Castor

No that wouldn’t be sufficient. Illusions, biases, dreams, errors, wishful thinking or delusions can lead one to hold a false belief about the world. If only this person would verify that belief the falsehood of that belief might not show. If that is what Grames is addressing, I would respond with the following: Key point, in my understanding of objectivity, is not the actual participation of as many people as possible in investigating the truth of a statement. Rather it must be possible for others to test the claim in reality. When a claim only refers to ‘stuff’ that other people cannot detect, that claim is generally concerned as being subjective or false. The claim: ‘Paris is in France’ is objective, cause it is possible for others to verify it. The claim: ‘Paris is in France’ doesn’t become ‘more’ objective if more people verify it. The claim: ‘God is in Paris’ is subjective (or false), cause no one can verify it. The claim: ‘I like fries more than I like carrots’ is objective cause it can be verified by studying my eating behavior or maybe with a MRI scan of my brain while eating. The claim: ‘fries are more likeable than carrots’ is subjective (or false), cause no one can verify it. There are no observable facts in fries or carrots that express ‘likeability’. Can you, or anyone else, name one example of a fact that is a) generally regarded as objective, and is fundamentally closed for any form of verification by more than one person?

Please note that my conclusion was: “identification cannot be a purely objective act”. So I could agree to your “Nothing is ever "uniquely X to all people at all times."” When “nothing is ever "uniquely X to all people at all times."”, what value can a statement like ‘ X = X ’ have? Please note that I said verifiably is a precondition for a claim to be objective (and that the truth of that claim depends on the coherence with reality). A claim that cannot be verified by another person cannot be objective. A claim that can be verified by another person can be objective, but doesn’t have to be. The poll that you are referring to is impossible. There is no such thing as a poll over all times, all spaces and all people. Does that mean objectivity can never be proven? Maybe so, but you didn’t demonstrate them.

How is a proposition "this table is primarily treated as firewood" to be formalized in Objectivists’ terms? Is it something like: “the concrete object x as conceptualized as an integrated identity A is employed in reality to the extent that its expressing his integrated identity B and thus negating the A-identity”? At this point I think a more realistic account is this one: 1] The needs and wants of people are met when an object x is created with the capacity to perform a desired function F. (e.g. to place stuff on, preferable foods or decorative materials). 2] The capacity of a concrete object x to perform function F is equivalent to having an identity A1. (e.g. all table-like objects have the capacity to perform table-functions.) 3] In order for objects to exist they must be made of matter. The chosen materials for object x have identity M. (e.g. this table is made of wood.) 4] A concrete object x can be utilized for any desired function F2, F3, F4,….Fn, as long as it doesn’t contradict the physical properties of x, i.e. the only constrain is its identity M. (e.g. this table can be used as a raft, firewood, shelter,,, .) 5] Reiterating 2]: having the capacity to perform functions F2, F3, F4,….Fn is equivalent to having identities A2, A3,A4,,,,, An. 6] Thus object x can be identified as: (A1,A2,A3,,,,,,, and/or An) and M. 7] As 1] and 4] are predicated on the needs and wants of people, the identification is subjective in functional terms and only objective in reference to in its physical properties. (Although this specific object is meant as a table, commonly used as table, his material M fully enabling the usage as a table, we have to conclude that x is not uniquely a table to all people at all times). 8] Conclusion: identification cannot be a purely objective act. At this moment I personally think this last ‘deconstruction’ of identity is plausible and it seems to have some parallels with the accounts some Objectivists has given thus far. At the same time this conception of identification seems to differ substantial from what Ms Rand wants her readers to accept. (my marking) Man has not just only learned to use objective criteria in tool-making, he also has learned he has needs and desires and that those can be satisfied by tool-use. This is in part a subjective act, a valuation. A consciousness man is always creator and authority of identity. This is in part a subjective act, a valuation. A proposition containing this identity is only true when an objective part of the identity is indeed found in reality. e.g. The identity of Santa Claus is not: has wings, steals stuff from children and is dressed like Darth Vader. The ‘proper’ identity of Santa Claus is: dressed in red, quite chubby and old, gives stuff to children, ect. The ‘proper’ identity of Santa Claus has no factual reference in reality => Santa Clause does not exist. Even non-existing things have identities. These things considered I think Ms Rand suggests more rigorousness, more objectivity and more consistency than she actually delivers The ‘world’ of concepts seems to be much more muddy, more subject to agency and much less clear-cut as Rand portraits it to be. If something basic like the construction of concepts is partial but essential predicated on subjectivity it’s a misrepresentation to state: I think I can agree to your example but I question if Rand would with the bold part. Yes, AKA the metaphysical concept of objectivity. That definition struck me as a bit peculiar since a regular definition of realism entails: “Philosophers who profess realism state that truth consists in the mind's correspondence to reality.” By that account reality is not seen as being objective; only a belief or statement concerning reality can be objective (to some extent) if it accurately describes reality. In this more general view reality cannot be objective, only propositions can be. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism Rands Razor in the explanation here: In what regard is “description” different from “concept” one might ask, especially as Rand defines the concept of table in a descriptive manner. Also: this idea of “concept” doesn’t seem to promote well-being. Isn’t hair colour correlated to risk of sun induced skin cancer? I’ve discovered I find blonde x beautiful but, sadly, that does not apply to all other young woman. I’ve discovered she is 24 years old, in contrast to another woman who is 84. I might consider Blonde x as a candidate for marriage, reproduction or recreation while the 84-old woman is not in that conceptual domain. It’s seems essential for me to make this meaningful distinction/categorization. “Hi! I’m Mary” “No you are not, you are a woman.” “O Castor, you romantic fool….” A statement can be true on a desert island. As truth depends on the coherence with reality. When a second person would arrive he could verify the statement. The verifiably of a statement is a precondition for it to be objective, the actual verification is the explicit claim of a second person that this statement indeed is true. Without an actual verification a statement can be true and (maybe) objective but an observer stranded on an island has no absolute mean to be sure of that. I think I could sympathize with a good portion in these lines and with the way you formulated it. But in some way is doesn’t sound like the message or method Rand seems to promote. I wouldn’t be surprised to find a very similar phrasing as yours in a recommendation of a Nietzschean philosophy or of Existentialism (Sartre, de Beauvoir) The freedom’s you emphasize are very prominent in those philosophies, where, in my understanding of, Rand’s epistemology seems to advocate a kind of absolutistic reasoning.

As for primary sources: I have listened to “Philosophy Who Needs It” & “Objectivism - The Philosophy of Ayn Rand” (Piekoff) in full audiobooks. This question occurred to me while doing so. I did some additional research on-line but found no satisfying answer. Primarily I’m interested in a ‘good’ notion of objectivity, maybe an Objectivist notion, maybe another or maybe none. Whomever thinks discussing this is a waste of time is of course free to act accordingly. “Wooden table” is not a concept?? How is it even possible to think or talk about a “Wooden table”? Why would Objectivism not be able to integrate the concepts “wood” and “table”? As such a integration seems to be necessary to differentiate a wooden table from an iron table. The material of the table seems to be, In Objectivist terms, a irreducible primary in usages of tables where the specific material is important. So a tool-object is defined by its intended use; the use for which the maker intended the tool. And this object loses this identification the moment it loses the capacity for the intended function. That seems to imply, in an Objectivist view, that a physical object actually gets identified by another concept when you alter the physical object enough. Namely: after the point the physical object lost the last bit of capability to perform the indented use, it’s no longer identified as a “Table”. So the physical object has to be conceptualized in another way. Why doesn’t an actual, real usage supersede the original, intentional identification? Someone with the intention to burn the table is performing the same act of identifying an intended use: to be a source of warmth. That capacity is an objective fact. Furthermore: a wooden table always has the capacity to be used as firewood. As long, sometimes even longer, than the table is capable to perform its function as table, it’s also possible to burn it. The potential for that use is also determined objectively. As are the possibilities to use it for writing, as a raft, as a shelter, ect. ect. One could argue that the more accurate and fitting with reality one’s identifications are, the more they contribute to succeeding in one’s goals. So why is the indented use of something a more objective ground for the conceptualization than an actual usage or an intend one? Sure, but it also has to do with my attitude/stance towards things that express characteristics of buoyancy and flammability, and the possible usages of these characteristics. And note that these (and all other) physical properties are independent of our wishes and desires as well. Buoyancy and flammability are measurable. But when an table is used as firewood does it get another conceptualization? I was trying to state that my definition of objective would be: a statement is objective when it accurately describes a part of reality. The content and truth of an objective statement can be perceived (and must be accepted) by all reasonable men. In my opinion this definition view is very compatible with an Objectivist account of objectivity. My primarily questions are about the formations of concepts and how is that is objective in a Objectivist view. I would like to focus on that as I fully accept the reality as really existing independent from observers. Do you think the “essence” changes when the context changes? Does that imply that the conceptualization change as well? Maybe my original statement can be interpreted as expressing a form of intrinsicism, but that was certainly not what I meant. I fully accept the empirical reality of my table, it’s a fully real physical object with some very real and measurable properties. Any statement about my table is only objective when it concerns true facts that can be verified empirically by all reasonable and competed men. My questions here concern the way people conceptualize and to what extend that can be regarded as objective. Every concept that is objective must refer to a measurable aspect of reality. As indicated there are a lot of possible conceptualizations of any one physical object, ever so empirical, verifiable, practical and ever so objective. What is it that makes an Objectivist to accept any one conceptualization and reject other, empirical, verifiable and objective concepts? When I point at my wooden table and state: “this is a Flammable Object”, is a Objectivist forced to deny this statement? And if so, on which objective grounds? Is he/she forced to deny the concept of flammability or the concept of object or the integration of those identifications? What empirical fact makes a concept of a “flammable object” a non-concept for a physical object when it is in fact flammable?

Thanks for the replies! I thought (and please correct me when I'm wrong, as I'm quite new to Objectivism) that Objectivism aims at an objective kind of knowledge and not at an subjective kind (I.e. dependent of an observer). I take objective to mean something like independent of an observer, his subjective viewpoints or his interests. Additional qualifications like "purpose" or "context of the observer" seems to introduce a level of subjectivity. Does a identification of an object vary with the purpose of the observer? Does a empirical unit like a concrete table 'becomes' another concept when the circumstances or the interests of the observer chance? Is a boulder identifiable with the concept "Table" before is it used as such? Is it objective to say when pointing at a boulder: "look at that table"? When you use a table as firewood does it loose its association with the concept "Table"? Does it's identification change from the concept "Table" to "Firewood"? Is this chance in identification (if any) a objective fact or a chance in subjective identification caused by someone's need for warmth?

The Objectivists theory of concept-formation puzzles me. I hope someone can clarify this theory a bit. So an empirical, singular en concrete table in one’s room is related to all other perceived empirical unites of tables. The essential characteristics of all perceived tables are mentally integrated to form the concept “Table”. But now consider the concept of “Flammable Object”. An empirical wooden table is flammable and thus can be integrated in the concept of “Flammable Objects”. Or the concept of “Buoyant Object”. A singular wooden table has buoyancy and as such can be integrated in the concept of a “Buoyant Object”. It’s also possible to carve letters or numbers in the surface of that specific wooden table so as such the table could be part of the concept of “Medium for Information”. And so on, and so on. So when one perceives a specific wooden table how should one identify that unit of reality? Or more specific: what is an objective identification of a specific wooden table? Should one identify it as an instance of the concept “Table”? Or as an instance of the concept “Flammable Object”? Or is the empirical table to be identified as a “Buoyant Object” or as a “Medium for Information”? Or would the proper objective identification state: that thing over here is identified as an instance of the concept of a “Flammable, Buoyant Table with the capacity to hold Information”? What objective grounds are there for any particular identification and on what objective grounds does one reject other possible identifications?