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Are Rand and Peikoff right about materialism?

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Naïve meaning eliminative physicalist (there is no mind)?  If so then I disagree (if not then please correct me, as that's the basic premise of this reply).

 

Let's say, hypothetically, that someday we discover the exact pattern of firing synapses which forms the thought "A is A."  So, if you think that A is A, that simply means that thus-and-such neuron was primed just so to initiate the "A=A" circuit.  Does this mean it wasn't your thought, in the first place?

In this thread  http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=24331 Secondhander (way down towards the bottom), in my opinion, nailed the issue quite perfectly:

"It seems to me that the main mistake made is to tacitly presuppose that a man is something different than his attributes. Yes, you can look at my brain and "predict" what choice I am going to make. But my brain IS me, or part of what is me. So all you're really saying is that you are looking at what I am choosing to do and then saying it's not really me choosing it, just my brain, and therefore I don't really have free will, as though my brain isn't me."

 

All I think (again, I make great assumptions here) Eiuol is saying is that the brain is part of someone, just as much as their liver or kidneys, and it would make only perfect sense that the mind is a product of its processes.

 

But, again, I'm not sure if that's what you were asserting.

 

I suspect that tad was indulging in a little bit of satire...

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I think that Tad was being facetious.

Stephen actually said:

"By feature I meant that sort of more complex attribute. My first philosophy professor was a Thomist, so like you, I do use attribute for both simple ones (properties) and more complex ones (features). "

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In this thread  http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?showtopic=24331 Secondhander (way down towards the bottom), in my opinion, nailed the issue quite perfectly:

"It seems to me that the main mistake made is to tacitly presuppose that a man is something different than his attributes. Yes, you can look at my brain and "predict" what choice I am going to make. But my brain IS me, or part of what is me. So all you're really saying is that you are looking at what I am choosing to do and then saying it's not really me choosing it, just my brain, and therefore I don't really have free will, as though my brain isn't me."

 

Thanks!

 

In my earlier years, when I was a good seminary student and graduate, I gave a lot of thought to predestination (in terms of Reformed Theology) and how a person could be predestined and yet still have moral culpability for their actions. Long story short, I'm no longer religious but some of those same questions and thoughts have helped me in my understanding of this same issue in terms of natural predestination (if you will) and personal culpability. 

Edited by secondhander
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Thanks!

 

In my earlier years, when I was a good seminary student and graduate, I gave a lot of thought to predestination (in terms of Reformed Theology) and how a person could be predestined and yet still have moral culpability for their actions. Long story short, I'm no longer religious but some of those same questions and thoughts have helped me in my understanding of this same issue in terms of natural predestination (if you will) and personal culpability. 

You're welcome.  =]

 

For me it was the crucifiction.  I never could grasp why "everyone must be forgiven" translated into "kill him gruesomely" and the thought of sins being, not actually pardonable but sort of transferrable, did nothing to help ease my mind.

I still have yet to get a coherent answer to those questions. 

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  • 2 weeks later...

Thanks!

 

In my earlier years, when I was a good seminary student and graduate, I gave a lot of thought to predestination (in terms of Reformed Theology) and how a person could be predestined and yet still have moral culpability for their actions. Long story short, I'm no longer religious but some of those same questions and thoughts have helped me in my understanding of this same issue in terms of natural predestination (if you will) and personal culpability. 

 

I think "culpability" in the context of Objectivism does not rise to become a platonic existent "out there", certainly "moral culpability" is nothing like its Religious, Platonic or Kantian counterparts, and hence from an operational point of view (personally how do you extend your sense of "justice") you as an Objectivist would likely treat a "predestined" acting thing (human like robot?,, or perhaps a human itself) in the same way you would treat the non-predestined thing, which/who acts in similar ways.  Steer clear of the thing which thinks (processes) X and does Y based on it. and reward or befriend, or trade with one who thinks K and does J.

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