Certainty as the Foundation for Knowledge

[William O]

I have always leaned towards Peikoff's view that probabilities have to be grounded in certainties, but that was only based on intuition, and I could never quite concretize it to my satisfaction. However, I recently realized that I am well acquainted with a perfect example of Peikoff's point: modern academic philosophy.

 

If you take a class in philosophy in most universities, you will be presented with an array of mutually exclusive theories and a baffling list of arguments for and against each of them. Each of these theories is presented as "plausible" or "having some evidence in its favor," but no theory is ever presented as certain. The overall tone of a typical philosophy class is "maybe A is true, and maybe B is true, and maybe C is true, but who knows?"

 

Peikoff's principle cuts all of this down by pointing out that if no theory in philosophy is certain, we have no idea what even counts for or against any philosophical theory, because we have nothing to compare them to. We could compare them to other theories that are uncertain, but then we would have no way of ruling out the possibility that both theories being compared are completely wrong. We cannot even compute the probability of both theories being wrong to delimit our doubts, because we have nothing certain to compare them to.

 

Something similar happens in science, when scientists compare theories that are under scrutiny with well established theories like Newton's laws or the theory of evolution. They basically say, "the theories that have been established so far have tended to be testable and based on observational evidence (and so on), so those qualities are virtues in a theory in our field and their absence from a theory in our field is a vice." In the absence of established theories, there could be no criteria for judgment.

 

Edit: Upon rereading my post I realized that it could be taken to imply that I think that there is no certainty in philosophy. That is not what I was saying. Rather, my point was that academic philosophy's insistence that no theory in philosophy is certain is internally inconsistent, so they should adopt a specific philosophy as certain, like Ayn Rand's philosophy. Indeed, I think that many tenets of Ayn Rand's philosophy qualify as certain.

Edited November 17, 2014 by William O

[dream_weaver]

I think you're barking up the right tree here.

 

Before one can discover they are wrong about a particular, it needs to be distinguished from being right. In this sense, grasping wrong presupposes right. Uncertainty presupposes certainty in knowledge.

 

In science, the distinctions of hypothesis and theory are such that theory has passed the tests of observational (or perceptual) evidence and evidence that has validly been inferred (or abstracted) from the same, while hypothesis is a state where this has yet to take place. Newton provided his evidence to substantiate his conclusion. To convert a hypothesis into theory, the same process needs to transpire. In this sense, the evidence Newton provided was the virtue that moved his notion of gravitation from disparate observations, to an integrated or interconnected whole, as he presented it. A hypothesis lacks this crucial aspect.

[Devil's Advocate]

Buddha addressed uncertainty when questioned, "Fixed in their own pet beliefs, these diverse wranglers bawl, 'Hold to this and truth is yours, reject it and you're lost'. Thus they contend and dub opponents 'fools' and 'stupid dolts'.  Which of the lot is right when all as experts pose?"  I don't have the actual text in front of me, but the gist of his response was...

1) If a diversity of opinion implies wrongness, then everthing is wrong because each view is diverse, or
2) if all opinions seem plausible, then everything is correct because nothing seems implausible.
3) (he concludes) Truth is not supported by claiming your opponent is ignorant based solely on having a diverse opinion.

 

I agree with dream_weaver that "uncertainty presupposes certainty in knowledge."  A diversity of opinion is useful in that regard primarily as encouragement to keep looking for certainty, rather than drawing the conclusion that certainty isn't possible due to a diversity of opinion.  I'm curious to know which "tenets of Ayn Rand's philosophy qualify as certain" in your opinion, and if you consider them unique to Objectivism.

[William O]

Buddha addressed uncertainty when questioned, "Fixed in their own pet beliefs, these diverse wranglers bawl, 'Hold to this and truth is yours, reject it and you're lost'. Thus they contend and dub opponents 'fools' and 'stupid dolts'.  Which of the lot is right when all as experts pose?"  I don't have the actual text in front of me, but the gist of his response was...

1) If a diversity of opinion implies wrongness, then everthing is wrong because each view is diverse, or

2) if all opinions seem plausible, then everything is correct because nothing seems implausible.

3) (he concludes) Truth is not supported by claiming your opponent is ignorant based solely on having a diverse opinion.

 

I agree with dream_weaver that "uncertainty presupposes certainty in knowledge."  A diversity of opinion is useful in that regard primarily as encouragement to keep looking for certainty, rather than drawing the conclusion that certainty isn't possible due to a diversity of opinion.  

Just to be perfectly clear, I'll reiterate that I wasn't saying that certainty isn't possible in philosophy.

 

 

I'm curious to know which "tenets of Ayn Rand's philosophy qualify as certain" in your opinion, and if you consider them unique to Objectivism.

 

Great question. I'll give three examples:

 

1. The primacy of existence. This was first identified by Rand.

2. Existence is identity. This was first identified by Rand, although Aristotle may be a precursor with his intriguing identification of substance with form.

3. Causality as a corollary of identity. This was identified by Aristotelian logicians like H. W. B. Joseph before Rand, but Rand is probably the most responsible for popularizing the notion, and there is no evidence that she was familiar with the work of these earlier logicians when she came up with the principle.

 

I don't think there is any legitimate doubt at all about any of these principles.

Edited November 18, 2014 by William O

[Devil's Advocate]

1)  "Mulla Sadra made the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud) the cornerstone of his philosophy" (prior to ah 1050/ad 1640).  Building on Aristotle's view that, "... existence was the most universal of predicates..."

 

"By taking the position of the primacy of existence, Mulla Sadra was able to answer the objections of Ibn Rushd and the Illuminationists (who argued the opposite) by pointing out that existence is accidental to quiddity in the mind in so far as it is not a part of its essence. When it is a case of attributing existentiality to existence, however, what is being discussed is an essential attribute; and so at this point the regress stopped, for the source of an essential attribute is the essence itself."
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H027.htm

 

2) Yes, Aristotle was a precursor.

 

3) A philosopher who wasn't familiar with the work of earlier logicians when she came up with a logical principle, and yet was aware of Aristotle and Aquinas?  Doubtful...

 

That is not to take any wind out of Ayn Rand's sails.  She was an accomplished writer/philosopher, and if she didn't stand on the shoulders of those who came before her, she was at least capable of recognizing whose shoulders supported her view.

Edited November 19, 2014 by Devil's Advocate

[dream_weaver]

Even in OPAR, Peikoff points out (in Chapter 1) that there have been philosophers before that upheld the primacy of existence. He credits her with being the first to systematically apply "it methodically in every branch of philosophy with no concession to any version of its antithesis."

 

Sticking with the metaphysics, I would nominate consciousness as identification as a tenet that is certain which she credits herself with in Galt's speech. Quiddity led me to wikipedia to begin familiarizing myself with the term, In essence, "What is it?" Here again, Leonard Peikoff points out in Chapter 4 that every question reduces to: "What is it?". His examples that follow are:

 

"Why did a certain event occur?" means: "What is the nature of the cause? .... How?" means "What is the process? .... Where?" means "What is the place?"

Consciousness is a faculty of discovering identity.

 

DA, your cited article reminds me that I have yet to find the section from "Why I am not a Muslim" with regard to their brush with Aristotle's work, and how it was abandoned.

[Devil's Advocate]

...

Sticking with the metaphysics, I would nominate consciousness as identification as a tenet that is certain which she credits herself with in Galt's speech.

...

 

Yes, I think that's fair.  Rene Descartes' I think, therefore I am might be considered a precursor, but she deserves credit for clarifying the relationship of existence and consciousness with I am, therefore I think.  I would also extend an honorable mention to that noted mariner/philosopher Popeye, for his contribution of I am what I am. and that's all that I am...

 

nothing more and nothing less.

[andie holland]

I have always leaned towards Peikoff's view that probabilities have to be grounded in certainties, but that was only based on intuition, and I could never quite concretize it to my satisfaction. However, I recently realized that I am well acquainted with a perfect example of Peikoff's point: modern academic philosophy.

 

If you take a class in philosophy in most universities, you will be presented with an array of mutually exclusive theories and a baffling list of arguments for and against each of them. Each of these theories is presented as "plausible" or "having some evidence in its favor," but no theory is ever presented as certain. The overall tone of a typical philosophy class is "maybe A is true, and maybe B is true, and maybe C is true, but who knows?"

 

Peikoff's principle cuts all of this down by pointing out that if no theory in philosophy is certain, we have no idea what even counts for or against any philosophical theory, because we have nothing to compare them to. We could compare them to other theories that are uncertain, but then we would have no way of ruling out the possibility that both theories being compared are completely wrong. We cannot even compute the probability of both theories being wrong to delimit our doubts, because we have nothing certain to compare them to.

 

Something similar happens in science, when scientists compare theories that are under scrutiny with well established theories like Newton's laws or the theory of evolution. They basically say, "the theories that have been established so far have tended to be testable and based on observational evidence (and so on), so those qualities are virtues in a theory in our field and their absence from a theory in our field is a vice." In the absence of established theories, there could be no criteria for judgment.

 

Edit: Upon rereading my post I realized that it could be taken to imply that I think that there is no certainty in philosophy. That is not what I was saying. Rather, my point was that academic philosophy's insistence that no theory in philosophy is certain is internally inconsistent, so they should adopt a specific philosophy as certain, like Ayn Rand's philosophy. Indeed, I think that many tenets of Ayn Rand's philosophy qualify as certain.

Hume was the first modern philosopher to seriously question Cartesian certainty--an event that shook Kant out of his dogmatic slumber. 

 

As for Peikhoff's view of certainty, I imagine that the real issue is his criterion for what, exactly, 'certainty' might be.

 

My own view somewhat follows that of Dworkin (Justice for Hedgehogs): discursive truth, being what philosophy does,  is only based upon scientific certainties. To this end, Dworkin, unlike Quine, writes that by the process of debate we can arrive at a singular discursive truth which resembles certainty.

 

The key issue, of course, is neither to expect discursive certainty to resemble its scientific counterpart nor to misunderstand discursive truth as somehow sunject-independent, or 'objective'.

 

Andie

[William O]

1)  "Mulla Sadra made the primacy of existence (asalat al-wujud) the cornerstone of his philosophy" (prior to ah 1050/ad 1640).  Building on Aristotle's view that, "... existence was the most universal of predicates..."

 

"By taking the position of the primacy of existence, Mulla Sadra was able to answer the objections of Ibn Rushd and the Illuminationists (who argued the opposite) by pointing out that existence is accidental to quiddity in the mind in so far as it is not a part of its essence. When it is a case of attributing existentiality to existence, however, what is being discussed is an essential attribute; and so at this point the regress stopped, for the source of an essential attribute is the essence itself."

http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ip/rep/H027.htm

 

2) Yes, Aristotle was a precursor.

 

3) A philosopher who wasn't familiar with the work of earlier logicians when she came up with a logical principle, and yet was aware of Aristotle and Aquinas?  Doubtful...

 

That is not to take any wind out of Ayn Rand's sails.  She was an accomplished writer/philosopher, and if she didn't stand on the shoulders of those who came before her, she was at least capable of recognizing whose shoulders supported her view.

This may be due to my lack of familiarity with Medieval metaphysics (and even more so with Medieval Islamic metaphysics), but I don't understand how the quote you provided for 1 is expounding the same doctrine as Rand's primacy of existence. My understanding is that the primacy of existence in Objectivism says that existence comes before consciousness and does not depend on consciousness - rather, consciousness depends on existence. The quote you provided does not mention consciousness, although it uses the phrase "primacy of existence," so I think it may be using the phrase differently than Rand did.

 

I think you have provided fairly respectable reasons for doubting that 2 and 3 were completely original to Rand, although I think there is still room for argument about the degree to which Rand's principles were original. Regarding 2, while Aristotle's identification of substance with form is a precursor to Rand, it is also tied up with his own metaphysics, in particular his solution to the problem of universals which implies the existence of metaphysical forms contained within particular things. I think we can agree that Rand's principle that existence is identity is a significant improvement on this.

 

3 could be argued either way, although I think the evidence slightly tends to favor your position that Rand was aware of earlier thinkers who identified the principle. Rand had a tendency to exaggerate her own originality - for example, she claimed that the only prior philosopher she was influenced by was Aristotle, when John Locke and Adam Smith were clearly precursors as well. So, since we have no reason to think she would have mentioned Joseph if she had been aware of him, it is slightly more likely that she did not come up with the principle that causality is a corollary of identity on her own, as you say. Still, the issue is not settled by the evidence I am aware of.

[William O]

Hume was the first modern philosopher to seriously question Cartesian certainty--an event that shook Kant out of his dogmatic slumber. 

 

As for Peikhoff's view of certainty, I imagine that the real issue is his criterion for what, exactly, 'certainty' might be.

 

My own view somewhat follows that of Dworkin (Justice for Hedgehogs): discursive truth, being what philosophy does,  is only based upon scientific certainties. To this end, Dworkin, unlike Quine, writes that by the process of debate we can arrive at a singular discursive truth which resembles certainty.

 

The key issue, of course, is neither to expect discursive certainty to resemble its scientific counterpart nor to misunderstand discursive truth as somehow sunject-independent, or 'objective'.

 

Andie

Most people who adopt Hume's philosophy, in my experience, maintain that while we can't be certain of anything, we can have higher or lower degrees of probability with respect to our beliefs. This was not Hume's position, and Hume made an argument against this position in the Treatise. It goes like this:

 

1. Suppose we never have certainty about any of our beliefs, but only higher or lower degrees of probability.

2. Now, take a belief B.

3. From 1, we cannot assert B, but only that it is probable that B.

4. But the belief that it is probable that B is itself a belief.

5. Therefore, from 1, we cannot assert that it is probable that B, but only that it is probable that it is probable that B.

6. By extrapolation, B will be conditioned by an unlimited number of probabilities, each slightly lowering its probability.

7. This will lower the probability of B to a negligible probability.

8. Therefore, we don't have any reason at all to accept B. Since B stands for any belief, we have no reason to believe anything.

 

Hume accepted the conclusion of this argument. So Hume is not the same kind of skeptic that thinks everything is more or less probable; he is a Pyrrhonian skeptic who thinks we have no reason to believe anything. We can only organize the variety of unjustified intuitions we find ourselves with into configurations that we find more or less aesthetically pleasing. The upshot is that we should just trust common sense and not try to analyze our philosophical beliefs down to the roots, because after a certain point everything turns subjective and arbitrary.

 

Am I correct in thinking that this is similar to how you think about discursive truth? This is strongly suggested by your mention of Hume and your claim that discursive truth does not need to be objective.

[andie holland]

Most people who adopt Hume's philosophy, in my experience, maintain that while we can't be certain of anything, we can have higher or lower degrees of probability with respect to our beliefs. This was not Hume's position, and Hume made an argument against this position in the Treatise. It goes like this:

 

1. Suppose we never have certainty about any of our beliefs, but only higher or lower degrees of probability.

2. Now, take a belief B.

3. From 1, we cannot assert B, but only that it is probable that B.

4. But the belief that it is probable that B is itself a belief.

5. Therefore, from 1, we cannot assert that it is probable that B, but only that it is probable that it is probable that B.

6. By extrapolation, B will be conditioned by an unlimited number of probabilities, each slightly lowering its probability.

7. This will lower the probability of B to a negligible probability.

8. Therefore, we don't have any reason at all to accept B. Since B stands for any belief, we have no reason to believe anything.

 

Hume accepted the conclusion of this argument. So Hume is not the same kind of skeptic that thinks everything is more or less probable; he is a Pyrrhonian skeptic who thinks we have no reason to believe anything. We can only organize the variety of unjustified intuitions we find ourselves with into configurations that we find more or less aesthetically pleasing. The upshot is that we should just trust common sense and not try to analyze our philosophical beliefs down to the roots, because after a certain point everything turns subjective and arbitrary.

 

Am I correct in thinking that this is similar to how you think about discursive truth? This is strongly suggested by your mention of Hume and your claim that discursive truth does not need to be objective.

I can't speak for 'most people's' understanding of Hume. Moreover, as to whether his skepticism was pyronnian is an interesting question that deals with issues of labeling extent that are interior to philosophy itself. By that i mean that his influence on others was not necessarily what we debate of him today.

 

So my use of Hume, is a bit different. First is his influence on Kant, in Kant's own words,  by having attacked Cartesian certainty. This invariably led to consciousness as an method of inquiry--not just something to be 'affirmed'.

 

This also quickly edged over into Quantum Mechanics, despite the protests of Einstein. the act of measurement makes quantum states exist.

 

Discursive truths are not objective in the sense, again, of subject -independence. or as the old joke goes, Ethics creates values via its own discourse. it does not discover discreet moral units called 'morons'.

 

Andie

[Devil's Advocate]

This may be due to my lack of familiarity with Medieval metaphysics (and even more so with Medieval Islamic metaphysics), but I don't understand how the quote you provided for 1 is expounding the same doctrine as Rand's primacy of existence. My understanding is that the primacy of existence in Objectivism says that existence comes before consciousness and does not depend on consciousness - rather, consciousness depends on existence. The quote you provided does not mention consciousness, although it uses the phrase "primacy of existence," so I think it may be using the phrase differently than Rand did.

 

...

 

"By taking the position of the primacy of existence, Mulla Sadra was able to answer the objections of Ibn Rushd and the Illuminationists (who argued the opposite) by pointing out that (1 - existence is accidental to quiddity in the mind) in so far as it is not a part of its essence. When it is a case of attributing existentiality to existence, however, what is being discussed is an essential attribute; and so at this point the regress stopped, for (2 - the source of an essential attribute is the essence itself)" ~ from post #5

 

1) existence isn't dependent on consciousness.

2) existence is dependent on existence (as is consciousness).

 

It's reasonable to presume that the good Mulla wasn't looking to dismiss Allah (God), as is so eagerly pursued by mainstream Objectivists.  The historical pursuit of resolving the priority of the chicken or the egg usually accepted a Divine Creator as given, i.e., that both chicken and egg were created by God.  So you might argue that he and others were correct, but for the wrong reason.  As dream_weaver points out in post #6, even Ayn Rand's intellectual heir concedes the point that other philosophers upheld the primacy of existence prior to her, but that she applied it more consistently throughout philosophy.  So you may continue to appreciate her take on the issue from the POV of an atheist/philosopher.

 

In any case, until a disembodied consciousness can persuasively rebut the point, it's fairly certain that existence will continue to precede it, or as Mulla Sadra claimed, that one cannot regress from existence.