Free Will and the Choice to Focus

[Harrison Danneskjold]

Can you elaborate on this?

You think unfocused action isn't possible?

The misidentification of "unfocused action" as random action, for one thing.

When wolves chase down their prey they clench their sphincters, to prevent excretion that would interfere with their running. That's far from random (random would be to actually let loose anytime and anywhere) but it's not a conscious choice, either, any more than when you do the same thing under similar circumstances.

"Random" and "deliberate" are contextual, anyway; a single action can have deliberately chosen consequences alongside accidental side-effects (indeed, since omniscience is physically impossible, every action ultimately does).

---

Look at Obama's "you didn't build that" speech, which denied any form of individual responsibility by arguing that nobody has ever willed themselves into existence from nothing - as if that were what we mean by "volition". What he was truly refuting was the idea of an unmoved mover which by all reason should've died in the rennaisance, anyway.

Look at the swirling controversy that surrounds any discussion of consciousness (even on this forum) - particularly the number of unverifiable claims for which there simply is no clear way to determine their truth or falsehood; that's a sure sign that you've based your proposition on flawed concepts.

Our progress in understanding consciousness is about where medieval Europe was in understanding motion, before Galileo.

[Devil's Advocate]

Not really, "a degree of X" is still X. The idea is simple and fundamental to Objectivist epistemology. It's measurement omission here: omitting a particular measurement, but the measurement exists in some quantity. "A degree of X" is not a distinct quantity from X, it's a type of X. As long as a degree of focus is present, it's still focus. The degree of focus is what distinguishes conceptual from non-conceptual awareness. I don't see a reason to say focus is a difference in kind as opposed to a difference of degree. After all, we're speaking of an abstract quantity, not entities, plus I'm claiming this quantity is always part of consciousness. 

 

What bothers me is that by linking everything by degree you undermine any distinction between elements, because as you say, "A degree of X is not a distinct quantity from X, it's a type of X", i.e., a form of X. So apparently consciousness cannot lack volition because all mental states take a degree of focus, focus being the minimal volitional choice. Volition further implies introspection by degree, which ultimately leads us to flatworms that are self aware and willful... by degree.

[New Buddha]

Our progress in understanding consciousness is about where medieval Europe was in understanding motion, before Galileo.

The medieval Scholastics reduced everything to God.  This was true for both motion and consciousness.    There was nothing could not be explained by them. They believed in some form of either Platonic or ontological essentialism.  These two variants of essentialism - coupled with reductionism - will lead inevitably to what appear to be contradictions and/or paradoxes.  Many modern scientists still think this way. 

 

What is the essential characteristic of consciousness?  Depends on the context.

[Eiuol]

Volition further implies introspection by degree, which ultimately leads us to flatworms that are self aware and willful... by degree.

Yes, it would. Worms would be a borderline case probably, given how primitive they are, and not self-aware as in knowing it exists (see the Rand quotes DW gave a few pages back). There are many things that differ by some characteristic, and share another. To be clearer: Consciousness has an essential feature - attention and awareness on the world. To do this requires focus to some degree, that's the omitted measurement. That's a claim in opposition to Peikoff, but I don't know what his argument is about what a non-volitional consciousness would be. As long as my conception of consciousness includes focus, then any differences in form will still maintain one commonality: focus. I'm not undermining any distinctions, all I said is focus is a continuous quantity, i.e. a matter of degree.

 

I need to think about it more, but I'd say focus is put ONTO different forms of content. A percept is different in kind than a concept, and that's not a matter of degree. Focus is neither perceptual nor conceptual, it's an action.

 

Will and self-awareness I consider different, with different connotations. Are worms "willful"? To me, willful means something like "a lot of focus", but there's enough going on to say an animal like a bee "meant" to do what it did. Lions, bears, hawks, worms, goldfish -  willful is more so a poetic way to describe how these animals do or don't pursue life. Something like Nietzsche's will to power.

[Devil's Advocate]

The term consciousness may be too broad for all animals, being an “awareness by the mind of itself and the world” (by common definition), and something we can agree worms don’t possess.  Perhaps the term awareness provides a better starting point for all animals, being perceptive to sensory data without necessarily implying understanding (again, by common definition).  From there we can delimit willful actions to a subset of animals that are mindful they have a will to express, i.e. consciousness.  We should then be able to agree that focus requires a consciousness that doesn’t extend downwards to a more primative awareness of the immediate surroundings.  Humans get it, worms don’t.

Edited August 5, 2015 by Devil's Advocate

[dream_weaver]

"Not every consciousness has the faculty of volition. Every fallible, conceptual consciousness, however, does have it."

Does Peikoff argue this? I'd say consciousness of all kinds is fallible in the sense of not being automatically error-free. If the choice to focus is necessary to act at all, it's because it allows for attention onto the world AND internal mental states. If there is no attention on internal mental states, there is no consciousness. If there are no mental states, there is no consciousness. I don't see where or how Peikoff can argue that non-conceptual consciousness lacks volition.

I missed this passage earlier.

From pgs. 14-15 of For The New Intellectual:

 

Man's consciousness shares with animals the first two stages of its development: sensations and perceptions; but it is the third state, conceptions, that make him man. Sensations are integrated into perceptions automatically, by the brain of a man or of an animal. But to integrate perceptions into conceptions by a process of abstraction, is a feat that man alone has the power to perform—he has to perform it by choice. The process of abstraction, and of concept-formation is a process of reason, of thought; it is not automatic nor instinctive nor involuntary nor infallible. Man has to initiate it, to sustain it and to bear responsibility for its results. The pre-conceptual level of consciousness is nonvolitional; volition begins with the first syllogism. Man has the choice to think or to evade—to maintain a state of full awareness or to drift from moment to moment, in a semi-conscious daze, at the mercy of whatever associational whims the unfocused mechanism of his consciousness produces.

 

But the living organisms that possess the faculty of consciousness need to exercise it in order to survive. An animal's consciousness functions automatically; an animal perceives what it is able to perceive and survives accordingly, no further than the perceptual level permits and no better.

 

As used here, volitional presupposes conceptual consciousness.

[Eiuol]

Thanks DW, but I'd say the ITOE quotes from the appendix shows that Rand hesitates to even talk about volitional in the context of pre-conceptual awareness. FTNI was published before ITOE, so it's fair to say Rand may have changed her thoughts:

 

"And although I hesitate to talk about volition on the preconceptual level—because the subject isn't aware of it in those terms—even a preconceptual infant has the power to look around or not look, to listen or not listen. He has a certain minimal, primitive form of volition over the function of his senses."

 

It's not a major shift at all in terms of epistemology, but it is a tweak from saying "the pre-conceptual level of consciousness is nonvolitional". This part I quoted is my view, and I've been arguing that this tweaked view is the right one. I only wish Rand wrote a follow-up to ITOE and expanded beyond an introduction.

 

Believe it or not, DA's previous post I agree with! I'd word it differently, but the main idea I agree with.

[dream_weaver]

I would add that the use in the workshop was extemporaneous and later transcribed, contrasted with edited thoughts expressed in FTNI albeit eight to ten years earlier.

 

To go from volition in a primitive sense to volition in a full sense rings of the distinction between value in the broadest context to value in the full rational context.

 

I'm still leaning toward the animal's consciousness functioning automatically. I would agree that consciousness has a range where snails, worms, and oysters could be operating by reactions to sensations. Even the Mimosa pudica a.k.a. the sensitive plant and sleepy plant, has leaves which fold in and droop when touched or shaken.

[New Buddha]

The term consciousness may be too broad for all animals, being an “awareness by the mind of itself and the world” (by common definition), and something we can agree worms don’t possess.  Perhaps the term awareness provides a better starting point for all animals, being perceptive to sensory data without necessarily implying understanding (again, by common definition).  From there we can delimit willful actions to a subset of animals that are mindful they have a will to express, i.e. consciousness.  We should then be able to agree that focus requires a consciousness that doesn’t extend downwards to a more primative awareness of the immediate surroundings.  Humans get it, worms don’t.

If, via drugs or inducing sleep, you can render an organism un-conscious and yet it still maintains homeostasis, metabolizes nutrients, engages in cellular repair, etc., then the animal can be said to posses consciousness.  This would be true of a fruit fly, worm, hamster, dog, human, etc.  It's not true of a plant, however.  When we use anesthetics to put someone under for an operation, we are affecting a certain part of the brain.

 

There is a difference between consciousness, which is common to all animals, and self-consciousness, which is uniquely human.

Edited August 6, 2015 by New Buddha

[Devil's Advocate]

...

To go from volition in a primitive sense to volition in a full sense rings of the distinction between value in the broadest context to value in the full rational context.

...

 

What’s primitive volition?  Having optional reactions??  There's no "form of" volition that doesn't acknowledge willpower, which means taking the initiative.  A forest fire is approaching from the North.  How many animals move towards the flames to fight it?  Does having 3 points on the compass to escape to demonstrate taking the initiative?

[dream_weaver]

What’s primitive volition?  Having optional reactions??  There's no "form of" volition that doesn't acknowledge willpower, which means taking the initiative.  A forest fire is approaching from the North.  How many animals move towards the flames to fight it?  Does having 3 points on the compass to escape to demonstrate taking the initiative?

Once again from ITOE appendix,

And although I hesitate to talk about volition on the preconceptual level—because the subject isn't aware of it in those terms—even a preconceptual infant has the power to look around or not look, to listen or not listen. He has a certain minimal, primitive form of volition over the function of his senses. But volition in the full sense of a conscious choice, and a choice which he can observe by introspection, begins when he forms concepts.

 

She could also be hesitant because she thinks or thought: "The pre-conceptual level of consciousness is nonvolitional; volition begins with the first syllogism."

[Devil's Advocate]

Because the subject isn't aware of it in those terms, should be indication enough that the term is being misapplied.

Edited August 6, 2015 by Devil's Advocate

[Eiuol]

I don't know what you mean DA, not being aware of terms would suggest simply a lack of conceptual awareness which consists of language. It's not a misapplied idea to say a subject can't tell you why it does what it does. The only problem here is working out what it would mean to act with intention. All evidence points to yes for animals as simple as ants, but clearly their lack of conceptual ability constrains the choices they're able to make considerably.

[New Buddha]

If all knowledge, no matter how abstract, is traceable to perception, what would either side of this issue need to observe to say that, "Yep, I was wrong and the other side is right."

[Harrison Danneskjold]

There's no "form of" volition that doesn't acknowledge willpower, which means taking the initiative.

A rat has initiative. If you put a rat in a maze with a treat in the center, they'll take the initiative to find it; so could a human. The rat cannot ask why the maze is there in the first place, though.

I really do think it's important that the apes which we've taught to use sign language have thus far proven incapable of understanding "why". It's not that it's a foriegn concept (all symbolism is, at first) but that they are not actually able to form that idea; it's incommunicable.

I furthermore think it's directly related to Rand's identification (I'm sure DW can find the precise quote) of "volition" as a mental analogue of the purposeful actions any animal can physically perform.

Edited August 7, 2015 by Harrison Danneskjold

[dream_weaver]

It took a couple of tries. Volition near identity came back with:

The Ayn Rand Letter
Vol. II, No. 12  March 12, 1973
The Metaphysical Versus The Man-Made

[M]an exists and his mind exists. Both are part of nature, both possess a specific identity. The attribute of volition does not contradict the fact of identity, just as the existence of living organisms does not contradict the existence of inanimate matter. Living organisms possess the power of self-initiated motion, which inanimate matter does not possess; man's consciousness possesses the power of self-initiated motion in the realm of cognition (thinking), which the consciousnesses of other living species do not possess. But just as animals are able to move only in accordance with the nature of their bodies, so man is able to initiate and direct his mental action only in accordance with the nature (the identity) of his consciousness. His volition is limited to his cognitive processes; he has the power to identify (and to conceive of rearranging) the elements of reality, but not the power to alter them.

 

Given your wording, I'm not sure if this is what you were grasping for. Purposeful near action did not bring back anything fruitful.




 

[Devil's Advocate]

If all knowledge, no matter how abstract, is traceable to perception, what would either side of this issue need to observe to say that, "Yep, I was wrong and the other side is right."

 

To observe something that either agreed with or contradicted an objectively known truth.

[Devil's Advocate]

I don't know what you mean DA, not being aware of terms would suggest simply a lack of conceptual awareness which consists of language. It's not a misapplied idea to say a subject can't tell you why it does what it does. The only problem here is working out what it would mean to act with intention. All evidence points to yes for animals as simple as ants, but clearly their lack of conceptual ability constrains the choices they're able to make considerably.

 

Preconceptual isn't a degree or form of conceptual awareness.  It's a lack of conceptual awareness.  It can't tell you why it does what it does because it doesn't know why it does what it does.  It simply does.  Throw 3 carrots at a rabbit and it will "choose" one.  Why?  Because it's hungry.  Why that one??  Because it's hungry.  Why not the other one???  Because it's hungry.

 

When choices are constrained to impulses can we truly describe them as volitional?

[New Buddha]

 Why that one??....Why not the other one???

Handedness has been explained by some as biasing the decision making process -- meaning, simplifying the decision making process to pick something up with the right hand in lieu of the left hand.  In this way, it reduces the number of "choices" that an organism needs to make, and makes thinking more economical and less energy intensive (thinking   deliberative decision making is one of the most calorie-burning activities that humans do).

Edited August 7, 2015 by New Buddha

[Devil's Advocate]

Handedness is yet another example of, "a natural desire or tendency that makes you want to act in a particular way", which by definition points away from volition towards instinct. To suggest handedness is an economical form (or degree) of volition uses a modifier that transforms the specific meaning of the word away from thoughtful towards impulsive action. Can the same case be made without using modifiers as a crutch to replace what is commonly referred to as instinctive with a form or degree of volition??

[Eiuol]

NewBuddha didn't say handedness is itself a form of choice to any degree. It's part of a decision-making routine where preferences enter the process when making a decision. No, it might not lead to thoughtful action, but it still leads to an intention. "Degree of" is an adjective, it doesn't take away the essentials.

[Devil's Advocate]

The essential I see being taken away by degree is willpower, to the point where it becomes prevolitional.  A volitional use of handedness would be to focus on using the unfavored hand.  A decision making routine requires something more than a natural desire or tendency that makes you want to act in a particular way.

 

EDIT:  Being averse to allowing that all actions suggest a volitonal degree of focus, I looked for some other avenue to account for what has generally been considered to be instinctive behavior and found the following:

 

"Psychologists say that episodic memory mediates the ability to remember—or to engage in a form of 'mental time travel.' The question is whether that ability is uniquely human.

 

'There are many beautiful examples of complex behavior that occur without higher thought or consciousness,' cautions Endel Tulving, a cognitive psychologist at the Rotman Research Institute of Baycrest Center for Geriatric Care in Toronto. In his book 'Elements of Episodic Memory,' Tulving wrote that animals can adjust, adapt, and learn, but they cannot 'travel back into the past in their own minds.' But he enjoys the fact that scientists are challenging his ideas."

 

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/08/0822_030822_tvanimalmemory.html

 

And I enjoy the fact that you are challenging mine.  Usually I'm the one arguing for animal abilities, so this is a interesting turn of events for me

Edited August 7, 2015 by Devil's Advocate

[New Buddha]

Objectivist literature tends to breakdown knowledge into two types.  I see it as, at a minimum, breaking down into three types:

 

1.  Instinct, Fixed Action Patterns:  A baby will grasp something if it's placed in his hand.  A baby will shy away from a ledge.  A new born horse will try and stand within hours of being born.  Ducks will imprint on a human or a dog.  Etc.  These are hard wired behavior.  We know this, because experiments have been conducted that can erase this behavior, and yet the animal will still live, although in a greatly compromised state.

 

2. Learned Behavior that is species-specific, regional, and handed down thru generations through nurturing.  Geese migration, wolfs hunting in pack, introducing a wild wolf pack into a new region with different seasonal patterns and prey types. etc. as discussed in posts above.  Human babies learning at a pre-verbal, pre-conceptual level fall into this category.

 

3.  The uniquely human ability to abstract-from-abstractions and break complex problems down into simpler problems, in an algorithmic manner, so that they can be solved.  This is done via math and language and is done externally (by externally I mean graphs, writing, chalk boards, computer codes, etc.).  Working externally allows us to greatly extend past our perceptual boundaries - which are, in many ways identical to other complex animals.

 

Edit.  These systems (and they correspond, roughly, to different brain systems) are layered, via evolution.  Evolution does not scrap things very often.  It builds on previous success.  All animals do 1, (insects, birds, fish, reptiles, mammals).  Some do 2, but only one does 3.

Edited August 7, 2015 by New Buddha

[Eiuol]

The essential I see being taken away by degree is willpower, to the point where it becomes prevolitional.  A volitional use of handedness would be to focus on using the unfavored hand.  A decision making routine requires something more than a natural desire or tendency that makes you want to act in a particular way.

But how does a natural desire, as you call it, manage to cause action? To say there are natural desires is to say there are mental states, and for mental states to have an effect on action requires focus onto those states. All I keep seeing is equating human volition with all volition. A fixed pattern behavior is sensible, but keep in mind that it doesn't contradict what I'm arguing for, that all acts of focus require volition and that all behavior requires focus.

[Devil's Advocate]

Good list New Buddah, and I mostly agree with your edited conclusions.  The following is my take on positing what you've presented by objective observation:

 
1) Default Actions (instinctive):  Actions that occur from birth that an animal may or may not have the ability to modify, i.e., impulsive behavior <<all animals>>

 
2) Acquired Actions (learned):  Actions that are acquired by observation of others, or by chance, and demonstrate modified default behavior, i.e., intentional behavior <<many animals>>

 
3) Volitional Actions (willful):  Actions that demonstrate "I want this to happen", by pursuing a consequence initiated by the actor, i.e., individual behavior << few animals >>

 
And with that I'm going to retire for the weekend to mull this over (including your latest, Eiuol)...