37 replies to this topic

[John McVey]

I am writing my own personal book on economics (which I intend to clean up for proper publication, eventually). I could do with some feedback on one of the chapters I have finished as a draft. This extract is early on (chapter 5 out of 23 I have outlines for so far, and there will be many more), and it only takes for granted what most posters to this forum already know (ie Objectivism). The chapter, called "the concept of value" is also the first in three chapters under a Part called "The Theory of Value". The other two chapters deal with living things and action, and the context of valuation.

What I want to know is:
1) is it understandable?
2) have I made any mistakes anywhere, whether of content or method?
3) is my style too awkward (I know I am bookish)?
4) have I concretised enough, too much, or not enough?
5) are there any other references to the works of others I ought make?
6) have I over-referenced?
7) any other comments people care to make?

It's long - grand total is just over 10,000 words. I have broken it into five separate posts in this thread, which match the five sections in the chapter. They are: formation of the concept of value, prerequisites of value, measurement of value, objective values, and non-objective values.

One last point: in the prerequisites of value I specify four. Prima facie Miss Rand specified three, but she does mention the fourth in a way later on in the Objectivist Ethics, as does Dr Buechner in his six-part lecture series. All I did to get the fourth was take a point from Carl Menger's prerequisites of something being a good and realised that this point could be generalised to all value after including consideration of what Miss Rand and Dr Buechner said.

Two people have expressed interest when I have asked them about it, so here goes...

Edited by John McVey, 18 July 2007 - 05:07 AM.

[John McVey]

1 The formation of the concept
Economic theory begins with an examination of the nature of value. We are not concerned with things from alleged planes of existence beyond the universe we inhabit, so we will ignore them and discount the values commonly associated with them.

The two-fold nature of value
There are two senses in which the word ‘value’ may be used in economics. These are the ideas of value as an entity and value as a magnitude. An entity is only referred to as being a value as an entity because it possesses value as a magnitude. Both are fundamental to economics as it is at root the study of the nature and causes of interaction between value as an entity and value as a magnitude, as apply under different circumstances.

By ‘entity’ we do not mean solely physical objects. Entity means anything that actually exists, so long as it has at least some form of physical existence. To start with, a value may well be as obvious as a single specific item or collection of items. These are the directly observable physical objects, such as a cat or a pen or a house. Other values are also directly observable and have a physical existence but are not objects. Examples of these are specific characteristics of items such as choice of brick colour in one’s intended house, activities performed by others as in all labour services, and relationships with others such as someone being on call for work. These can also become broader and more abstract, extending all the way to whole social systems and cultures. Value can also go on to foci of value that are sometimes harder to correctly identify. An example will be access to something whose existence or other characteristics may be taken for granted, such as sunlight in northern climes as opposed to those closer to the equator. Whatever they are, what may be a proper value will be something that exists in some physical form in this world. As real existents, the values we are concerned with are subject to the same laws of identity and causality as the same as everything else that exits.

Both uses of the concept can be found outside of economics. The concept of value as an entity is also used in social sciences and some life sciences. As economics is itself a social science, it is directly dependent on the principles of its use as developed by core science that sets the tone for all social sciences. The concept of value as a magnitude is also extensively used outside of the field of the social sciences altogether, where many of the principles of dealing with the concept of value developed by them are also applicable to economics. The primary source of those principles is mathematics, which are then used in the physical sciences. Economics uses the principles developed by both. It takes the principles from the fundamental underlying all social sciences, then in conjunction with many relevant ones from mathematics, formulates its own to add to the total for its own use.

The main source for economics is that which allows its use in all the social sciences. The formation of the concept of value for use in social science is the province of the philosophical field of ethics[1]. It is no accident that concepts such as value, worth, good, action, rationality, and many others like these, are fundamental to both ethics and economics. Political and economic theories are all derivative fields that depend on ethics and general philosophy. Economic action is a subset of all action generally, and the principles that hold for action generally are applicable to all subsets within it, including economics. Similarly, economic value is a subset of all moral values generally. To understand the concept of value fully it is therefore necessary to start with how ethics explains it and then apply it to economics.

The meaning of value
The formation of any concept begins by looking at all the instances of something. The practice is to cast one’s vision and mind over a wide range of concretes, and then seeing what simultaneously unites them and also differentiates them from other concretes[2]. Our world is a physical one, where what exists primarily is entities. Magnitudes of value are characteristics assigned to or ascribed of them, and do independent of entities. There can be entities that possess no value, but there cannot be values that exist without entities. It is values as entities we must look at first as magnitudes are a derivative phenomenon.

When we look at all the entities that are said to be valuable we will find a great many characteristics that are common to them all. In order to understand any concept we must pick out from that set what is essential for that concept. This means simultaneously picking out what best distinguishes the concretes from what not part of that concept and also what best causally explains the largest number of all the other common characteristics. That characteristic is then used as the central element in the formal definition of the concept. Apply this to value and we arrive at this definition: a value is that which one acts to gain or keep[3]. Consider sunlight, for example. Plants act to make use of it, so do lizards, and so do people who are beachgoers. A comet, by contrast, reacts to sunlight but does not initiate action and does not try to gain or keep sunlight.

This definition holds irrespective of why anything is said to have value. Whatever it is, if there is action to gain or keep an entity then that entity is treated as a value. The easiest to see are the ‘instrumental’ values, those things we use as instruments for various purposes. The plant and lizard value sunlight for specific purposes, and a person can value sunlight because it lights things up. Other values are not instrumental, and are valued as ends in themselves rather than as useful for purposes. They are still acted towards so as to gain or keep them, such as a day at the beach. Irrespective of the whys and wherefores, we call entities valuable because they possess magnitudes of value, where that possession of magnitude of value causes us to separate them from what does not bear any magnitude of value. We separate them in mind as a precursor to determining action to gain and/or keep entities that are valuable because they possess magnitudes of value.

The need to look at conceptual roots
We know that values are that which one acts to gain and/or keep, that entities are called values and pursued because they possess a magnitude of value – but why? Why do some entities possess those magnitudes of value in the first place? What is so special about them that they are separable from other things and worthy of action to gain or keep them while what they are separated from is not worthy of that action? The question is most obviously relevant to non-instrumental values, but even for the instrumental values there is the question of why the purpose is valued? A beachgoer will value a beach-towel because it is something to place on the sand to lie on, but people aren’t reptiles so what purpose does lying in the sun serve? Is something a value merely because at some point it comes down to that someone or something says so?

That kind of question only arises because most people use the word ‘value’ without fully understanding where it came from in the first place. All we have done so far is to point out that value is not an invalid concept, but not explained what value really is and why. Value is an abstract concept, not a perceptual level primary. It cannot be properly understood simply by physically pointing out a host of examples and saying “that’s what value means.” To try to develop scientific theories from with a primitive notion like that is to become vulnerable to confusion and error. A key problem in every science is that people who lack a full understanding of a concept they’re using frequently end up denying the necessity of the concepts that are logically prior to it. This error is called the fallacy of the stolen concept[4], and especially destructive when committed in relation to fundamental concepts. Full understanding requires the understanding of the logically prior concepts and principles that give rise to it. We must reduce the concept back through its conceptual roots[5].

Life as the prime conceptual root
When we look at all the instances of value and realise that they are called so because of action to gain or keep them, we raise the questions: action by whom and for what? After rejecting supernaturalism there is only one answer: living beings, so that they may live. When the process of forming the concept of value is properly performed, it will also be found that those entities claimed as values for which a life-serving purpose cannot be found are those whose purported status as values cannot be sustained without stepping beyond the proper epistemological method. Only through observation of the fact that good versus bad is meaningful exclusively in relation to what is good or bad for living things can one arrive at either concept, whether of life or value.

To understand life, perform the same concept-formation principles as was necessary to form the concept of value. Take a look at a wide range of living things and what they have to do in order to remain alive. Contrast them to non-living things, which can change form but need not do anything in order to remain non-living. What separates the living from the non-living is that life-forms continually have to initiate action to sustain themselves. If they fail then they die, and their bodies join the ranks of the non-living. A plant, a lizard, and a person, are all able to and all need to continually act to sustain themselves even if not actually harmed by something else. A comet cannot act, and need not act as it will continue to exist indefinitely unless an external force interferes with it. The action required is to pursue the material means of living, and it is these material means of living that are values. Values only exist because life exists, and life only continues to exist because living things are successful in pursuing their relevant values. Values are necessitated by and necessary for life. It is only the concept of life that makes the concept of value necessary and meaningful[6].

Why does life exist? This question may be taken two ways. In terms of efficient causation: how come life arose? That is a question not for philosophy but one we may leave to the physical science of biology. After leaving origins to the biologists, we can say that it continues to exist because living things have been successful at gaining and keeping the values they need in order to live. The second way of taking the question is in terms of final causation: what end does life serve? The answer is that the end of life is life, that it exists for no other reason than to continue to exist for its own sake[7]. It has no higher purpose to serve, and the entire idea of action and values having an end only has meaning within the context of life. There is only the one fundamental alternative: life or death. Those who have no choice will automatically act to live and pursue relevant values accordingly. Man, who does have choice, is faced with having to discover what values are and choosing to pursue them. In either case, choice or not, life is an end in itself. Values presuppose the context of life, and it is only life that sets the terms for all valid values.

Measurement as the conceptual root of value as a magnitude
All value as magnitude is by its nature a quantitative concept. To say that something is valuable is to imply that there is an answer to the question of how valuable. In giving that answer, to evaluate is to compare something against a standard and arrive at a quantitative relationship signified by the magnitude of value. Value presupposes measurement.

Measurement as a root of value applies both as a root within the roots of the concept of life, but it also stands outside of life as a root of the concept of value in the more general sense used by mathematics and the physical sciences. Consequently, a separate examination is worthwhile.

Many of the core principles of numerical measurement and use of the concept in the mathematical sense apply to the evaluation of concrete valuables. Some of the concepts that are roots of the concept of measurement and are of interest to economics are standard, unit, amount, and calculation. We will see their uses as we progress.


[1] Rand, A, (1964) “The Objectivist ethics” The Virtue of Selfishness, p15
[2] Rand, A (1990) Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd Edition, Meridian, pp9-17
[3] Rand (1964), op. cit.
[4] Rand, A, (1990) op. cit, p3, 60; Peikoff (1991) op. cit, p136
[5] Hull, G, (1999) Reduction: the tie to reality, Second Renaissance Books; Peikoff, L, (1991) op. cit, pp132-141
[6] Rand (1964), op. cit, pp15-17
[7] Rand (1964), op. cit, p17

Edited by John McVey, 18 July 2007 - 05:20 AM.

[John McVey]

2 The prerequisites of value
As part of the process of forming the concept of value four prerequisites to the existence of values will be identified[8]. All four are observable as inherent in life and the processes of life, as they are the general description of the methodology underlying the process of life[9] These prerequisites are: there must be a valuer, there must be an end, there must be an alternative faced by the valuer, and there must be a mechanism that brings everything together[10]. Their exact nature, and all that goes into them, sets the context of value. Change any one of these elements of context and the value will change, and if any one of these is absent then value does not exist. They are an integrated whole, necessarily implying each other and overlapping each other in many ways.

There must a valuer
In examination of all values one must ask why they are said to be values, and put aside those called values with no identifiable explanation. Do that and we will find that there is not and cannot be anything that is valuable in and of itself without reference to a valuer. All values exist as values to a valuer. Sunlight is valuable to a plant, to a lizard, to a beachgoer, and so on, but it is not valuable in its own right. After casting aside the no-reason and anti-reason claimed values, the status as values of all remaining things said to be values depends upon there being living creatures that care about them enough to act to gain or keep them. Without that, there is no basis for saying that something is a value.

The only valuers are living creatures, as only living things can be actors. The non-living neither act nor is anything in relation to them a value to them. Sunlight is not a value to a comet. The sunlight is just there, and the comet doesn’t care about it. The sunlight has effects on the comet, but the comet cannot initiate action to get closer to or stay away from the sun. Values are values because living things treat them as such, and for no other reason.

There must be an end
Living things do not act arbitrarily but pursue particular values in order to achieve intended outcomes. A value is pursued as a means to an end. If there is no end to be served by something, then that something is not a value to the valuer. The plant turns its leaves to the sun so it can use the energy, the lizard sets itself atop a well-lit rock because it wants to warm itself, and the beachgoer wants to enjoy the sun. The comet, by contrast, has no ends to which sunlight can be put, and the generation of a tail is not its intention nor something that could possibly matter to the comet.

Any particular end to be achieved is often the means to a yet further end, and that in turn means to another, and so on. But there can be no infinite regress, so something must be an ultimate end. As life is an end in itself, that ultimate end is of course the life of the creature pursuing the values. Each particular end is a subsidiary to the overall end of living as that particular type of creature. The more complex the creature, the more complex the array of subsidiary ends may be. Thus, for something to be a value, it is not merely required that it be possibly a means to an end, but must instead possibly be fitted into an entire means-end structure that has the valuer’s life as the ultimate end and guiding principle for the formation of that structure. A plant has to take up the energy from sunlight as that is what powers its maintenance and development, along with taking up other needs from the air and soil, but wont want so much sunlight that the plant gets dehydrated or burned. The lizard must periodically warm itself in the sun because its body does not generate enough heat to keep itself at the required temperature, and the lizard must balance its need for sunlight with other needs such as watching out for predators and also itself being a predator. The beachgoer will enjoy the sunlight as a means to a tan and relaxation, and that in turn provides emotional fuel, but the beachgoer must not go to the beach so often as to have employment terminated! The comet has no ends at all, and hence no structure of them.

Some of the means-ends chains for various creatures are not exclusively linear. Instead, there may be a branching out, and sometimes considerable amounts of it. Structures can get quite complex, and the more complex the living creature, the more complex that its appropriate means-ends structure is. The plant is purely automatic and its needs are comparatively simple, but the lizard has to make what judgements it can about how to balance its various needs against the possibilities of the moment. The beachgoer has to consider an immense variety of different factors and alternatives that are also good means of relaxation, those in turn balanced against other things that could be or may need to be done on a weekend, and includes consideration for longer term plans that may require not relaxing on the weekend at all but instead doing some work to get more money, all as part of modern living.

There must be the ability and need to act in the face of an alternative
It is not enough that there be an end. If there is nothing that the valuer can do or the valuer does not have to do anything, why should that valuer care about what does or does not happen? To be valued, a state of affairs that does not currently hold must be the subject of an opportunity to be brought into being, and a state of affairs that does currently hold must be subject to the threat of no longer being. How substantial these opportunities or threats may be is not at issue here, so long as they are sufficiently large for alternatives to be identifiable. The attainment or retention of a value must be contingent upon the success of appropriate action in the face of those alternatives. Unless this holds, any value previously attached to something will vanish.

We can easily see how this is inherent in life. The most fundamental distinction of types of things is that between the living and the non-living. It is only the living that faces a fundamental alternative, and that is between life and death. Only living things have reason to care about alternatives, because they are integrated structures of materials organised to serve a self-sustaining end. The alternative for living things is to fail to achieve that end and lose that integrated structure. If the plant does not get enough sunlight then it wont have enough energy to run all the active processes it needs to do just to maintain itself never mind grow. If the lizard does not get enough sunlight it will get cold and slow down, which makes it vulnerable to predators and less able to catch its own prey. If an incurable beachgoer doesn’t get enough relaxation and enjoyment then motivation for work and living will begin to drain away. Living beings value things for subsidiary ends because those ends are in turn means to their respective ultimate ends as life as that type of creature, and a failure to achieve any subsidiary end is a step in the direction of death.

The non-living do not face a fundamental alternative. They change form, but changes are of no consequence to them as one structure is just replaced with another structure. No matter what the change of structure, it still remains in the same category of the non-living and nothing fundamental has changed. A comet will be eroded by repeated exposure to enough sunlight and solar winds, but the materials remain just as non-living as they were before and don not care if they are joined together in a single cometary body or not. Only we care about the comet and what happens to it because of what it portends for our lives, whether legitimately as in the case of tracking its trajectory to see whether it is going to hit the Earth or illegitimately as in the case of superstition about it being a fearsome or auspicious omen.

There must be a mechanism of connection
It is still not enough that there be a living creature capable and required to act so as to achieve an end in pursuit of its life. It is entirely possible that all three prerequisites so far be met and yet there still be no action, simply arising from the creature being unaware of the opportunity or threat. Something must actually connect the facts of the situation directly into the creature’s means of valuation and action. The living being must be moved to act arising from being prompted to do so by an actual mechanism that brings the first three prerequisites together to bear upon any given situation and at a level appropriate for the scope of valuation and action.

The mechanism will change depending on the type of living creature vis-à-vis the requirements of life as that creature at various levels (e.g. cellular vs. macro). A plant has to detect the presence of sunlight by the first rays interacting with its leaves at the crack of dawn before it will turn itself sunward for the day. For non-volitional conscious living creatures, the mechanism also takes the form of perception of a physical object, which perception then triggers genetic or learned responses within the creature. A lizard has to spot a suitable rock or similar location to perch itself on, and must also notice an apparent lack of predators, before it can make use of the sunlight in safety. Finally, for man there can also be a conceptual understanding of all the facts involved and then made the choice to act. At the conceptual level there will be a definite three-part process of cognition-evaluation-planning, followed by the action itself according to that plan. A beachgoer has to know there is a suitable beach and a good weekend coming up, take note of the forecast weather and also of other things that can be done that weekend, make a judgement about which alternative is best, and if the beach is the choice then plan what to take to the beach and what to do there.


[8] There is a distinction between prerequisites of value and prerequisites of goods. Goods are a type of values, and are the main but not the sole type examined by economics. Naturally there will be overlap between the two sets of prerequisites: c.f. Menger, C, (1871/1994), Principles of Economics, Libertarian Press, p52
[9] “Life is written all over [the prerequisites]” Buechner, M, (1994) Objective value versus modern economics, Second Renaissance Books, Lecture 2
[10] Rand (1964), op. cit, p15. There is no contradiction between my four and the three of Rand as she does not specify exactly how many prerequisites there were and does specify the need to connect fact and value with appropriate action.

[John McVey]

3 The measurement of value
Standards of value, ultimate and operative
Measurement is a root of value just as much as life is. The use of a means to serve an end is not just a case of “does it or doesn’t it”, but instead is often a result of asking how well that entity serves as a means to an end. The magnitude of value that may be attached to something is the answer to that question. Measurement of magnitudes requires a standard to compare something with so as to generate those magnitudes. Therefore, to arrive at the magnitude of value the intended end is thus used as a standard of value. The magnitude is thus a quantitative relationship that exists between the value and the intended end, as measured by the living being. How strongly plants react to sunlight depends on how strong the sunlight is. How likely a lizard is to sun itself depends on how much sunlight there is, what it needs, and what other matters are important. How good the sunlight is will influence whether a beachgoer will go to the beach on any weekend, and also influences which choice of beaches to visit if planning an overseas holiday.

The use of ends as standards of value continues all the way through the means-ends structures to the top. At each stage, a given end is the standard of value for all below it that serves as a means to it, both directly and intermediated by other subsidiary ends. For any given creature, the sum of all its ends is the totality of what it needs to do in order to live as that type of creature. With one class of exceptions we will deal with later, everything that living things do is geared towards the end of continued life. At the top, since life is that ultimate end, life is the ultimate standard of value. For any living creature, all things that may be of value are valued to the extent they are somehow able to serve the life of that creature, whether directly or indirectly.

Evaluation is a regular feature of life because action is a regular necessity for life – but neither does nor need there be an express invoking of life as the ultimate standard every single time a living creature has occasion to evaluate. More critically, creatures other than people can’t do that. Instead, there are just the needs of the moment determined by the ends of the moment, and even for people the broader value of those ends may be present but will be kept in the background. Values do not simply serve the ultimate standard in abstract but do so through serving a particular end as an instance of that standard in action. In any instance of evaluation it is only the particular end of the moment that is, that need be, and mostly only that can be, the operative standard of value. A plant does not concern itself with anything other than the biochemical process of the moment, running genetic programs and processing nutrients in line with it. A lizard is concerned only with occasional triggers for the need to warm up, and pays no mind to the value of the process as such. A beachgoer does not reconsider the value of the idea of a day at the beach in relation to the whole of life each and every time an opportunity to spend a day at the beach arises.

People are different from plants and animals because we can consider the value of the more abstract ends, all the way up to consideration of the entirety not only of our own lives but those of others in relation to us as well. The beachgoer can reconsider the idea of the day at a beach aside from any actual day, and re-evaluate whether going to the beach is important enough when say considering taking up an offer of work at an inland location away from beaches. Here again, however, the idea of the operative standard remains. What happens here is that the operative standard of the moment is just at a more abstract level. When reconsidered it then sets the frame of reference for its use thereafter. This can be taken all the way up to the top of means-ends structures.

It is also the case for people that the entire structure can and should be evaluated and re-evaluated as required. However, the need to do so decreases as the level in a structure that a particular subsidiary end being considered is increases. As circumstances change so must values be reconsidered irrespective of the conceptual level of those values as subsidiary ends in the total structure, but the higher in the means-ends structure that an end is the less frequently it is required to re-evaluate at that level. Therefore it is perfectly fine to re-evaluate higher levels of value-abstraction less often than more concrete levels, so long as they are in fact considered at some stage.

Values are relational, and therefore observable
A value, properly identified, is a real and logically identifiable relationship between a living being with its intended ends that matter to it and an item that may aid the life of that being by meeting those ends. This means that the value of the same one thing will be different for different valuers who all have different purposes. The same sunlight that is just right for a plant may be too little for a lizard and the a beachgoer, while what is good for the lizard may be too much for the beachgoer.

The value can change even for the same valuer facing the same thing, when other factors in the entire means-ends structure change. The value of sunlight to a plant will change depending on how much water it has available to renew what it loses. The value of sunlight will fall greatly for the lizard if there is too much chance of being swept up and eaten by bird. The value of a particular prospective day at the beach will change depending on an immense variety of issues, and the result will affect how the beachgoer will value the sunlight on that day.

We have to be careful about the word we use to describe this straight-forward phenomenon. It is a mistake to say that values are relative, because in proper terms ‘relative’ means the values change depending on who is looking at the situation rather than what the situation itself happens to be. It is improper to say that values are subjective merely because they differ depending on the nature of the living being whose life is being used as the standard of value. In terms of the philosophical use of the words, values are not relative but relational[11]. The values will be the same, as a definite relationship between an item and a standard of value identified by someone looking at the situation, irrespective of who is looking at that situation. This fact means that the value that a given item may have to a given creature is frequently observable by others besides just that one creature. Anyone with sufficient mental capacity to be objective, who uses the right method of drawing valid conclusions, and who knows the details, can identify the relationships underlying values as they pertain to other living beings. Whosoever knows the same facts and uses the same standard of value, will arrive at the same conclusion as anyone else who looks at the same situation. The difficulty lies only in coming to know those details. The principle of identification is valid and the ability to make a legitimate prediction of the value of something to another is real, made possible because values are not relative.

This observability of values is inherent in all agriculture and animal handling, and is the basis of many life sciences and their applications. We can learn what will be of value to a plant or animal, and supply those needs to them so that we in turn may acquire our needs from them. We know very well that sunlight is valuable to a plant, in particular conditions, and plan which plants are best for a given climate. Some plants we grow in tropical areas with strong sunlight, some in cooler areas with weaker sunlight, and so on. Similarly, we know that lizards need to warm themselves and so the curators of zoos will provide natural or artificial lighting for their lizards’ needs. Less seriously, we can pick out appropriate plants for the conditions of our homes and gardens, and later move our pot plants to various locations depending on sunlight. We can also determine whether we have the means that make owning a pet lizard viable, and if so we build enclosures for pet lizards that include sunning spots. Finally, businesses know that we need plants and animals and make things that we can use because we know that they are values to plants and animals and they are in turn values to us, such as greenhouses and light fixtures. Again less seriously, businesses know that beachgoers love the sun, so and produce things like beach toys and sunscreen for their use.

When dealing with other people it is harder to know the details because it includes their personal preferences that we can’t know about unless they tell us. Nevertheless it is still possible to make good educated guesses to varying degrees of success[12], especially in aggregate. We can determine what may be of value to other people and supply those values in return for the same from them. Other benefits will include guidance for searches for what may be of value to another, searches for to whom something may be a value, why it may be a value to someone, and showing that someone how to gain or keep that value. These and more, developed from the observability of values, are crucial to all economic activity.

The values generated by measurement
The act of measurement implies the generation of a quantitative relationship between what is measured and the standard against which it is measured. This process requires there to be a unit of measurement, where that unit is taken to be ‘one of’ something. The act of measurement would then generate cardinal numbers, which are numerical multiples and fractions of this unit.

At this point in time, however, we do not have a unit. Measures generated by measurement are not yet expressible in terms of numbers. The best that can be achieved at present is literary expressions of degree of value. Something may be said to be of negligible value, of some value, or moderate value, and so on up to something that is said to be of immense value. This suffices for the great majority of our needs, as the issue for personal use is only one of precision. For example, notice that the lack of a specific unit hasn’t stopped agriculture, biology and medicine from being sciences, and so too is the situation for economics. For personal purposes what we have is good enough to allow the creation of scales of rank, in which items being measured are given ordinal numbers as positions on that rank. Equally importantly, the fact of measurement of value also allows us to insert new members into that scale and hence reassign ordinal ranks, all of which can be done both without difficulty and in a manner that can be identified by another.

It is erroneous to say that values are ordinal as there is a definite quantitative relationship underlying measurement, but it is true that measured values are not yet cardinal. It is one thing to say not yet, but it is quite another and totally unjustified to say not ever[13]. Moreover, as we will see, there is a unit suitable for calculation available to meet business needs. The use of this unit can be taken to whatever level of precision is practical in any situation. We will also see that this unit itself arises from the sufficiency generated by the system of ranking.

The need of conceptual creatures to be rational
The range of consideration for all non-volitional non-conceptual creatures is limited. The great majority are bound to the biochemical or sensory-perceptual stimuli of the moment, such as plants or jellyfish, some only able to think about a few minutes at a time such as lizards, and the rest act on the basis of one set of seasons at a time, such as bears and squirrels. They have no real understanding of time and do not consider the whole context of their lives. In comparison to volitional conceptual creatures such as man, the needs of non-volitional non-conceptual creatures are simple, and their valuations are equally simple. A given item that is a subject of opportunity or threat is evaluated and acted upon according to the needs of the moment and no further. Non-volitional creatures will have their standards of value and the skills required to use their means of survival built into them either by genetics or raising by their parents. Once set, they do not and need not change for the rest of their lives. They have no capacity to examine more abstract ends, and never contemplate the idea of life as the standard of value. For them the operative standards are only ever perceptual-level needs. The structural system of means and ends changes only at a pace slow enough to allow evolution to work on genetics or skill-sets. The requirements of these creatures to form values can be safely left at the perceptual level.

For man, however, this range-of-the-moment kind of valuation will not do. As a creatures with conceptual consciousness, man is capable of understanding time and the whole of his means-ends structures from concrete to abstract levels. For man it is the conceptual faculty rather than any other bodily capability that is the means of survival, as at the physical level we are quite humdrum and the use of our brains is the only way we can deal with our means-ends structures. However, people have neither their standards of value nor skills in the use of their means of survival built into them. Conceptually, man is born tabula rasa, and inherits only a handful of basic skills and reflexes that are all entirely non-conceptual. He can learn more, but at any moment he can choose to ignore what he has learned, and do so irrespective of how well he knows what to do and how practiced he is at doing it. He has no choice but to use conceptual-level identification. As a volitional creature he does get to choose his method, but as a conceptual creature he must learn and choose one deliberately because if he does not then he will always end up using his mind in the myriad accidental ways that personal history leads to. Precisely because the conceptual method is powerful both for good and ill, failing to choose a deliberate method and defaulting to accident is very dangerous as it throws his life, through his values and actions, onto the fickle mercy of chance. A beachgoer who just sees that the day is sunny and rushes off to the beach, either after dredging up some rationalisation or without further thought at all beyond observing the present sunlight, could end up with a ruined weekend or even suffer job loss if it was a workday, and he or she could and should have known better.

At the conceptual level the complexity of the means-ends structure is considerable, and can change quickly[14]. In most cases, however, it wont be so unwieldy that it takes a genius to handle, as the degrees of complexity that must be handled by people are the product of what they are mentally capable of and what people have created for themselves accordingly. A man who is not a genius wont have to deal with a highly complex means-ends structure because he wont create one for himself, while a genius will have to because he did. The only constant in this is that as an example of man, and hence possessing at least some degree of conceptual ability, there will be some degree of complexity that requires a matching degree of proper use of that conceptual faculty. The only way to deal with that complexity, at the conceptual level, is to use the only tool suited for it: reason. If a conceptual being – a person as opposed to an animal – wants to live successfully, then that person must ensure that he or she forms his or her values objectively.

[11] See also Smith, T, (2000) Viable Values, Rowman & Littlefield, pp97-99
[12] Contrary to what some believe, a proper economics does not ignore psychology but instead must consider it when trying to guide those who want to understand the path of future valuation. This fact is made use of in marketing science, for example. Contrast this to Rothbard, M, (2004) Man, Economy and State, Scholar’s Edition, Ludwig von Mises Institute, p308
[13] C.f. von Mises (1964/1996) Human Action, 4thd Edition, Fox & Wilkes, p97
[14] Biologists point out that conceptual consciousness arose in the first place because it was the most effective means of dealing with this fact. Changes in circumstances of survival – meaning means-ends structures in regard to food sources and protection against predators and the like – were just too complex for the perceptual-level consciousnesses of our primate ancestors to handle. Those with the first conceptual-level consciousnesses preferentially thrived and out-competed those that did not have that level of consciousness. For example, Sagan, C (1980/2000) “The Persistence of Memory” Cosmos. Needs a better reference.

[John McVey]

4 Objective values
So far, this material is drawn directly from ethical philosophy. At this point we now begin to depart from ethics’ train of thought and into economics’ own. Having shown life as the standard of value, and reason as the only means that conceptual creatures have for dealing with life, ethical theory goes on to demonstrate the principles determining what volitional creatures should and should not do. That discussion teaches that man should accept the principle of life as the standard of value and then teaches how to apply it to himself via moral virtues so as to achieve continued and improved life[15]. Ethics identifies rationality as the primary virtue, of which all other virtues are instances in action[16]. Epistemology teaches that man can be objective, ethics teaches that man should be objective, and together they teach that all properly formed values are objective[17]. Economics, by contrast, begins to take a different path here. Economics notes both that, on the one hand, people have to use reason and be objective to survive and prosper, and on the other hand that they might or might not actually use reason and be objective. Economics then looks at the values people do form, and tells what the consequences of this will be for their lives accordingly. What, then, is the epistemological status of actual values, properly formed or not?

In relation to non-conceptual creatures, there are only values, without any other qualification. They deal with the world on a perceptual level at best, and a great many do not have consciousness at all. The topic of epistemology does not apply to their methods of valuation as they are sensory or perceptual only and have their valuation systems built into their action-determination systems. There is no such thing as sunlight being an objective value or not to a plant or a lizard, it is only a value to that plant or lizard or it isn’t. If it is valuable then how valuable it is directly detected as being automatically controls their actions in conjunction with other values and their influences in the automatic response systems.

Epistemology, and hence the concept of the epistemological status of values, applies only to those possessing a consciousness capable of operating by the use of concepts. Man can identify what may be of value to a non-human, and so man can have an objective understanding of what the non-human values, but that does not mean that the value to that non-human is an objective one. It is a simple value, without any further qualification. The notion of values as objective or otherwise applies only to values to conceptual beings because the means of forming values is the same as that of generating all knowledge. The beachgoer who notices that a day is sunny has to think about whether or not to go to the beach, and the epistemological status of the value of the day’s sunlight to the beachgoer will depend on whether thinking actually takes place and how that thinking is performed.

Values, properly formed, as objective
All things that may be values are real, existing either concretely such as the sunlight on a given day or abstractly such as the weighing of merit of beach access considerations in choice of location of home against other lifestyle possibilities. Similarly, all living creatures and their requirements for continued life, and the principle that life is the standard of value, are equally real. All of these are definite things with definite characteristics and exist under definite conditions. All of these conditions about things are facts. So too are the relationships that exist between them all real. Values are formed when the identification of these relationships is made, and are valid only insofar as they are bona-fide attempts to quantify those relationships. There is therefore a consonance of fact and value rather than the conflict that erroneous philosophy suggests.

The conscious process of identification of facts, including of the relationships between them, is formulation of truths. As values are types of identifications of relationships, fully traceable back to the underlying facts, they are a type of knowledge – but we haven’t categorised that knowledge yet. Any particular value, like any particular piece of knowledge, can be held by someone yet obtained by a variety of different means. An example is just going by what others say and without discovering why they say it is true or valuable, such as dropping everything and following someone to the beach. Another is accepting something that wells up from the subconscious that is of unknown provenance or is a spur of the moment desire to have something that arises just because that something had been seen. “Sunny day? Beach!” What another says or what the subconscious offers up may well be true or valuable, but at this point who knows? It cannot be safely relied upon by someone until properly validated by that someone. Maybe the beachgoer can dash off to the beach and enjoy the day without ill effect, but maybe not. The only means of finding out which is a process of reason, which means logical inference from material that is traceable back to the facts directly observable though sense perception. Accordingly, objective knowledge is conclusions generated and/or validated by a process of reason. The same holds of values: objective values are conclusions about the relationships of something to an appropriate standard of value that are also all validated by reasoning. Before the beachgoer can dash off, he or she has to consider everything else that might be affected by the choice to go to the beach and everything that might significantly affect the quality of the day at the beach.

In both cases, whether knowledge generally or values in particular, that process of reasoning may also be intermediated by other conclusions themselves traceable back to sensory data. For values in particular, this includes validating the appropriateness of what is used as the operative standard of value. A beachgoer has to consider the merit of going to the beach as such because some people are more susceptible to sunburn and less able to get tans than others, and that issue will in turn affect the valuation by different people of any particular opportunity to go to the beach. That merit will be traceable back to actual experience in getting burned versus tanned, and might be predicted in advance by learning about the meaning of perceptual-level indicators such as natural hair colour[18].

The definition of objective value flows readily from the definition of objective knowledge. The method for valuation is exactly the same as applies to all cognitive activity aimed at understanding the facts and coming to know truth: reason. The conceptual status of the result of the proper use of reason to formulate values is the same as for all knowledge: objectivity. All values are objective if formed by a conceptual consciousness through non-contradictory identification of all available relevant data.

Mistaken values
Man is not omniscient. We can misidentify facts and relationships, or fail to identify relevant facts, and so on. The method of objectivity is not a foolproof guarantee of correctness, and wont inherently stop a practitioner from coming to wrong conclusions. Reason is a method of dealing with reality, not reality itself. It is the proper use of reason – which includes realising the need to seek out more facts to work from as and when indicated by the known facts – that entitles the products of its use to be called objective even when the known facts worked from are an incomplete list. If a beachgoer diligently gathers all the relevant facts available and decides to go to the beach after proper thinking then the expected sunlight is an objective value. That sunlight will remain an objective value even if it turns out that some of the facts were wrong badly enough so that the beachgoer wouldn’t have gone that day if he or she knew. For example, the beachgoer’s leave application may have been filled in correctly and approved by his or her supervisor but a computer system processing glitch it meant technically the day was not approved and so the beachgoer was flagged for discipline.

Another important feature of the method of reason is that knowledge is open to constant correction and updating. When we apply what we have learned to reality, we will learn whether our knowledge is correct or not, and to what degree. In general, to the extent an idea is true, in practice it leads to worthwhile results. Exactly the same principles apply to values for the same reason, because they are items of knowledge intended to be put into practice. When the beachgoer’s supervisor gets the notice it will inform all concerned that there was a problem with the computer system and they will try to fix it. The beachgoer will also learn to be extra-vigilant and double-check leave applications and their approval before taking off for a day at the beach.

When reason is properly implemented in judging a particular entity compared against an appropriate standard of value the resulting values are entitled to be called objective even if it should turn out later that the judgement was in error. Objectivity is not just method of initial discovery, but of constant determination and re-evaluation, based on the use of life as the standard of value and the actual consequences for life arising from value judgements that have been acted upon. If we do discover error, it is that same method of reasoning – of achieving objectivity in judgement of all knowledge including values – that enables us to learn and improve how we live and evaluate.

Optional values
For creatures without volition and conceptual awareness, filling the need for means to meet ends is often just opportunism. For man, however, the entire structure is available for contemplation at any time and man can use it to plan ahead. There are often two or more alternative methods of meeting a particular end, and man will be aware of those alternatives and need to make a choice between them. This also includes the existence of alternative ends that are subsidiary to the use of the principle of life as the ultimate value. In all these cases, any means or subsidiary end will do if it is genuinely capable of advancing life in some way. Normal life for man is neither so precarious nor so simplistic that short-range concrete opportunism is the only possible means of living[19]. Instead, for man, doing more than just reacting to the stimuli of the moment, options abound. One could even make the case that in a great majority of situations the existence of options is inescapable, and it is not simply that choices can be made but that they must be made. A beachgoer who knows there are two or more perfectly good beaches nearby can choose between them, and if both are mentioned explicitly as available options then the beachgoer will have to make a conscious decision.

The fact that options exist does not in any way mean any choice made from them isn’t an objective one. The use of life as the standard of value, and the pursuit of happiness as the goal of life, does not specify the concrete means by which life has to be pursued or what in particular will make someone happy. There are many possible concrete means that can serve a given end, many possible alternative subsidiary ends, each of which are consistent with the needs of life. All that counts for objectivity is that what is chosen is properly identified a means to an end that is itself properly identified as really being an instance of life as the standard of value, all determined by the use of reason. So long as the options chosen from are consistent with the principles of morality then they are all equally rational to pursue. When there are two or more particular possible ways open to a given individual it is perfectly rational for that individual to choose between them based on whichever the individual feels is more likely to bring happiness. A personal choice from options that reason says are equally valid is entirely objective, because reason has identified them as all objectively permissible means to ends and so on up to the ultimate end.

If beaches A and B are both perfectly good, then a beachgoer who prefers A over B is still being objective if the reason for going to any beach that day is a sound one. That person is also still being objective if as means of relaxation he or she prefers going to the beach as opposed to a friend who likes to do gardening instead. Both a day at the beach and an easy day’s gardening are objective means of personal relaxation, and some time for relaxation is an objective need for human beings.

Potential and latent values
There can be no values without all four prerequisites of value having been present for any given living being. What is the value-status of an entity where some but not all of the prerequisites in relation to it are met? In any such case the entity is simply not a proper value. There may be a potential value to that item, but there is no actual value. If the day is nice and sunny, a day at the beach is not an actual value until and unless a beachgoer decides to think about it and formulate a positive opinion. Prior to that the most we can say is that the day at the beach may become a value, but not yet that it is a value.

There are some cases where it is objective to act to gain or keep an entity that is only potential value rather than an actual value. This will arise where there are conditions required for the use of some entity which are not yet met but there is a worthwhile amount of possibility that they could be met at some point in the future. At this point the entity is not a proper value in relation to its actual end use. Nevertheless, to the extent that the potential is identified by reason, the intended end of the moment and hence operative standard is the holding of the item ready for a possible use. All four prerequisites are therefore met and a kind of value objectively generated as a result, but only on a more abstract and contingent level. We refer to these as latent values[20].

A common example of this is a new product that is in the process of development and is being readied for sale, such as a cafeteria or surf shop on the edge of the beach planning to increase their offerings to beachgoers. The prospective customers do not yet know that the new product exists, so they cannot value it as the fourth prerequisite is not met for them. Nevertheless the one offering the product will value it and can be considered objective in doing so even though the product is not yet an actual value to any end user. The reason is that there are reasonable grounds for expectation of future customers finding the product to be valuable to them, which expectations are made possible because of the external observability of values. The value to the customers is latent, and still objectively identifiable. On that basis calculation based on the latent value is objective to the extent that reason is used to determine both the likely degree of actual value when it eventuates and every other issue relevant to the creation and sale of the product.


[15] Peikoff (1991), op. cit, pp250-324
[16] Peikoff (1991), op. cit, pp220-229
[17] Peikoff (1991), op. cit, pp241-249
[18] For instance, as a redhead the present author can’t tan but will instead just burn to a crisp!
[19] It can be the case – but these are highly primitive situations and often the product of some disaster. They are not normal. Further, it is precisely through deliberately not falling into the trap of short-range opportunism and instead using reason to solve the problem that the situation is resolved.
[20] Menger, C, (1871/1994) op. cit, p85

[John McVey]

5 Non-objective values
All properly formed values are objective, but this does not exhaust the possibilities open to man. We are not talking about values formed erroneously because of honest mistake or a lack of sufficient information, as we have seen that values formed in error are still objective if formulated via a process of reason. The issue now is what if reason is improperly used, or not at all, in the formation of values.

Irrational values
Since man is a volitional creature as well as a conceptual one, and that the use of the conceptual faculty needs to be learned, individual people aren’t necessarily going to use reason even if they’re trying to be honest. Further, since possession of a consciousness that also includes powers of creativity, coupled with the biologically original physical pleasure-pain mechanism now supplemented with the intellectual one, the requirement for people to think is also wide open to fantasy and wilful deception even by people who do know how to use reason. Although it has been shown that reason is the proper means to formulate value, it does not follow that any particular person will actually follow that method. The result is the formation of irrational values.

Irrational values are formed when reason is either passively omitted or actively excluded from some part of the process by which values are formed. Passive omission would arise where someone lets their emotions rule them. For whatever reason other than active denial of the need for rationality, this someone doesn’t stop to think and instead barrels on heedlessly. An example is a spur of the moment decision to go to the beach, dismissing any thought of the boss’s potential anger at non-attendance at work with a glib “she’ll be right” attitude. Active exclusion arises where it is held that it is improper to use reason in one or more aspects of the valuation process, which can go so far as the belief that reason as whole is invalid and must be eschewed. An example of this is some puritan who decries the practice of going to the beach and the manufacture of beach-related gear because human enjoyment and rationality are held to be evil.

Pre-conceptual values
The epistemological status of values applies only to man. However, it does not always apply to all people automatically just because they happen to have a conceptual faculty. There is also the issue of the ability to use that faculty. The concept of epistemological status does not apply to the values formed by the seriously mentally handicapped or by the very young.

For those mentally handicapped to such a degree that they are incapable of reason but still of acting, there will most likely never be any issue of epistemology. In most cases they will be handicapped for life. They still have simple wants and desires, and can retain at least some ability to act upon them. If they can act to meet those wants and desires, then they can still form values. It is not uncommon for a patient at a facility for the mentally handicapped to take whatever he wants from an unguarded lunch cart. These wants and desires will only be at the perceptual level, such as food or attachment to another person. For these people, living entirely on the pre-conceptual level, there are neither objective nor irrational values but just the unqualified values as per the perceptual level.

For children, the applicability of the notion of epistemological status is absent at birth but builds up over time as their abilities improve and become responsible for an increasing amount of what they do. At birth, they begin at a totally non-conceptual level, and their values are in the same status of being unqualified just as for those of animals and the mentally handicapped. By the time they have joined us in adulthood they are in the same position as us as having fully developed conceptual-level consciousnesses and hence their values having a status as either objective or irrational. In between it is mixed.

The handicapped and the young will have guardians watching out for them. The guardians are responsible for selecting many of the things that are needed by those in their care. These guardians will have their mental abilities undamaged, and it is these guardians who must be objective. To that extent the notion of epistemological (and moral) status does apply to what they do.

---

JJM

[softwareNerd]

I've only read the first section. Just one question for now: Who is the target audience for this book?

[y_feldblum]

Economic theory begins with an examination of the nature of value.

Why? Your next sentence should capture the essence of the answer to that question.

[Tenure]

I've only read the first section. Just one question for now: Who is the target audience for this book?

That was my very same question I asked in chat. I wonder if we have the same reasons for asking.

[John McVey]

I've only read the first section. Just one question for now: Who is the target audience for this book?

Undergrads studying economics as part of their degrees in business, finance, marketing, or accounting. It wont past muster as an economics undergrad textbook, though I imagine they would pick up the book of their own accord.

On top of that, anyone interested in the subject, particularly those already in business and finance. I am staying away from heavy mathematics.

JJM

[John McVey]

Why? Your next sentence should capture the essence of the answer to that question.

My first response was going to be that I already dealt with that elsewhere and I am wary of putting in too much repetition, but then I figured that you are still right and a quick description of why is indeed required there as a reminder.

Earlier on I discussed the nature of man as actor in a previous chapter, which was itself in a previous whole part under Philosophy and Economics rather than economics theory in its own right. With that in place I then had to decide whether value in general should be next or action in general. Both are two sides of the same coin and are on the same hierarchical level, and accordingly there is a great overlap in the two discussions. I picked value-then-action because it is easier to see value as the motive of action than to try to talk about action prior to mentioning value. That choice also follows the development in ethics theory of explaining value first then explaining the moral system required for man to properly act to gain or keep objective values. I cover that in the fourth section, and show how the development of economic theory follows the same path as ethics for a while and then begins to diverge into its own field of study.

After I thought about and concurred with your observation I started working on the problem. I have expanded the first paragraph, then pulled up the fifth to second and edited it to eliminate the seam. To whit:

1 The formation of the concept
Economics is a study of what men actually do in a certain context, and contrasted with what they ought do in that context. Men place values on or learn the values of things, and then undertake various kinds of action based on those values. These actions then have consequences for good or for ill depending on the validity of men’s thoughts about values. Therefore economic theory must begin with an examination of the nature of value, tracing the concept back to its roots. In doing so we find the broadest context for value, where next we must progressively narrow that context down to that of economics. In this way we can begin to see the full connection that economics has to broader issues, and particularly the basis for examination of oughts and consequences.

The broader context of which economics and economic action is a part is the field of ethics. It is no accident that concepts such as value, worth, good, action, rationality, and many others like these, are fundamental to both ethics and economics. Political and economic theories are all derivative fields that depend on ethics and general philosophy. Economic action is a subset of all action generally, and the principles that hold for action generally are applicable to all subsets within it, including economics. Similarly, economic value is a subset of all moral values generally. To understand the concept of value fully it is therefore necessary to start with how ethics explains it and then apply it to economics.

We are not concerned with things from alleged planes of existence beyond the universe we inhabit. We will ignore these planes and discount the values commonly associated with them.

JJM

[softwareNerd]

Undergrads studying economics as part of their degrees in business, finance, marketing, or accounting. ... On top of that, anyone interested in the subject, particularly those already in business and finance. I am staying away from heavy mathematics.

I still have only read the first section. The reason I asked about audience is because I found that reading it required an extremely high degree of focus. I don't know why for sure, but I think it might be because, as a reader, there were many times when I didn't know where you were taking me. So, I had to remember the sequence of thoughts without any peg to hang them on. In summary, I think "motivation" is missing -- i.e. motivation in the sense of intellectual motivation to know why each set of paragraphs is going to be useful knowledge. On a lesser, but related, note: I think there were some distracting asides; but those are probably a question of editing.

Another question I had was about the extent to which you are delving into ethics, i.e. still explaining ethics in chapter 5; I'm sure you've struggled with the question of how much ethics and philosophy to put in and how much you simply have to take for granted.

[John McVey]

I went through my work on value and did a significant rewrite. In particular, there was a critical error in the discussion of the fourth prerequisite. Most of the new material is in there, though I have edited the entire thing. It's also now chapter 4, not 5, as I totally rearranged prior material.

Value.doc saved in Word 2003 format.

Why? Your next sentence should capture the essence of the answer to that question.

Duly provided. The short introduction has been turned into a larger one and converted to a section in its own right.

I found that reading it required an extremely high degree of focus.

The average sentence length has been shortened, either by breaking them up or just eliminating pieces altogether.

The introduction should also serve well as the motivation required for anyone who gets this far into the book.

I think there were some distracting asides; but those are probably a question of editing.

Duly excised.

Another question I had was about the extent to which you are delving into ethics, i.e. still explaining ethics in chapter 5; I'm sure you've struggled with the question of how much ethics and philosophy to put in and how much you simply have to take for granted.

I've left in the first three chapters' headings for the purposes of seeing what this chapter on value is working from.

The full content of ethical theory is indeed taken for granted. Chapter 2 contains an introduction to the contents of ethics, but that is just a single section with half a dozen paragraphs. One of those paragraphs is on value, which then refers to this chapter on value. This chapter then begins with an explanation of why value has to be examined in greater detail, then does so.

JJM

[Grames]

I went through my work on value and did a significant rewrite. In particular, there was a critical error in the discussion of the fourth prerequisite. Most of the new material is in there, though I have edited the entire thing. It's also now chapter 4, not 5, as I totally rearranged prior material.

Value.doc saved in Word 2003 format.

Geocities is now tits up, like a small dead mammal on its back. Can you upload the file elsewhere? Its easier to read long batches of text off-screen.

[John McVey]

Geocities is now tits up, like a small dead mammal on its back. Can you upload the file elsewhere? Its easier to read long batches of text off-screen.

Yah, I noticed

I'm looking into it now, and want somewhere to put my Constitution as well. In the meantime I posted C2.1 to my blog.

JJM

[John McVey]

Try this.

I've since re-edited my blog to get rid of that long post.

JJM

[Grames]

I've finished reading your book chapter at last. Sorry for the delay, but I had that other project I was in the middle of, and I got bit by a dog!

Before I lay into you ( ) I'm going to check some of your footnotes. I meantime, could you answer a few preliminary questions please?

You hold there are values which are not objective, but which are also not subjective or intrinsic because those are both impossible. Then what are they? (Just non-objective?)

You almost ask this question on page (18 of 32, or 2 paragraphs before section 3.3). In fact the actual question you ask here ("what is the epistemological status of actual values?") you leave hanging unanswered. Because plants and animals have no epistemology, this implies non-objective is the result of the inapplicability of epistemology. But then they are also equally non-subjective and non-intrinsic. Man does require an epistemology, and his actual values do have an epistemological status, but what is it? If you would answer again they are non-objective, it must be for a different reason than that which you applied to non-sentient critters.

You circle around again to the topic of non-objective values in section 3.4 where non-objective values are divided into irrational and preconceptual values. So perhaps the answer to my first question is 'irrational values'.

[John McVey]

I got bit by a dog!

Ah, but is your homework still intact?

You hold there are values which are not objective, but which are also not subjective or intrinsic because those are both impossible. Then what are they? (Just non-objective?)

The concept of epistemological status simply doesn't apply to the values formed by non-conceptual beings. You're right that I am not clear enough, but I do touch on it by noting that these values are pre-conceptual. What I need to do is to include an answer to the obvious question in section 2.5 that arises after I dismiss intrinsic and subjective values, and tie it in with the discussions in chapter 3 on the matter.

There are no subjective or intrinsic values ever, but for non-conceptual beings values the question of objective versus non-objective has no application because that question only arises in relation to conceptual methodology. Thus non-sentient creatures' values are just unqualified values, as I explain in the second paragraph of the topic of pre-conceptual values in section 3.4. An intimation of this needs to be put in section 2.5.

You almost ask this question on page (18 of 32, or 2 paragraphs before section 3.3). In fact the actual question you ask here ("what is the epistemological status of actual values?") you leave hanging unanswered.

I also need to adjust that question to ask it specifically of men's values.

Because plants and animals have no epistemology, this implies non-objective is the result of the inapplicability of epistemology. But then they are also equally non-subjective and non-intrinsic.

Yes, technically they are non-objective values, but as I was dealing with non-men I had left the concept of value unqualified in chapter 2, leaving the question of objective versus non-objective specifically for men's values in chapter 3. Now I see that was a mistake.

Man does require an epistemology, and his actual values do have an epistemological status, but what is it? If you would answer again they are non-objective, it must be for a different reason than that which you applied to non-sentient critters.

When men don't have functioning conceptual faculties then their values are in the same epistemological boat as those of non-sentient creatures. The difference is that this is an oddity for men whereas it is the norm for non-men. Men's values when pre-conceptual have to be expressly qualified as such because these values are unusual and in a context when one would normally make epistemological judgement.

You circle around again to the topic of non-objective values in section 3.4 where non-objective values are divided into irrational and preconceptual values. So perhaps the answer to my first question is 'irrational values'.

Irrational values are values arising from improper use of the conceptual faculty in their formation. Non-men's values aren't even irrational because they don't have (or are expected to have) a functioning reasoning faculty, but as I said I had previously not identified that. In relation to men, I had attempted to locate men's pre-conceptual values with the fact that a man still has valuation mechanisms that precede his conceptual faculty because of his origin as a non-sentient creature and sharing those mechanisms as part of his heritage. As you've identified, however, that was a bad move and I need to fix this mess

JJM

[John McVey]

I've edited it and reposted it. However, I haven't gotten the hang of GoogleDocs yet so it ended up giving me a different link for the published file.

JJM

[Grames]

This quote from your new version is problematic:

Values as relational, and therefore observable
A milder version of subjectivism asserts that values are relative, that values are subjective because they differ depending on the nature of the organism whose life is being used as the standard of value. This assertion is a mistake, because in philosophical terms used by ordinary people (as opposed to scientific) ‘relative’ means the values change depending on who is looking at the situation rather than what the situation itself happens to be. The fault with the relativist thinking is in the failure of the thinker to disassociate his or her own life from the appropriate standard of value when looking at other organisms. The values relate to whom they may be of value, and do not change with change in the identity of the valuer. In terms of the philosophical use of the words, values are not relative but relational[25]. If we were to use the scientific meaning of relative, that of A being related to B, there would be no problem, but that is not what is meant philosophically and not what is meant by the ordinary man.

When the whole of the prerequisites of value is properly identified in any given case it turns out that anyone who so identifies them can identify that relationship between them and come up with the same value. The fact that values are relational means that the value that something may have to a given organism is frequently observable by others besides just that one organism. Relativists fail to note that the organism actually measuring the value need not be the one whose life serves as the standard of value for that measurement. Any man who knows the same facts and uses the same organism’s life as the standard of value will arrive at the same conclusion as anyone else who looks at the same relationship. The difficulty lies only in coming to know the details that go into the relationship. The principle of identification is valid and the ability to make a legitimate prediction of the value of something to another is real, made possible because values are not relative.

(Prefatory remark- discussing the rejection of intrincism and subjectivism before even arriving at reason as mans means of survival is out of sequence. Animals don't make those mistakes, the biological root of value is not the context that requires discussing those mistakes. If it is not required, leave it out until it is.)

This passage speaks of organisms, not men with consciousness and a requirement for epistemology. The values of non-men are automatic, and I agree that for them "The values relate to whom they may be of value, and do not change with change in the identity of the valuer." But this is because the identities of the valuers are interchangeable, not the nature of value. Men are not interchangeable because they have minds, and for men value does change with change in identity of the valuer. This passage ignores "man's means of connection."

First point, a quote from OPAR illustrating value relativity:

To concretize the point, let us say that six men look at a screen on which a series of medical slides is projected; the slides contain cross sections of various bodily tissues. One man is a savage fresh from the jungle; to him, the procession of eerie shadows and colors—which is all he can make of it—suggests, say, something undreamed of and inexplicable, some ominous supernatural force; he feels a pang of dread. A second man is civilized but ignorant; he knows that the slides are something safe and scientific, but has no idea what they mean; <opar_155> he yawns. A third man is a painter of the representational school; he too lacks medical knowledge but, focussing on a certain group of blobs, he thinks: "It reminds me of Kandinsky. How hideous!"—and feels a touch of revulsion. Then we bring St. Augustine to look at the screen; he understands only that this is a product of that blasphemous science of the pagans, and he feels anger, even outrage, in the presence of such "lust of the eyes." Then a physician comes in and feels a stab of sorrow; the screen reveals tissue taken from the body of his close friend and means, he understands, a fatal illness. Finally, an ivory-tower researcher looks at the screen. He has spent years looking for a certain type of growth to prove a complex anatomical theory, the culmination of his life's work; he sees the growth before him—and feels a surge of elation.

The same object has been perceived by members of the same species. Yet depending on their conceptual context—on their knowledge of what the object is and above all on their value-judgments—they feel superstitious dread or yawning indifference or esthetic revulsion or pious condemnation or painful depression or joyous exultation. What caused these emotional states? The slides? The physical object by itself? Clearly not. The cause is the slides as identified and evaluated, the slides as grasped and appraised by a mind.(3)

Second point, the footnoted (25) portion of Tara Smith does not support your claim that values are relational but not relative. In explaining how objectivity applies to values she draws attention to how the intrinsicist and subjectivist schools reject the relation of valuer to value, instead focusing exclusively on one or the other. This follows in method the way Rand described the Intrinsicist/Subjectivist/Objectivist trichotomy in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. Intrinsicism and subjectivism are failure modes of objectivism, particular ways the logical structure collapses when crucial elements are removed. Objectivity demands considering both external factual context and internal conscious context. Rejecting subjectivism is rejecting the omission of relevant contextual facts, not rejecting the relative or relational character of value. Rejecting an omission is a kind of double negative, possibly that is source of the slipperiness of this point. Double negatives are to be avoided in expression, but I don't see how to get around this one.

('Failure mode' terminology comes from Failure mode and effects analysis, you may be familiar with the term.)

Third point, Tara Smith's footnote 30 (in chapter 4 appearing just before the passage you cite) states the hierarchy relation. A person is an objectivist, an existent is not objective. I'll let her explain in her own words:

There is a further layer of meaning to the claim that values are objective that I will not develop in the text but that I should briefly indicate. The meaning of the claim naturally depends of the nature of objectivity. Strictly, it is persons who are or are not objective in their judgments concerning value and moral prescriptions, not the values or prescriptions themselves. Objectivity pertains to a person's process of thinking, the manner by which one reaches conclusions. Correspondingly, the objectivity of values depends on the way in which a particular person came to regard a given thing as valuable. Part of what value's objectivity refers to is the factual relation between a given thing and a particular person's life that requires that he act in certain ways rather than others, if he is to live. But value's objectivity also reflects the fact that values are conclusions of a volitional consciousness. Since objectivity pertains to the use of one's mind, values' objectivity also refers to a persons method of conclluding that something is valuable.

...(2nd paragraph omitted: beyond scope etc..., references to Peikoff and Binswanger)

A value held consciously has a dual nature as a concept and as a referent. The concept is objective (or not), while the referent is not objective (or subjective or intrinsic, it merely is.)

Fourth, my own answer to the question "what is the epistemological status of actual values?" is that actual values do not have an epistemological status at all. As actions, they are physical facts external to consciousness and simply are existents. This applies to men and non-men equally. A man can be a subjectivist, and rationalize he ought to get a particular value which is then deemed a subjective value by its derivation. Once the subjectivist acts, he is simply valuing and his action is a fact to be evaluated as any other fact, not epistemologically as true or false but ethically as good or bad.

I'll stop here and await your response.

[John McVey]

(Prefatory remark- discussing the rejection of intrincism and subjectivism before even arriving at reason as mans means of survival is out of sequence. Animals don't make those mistakes, the biological root of value is not the context that requires discussing those mistakes. If it is not required, leave it out until it is.)

I disagree. The issue is not yet about man's values and use of reason for his own values but the topic of values as such and what men may think about the origin and nature of values as such and not their own in particular. Thus that discussion comes at just the right time because the identification in the prior sections of how values are generated sets the scene for rejecting two false ideas about the nature of values that many readers are already likely to hold (which is why you were right to note my failure to raise and answer the obvious question).

If anything I need to make that point explicitly, that while the main content of what I've written is fine I should only invoke the concepts of intrinsicism and subjectivism themselves gingerly and then deal with the non-applicability of epistemological concepts to non-men even more clearly than I have with the new edit (trivial note: the specific passages you cited are part of the older material). Such is part of the value of independent review and criticism!

This passage speaks of organisms, not men with consciousness and a requirement for epistemology. The values of non-men are automatic, and I agree that for them "The values relate to whom they may be of value, and do not change with change in the identity of the valuer." But this is because the identities of the valuers are interchangeable, not the nature of value. Men are not interchangeable because they have minds, and for men value does change with change in identity of the valuer.

I think you misunderstand my point, which was about that there is a distinction between whose life is the standard of value being used in an evaluation and who is the one actually performing that evaluation. The two need not be the same being, and I showed a number of upshots of that fact that will turn out to be critical for economics (particularly understanding the actual nature of the entrepreneur; footnote 26 is a cross reference to my work on that topic, which work directly depends on value theory as well as everything else prior to it). Thus a value is related to a specific standard of value. I was then rejecting the popular notion of relativity that values change with change in the identity of the observer performing the evaluation.

In fact, your quote from OPAR illustrates my point on the matter nicely. The very fact that anyone can look at these situations and understand why these men have the reactions they do comes from the same root that gives rise to the fact that values but originate in a relationship to an identifiable standard of value with all its intricate details. The fact that emotions have definite causes that can be rationally understood is precisely why Dr Peikoff put that example in!

Consider man 5, the physician. He feels pain because the slides mean a good friend of his is seriously ill. Posit a man 7, the oncologist who prepared the tissues shown in the slides. Let us say he that knows of the friendship between the physician and the patient. This oncologist is capable of coming to similar conclusions as the physician, and since he knows of their relationship he knows very well what the physician’s reaction is going to be when he passes the slides on. Any person in the shoes of that oncologist will come to the same conclusion about how the physician is going to react. Another, say that oncologist's lab tech, can likewise identify both how that physician and that oncologist are going to react to the lab findings, and similarly her boyfriend could understand the physician’s potential reaction and understand her boss’s treatment of her that day when she talks about it with him after work, and so on. You could extend that ad infinitum, which works both because men are interchangeable as valuers when they abstract themselves from the standard of value and because the nature of value as being related to an identifiable standard allows this process of abstraction.

As to the phenomenon of different men arriving at different values even when men are abstracting themselves from the standard of value used, I did note that the problem lies in the ability of different people to gain the full knowledge required (e.g. how the lab-tech’s boyfriend is far removed from the physician, the patient and his medical history, and the slides). Any differences in estimated values will be traceable back to differences in knowledge (and methodology of interpretation) and not because values are relative to observers.

This passage ignores "man's means of connection."

I also need to note that it is only men who are capable of this observation of others’ values (because it is a feat of abstraction). For instance, ants aren't making these kinds of abstract identifications when they gather material to feed to aphids or fungi, but are just doing what they've been instructed to. They do act to gain and keep the fungi food, but no ant actually knows why it needs to do what it is doing.

Second point, the footnoted (25) portion of Tara Smith does not support your claim that values are relational but not relative.

You’re right about the not-relative part not being supported. I did get the ‘relational’ appellation from her in that location, though, so I am keeping the reference, but I will cut the pages referred to back to just 97 and indicate the origin of the term I use more clearly.

Third point, Tara Smith's footnote 30 … states the hierarchy relation. A person is an objectivist, an existent is not objective.

What she wrote both in that endnote and in other passages in the body of her work in fact mirrors my point about how values are the results of identification and not just the relationships themselves. What values refer to are concrete existents, but they themselves are more abstract (ie they can be mental existents). The fact that they are identifications is what gives rise to the determination of epistemological status of men’s values.

Fourth, my own answer to the question "what is the epistemological status of actual values?" is that actual values do not have an epistemological status at all. As actions, they are physical facts external to consciousness and simply are existents.

I disagree with this. I do need to keep clearer my own distinction between the valuable and the magnitude of its value, but nevertheless values as magnitudes are products of some means of identification, and this either precedes or is contemporary with the action. Similarly, the action cannot be understood except by reference to the value as it stands independent of the action to gain and/or keep the concrete.

They do not exist until that relationship is actually connected the standard of value – that is why I identified operation of a mechanism of connection as a prerequisite of value. So, you can have all the referents and relationships in the real world as you please, but no identification -> no magnitude of value. The referents aren’t properly called values until the magnitude has been identified.

I then developed the implementation of this mechanism by reference to means (or lack thereof) of awareness and more detail of what values as concretes do for standards of value also as concretes. Epistemological status doesn’t apply to non-men’s values because that mechanism is non-conceptual. By contrast, epistemological status does apply to men’s values (leaving aside things like cellular mechanics) because the mechanism by which values are formed (specifically, the magnitudes determined) is the same one by which concepts are formed. Value-formation for men is a process with many essential features in common with concept-formation, and values do not pre-exist just as concepts do not pre-exist: as with values as entities and magnitudes, the referents are all there, as is their causal connections that allows for conceptualisation, but concepts do not exist until men form them – and likewise men’s values do not exist until they grasp them. It is for this reason that belief about value theory and its consequences for human action go hand in hand the same in regard to concept theory.

JJM

[Grames]

I think you misunderstand my point, which was about that there is a distinction between whose life is the standard of value being used in an evaluation and who is the one actually performing that evaluation. The two need not be the same being,

Different people can come to the same conclusions, and indeed it is objectivity that makes that possible. But if the one whose life is the standard is not also the one performing that evaluation, that person does not have that value. Agreement is possible, but not imposition. The valuer must participate consciously in the act of valuing. Values are relative to valuers, always.

Any differences in estimated values will be traceable back to differences in knowledge (and methodology of interpretation) and not because values are relative to observers.

But these are the differences in the valuers that make values relative. Assuming perfectly equal contexts erases all differences, but it also erases all individuals. In a limited, specific context such as a price the knowledge of two persons can be brought to an arbitrary degree of agreement, but not generally.

I disagree with this. I do need to keep clearer my own distinction between the valuable and the magnitude of its value, but nevertheless values as magnitudes are products of some means of identification, and this either precedes or is contemporary with the action. Similarly, the action cannot be understood except by reference to the value as it stands independent of the action to gain and/or keep the concrete.

They do not exist until that relationship is actually connected the standard of value – that is why I identified operation of a mechanism of connection as a prerequisite of value. So, you can have all the referents and relationships in the real world as you please, but no identification -> no magnitude of value. The referents aren’t properly called values until the magnitude has been identified.

This is a good place to note that Rand concept of value is biological and includes the actions of nonsentient life: microbes, trees, dogs. Values as acts and facts have identity but do not require identification, which is why value can apply to life in general. Only man has this problematic split between what he is doing and what he ought to do. He ought to identify, but once he acts there will be consequences that are objective and may vary from his prior identifications. A conscious identification is necessary, but an actual identity of an act's consequence is automatic and inescapable. The two identities can differ, which is why there is such a subject as epistemology.

Now I would switch to your taxonomy of values. Specifically Beuchner's argument is what I am going to reject. You posted the following on another thread:

I covered my thoughts in depth here. What I have written has since been edited, but the essence is unchanged.

I identified that values are either objective or non-objective. Objective values are divided into rightly-identified values, mistaken values, and also potential & latent values. Non-objective values are divided into irrational values and pre-conceptual values.

It's not that subjective values are bad, but that subjective values do not exist at all. Certainly, irrational values are as close as men can get to subjective values, but they never actually get there because at root there are still causes as to why someone values X over Y (Dr Beuchner formulated this argument, not me, but I do subscribe to it). There are always causes, hence never any subjective values. Don't confuse the source of values with the methodology used to follow through on them.

When men's values are irrational, the key to not mistakingly calling them subjective is to identify the fact that there is no such thing as a causeless emotion, that they are not subjective in the proper meaning of the word either. A large part of the problem in considering the word subjective is the switch in its usage from the full philosophic meaning (the wholly uncaused creation of the subject, which you've correctly identified) and the slacker vernacular (that which changes from individual to individual and has causes we may or may not think well of). It pays to stick strictly to the philosophic meaning.

Similarly, to the extent that someone's capacity to form abstractions is non-functional their valuations are pre-conceptual. Their values begin to approach those of animals, to whom the entire idea of epistemological status does not apply. They either have values or they don't, where whether the values are helpful or not has no bearing on their status as values or the fact that concept of epistemological status doesn't apply.

JJM

Metaphysically, nothing is arbitrary in the sense of causeless because everything has a cause including psychological conclusions, such as values. Epistemologically, what is subjective is arbitrary because it has no basis in necessity and so is unjustified by any process of reason, inductive or deductive. Dr Beuchner is equivocating on the word subjective by claiming nothing is subjective in the sense of arbitrary metaphysically therefore nothing is subjective in the sense of arbitrary epistemologically.

It is bizarre to even construe subjective as acausal in the metaphysical sense, and he absurdly and contrafactually denies that epistemological and ethical subjectivism exists in face of Rand and a host of other philosophers.

It is a stolen concept to take for granted the scientific, logical psychological perspective on psychological causation and then turn about to deny that there is any arbitrariness in epistemology.

The only cause of anything in consciousness is volition. Volition is what selects between prior conclusions, current emotions, and the evidence of perception. By glossing over any distinction between the metaphysical and the epistemological and treating epistemological products as metaphysical causes Beuchner denies volition by leaving no role for it to play. It is actually determinist to claim psychological causes are responsible for valuing X over Y.

This particular argument that there are no subjective values is hopelessly, irrecoverably false and I hope you abandon it.

[John McVey]

Different people can come to the same conclusions, and indeed it is objectivity that makes that possible. But if the one whose life is the standard is not also the one performing that evaluation, that person does not have that value. Agreement is possible, but not imposition. The valuer must participate consciously in the act of valuing. Values are relative to valuers, always.

I'm in agreement with everything but the assertion that I think agreement is imposition. All I said was that an external party can understand the values that another forms or may form, ie that the values someone has are observable by another who can understand the situation perfectly if he possessed all requisite knowledge, and that the real-world problem was insufficient or incorrect information. That being said, what I wrote could easily be misconstrued.

If A has already valued X then indeed X is a real value to A. In this case, B can (with sufficient knowledge) understand why A values X and to the degree A does. However, when A has not yet valued X then X is not a valuable to A yet (the fourth prerequisite is absent) and all B can do is make a prediction about the value A might place on X. I also noted in C3S3 that the concept of latent values includes this second scenario, along with the express repudiation of X being a value to A if A hasn't valued it even though B can predict that X will be a value to A when A gets a chance to do so. It is the lack of X's value to A in the second scenario that needs better clarification back in C2S5.

But these (differences in knowledge about valuational contexts) are the differences in the valuers that make values relative. Assuming perfectly equal contexts erases all differences, but it also erases all individuals. In a limited, specific context such as a price the knowledge of two persons can be brought to an arbitrary degree of agreement, but not generally.

I don't see how any of that follows.

Regarding relativism: if man A values X then that's a fact of the world. That fact wont change for man B, C or D. Similarly, if man A would value X if he were to consider it properly then that too is a fact, and so same again for B, C and D. In both cases, disagreements between B C and D would revolve around their understanding of A's value-system (and in the second case, the likelihood of A evaluating X, which includes consideration for A's volition). I don't see any relativism in this.

Regarding erasure: how would B's fully understanding the essential elements of A's value system that go into A's evaluation (or potential evaluation) of X constitute erasing the difference between men A and B? Absolutely, it is impossible for B to know every last relevant bit of that value-system when A is as complex and volitional an organism as man, but assuming B could, how would this make A and B indistinguishable? Or say B and C when both pondering A - how would they be rendered indistinguishable from each other?

Unless you're saying that there is limited ability to understand a man's value-system sufficiently to make accurate predictions for anything other than a limited range of potential-valuables and within a given time-frame, and hence expanding on one of my own points, your last sentence there baffles me.

Values as acts and facts have identity but do not require identification, which is why value can apply to life in general.

Yes, the last sentence I wrote in response to you earlier is in error. "Identification" was not the proper word to use - that is an act specific to conscious organisms, not to all. "Triggering and operation of the mechanism" is more accurate, but right now I can't think of a word to express that in a much neater fashion.

Now I would switch to your taxonomy of values. Specifically Beuchner's argument is what I am going to reject.

That I am going to have to spend much more time thinking about, including a review of what Dr Buechner actually said.

JJM

[Grames]

Regarding relativism: if man A values X then that's a fact of the world. That fact wont change for man B, C or D. Similarly, if man A would value X if he were to consider it properly then that too is a fact, and so same again for B, C and D. In both cases, disagreements between B C and D would revolve around their understanding of A's value-system (and in the second case, the likelihood of A evaluating X, which includes consideration for A's volition). I don't see any relativism in this.

The valuation is in this example always relative to (relational to, with respect to) A, even when B, C, and D are performing it.

Regarding erasure: how would B's fully understanding the essential elements of A's value system that go into A's evaluation (or potential evaluation) of X constitute erasing the difference between men A and B? Absolutely, it is impossible for B to know every last relevant bit of that value-system when A is as complex and volitional an organism as man, but assuming B could, how would this make A and B indistinguishable? Or say B and C when both pondering A - how would they be rendered indistinguishable from each other?

I think I slipped back into B, C, and D valuing for themselves the same as A does. This 'remote valuation' idea is novel to me.

Unless you're saying that there is limited ability to understand a man's value-system sufficiently to make accurate predictions for anything other than a limited range of potential-valuables and within a given time-frame, and hence expanding on one of my own points, your last sentence there baffles me.

There is still an information problem along the lines of Mises (or Hayek's?) critique of bureaucracy in a command economy. The bureaucracy couldn't possibly set all the prices correctly, here one person can't even know all of what factors into one other person's valuations. But economics is like engineering here, perfection is not necessary.

That I am going to have to spend much more time thinking about, including a review of what Dr Buechner actually said.

I don't have access to any Dr. Buechner's works, so I'll have to retract and modify if he argued something significantly different.

[John McVey]

Grames:

The first thing I did was check to see if I had committed an injustice against Dr Buechner. What I said was correct but I did leave out some of the context. What I did put in was his recognition that the other view of the subjective, that which depends on the context of the subject, is a valid one, where he says he wants to stress the 'philosophical' meaning rather than the layman's meaning.

His basis is that all values, like all knowledge, is the result of processing of facts by the mind. There are no intrinsic values because _man's mind_ has to be involved in processing the facts, and that there are no subjective values because man's mind has to be involved in processing _the facts_. All knowledge, and all values, are the joint product of both reality and consciousness. The question is how that product is formed. A man therefore has two basic choices: take control by reason in the forefront of your mind or allow your psychology to take over in defiance of reason. The result is the division of values (as considered by a conceptual-level consciousness) into the objective and the irrational. (And, at a subsidiary level, he notes that optional values are those in which man has a choice as to the particular form that values may take within the category of objective value).

His concept of the subjective is the idea of the content of mind being an exclusive primary. To be a true subjective value, a value placed on something has to be completely divorced from the nature of that something. He gives the analogy of the value-meter: one walks down the aisle of a supermarket, then suddenly the needle on the meter shoots up because one passes say a box of cornflakes, and purely as a result of that one grabs the box and puts it in one's trolley. There is no consideration whatever of why cornflakes might be valuable, there is only the value-meter. His argument against subjective values is that in reality one's mind is always going to consider the nature of the cornflakes (or whatever) themselves and a standard of value when evaluating them. The values do not spring causelessly to mind, "there are no baseless, causeless, arbitrary convulsions of consciousness." The abdication in favour of emotion is as close to subjectivism as one can get, such that the values might as well spring causelessly to mind because this method does not allow a man to understand the causes. Nevertheless, it is still not subjectivism because it always remains an identification of facts and their judgement against a standard of value. By saying that no emotion is causeless he is noting that there are always reasons as to why a man will experience a particular emotion, and that any given emotion is the result of subconscious processing of the facts. That is straight out of Objectivism, and he even quotes Galt's speech on the matter.

As to the rest of your charges, that's between you and Dr Buechner, and I am not fit to speak on his behalf. What does concern me is me, what I think and what I have written. You're right to note that AR holds the subjective as the arbitrary and the emotional (this is just from a quick check of the Lexicon), but I still tend to think there's a confusion between subjective meaning subject-as-creator (all consciousness as self-consciousness) and subjective meaning requiring knowledge of the subject's context in order to comprehend. I also have disputes with other things you've said, but I am still thinking about this topic and I will get back to you once I have more time.

JJM