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Identical situations create identical outcomes?

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Kjetil

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If you say that Context C leads to "choice" A, and only to "choice" A (which, as my quotes are meant to demonstrate, is no longer a choice in any meaningful sense), then every human choice is metaphysically necessary. We must then say that it was inherent in the nature of existence for him to have made "choice" A: he could not have chosen otherwise.

I didn't say anything of "having to" in the sense of "my consciousness played no role". I am suggesting that by employing -some- capacity of decision making, I am necessarily going to use -some- standard to determine which action to take. Those standards, in conjunction with where my capacities are directed toward the context, will lead me to a choice. Because of directedness, the choice is not inherent to reality. But by employing your capacities, you are making a decision within a specific context in an exact way.

 

Think of it this way: you started off by reading some of my post. You had an objection to my post for some reason. By seeing an error or mistake in my post, and because you had time to post, and because of many other reasons, you choose to post. Free will refers to this entire process, up to the action. Yet as long as you're employing a process, you'd only change what you did if one step in the process went differently. You'd need to add or remove reasons, alter the environment, alter your standards, or act randomly (indeterminately). Since we're talking about identical situations, only acting randomly applies. That is, your reasons will be randomly determined, rather than determined by directing your capacities at the context in a specific way.

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Harrison, you and I have discussed this subject at length in private. We have, and continue, to disagree -- which I'm okay with. I don't expect to change your mind today. But if you don't mind, I'd like to introduce one of the thought experiments we'd discussed for the purpose of this conversation. If you'd like to comment on it anew, here, I'd appreciate it.

 

Determinism does not contradict unpredictability (in an epistemological sense).

 

The weather patterns in Earth's atmosphere are a deterministic system, which acts according to a few simple rules (and can be described in terms of a handful of them)- and yet it proves incomprehensibly difficult for us to predict.  This is because the air currents which drive it are dictated by the heat absorption, the terrain, the water (the content of that water) of so many different places that we really never know which situation we're in, which precludes us from predicting what will come next.

 

This type of system has been described as "chaotic"; one whose behavior is deterministic, but influenced by too many variables to accurately predict.

Granting the determinism you argue for, you're correct that man's actions are unpredictable in this "epistemological sense"; that man's actions are "chaotic."

But that is not all.

If we could imagine (at least as far-future science fiction) a computer capable of predicting the weather with precision, then, continuing to grant the determinism you argue for, I would also posit that we could imagine a computer equally capable of predicting a given man's actions.

To simplify the scenario, let's imagine a man who is going to pick one of two doors -- Door A or Door B. Our computer will tell us which he will select.

Now suppose (and this is a factor the computer has access to as well, and will take into account in its initial computation) that the man is told what the computer has selected. Let us say, for Test Run One, that the computer predicts our man will pick Door A. The man receives this information.

Will he pick Door A? Or will he now choose Door B, to spite the computer's prediction? And if he does pick Door B -- or if we simply recognize that as a plausible scenario -- then what (if anything) does that say about the project? What does it say about our assumptions?

If a man's choice were wholly determined by antecedent factors, one outcome possible for any given set of inputs, then I would agree that a man's choice between two doors is chaotic -- meaning that it is very difficult to calculate, due to the range and subtlety of factors (along with the difficulty in determining the precise relationships between those factors). But I think that man's choice is something more than even that. I think it is not only epistemologically unpredictable, but metaphysically unpredictable.

Given sufficient science, understanding and technology, a man could predict the weather with precision. But, even allowing for all conceivable science, understanding and technology, I'd argue that there is never a point at which a man could predict with precision which among even two lowly doors a man will choose to walk through.

This is a difference, not of degree, but of kind.

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I didn't say anything of "having to" in the sense of "my consciousness played no role". I am suggesting that by employing -some- capacity of decision making, I am necessarily going to use -some- standard to determine which action to take. Those standards, in conjunction with where my capacities are directed toward the context, will lead me to a choice. Because of directedness, the choice is not inherent to reality. But by employing your capacities, you are making a decision within a specific context in an exact way.

 

Think of it this way: you started off by reading some of my post. You had an objection to my post for some reason. By seeing an error or mistake in my post, and because you had time to post, and because of many other reasons, you choose to post. Free will refers to this entire process, up to the action. Yet as long as you're employing a process, you'd only change what you did if one step in the process went differently. You'd need to add or remove reasons, alter the environment, alter your standards, or act randomly (indeterminately). Since we're talking about identical situations, only acting randomly applies. That is, your reasons will be randomly determined, rather than determined by directing your capacities at the context in a specific way.

Eiuol, with respect, I was not asking you to restate your argument. I understand your argument. I constructed a very similar argument when I took tenth grade physics. (Which, to clarify, is not intended as a put down; I'm only trying to emphasize that your position is very familiar to me, and has been for a very long time.)

Instead, I was asking you whether you recognize that your argument stands opposed to the quote from Leonard Peikoff I'd provided. And I ask, not for the purpose of accusing or implicating, or anything else, except that one of the features of this longstanding debate which frustrates me is that the proponents of determinism are seemingly very reluctant to recognize that they are arguing for it, or to call it by name. I don't mind that people argue for determinism (though I think they're mistaken), but I'd like to see a spade called a spade. I think that discourse generally requires such honesty.

So really, I'd like to know. Do you understand that your position is contra the position expressed in that quote? Or do you truly believe that there is no conflict between this quote and what you're proposing? I'll provide it here again, for convenience, and then I will sincerely hope for an answer:

 

Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have chosen otherwise.

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So really, I'd like to know. Do you understand that your position is contra the position expressed in that quote? Or do you truly believe that there is no conflict between this quote and what you're proposing? I'll provide it here again, for convenience, and then I will sincerely hope for an answer:

The label is inconsequential. I don't disagree with Peikoff. You could do otherwise, broadly speaking. I'm talking about would, not could. Peikoff is talking about hard determinism, while I think my "cognitive capacity" view is being confused with the "particles ultimately cause everything" view. If it makes me a determinist to say I wouldn't choose differently despite the capacity to choose differently, okay. Not a problem. But it'd be strange to call me a determinist when I'm saying that conscious decisions based on standards are why you -would- act as you chose. It's too different than what determinism is treated as usually.

 

If I choose to eat a bowl of chocolate ice cream because I want some chocolate, well, I made the choice for all sorts of reasons. I can abstract away the environmental input to say "I will eat ice cream as long as my sugar intake is low enough" and end up not eating the ice cream because I remembered I had ice cream for breakfast. It's a fact that my sugar intake is a certain level, so how the choice ended up is one way. It's not like the physics version of it that would say I eat the ice cream because of how all particles in the universe are arranged. So, yes, I really believe there is no conflict with the quote.

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Harrison, you and I have discussed this subject at length in private. We have, and continue, to disagree -- which I'm okay with. I don't expect to change your mind today. But if you don't mind, I'd like to introduce one of the thought experiments we'd discussed for the purpose of this conversation. If you'd like to comment on it anew, here, I'd appreciate it.

 

Granting the determinism you argue for, you're correct that man's actions are unpredictable in this "epistemological sense"; that man's actions are "chaotic."

But that is not all.

If we could imagine (at least as far-future science fiction) a computer capable of predicting the weather with precision, then, continuing to grant the determinism you argue for, I would also posit that we could imagine a computer equally capable of predicting a given man's actions.

To simplify the scenario, let's imagine a man who is going to pick one of two doors -- Door A or Door B. Our computer will tell us which he will select.

Now suppose (and this is a factor the computer has access to as well, and will take into account in its initial computation) that the man is told what the computer has selected. Let us say, for Test Run One, that the computer predicts our man will pick Door A. The man receives this information.

Will he pick Door A? Or will he now choose Door B, to spite the computer's prediction? And if he does pick Door B -- or if we simply recognize that as a plausible scenario -- then what (if anything) does that say about the project? What does it say about our assumptions?

If a man's choice were wholly determined by antecedent factors, one outcome possible for any given set of inputs, then I would agree that a man's choice between two doors is chaotic -- meaning that it is very difficult to calculate, due to the range and subtlety of factors (along with the difficulty in determining the precise relationships between those factors). But I think that man's choice is something more than even that. I think it is not only epistemologically unpredictable, but metaphysically unpredictable.

Given sufficient science, understanding and technology, a man could predict the weather with precision. But, even allowing for all conceivable science, understanding and technology, I'd argue that there is never a point at which a man could predict with precision which among even two lowly doors a man will choose to walk through.

This is a difference, not of degree, but of kind.

 

DonAthos

 

Do not forget that a properly designed computer doing a properly designed test would, prior to telling the man anything, make the prediction twice:

 

1)  What would he do given everything including being told he would pick door A

2)  What would he do given everything including being told he would pick door B

 

It matters not whether the Man is being told the truth or a lie when he is told of the prediction.  No paradox arises, these calculations proceed prior to telling him anything and in fact could be used to decide what to tell him if anything.

 

Now I do not think it matters to your example but technically speaking such would have to be the calculation made to predict a mans choice.. IF such prediction were possible

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The label is inconsequential.

I think it matters to the discussion whether you're arguing for determinism or against it. I think we should strive to be as clear as possible in our arguments, and that the proper use of such labels is an important part of this.

 

I don't disagree with Peikoff. You could do otherwise, broadly speaking.

What do you mean by this modifier "broadly speaking"? In what broad sense could you "do otherwise," and in what more narrow sense could you not?

Aren't you saying that if a man chooses Door A (to adopt the bare bones example I'd introduced in #27), that, given the conditions at the time (meaning: the context), that he could not have done anything other than choose Door A?

Aren't you saying, in light of your post #24, that context C leads to choice A, without exception?

If that is your contention -- and I believe that it is -- then what do you mean that a man "could do otherwise, broadly speaking"? If he could do otherwise -- if your "broadly speaking" has actual meaning, and pertains to actual situations -- then couldn't context C lead to choice B?

I do not see how your arguments allow a man to "do otherwise, broadly speaking." In fact, that's the very thing I think you're saying that a man cannot do.

 

I'm talking about would, not could. Peikoff is talking about hard determinism, while I think my "cognitive capacity" view is being confused with the "particles ultimately cause everything" view. If it makes me a determinist to say I wouldn't choose differently despite the capacity to choose differently, okay. Not a problem. But it'd be strange to call me a determinist when I'm saying that conscious decisions based on standards are why you -would- act as you chose. It's too different than what determinism is treated as usually.

 

If I choose to eat a bowl of chocolate ice cream because I want some chocolate, well, I made the choice for all sorts of reasons. I can abstract away the environmental input to say "I will eat ice cream as long as my sugar intake is low enough" and end up not eating the ice cream because I remembered I had ice cream for breakfast. It's a fact that my sugar intake is a certain level, so how the choice ended up is one way. It's not like the physics version of it that would say I eat the ice cream because of how all particles in the universe are arranged. So, yes, I really believe there is no conflict with the quote.

I think there is conflict with the quote, and with the meaning of the quote, and with the Objectivist view of free will more generally.

Not to preclude you from answering the question(s) I've posed -- because I'd still like your answer -- but I think that you believe that Context C will lead to choice A, without exception, while the "broad" sense in which a person could do otherwise is, given some other context, a man could make some other choice.

But it is true of all things that, given a different context, different results would follow, and it collapses any sensible distinction between "the metaphysical and the man-made."

You're saying that you have "the capacity to choose differently" if the context is different (e.g. you remember what you had for breakfast). But the domino that falls towards the north has "the capacity to fall differently" if the wind changes. That's not the point. Given the wind, the domino must fall in one, and only one, direction. It cannot do otherwise. This is determinism.

If you believe that, given the wind (i.e. the context), a man must fall in one, and only one, direction -- that there is only one choice that he is capable of making in any particular context -- then you are a determinist.

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The label is inconsequential. I don't disagree with Peikoff. You could do otherwise, broadly speaking. I'm talking about would, not could. Peikoff is talking about hard determinism, while I think my "cognitive capacity" view is being confused with the "particles ultimately cause everything" view. If it makes me a determinist to say I wouldn't choose differently despite the capacity to choose differently, okay. Not a problem. But it'd be strange to call me a determinist when I'm saying that conscious decisions based on standards are why you -would- act as you chose. It's too different than what determinism is treated as usually.

 

If I choose to eat a bowl of chocolate ice cream because I want some chocolate, well, I made the choice for all sorts of reasons. I can abstract away the environmental input to say "I will eat ice cream as long as my sugar intake is low enough" and end up not eating the ice cream because I remembered I had ice cream for breakfast. It's a fact that my sugar intake is a certain level, so how the choice ended up is one way. It's not like the physics version of it that would say I eat the ice cream because of how all particles in the universe are arranged. So, yes, I really believe there is no conflict with the quote.

 

If the label is inconsequential... then not only would you be comfortable calling yourself a determinist you would be calling LP a determinist, because what he believes would be (as you claim) the same as what you believe.

 

If what you believe is not determinism, the label cannot be inconsequential. So what DO you believe?

 

What metaphysically would be the difference between a universe which is deterministic (universe means.. i.e. all of it, determined not probabilistic or alternate possibility) and what you hold to be metaphysically true?

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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Clearly not.

 

On the surface, it's obvious that most of life is governed by chance--ie rolls of dice or he possibility of an auto accident while on a well-traveled street.

 

Determinists/materialists then reply that if we possessed sufficient information, chance would not exist--ie would could roll the dice in a certain way to obtain a particular number.

 

Yet even on the deepest level, that of the quanta, the equations are written as probabilities. god does seem top play dice with the universe.

 

AH

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Broadly speaking - abstracting away many particulars, especially the environment as it is. Abstracting away specific methods, but retaining that there is a method. If there is a method, the result is singular - one output. I'm using context as "the totality of existence", with nothing abstracted away. That's different than context as "what I am paying attention to".

This is the part why I'm not a determinist, but that isn't to say choices don't rely on the world as it is. I simply can't be put into a determinist or non-determinist camp, it's a false dichotomy. I mean, if I am a typical determinist, I'm not seeing how I am, unless I'm forced to "pick a side".

But yes, I'm saying C always leads to A, as long as you keep in mind that people form beliefs about C to get to A. I mean, if a bull is charging me, and I move out of the way, I'm going to choose to move out of the way every time a bull is charging me - unless I learn it is a plush bull that won't hurt me. Not because I "have to" but because I have standards of safety.

By the way, I'm probably unclear on the difference between could and would. Could is a metaphysical possibility here, where it doesn't go against reality to end up choosing to eat or not eat ice cream. Would is that in spite of possibility, I only will make one choice, with reasons that explain why I ultimately ate no ice cream. Maybe I simply I don't eat ice cream on Tuesdays. So whenever it is Tuesday, I won't eat ice cream. Will I do the same next Tuesday? All things being equal, yes, I will! All things being equal is another way to say "identical situation", except some of the context is ignored. It's not because of physics, but because of epistemological standards, that I end up acting the same.
 

You're saying that you have "the capacity to choose differently" if the context is different (e.g. you remember what you had for breakfast). But the domino that falls towards the north has "the capacity to fall differently" if the wind changes. That's not the point. Given the wind, the domino must fall in one, and only one, direction. It cannot do otherwise. This is determinism.

That's reductive determinism where all action is the sum of its parts, which reduces all causality to some primary domain - usually physics. But there is no domain of knowledge that is more fundamental than another. In physics, I don't propose that a special causation for mental existents or even talk about mental existents. In psychology, I don't propose that it is all reducible to biology. If you want to talk about dominoes, we need to switch the domain to something like computer science. A domino has essentially zero computing power. PCs, quite a bit. The human mind? Massive. And since we're doing philosophy, we're trying to be abstract and make distinctions.

My "determinism" is that people act for definite reasons. For what it's worth, my view is better characterized by some Buddhist views on mind (not the mystical parts), so using usual western philosophy categories is misleading. It's not very different than Objectivist philosophy.

Edited by Eiuol
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Could and would, in one context - could I go to the park? Yes, I am quite capable.

Would you go to the park? No, I've got other things to do at the moment.

Should I go to the park? Yes, I promised someone I would, but something came up, I can, but what came up is more important.

 

Can you do this? Yes, I am quite capable.of doing this.

Will you do this? No. I am unwilling to do this.

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But yes, I'm saying C always leads to A, as long as you keep in mind that people form beliefs about C to get to A.

Okay. Let's take on a scenario.

Suppose a young man walks into a liquor store with the intent to rob it. He has a gun. His face is hidden.

But then it strikes him that "he doesn't have to do this." He can still walk out of the store. He hasn't taken the gun out yet, and he's scared, and he knows that this is morally wrong. He has a decision to make.

Suppose he decides to go through with it and robs the store.

You would say that given the context of that moment, robbing the store was the only possible choice he could make? The robbery is the 'A' which results from the prior 'C'?

When we look back at that "moment of decision" -- at that "choice" -- you would therefore say that he could not have decided not to rob the store? (Not given the particular context with which he was faced, that is.)

If this is your case, then what would you mean by "free will" or by "volition"? (For I take it you don't repudiate those terms in themselves, whatever you would have them represent conceptually.)

If he was incapable of following but one path, then what differentiates him from a domino tipping over due to the wind, or a computer program following its routine?

And if he was powerless to do anything other than rob the store, then upon what grounds would we hold him morally responsible for this "decision" (which I hold cannot truly be a decision in any meaningful sense)? For when you say that "people form beliefs about C to get to A," how can we avoid the further observation -- by the nature of your argument -- that the formation of every single belief is itself the only possible result given some particular context? That is to say, from birth (and actually from well before that), we are perpetually on rails, making the only "choices" possible to us, given the context of every succeeding moment.

By this view, I think I'm forced to conclude that human action is as morally significant as a hurricane: many factors conspire to produce the only outcome they can, for good or ill. C leads to A, and it could not have been any other way.

 

My "determinism" is that people act for definite reasons.

I agree that people act for definite reasons. If the young man decides to rob, he will have reasons for having done so. If he decides not to rob, he will likewise have reasons for not having done so.

 

For what it's worth, my view is better characterized by some Buddhist views on mind (not the mystical parts), so using usual western philosophy categories is misleading. It's not very different than Objectivist philosophy.

Are we agreed, then, that your views on determinism (or "causality as it relates to human action," if we must) do not reflect Objectivism? If they are "not very different," then they are different?

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Let's hope there are no evasions, equivocations, or avoidance of the very simple and direct issues, in the answer.

Of course I won't do that... I haven't yet even. I asked you questions before, but you didn't answer. If I skip questions, it's because I think I answered it in the post already, or the ifs in Don's post don't apply.

You would say that given the context of that moment, robbing the store was the only possible choice he could make? The robbery is the 'A' which results from the prior 'C'?

Nope. It's the only choice he would make, but not the only one he could make, as I explained about would/could before.

If he was incapable of following but one path, then what differentiates him from a domino tipping over due to the wind, or a computer program following its routine?

I don't like the word "incapable" here because I'm saying the path has to be figured out. Dominoes don't figure or calculate. People do. Figuring and calculating imply that an entity could act in more than one but finite number of ways, with one answer given the information put into the system.

If they are "not very different," then they are different?

In so far as it's "more than" what Objectivism says, yes. But I'm not contradicting it.

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Nope. It's the only choice he would make, but not the only one he could make, as I explained about would/could before.

Suppose a computer program, designed to accept one input, run it through a function, and produce one output. Let's say we input 3 and the output is 7.

If I were to say, "The program could not have delivered any other output," does it speak to your distinction to rebut, "No, the computer would not deliver any other output, given that input. It could deliver some other output, given some other input."

Isn't this what you hold to be true about human action?

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I'll give this one last shot, try to sum up my previous post, since I see no one here got my point:

The phrase "identical situations" is a contradiction. The use of plural suggests a distinctions between two or more things. Distinction is the opposite of identity. The whole point of the law of identity is that one thing is identical to itself, but two or more things are not identical.

Nothing you say, that relies on the assumption that identical situations can exist, makes any sense. Interpreting the law of identity to contradict the existence of free will is ridiculous.

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Hmm. Yeah, that's a good way to put it. Essentially, yes, keeping in mind consciousness adds substantially more depth to that process.

Right. Good. Yes.

What I want you to understand is that, in the Peikoff quote I'd provided initially, when he says "he could have chosen otherwise," he does not mean what you mean with respect to this "could/would" distinction. What he means is that the human actor was empowered in the moment of decision, and given the singular input to produce from among more than one possible outputs. Which is to say that the human actor has an ability which the computer lacks, which is not merely "more depth," or a more complicated function, but is the ability to respond to the same context, the same input, with a variable response (not to say "random," which is a typical point of confusion). Human action is not a function, with one and only one output for every input, or set of inputs, or context.

Or at least, not in the Objectivist view. To clarify Peikoff's stance on this account, this is from a lecture per the Lexicon:

 

“Volitional” means selected from two or more alternatives that were possible under the circumstances, the difference being made by the individual’s decision, which could have been otherwise.

By "under the circumstances," he means given the input, or given the context (which, yes, here means "everything else").

If you give our computer 3, you will get back 7. It can not do otherwise, given that input -- not alone "would not," but "could not." However, if you give a human being 3, you may get back 7... or you may get back some other number. The human can (i.e. is empowered to; has the ability to) do something that the computer cannot do. The difference between them is that the human being gets to choose. The computer has no choice, no volition, no free will, per its nature, but a human being is unlike a computer in this way, and does.

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I'll give this one last shot, try to sum up my previous post, since I see no one here got my point:

The phrase "identical situations" is a contradiction. The use of plural suggests a distinctions between two or more things. Distinction is the opposite of identity. The whole point of the law of identity is that one thing is identical to itself, but two or more things are not identical.

Nothing you say, that relies on the assumption that identical situations can exist, makes any sense. Interpreting the law of identity to contradict the existence of free will is ridiculous.

 

 

Sometimes philosophical discussion (as well as scientific and mathematical discussion) as you know turn to "hypotheticals". 

 

In this way we can think about things such as:

 

What IF Mount St. Helen's HAD erupted with twice the power, or what IF the distribution of matter and antimatter in the early universe WERE different... etc.

 

I think we all understand your point that literally no two different things (in space and/or time) can be in "identical situations".  The discussion however is a hypothetical one which in fact does deal with the core issue of determinism, free will, and whether "God could play with dice"... 

 

 

It's like you are replying... "but Mount St. Helen's DIDN'T erupt with twice the power".... or "but the distribution of matter and antimatter in the early universe could not be different from what it was"... yes we get it.  But for the purpose of discussion and especially to investigate the issues which were intended to be addressed by the OP (in my opinion), we are indulging in the "what if?"

 

"Identical situations" is a hypothetical and should not be interpreted to mean literally "different identical situations" which is a contradiction. 

 

The plural implies "hypothetical analysis".

 

So "what if" the universe could be rewound to a particular situation and replayed, perhaps over and over, would everything proceed as exactly as before, with exactly the same outcomes always?... i.e. determinism, or would some people do different things (volition) or some photons after interfering with itself hit the screen "here" instead of "there" (probabilistic causation - QM).

 

 

Surely you are not purporting to claim that "hypothesizing" is outside of the realm of valid cognition or discussion?

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Eiuol:

 

 

Is the "situation" of the universe, as it will be 10 days from now, currently "written" in the totality of the present "situation" of the universe at this moment?

 

I.e. is everything fated to be one singular particular way 10 days from now based on the totality of everything as it is now?

 

 

If you believe anything in the future is truly contingent, i.e. metaphysically could happen one way or another (and correct me if I am using could when I should use would??) not that we cannot predict it because of any lack of knowledge, but that objectively the future IS NOT completely written in the present, then you would not be a determinist.  

 

If you claim the universe 10 days from now is already defined by the universe currently, all of the people, all of their thoughts and choices, and that the future universe will simply arise from the current universe following the inexorable path of single valued causation and identity... then you are a determinist.

 

 

Determinism is inconsistent with the Objectivist view of man's possession of volition.

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I'll give this one last shot, try to sum up my previous post, since I see no one here got my point:

The phrase "identical situations" is a contradiction. The use of plural suggests a distinctions between two or more things. Distinction is the opposite of identity. The whole point of the law of identity is that one thing is identical to itself, but two or more things are not identical.

Nothing you say, that relies on the assumption that identical situations can exist, makes any sense. Interpreting the law of identity to contradict the existence of free will is ridiculous.

 

I got it, I just haven't responded because I've been thinking about it. I think it's the most important and original contribution to this thread.

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There is no "internal inconsistency" with what I have stated in this thread.  If you can find something please specifically point it out to me.

No; "consistency". 

 

There are only three ways to answer the OP:

1-  The actions of all entities, including man, are determined by something.

2-  The actions of some entities are determined, but not the actions of others (particularly man).

3-  No action of any entity is determined by anything.

Of these, 1 and 3 (which are essentially your position and mine) seem internally consistent, but not 2 (which would be Binswanger's).

 

(Please note I remain agnostic... as to your strongly held belief in "determinism"... I think THAT belief, since empirically we cannot "prove" or disprove it, is an example of "the arbitrary" (see OPAR)) 

Fair enough.

 

Behavior which is not determined by any conditions whatsoever cannot be predicted, by definition.  Would you agree?

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Nothing you say, that relies on the assumption that identical situations can exist, makes any sense. Interpreting the law of identity to contradict the existence of free will is ridiculous.

Not sure if the "you" here is me, if it is, of course identical situations don't exist. I don't need to appeal to identical situations as a realistic thing anyway. The situation that is identical to another is really the same situation. In fact, saying someone may be able to do otherwise in an identical situation makes for free will makes no sense. All we can really do is speak broadly of varying situations. It makes no sense to say it is "free will" unless we want to start coming up with ideas that really don't refer to reality. Only the philosophical view of libertarian free will would make a view that is impacted by "identical situations". Saying a person would only end up doing one thing in "same situations" is only to say that only one thing will in fact happen, and so as you said, being faced with identical situations makes for a non-issue.

Employing any capacity of decision-making relies on being able to make a definitive decision based on how the world is thought to be. So I can't be giving a determinist view when how the world is thought to be really matters. A person doesn't see the world in multiple ways at once, at least not consciously. There isn't really a way to just simply end up choosing REGARDLESS of how you see the world to be. If a person went through ALL the same  reasons to say, eat ice cream, then, well, they'll eat ice cream. That's how I can say hungry people will seek food. I'm not thinking "ah! but at any moment they might arbitrarily decide to stop seeking food, I'll never know!"

"What he means is that the human actor was empowered in the moment of decision, and given the singular input to produce from among more than one possible outputs."

I really don't think he meant that. I mean, I don't see it as incompatible, but other views are possible as well without contradiction.

"However, if you give a human being 3, you may get back 7... or you may get back some other number."

Okay, so how? Besides appealing to "because free will means you can". Clearly, humans are far more complex but... see my hunger example above. Free will is real, but I don't think it entails you really might get some other answer by virtue of will alone as its own mental power with primacy over the mechanisms that allow you to calculate an answer. I'm saying "calculate" as equal to "a procedure of thought".

 

SL

 "not that we cannot predict it because of any lack of knowledge, but that objectively the future IS NOT completely written in the present, then you would not be a determinist.  "

Yeah. I'd say a determinist, to be consistent with the meaning of the future "had to" happen, has to say conscious mental states are epiphenomenal, i.e. have no causal power. In some sense we can predict what will happen, I'd just say it is incalculable by any realistic standard to predict all action. Similarly, I may be able to use economics to make reliable predictions about future economic conditions, but it is simply incalculable to lead a total command economy. Sometimes, some problems are so complex that prediction is not possible no matter how much knowledge you have.

I'll admit though my view is influenced by Nietzsche and his "eternal recurrence" view: he presents a hypothetical of the universe repeating forever, suggesting even choices would be the same if it were true. He doesn't say it is true, that the universe will repeat. The context was more about ethics though, and how to embrace decisions you've already made even if those choices were bad for you.

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No; "consistency". 

 

There are only three ways to answer the OP:

1-  The actions of all entities, including man, are determined by something.

2-  The actions of some entities are determined, but not the actions of others (particularly man).

3-  No action of any entity is determined by anything.

Of these, 1 and 3 (which are essentially your position and mine) seem internally consistent, but not 2 (which would be Binswanger's).

 

Fair enough.

 

Behavior which is not determined by any conditions whatsoever cannot be predicted, by definition.  Would you agree?

 

Your choices are somewhat contrived, and your conclusions about internal consistency are a bit off. 

 

Certainly, determinism is determinism.  If no thing can be undetermined, for any of its actions, then everything must be determined for all actions.  If this is what you mean by internal consistency, then I suppose you could characterize 1 as such.

 

As for 3, that is sheer nonsense.  "No action is determined by anything" is ridiculously chaotic.  There would be no recognizable universe; we would exist in the Wonderland of Kant's Noumenal world.  It WOULD literally mean an electron could turn into Hegel or Hume and then into a Ducati Superbike.  Things have identify WHEN THEY INTERACT with other things (more generally when any part of anything interacts with any part of any other thing) an outcome in the things (some possibly new. things.. e.g. generation of photons from an incandescent bulb) afterward results.  The configuration, states, way those outcome things come out of the interaction is dependent upon causation acting in the context of the particular interaction.

 

My actual position is better characterized as: for some particular interactions (and we must get to the root interaction below which there is only sheer causation and nothing further into which to break it down) outcomes are not strictly determined i.e, some probability is at play (for example although there may be an infinite number of possible orientations into which you could place a polarized photon, but after it passes through polarized film it has two possible outcomes, taking a new orientation or being absorbed.  The probability is determined but each outcome is not. This does not mean it will take on any arbitrary orientation with arbitrary probability.. the interaction has probabilistic causal outcomes but they are limited by the context of the particular interaction.  Other interactions, such as passing the polarized photon through a polarization filter oriented in the same direction, have only one possible (therefore determined) outcome, in this example the photon will pass through, and never be absorbed.  This position is not that everything is probabilistic but that some things are.

 

Here I make no particular distinction between groups of entities, particular systems, or organisms, they are all the same matter arranged in different forms so that they take on and exhibit different properties and functions respectively.  So there is no deterministic versus probabilistic divide between say bananas and turnips.  They are made of the same stuff.  Insofar as the stuff when configured a certain way interacts a certain way... so it is.  that is not to say certain configurations exhibit more determinism whereas others exhibit more probability, that is inherent in the nature of the constituents and the particular arrangement and interactions... natural non-arbitrary phenomena having identity.

 

Now observe even if only one kind of particle or system behaved in a non-deterministic fashion, all the future being a complex result of a complicated web of interactions would not ever be "the same way twice".  Only in certain controlled statistical situations would there be apparent determinism although if you looked at the details you would see it actually is completely different. 

 

 

I think where you think there is inconsistency in 2 is not in that some things behave one way and others behave in other ways, but in that you perceive a certain arbitrary distinction (rather than empirical) division between the some things.. from the other things... the particular one chosen perhaps by Binswanger.  I would tend to agree.  Man is a special complex natural system... but to divide all of "creation" as regards to determinism based on that one fact alone is akin to ascribing man a mystical exception to his nature, his composition. his identity.  If Man as a whole is not determined some of subset of the complex system that that he is also must not be determined.  (Although it IS very reasonable to argue no subset of a man has volition)  Those nondeterministic things are what makes his volition possible.  

 

Somehow, I would guess, the deterministic and the probabilistic interactions arranged "just so" in the system of man and in his mind, are such that he possesses volition, acts probabilistically, yet accordance with (i.e. limited in certain ways) his identity.

 

 

As for your last point you take liberties with the premises.  Of course "Behavior which is not determined by any conditions whatsoever cannot be predicted, by definition."

 

That said, a 100 sided, LOADED die may fall on side 56, statistically 90% of the time.  If we take an analogous "hypothetical" situation where causality for a particular interaction has only 100 possible outcomes (not an infinite number of arbitrary outcomes) but one (outcome 56) has a probability of 90%, it CAN be predicted, in the sense that one knows what it will do most of the time.  It CANT be predicted for any ONE interaction.  Certainly the interaction HAS character, it has a tendency, a personality if you will, just not one which is deterministic.  It has identity, but one which is described probabilistically.

 

 

Bedtime story:

 

I like Indian food, I will choose it 80% when given the choice as against Italian food ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL.  I cant predict on any one occasion whether I will go for Italian or Indian... does this mean some hidden ARBITRARY DEMON is causing me to act against myself?  I don't know why I choose one or the other but would I feel better thinking there is a DETERMINISTIC TYRANT ruling my choices to cause the 80% favoritism for Indian using a hard and fast determined and inescapable algorithm?  Personally the fact that some unthinking foundational element which makes up the complexity of me which helps me make choices consistent with who I am ... is probabilistic and thereby makes the "freedom to choose" possible (and yes this may mean probabilistically changing of internal focus rather than the actual choice being made probabilistically) why would I recoil from such an idea and embrace complete and utter CLOCKWORK MECHANISTIC DETERMINISM?... in the face of the nearly axiomatic nature of volition?

 

I digress.  For any who actually read through that ... you may disagree but I hope at least I was clear.  

Edited by StrictlyLogical
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I like Indian food, I will choose it 80% when given the choice as against Italian food ALL OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL.  I cant predict on any one occasion whether I will go for Italian or Indian... does this mean some hidden ARBITRARY DEMON is causing me to act against myself?  I don't know why I choose one or the other but [. . .]

So... there's a 20% chance you'll eat Italian and you won't know why, and in principle there isn't even an automatized reason? I mean, maybe it'll be a silly or strange reason, which is still a reason. But are you suggesting that all things being equal there are cases where you'll have no reason you know of to pick either?

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If we could imagine (at least as far-future science fiction) a computer capable of predicting the weather with precision, then, continuing to grant the determinism you argue for, I would also posit that we could imagine a computer equally capable of predicting a given man's actions.

To simplify the scenario, let's imagine a man who is going to pick one of two doors -- Door A or Door B. Our computer will tell us which he will select.

Now suppose (and this is a factor the computer has access to as well, and will take into account in its initial computation) that the man is told what the computer has selected. Let us say, for Test Run One, that the computer predicts our man will pick Door A. The man receives this information.

Will he pick Door A? Or will he now choose Door B, to spite the computer's prediction? And if he does pick Door B -- or if we simply recognize that as a plausible scenario -- then what (if anything) does that say about the project? What does it say about our assumptions?

 

First of all, to be clear, I'll reiterate that it would be perfectly plausible for him to pick door B- after being told that he would pick A.  That seems like the critical part.

 

If this computer can predict his actions with 100% accuracy, and if it predicts that he will choose A but he is never informed of this, then he will choose A.  I think it's logically necessitated by the way we've arranged our scenario.  However, if it makes the same prediction but tells him about it then it seems equally clear that he could then just as easily choose B if the mood should strike him.

 

So I think that the computer would be changing the very thing it meant to predict (his mind) by making its prediction public.  As SL pointed out, you could solve that problem by having it also predict what he would do after hearing any initial prediction- if you could build such a computer, in the first place.

 

I have a few other things to point out, but I'm not quite done chewing on them yet.

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