was"... yes we get it.  But for the purpose of discussion and especially to investigate the issues which were intended to be addressed by the OP (in my opinion), we are indulging in the "what if?"

 

"Identical situations" is a hypothetical and should not be interpreted to mean literally "different identical situations" which is a contradiction. 

 

The plural implies "hypothetical analysis".

 

So "what if" the universe could be rewound to a particular situation and replayed, perhaps over and over, would everything proceed as exactly as before, with exactly the same outcomes always?... i.e. determinism, or would some people do different things (volition) or some photons after interfering with itself hit the screen "here" instead of "there" (probabilistic causation - QM).

 

 

Surely you are not purporting to claim that "hypothesizing" is outside of the realm of valid cognition or discussion?

I'm officially in wonderment at your ability to seriously argue that the plural form of a noun should be interpreted as something other than a reference to multiple units.

And, if I knew a word that's stronger than wonderment, I'd use it to describe how I feel about your ability to turn it all back on me, and accuse me of being opposed to hypotheticals based on my assertion that plural means two or more units.

Edited by Nicky
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I don't mean to be flippant -- I'm asking this sincerely -- but why should a hard-line determinist feel shame for having done something he had no choice but to do?

 

I think I can call myself a determinist as well (I have not zeroed in on it because of QM considerations, which I have to study more thoroughly before coming to conclusions). The way I think of it, you cannot change what happens in the future. However, you still have a choice in what you can do in the present. Choice does not violate the fact that the future cannot be changed. Choice is the nature/ the identity that determines the future. All determinism means is that you do not have a choice whether your choices (i.e., your identity) will affect the future. I.e., you do not have a choice to change your nature.

 

Determinism still requires that you were the agent that resulted in your action (i.e., it was your unchangeable nature that resulted in an unchangeable future), and being the agent, you are responsible for your actions. In other words, you could have done anything as per your nature requires, but your nature itself is unchangable (i.e., you would always have chosen the same). The role of choice is to determine the future, not change it. Even though you cannot change your future, it is still your choice that determined your future. Choice determines the actual future out of the various conceivable futures.

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I'm officially in wonderment at your ability to seriously argue that the plural form of a noun should be interpreted as something other than a reference to multiple units.

And, if I knew a word that's stronger than wonderment, I'd use it to describe how I feel about your ability to turn it all back on me, and accuse me of being opposed to hypotheticals based on my assertion that plural means two or more units.

 

Really.

 

The context of the OP is a statement about identical situations... with the point being an investigation into "creativity".  do you really think the poster meant to imply that identical situationS plural... across space and/or time introduces some kind of problem for the concept of CREATIVITY?   Really?

 

and you really believe that a discussion about "free will", whether someone's choices for say.. an art work or a poem ... i.e. creativity... is deterministic or not i.e. same outcomes... given the same "identical situations" (hypothetically if we could turn back time to when the creative process began)... is really missing the mark.. when it comes to the OP?

 

Really?

 

I'm not turning anything on anyone.  I think we quite simply disagree as to what the point of the discussion is.

 

 

"Identical situations" as a plural, is a nonsensical contradiction and irrelevant to the issue of creativity... am I wrong?  I am being flexible in the interpretation as a courtesy to the poster and his original point of discussion... 

 

Just say yes if I am wrong .. no need to get personal... but I will expect reasons.

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And, if I knew a word that's stronger than wonderment, I'd use it to describe how I feel about your ability to turn it all back on me, and accuse me of being opposed to hypotheticals based on my assertion that plural means two or more units.

To say "identical situations" is only to suppose returning to a same situation as if it were time travel. So it does seem like you're only opposed to it being a hypothetical. It's easy enough to say that they couldn't be different situations, as in only one thing would ever happen into eternity if you kept repeating the hypothetical.

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I'd like to get a 1 million foot integrated view from a few of you people, both determinists and non-determinists. 

 

 

Let me start with the labels for the errors of which we are all familiar with, without going into the explanation:  we all know about the errors of:

 

possibility, probability, certainty

rationalism

requirement for omnipotent "proof", mystic revelation

mysticism

denial of induction

denial of the senses, false definition of "direct perception" etc.

skepticism

 

We all know that it takes a contextual, comprehensive integrated view of all of your knowledge to properly assess and reason why these are mistakes.

 

 

We can conclude of some of the following:

 

an arbitrary claim is incoherent and forms no part of cognition

agnosticism as to the nonexistence of God or the devil is an error

to deny the senses is insanity, etc

 

Given all the above sorts of all encompassing philosophical issues requiring the WIDEST kinds of integration.

 

 

With the totality of all your knowledge about reality as it is, material, biological, psychological, your choices, your life, photons and billiard balls, joy and pain, all of it...  which of the following is MOST consistent with all of it (the way you can honestly say "there is no God", "senses are valid" etc.are the most consistent with the totality of your knowledge):

 

a) Free will DOES exist, the universe does not obey determinism

B) Free will DOES NOT exist, the universe obeys determinism

c) From all of the evidence one MUST BE AGNOSTIC as to whether will is actually free and as to whether the universe is deterministic or not.

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I look at your first collection of errors and have to ask, which of these does not belong.

Unless I'm missing something in the rest of your post, possibility, probability, certainty are the stages in the process of achieving certainty. during the integration of the evidence available, into the context of the rest of your knowledge.

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I think I can call myself a determinist as well (I have not zeroed in on it because of QM considerations, which I have to study more thoroughly before coming to conclusions). The way I think of it, you cannot change what happens in the future. However, you still have a choice in what you can do in the present. Choice does not violate the fact that the future cannot be changed. Choice is the nature/ the identity that determines the future. All determinism means is that you do not have a choice whether your choices (i.e., your identity) will affect the future. I.e., you do not have a choice to change your nature.

 

Determinism still requires that you were the agent that resulted in your action (i.e., it was your unchangeable nature that resulted in an unchangeable future), and being the agent, you are responsible for your actions. In other words, you could have done anything as per your nature requires, but your nature itself is unchangable (i.e., you would always have chosen the same). The role of choice is to determine the future, not change it. Even though you cannot change your future, it is still your choice that determined your future. Choice determines the actual future out of the various conceivable futures.

I think that the determinists in this thread all make a similar argument. There are a few things I have to say in response:

#1) I believe that this is an abuse of the word "choice." That if I can only "choose" to do one thing -- that it is metaphysically possible to only select one thing among "alternatives," per my unchangeable nature (as you would have it) -- and if the future, which includes the sum of my choices, is unalterable, is set, is already determined, then this is no "choice" at all.

Or it is the very same "choice" that a domino has to tip in the wind.

And before moving on from this point, let me say that I understand the objection that a domino doesn't have a "choice" in the same way, because "choice" is here used to describe a particular process that only belongs to people, whereby they use reasons and so forth (which does not change the determined outcome of this process, by this argument), but to that I can only say that this misrepresents what everyone else means by choice, including Rand, Peikoff, etc. "Choice" is not merely the description of a process, and it certainly is not the description of a determined process; it refers to the exact opposite of a determined process. It is the recognition that at the moment of decision, the future could literally, metaphysically proceed in (at least) two different directions -- and that we have the power to select from among them.

By the way "choice" is used above, and I believe generally by those who argue for determinism, they might as well say "we have no such thing as choice or free will or volition; the future is set in stone," which would mean the very same thing, but with greater clarity and semantic/syntatic agreement with the usage of the vast majority of humanity, along with Rand, et al.

#2) "I.e., you do not have a choice to change your nature."

If it were still a question in anyone's mind as to whether Rand's position is, itself, determinist or otherwise, it might be helpful to compare this conclusion to Rand's appraisal, which (if I remember correctly), was that man has a "self-made soul."

Given the determinism argued for above (and elsewhere in this thread), then what is any man's opportunity to be better, to do better? He has none. He is just along for the ride.

This position is not only incompatible with Objectivism, per the letter of Rand's essay on the metaphysical and man-made (though to be very clear, it is precisely the opposite in intention to that essay)... but it is incompatible with the entire character of Objectivism, which is the idea that we may make better choices, and thereby embrace a better nature, which gives us a better future.

The determinist position ultimately must erode all of that. No choices. Set nature. Determined future.

#3) "Determinism still requires that you were the agent that resulted in your action (i.e., it was your unchangeable nature that resulted in an unchangeable future), and being the agent, you are responsible for your actions."

Yes, but a hurricane is equally responsible for the destruction it causes, in this very same sense. This remakes all people (as determinism ultimately must) into forces of nature.

And begging your pardon, but if I come to regard myself as having an unchangeable nature which results in an unchangeable future, then, no, I refuse to feel guilt or shame or sorrow or anything else, even for the greatest of my misdeeds (neither, if I am being honest, can I take pride in my accomplishments). I am not going to blame myself for doing that which I had no opportunity to avoid doing, and I won't be held accountable by others on that same score. If I am to be a hurricane, of my unchangeable nature, I won't be ashamed of it.

The implications of determinism for morality... I think they are incalculable, except to say that I think they are "not good."

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And before moving on from this point, let me say that I understand the objection that a domino doesn't have a "choice" in the same way, because "choice" is here used to describe a particular process that only belongs to people, whereby they use reasons and so forth (which does not change the determined outcome of this process, by this argument), but to that I can only say that this misrepresents what everyone else means by choice, including Rand, Peikoff, etc. "Choice" is not merely the description of a process, and it certainly is not the description of a determined process; it refers to the exact opposite of a determined process. It is the recognition that at the moment of decision, the future could literally, metaphysically proceed in (at least) two different directions -- and that we have the power to select from among them.

Well, all I've really said is "would you change your mind if you managed to repeat that moment?" I say no. That hardly is determinism.

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I look at your first collection of errors and have to ask, which of these does not belong.

Unless I'm missing something in the rest of your post, possibility, probability, certainty are the stages in the process of achieving certainty. during the integration of the evidence available, into the context of the rest of your knowledge.

 

I meant only to remind the reader of the common errors regarding, possibility, probability, and certainty... not that these concepts themselves are errors.  I can see now that I was a bit misleading in the way in which these were placed/presented in the list.

 

It's possible an all powerful demon made me do it....  :)  (not!)

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Well, all I've really said is "would you change your mind if you managed to repeat that moment?" I say no. That hardly is determinism.

Therefore if we managed to time warp the entire world back five years, I expect you'd say that every single person would do exactly the same things -- leading up to this moment, and the exact words I'm "choosing" to construct this very sentence. Thus, if five years ago someone had said, "Everything that will be five years from now is already determined, and no one has the power to change it," I guess we'd have to say that this was basically correct.

And standing here, now, looking ahead five years into the future -- though none of us can predict what it will be -- we must, by this same rationale, say that there is one particular path ahead, and no individual has the power to deviate from that path. Just as galaxies form and dissolve mechanistically, or dominoes are struck and fall, so too are the "choices" of men.

That hardly is determinism.

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