Jump to content
Objectivism Online Forum

Free Will and the Choice to Focus

Rate this topic


Recommended Posts

I'm somewhat fascinate with the relationship that man has with wolves/dogs, because, in some ways, we are culturally more like wolves than other primates.  By this I mean that we evolved, like wolves, to cover large territories, hunting in small groups, for food.  However, unlike the wolves, when we made a kill, we did not devour it on-site.  We carried it back to a central local.

 

You are Grok, the Paleo hunter,on a day-trip hunting with four of your friends.  You realize that it's late afternoon and, if you turn around now, you can make it back to your cave with a little time to spare before nightfall.  However, if you don't make a kill soon, you will probably arrive back home after dark because you know from experience that when carrying heavy loads, even if distributed equitably among your hunting partners, you will be moving much slower.  Also, you may not be able to take as direct a route, and will have to take detours around hills and streams on your way back to the cave, adding time to your return journey.

 

My belief is that the unique cognitive trait that humans developed is not volition per se, but rather imagination which stemmed from this dual-type existence that we led as animals evolved to carry very heavy loads over great distances.  And the double-edge sword of this niche is that the more successful we became, and the larger our band grew, the more necessary it was for us to spread into new territories - eventually covering the globe.

 

The logistics of carrying heavy loads over rough terrain is entirely different that moving over terrain empty handed - as do wolves (and other animals).  The issue at hand, however, is not just the "logic" of solving logistical problems, but rather the dual nature of man i.e. empty handed and burdened.

Edited by New Buddha
Link to comment
Share on other sites

The programs do this a bit differently than humans do, though, because they have no grasp of the context. I mean, your computer is "perceiving" all kinds of things right now if you want to use a loose enough sense of that word, e.g., all the pictures and documents you've saved on it or viewed. The whole thing gets translated into bits switching on and off at the bottom, anyway. The problem is that it has no idea what these things are.

Response here.

I'm somewhat fascinate with the relationship that man has with wolves/dogs, because, in some ways, we are culturally more like wolves than other primates.

I think you'd get a kick out of this.

One of the things I find fascinating about Wolves is that they evolved into a world that already had such an apex predator; one that was actually bigger, faster and stronger than any Wolf (Terror Birds) and which they helped drive to extinction, in competing for its niche.

It's almost as if, after a billion years of life on Earth being dominated by the big and the strong, somebody flipped a switch and intelligence became more valuable in a single instant.

Something must have changed, but I haven't the faintest idea what.

Edited by Harrison Danneskjold
Link to comment
Share on other sites

"Not every consciousness has the faculty of volition. Every fallible, conceptual consciousness, however, does have it."

Does Peikoff argue this? I'd say consciousness of all kinds is fallible in the sense of not being automatically error-free. If the choice to focus is necessary to act at all, it's because it allows for attention onto the world AND internal mental states. If there is no attention on internal mental states, there is no consciousness. If there are no mental states, there is no consciousness. I don't see where or how Peikoff can argue that non-conceptual consciousness lacks volition.

The quote was from page 71 of OPAR, chapter 2 on Sense Perception and Volition.

His wording, suggests to me that in the range of consciousness' that do exist, not all of them has the faculty of volition, thus some of them do.

Does he argue this? Not really. The passage is inside a section dealing with determinism.

 

On the attention to internal mental states, would all consciousness' require the ability to attend to the mental state, or might it be sufficient to observe a threat and move away from it, or observe food to move toward. Isn't attention to an internal mental state a form of introspection?

Edited by dream_weaver
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On the attention to internal mental states, would all consciousness' require the ability to attend to the mental state, or might it be sufficient to observe a threat and move away from it, or observe food to move toward. Isn't attention to an internal mental state a form of introspection?

Learning what to attend to and what to ignore is a learned behavior, it is not a reflex or a stimulus-bond response (among the more complex animals that is).  In my deer example above, the deer in question learned to be skittish of noises by observing the behavior of others in it's herd.  Had the deer been raised in captivity, it might have moved towards the noise knowing from experience that the noise, and the time of day, means the arrival of food by the keepers.  Dogs learn the sound of a can opener. and go into the kitchen looking for food.

 

This type of "attention" is not introspection, or the playing out multiple, hypothetical scenarios via abstract reasoning (as humans do) but it is conscious attentive behavior.  We know this in part, because this behavior can be attenuated by lesions or drugs, etc. affecting the ability to move to or acquire their goals.   Animals also sometimes have to figure out a strategy to get to their object of their attention, the more complex the animal, the more complex the strategy.

 

Add Edit:  If we are lucky to live to the age of 90, fully 30 YEARS of our life is spent non-attentive, i.e. a sleep.  Attention/volition severs a purpose, but it is not the purpose.

Edited by New Buddha
Link to comment
Share on other sites

New Buddha,

 

My question was directed toward an internal mental state as the object of attending to. The deer example indicates the deer's reaction to external stimuli, based on previous exposure. If this is an internal mental state, than I am still trying to sort out an understanding on some of these terms, and how they are being deployed here.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

My understand is that volitional attention is a "system" of the cortex that is active when we are awake.  There are, at all times that we are awake, various signals that are competing for attention of the cortical "self", and the strongest one usually wins.  By signals, I'm not talking metaphorically, I mean bioelectric, neurotransmitters and/or hormonal signals which are largely thought to be managed by the thalamus.  When you are settled in for the night, reading a book, the signal to noise ratio (S/N) is very low.  So when you hear a doorbell (a signal loud enough to overcome your concentration on reading) you switch attention.

 

But, even if you don't hear a doorbell, you mind will still wander.  You will scratch, shift position to increase circulation in your legs, think about a conversation you had earlier in the day, think about getting a drink, what you need to do for work tomorrow, etc.

 

This constant switching of attention to different signals is not a bug - it's a feature!  If you focused on any one signal (S/n) to the exclusion of all others, it would be disastrous - you would in affect be hypnotized.  Also, if you could not differentiate noise from signals (s/N) it too would be disastrous.  The ratio of S/N is also contextual.  The sound of a doorbell might barely register if you have a large, loud group of people gathered at your place.

 

This attention shifting behavior is not unique to humans.

 

From Lee Pierson paper:

 

The fringe/focus distinction makes volitional selection (switching among objects of attention) possible. An organism cannot directly choose the contents of its consciousness from outside its consciousness. You cannot consciously, directly select from outside your consciousness the next mental content to focus on within consciousness. You cannot say to yourself “I will now think about this” unless you are already at least peripherally conscious of the “this.” You can select content from within consciousness by
moving content from the fringe to the focus of awareness, and you can bring in more information about a given subject by choosing to sustain a thought process about it. 
Link to comment
Share on other sites

On the attention to internal mental states, would all consciousness' require the ability to attend to the mental state, or might it be sufficient to observe a threat and move away from it, or observe food to move toward. Isn't attention to an internal mental state a form of introspection?

Yes, and to some degree, anything conscious would be aware of a mental state, otherwise it'd be "empty in the head". To be aware of a mental state would take a degree of focus. Focus is the minimal volitional choice. That's why I don't see how any consciousness could lack volition.

Edited by Eiuol
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yes, and to some degree, anything conscious would be aware of a mental state, otherwise it'd be "empty in the head". To be aware of a mental state would take a degree of focus. Focus is the minimal volitional choice. That's why I don't see how any consciousness could lack volition.

A line from an introduction to Newton's Principia has Isaac returning home from church to discover that the dog had started a fire in his study by knocking a lit flame over. He admonished the dog with something along the lines of "You know not what havoc you have wreaked here." If both consciousness' are volitional, why is the dog absolved of moral blame by Newton, if the key to moral judgement lay in the volitional capacity?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Yes, and to some degree, anything conscious would be aware of a mental state, otherwise it'd be "empty in the head". To be aware of a mental state would take a degree of focus. Focus is the minimal volitional choice. That's why I don't see how any consciousness could lack volition.

 

Asserting "a degree of" something is a bit like asserting "a form of" something.  I think the trouble comes from suggesting equivalence by degree or form, which is something I've certainly been guilty of at times.  Focus is a pretty big deal, more I think than simply observing an apparent choice and presuming it was determined rather than just the result of a momentum of action.  It seems entirely possible that forks in the road may be taken randomly, with focus only coming to play as a course correction if necessary (and possible).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

A line from an introduction to Newton's Principia has Isaac returning home from church to discover that the dog had started a fire in his study by knocking a lit flame over. He admonished the dog with something along the lines of "You know not what havoc you have wreaked here." If both consciousness' are volitional, why is the dog absolved of moral blame by Newton, if the key to moral judgement lay in the volitional capacity?

 

The key to moral judgement is intention.  Did the dog choose to set his master's study on fire?  S**t happens, and the dog probably felt panic and terror at the event, and latter met Issac's return quivering with his tail between his legs being at least aware that Dad was going to be in a mood.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The key to moral judgement is intention.  Did the dog choose to set his master's study on fire?  S**t happens, and the dog probably felt panic and terror at the event, and latter met Issac's return quivering with his tail between his legs being at least aware that Dad was going to be in a mood.

So as long as I just act in a volitional manor,  if I had no intention of killing the man who blocked my way to robbing a bank when I stabbed him with a knife — I am absolved of murder?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

He admonished the dog with something along the lines of "You know not what havoc you have wreaked here." If both consciousness' are volitional, why is the dog absolved of moral blame by Newton, if the key to moral judgement lay in the volitional capacity?

Why admonish the dog at all, instead of himself (for failing to predict and consequently prevent such havoc)?

Volition is one of the keys to moral judgment but it's not the only one.

It seems entirely possible that forks in the road may be taken randomly...

I don't think so.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

So as long as I just act in a volitional manor, if I had no intention of killing the man who blocked my way to robbing a bank when I stabbed him with a knife — I am absolved of murder?

Yes. "Murder" means the conscious choice to kill another human being.

It might be a good idea to lock you up anyway, if you're capable of making an error like that, but it wouldn't be for murder (and we do exactly the same thing to animals which, for whatever reasons they can't control, become a threat to us).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I mean, look at the parents who've killed their own children through their irrational refusal to vaccinate them. It wouldn't be fair to call them murderers; most of them, in the very least, had no intention to kill their children, but it wouldn't be fair to let them go on hurting their other children either.

That's why concepts like "manslaughter" and "criminal negligence" are actually vital to the proper rule of law.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Why admonish the dog at all, instead of himself (for failing to predict and consequently prevent such havoc)?

Volition is one of the keys to moral judgment but it's not the only one.

The admonishment of the dog was the authors couching, and it fit with the scenario. Volition as a key component to moral judgement has been rudimentary to me prior to this discussion. I would not have admonished the dog.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I mean, look at the parents who've killed their own children through their irrational refusal to vaccinate them. It wouldn't be fair to call them murderers; most of them, in the very least, had no intention to kill their children, but it wouldn't be fair to let them go on hurting their other children either.

That's why concepts like "manslaughter" and "criminal negligence" are actually vital to the proper rule of law.

I think I get this, but the crux to me is of the blurring of the lines of instinctive vs. volitional with regard to non-conceptual consciousness. I see dogs and birds play with each other or dogs and squirrels, or even on an extreme of a dog and and a polar bear. It bears the mark of volition as I grasp it, but stepping over the line I ask about what is being invoked here. Conceptually, a parent need come to terms with vaccination, and if there is a valid reason in reality for complying with it. A bird, squirrel, possum, dog, or even a bear has no grasp of such a phenomenon as vaccination. If play, in such cases is instinctual, I have no issue, but as a matter of volition, there is something I am not grasping here.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

So as long as I just act in a volitional manor,  if I had no intention of killing the man who blocked my way to robbing a bank when I stabbed him with a knife — I am absolved of murder?

 

Hey, I never meant to hurt anyone.  Usually I just point my knife and people just give me whatever they can afford, you know?  But not this guy, he gets up in my face no matter which way I turn, there he is.  I'm telling you he was all over the place; I couldn't miss him.  I ask you, what was I suppose to do?!

 

The admonishment of the dog was the authors couching, and it fit with the scenario. Volition as a key component to moral judgement has been rudimentary to me prior to this discussion. I would not have admonished the dog.

 

Neither would I.  Volition is an exercise of will, i.e., intention.  There has to be an alternative action that was intentionally avoided.  My dog is house trained, but my dog also reacts negatively to disruptions in our routine.  Usually when I find poo on the carpet, it's not an accident; it's a vote.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

My dog is house trained, but my dog also reacts negatively to disruptions in our routine.  Usually when I find poo on the carpet, it's not an accident; it's a vote.

This comes across as another anthropomorphic projection onto the pooch to me.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

So as long as I just act in a volitional manor,  if I had no intention of killing the man who blocked my way to robbing a bank when I stabbed him with a knife — I am absolved of murder?

Cause and Effect is epistemic, not ontological.

 

If you stab a man in the lungs, did he bleed to death? or die of asphyxiation?  Could there be a case where the coroner could not determine which caused the death?  Did you kill the man?  Or your knife?  Or the drop in blood pressure?  Or the lack of oxygen?

 

We draw epistemic boundaries around what we observe.

Edited by New Buddha
Link to comment
Share on other sites

This ultimately boils down to the insufficiency of our concepts for entity-based causality. Causality, and particularly the O'ist idea of it, is implicit throughout the English language. However, like most things implicit, it's also full of warps and holes and all sorts of nonsense.

 

Can you elaborate on this?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Asserting "a degree of" something is a bit like asserting "a form of" something. 

Not really, "a degree of X" is still X. The idea is simple and fundamental to Objectivist epistemology. It's measurement omission here: omitting a particular measurement, but the measurement exists in some quantity. "A degree of X" is not a distinct quantity from X, it's a type of X. As long as a degree of focus is present, it's still focus. The degree of focus is what distinguishes conceptual from non-conceptual awareness. I don't see a reason to say focus is a difference in kind as opposed to a difference of degree. After all, we're speaking of an abstract quantity, not entities, plus I'm claiming this quantity is always part of consciousness. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

This comes across as another anthropomorphic projection onto the pooch to me.

 

It's intended to come across as an ability to communicate an emotional response.  As a counter example to actions that are accidental, or non-volitional, Newton's dog may be absolved from wrong doing, not because it's a dog, but because it's action was unintentional (choice-less).  My dog's action may be held accountable on the other hand because my carpet was intentionally targeted.  It isn't necessarily anthropomorphic to deduce intention (or lack thereof) by a behavioral response, e.g., tail wagging, cowering, raised hackles, etc.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Loading...
  • Recently Browsing   0 members

    • No registered users viewing this page.

×
×
  • Create New...