66 replies to this topic

[human_murda]

First of all, I think you have to see the same sentiment in Rand's writings. Her ideal characters are willing to live life only on their own terms, not on anyone else's. They are clearly not aiming at 'mere survival,' but something more. So let's explore this a little. She certainly states that her morality is based on the alternative of life and death, and yet her morality does not seem to result in people who are willing to prolong their life at all costs. Whence the disconnect?

I understand that Rand wasn't talking about survival "at all costs" (which is animalistic). She was aiming for survival as the fundamental, so reason is used to achieve survival in the best way. So naturally, she expected all positive emotions to derive from this fundamental. Rand did not believe that emotions are a reality in themselves, but can only become a part of reality when they are derived from the survival fundamental.

The problem is that positive emotions are very limited if you follow a survival fundamental. Rand assumed that all positive emotions are derived from this survival fundamental [which is not true as I have stated in post #1 and #15].

You write as though it's a crime for Objectivists to say that emotions are what's worth living for, but Objectivism does not denigrate emotion.

I said Objectivists thought that it was a crime to consider positive emotions as the fundamental and survival as the derivative [as I think it is] as opposed to survival as the fundamental and positive emotions as the derivative [as Objectivism puts it]. Post 15 would be a better indicator of this difference. (I am only justifying positive emotions as the fundamental in the present post).

And yet, we need standards to tell us what it is proper to feel positive emotions for, and we know from experience that emotion itself does not provide these standards. So what is the ultimate standard that tells us, no matter how good it might feel, that things that detract from our overall well-being are not good? What tells us that (to use an extreme example), no matter how good heroin feels, it's not ultimately a value?

Therefore I would advocate the same thing that Rand did : reason. Except reason is used to achieve positive emotions in the best way [as opposed to survival in the best way]. So I would say no to heroin. I don't think anyone will contest the fact that heroine degrades one's life so much so that you are left with nothing but negative emotions. It also limits your capability to love, seek knowledge out of curiosity and several other positive emotions, the pursuit of which I consider a fundamental in life. It also reduces your productivity, so that you have to fight like an animal for your survival leading to more negative emotions. Considering these factors, heroin becomes more of an avoidance of negative emotions, rather than pursuit of positive emotions. (I am talking about the positive-emotion-ultimate here).

Even love can be directed at the wrong people or things. There are any number of people who would swear that they love people who treat them badly; abuse them, cheat on them, etc.

These people simultaneously live and breathe negative emotions so that the positive emotion of love is stifled. This is again unreasonable.

Voldemort himself harbors a love for power

I'm certain that Voldemort's hunger for power is a negative and different emotion from the "love" that Rowling describes [I am not talking about the "love for something" emotion which varies according to the "something", but just "love" in itself, which is specific. For example, curiosity can be loosely described as a love for knowledge, but is a different emotion from "love"].

That said, love for power is not Voldemort's greatest fault. His greatest fault is that he condemns positive emotions. To understand this, we can compare him to Grindelwald, who had the same weakness for power but was later redeemed because of another positive emotion he could feel : remorse. This is the only difference between Grindelwald and Voldemort. This difference is also clear in another way : it is said that Voldemort would have to risk death if he were to feel remorse. So he chose life over this positive emotion. This is in direct contrast what Lily Potter did : she would die for her baby because of the love she harbored for him. [This love is different from Rand's love which was more limited : an acknowledgement of values and ability reflected in another person]. (Basically : positive emotion is the fundamental, while survival is the derivative).

@ Dante : Just out of curiosity - what exactly does the Salman Rushdie comment in your signature mean?

Edited by human_murda, 29 April 2012 - 10:24 PM.

[human_murda]

There is no commandment that one commit suicide at any time, just recognition that conditions may become such that the standard of life qua oneself is no longer realistically feasible and when and if such a point comes up you've exited the realm in which Objectivism is applicable.

I don't think I get you. What exactly did you mean by:

I was saying that Objectivism would be a-okay with somebody opting to call it quits on life sooner rather than later when their life has been reduced to such a hopeless terrible condition. Objectivism would NOT say somebody has to drag it out as long as possible existing in such an inhumane condition.

Cancer really is an unpredictable disease. So why not just fight it which gives you a sense of hope? This is different from life-boat/conjoined-twins situation, where a choice has to made regarding who gets to live. The choices available to a cancer patient is to fight it or to give up. You sound as though you are implying the latter.

[Aspiring Objectivist]

First of all, I think you have to see the same sentiment in Rand's writings. Her ideal characters are willing to live life only on their own terms, not on anyone else's. They are clearly not aiming at 'mere survival,' but something more. So let's explore this a little. She certainly states that her morality is based on the alternative of life and death, and yet her morality does not seem to result in people who are willing to prolong their life at all costs. Whence the disconnect?

Your answer here is the best one I've heard to this question, and I'm glad because it's one of the main questions which has kept me from accepting Objectivism. While it's cleared the issue up for me a little, I'm still confused. Life gives us the idea of value, and we are to value things that help our goal of long term survival. But then we find things to value that matter more than our life? It's just weird, I guess. It seems like a contradiction. How could we value something more than the very thing which gives us the whole idea of value?

[Spiral Architect]

Your answer here is the best one I've heard to this question, and I'm glad because it's one of the main questions which has kept me from accepting Objectivism.

As a complete aside, I just want to say that you should take your time on this. Be critical and ask questions. I took a long road to get comfortable with Objectivism (I actually read Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal in 1990 and didn’t call myself and Objectivist until the mid-00’s). I didn’t have the internet back then to expedite reading or discussion, which helps a lot now days, but still you should work through the ideas and read alternatives critically. I understand the journey your on and I can tell you the process is rewarding.

While it's cleared the issue up for me a little, I'm still confused. Life gives us the idea of value, and we are to value things that help our goal of long term survival. But then we find things to value that matter more than our life? It's just weird, I guess. It seems like a contradiction. How could we value something more than the very thing which gives us the whole idea of value?

Remember that the alternative is life or death, but once you choose life as a standard of value then you need to explore what is life according to the nature of man. Animals live on instinct and the life-death question relative to their values evokes the fight or flight response to basic necessities, but for humans the concept of value is more complicated. Human’s don’t try to live, as in simply survive, but to thrive and flourish. Values are essential as objects we work to gain or keep as part of flourishing as a man since we need to use our minds to live. We don’t settle for the animal life style and civilization has been a process of moving away from that since we were primitive hunter/gatherers.

The desire to flourish gives the opportunity to project desires onto long range goals which translates some of man’s greatest values to lifetime pursuits. The classic example is someone you love. I love my wife and she certainly is a long range value I project as necessary for my life to be successful and happy, rendering any threat to her a threat to my life and happiness as well. Life would be reduced considerably without her so any action on my part to protect her would be necessary but more importantly I would consider it an act of self-immolation to NOT protect her in an emergency.

The question of values and how they relate to you is something only you can determine for each value relative to your life. But if you love something enough to risk your life to protect it you are not saying less about your life but simply saying how important it is to your life that you are willing to lay everything on the line to keep it. Such is the stuff of romantic heroism!

[bluecherry]

I don't think I get you. What exactly did you mean by:



Cancer really is an unpredictable disease. So why not just fight it which gives you a sense of hope? This is different from life-boat/conjoined-twins situation, where a choice has to made regarding who gets to live. The choices available to a cancer patient is to fight it or to give up. You sound as though you are implying the latter.

I'll try to rephrase. Tell me if you get what I'm trying to say or not this time.
There is nowhere and no time which Objectivism would lead to the conclusion that the one and only proper choice is to die. However, Objectivism is formed under the assumption of certain conditions existing. Some of those conditions include things like existing as an individual person, having a functional rational faculty and that the goal of living according to your own nature as an individual human being is possible. If those conditions are not there then Objectivism does not apply. If one has terminal cancer where the odds of recovery are abysmal and one is just in pain and dysfunctional constantly then that means the only kind of survival left possible to somebody for as long as they can last is one which is not consistent with how humans exist. Also, Objectivism wouldn't still apply whenever there is a sliver of possibility of recovery, saying to keep up hope and that one has to keep trying because Objectivism also includes that one has to recognize reality for what it is. In this cancer example recognizing reality for what it is means recognizing that death coming soon is a pretty sure thing and that counting on recovery just isn't realistic. So, yeah, Objectivism doesn't apply and whatever one decides to do is up to them to decide without any advice from Objectivism. Because Objectivism isn't applicable to this person anymore, there is no right or wrong answer according to Objectivism.

If it has ever sounded like I implied one "should" commit suicide in such a case, I did not mean to say so. However, I certainly could understand and sympathize personally with somebody in a realistically hopeless situation deciding they just don't want to hang around suffering anymore.

[human_murda]

@bluecherry : So you are saying that Objectivism would neither say you have to continue to live nor would it say that you have to die, as both are supposedly inconsistent with who you are. Since one of the two has to be chosen, Objectivism isn't applicable.

Now that I have understood what you are saying, I am confused as hell! What are you trying to prove? Are you just saying that this is a case that should be added to the list of situations Objectivism can't explain [if you are, then this is best left to another thread]? Are you supporting the survival fundamental or positive-emotion fundamental? From this comment:

You just have to make sure that you don't put the cart before the horse and do just whatever you feel like doing whenever you feel like it without any further questions. That's a recipe for disaster like running blindly into a room of pointy objects without turning the lights on first because you smell something good in there. Check your feelings and desires, make sure that they and how you plan to get them aren't irrational and harmful, hit that light switch to see where the dangers are before proceeding to go get whatever is giving off that heavenly aroma -- THEN go after it full speed ahead.

it seems your are supporting a positive-emotion fundamental [with survival as derivative]. But do clarify.

Correct me if I am wrong, but your stance could indirectly mean that Objectivism can't make any judgement regarding the kind of life Voldemort chose. Within the Harry Potter universe, immortality is a possibility and Voldemort chose that route. But you can see how Voldemort is clinging to life and steeped in negative emotions [that bloody child in King's Cross is a representation of this state of Voldemort]. Several times in the books, it is stated that Voldemort is less than human. So assuming Voldemort wants to live, which he does, then "goal of living according to your own nature as an individual human being"[as you say] is not possible for him, as the only way to continue to live is to embrace negative emotions ["remorse" could kill him]. Then Objectivism would not be applicable for him [as you say]. Therefore, Objectivism cannot pass a judgement on what he does.

So I would say that your second condition that, "goal of living according to your own nature as an individual human being is possible" is not a necessary condition as the reality and identity of different humans is different, that living with cancer [non-terminal] is well within your own nature as an individual human being. That there is a sliver of possibility of recovery is sufficient condition that you should act within your capability to achieve recovery. If you do have terminal cancer, then there is nothing that anyone can say that can make a difference. Even if every philosophy on Earth cries : "live, human, live", since there are no treatments available [except palliative care], counting on recovery isn't realistic. So the problem really isn't "clinging onto life" [as a person with terminal cancer can't decide on that], but accepting that death is inevitable and coming soon [for those who have terminal cancer]. For those who have non-terminal cancer [with a sliver of hope], the choice is between fighting or giving up. The problem is that you applied the choice that is available for non-terminal cancer patients to people with terminal cancer. Objectivism does apply to both type of patients but Objectivism can't advocate that people with terminal cancer continue to live as the length of life available to them is outside their control and they can't choose on it [the point is that Objectivism can't advocate anything that goes against reality]. If anything is at fault here, it is the fact that death is inevitable [for any living being] and Objectivism can't decide on that [Objectivism can't say : "you should live for 200 more years"]. So yes, there is a lack of motivational factor if you apply Objectivism. But that is an inherent problem with Objectivism and the particular case here is not an exception. So Objectivism applies [but cannot extend your life, even if you are the most moral person in existence].

Maybe you should consider some medical conditions like "Persistent vegetative state", which are more suitable to the conditions you mentioned, especially the first. Doctors even have a choice to keep the patient alive [But don't confuse this with the fact that euthanasia is usually illegal]. But it would be better to start another thread, especially if you want to continue your argument that Objectivism doesn't apply.

Edited by human_murda, 01 May 2012 - 12:26 AM.

[Leonid]

"So, the fundamental problem I have with Rand's philosophy is the assumption that survival is the ultimate purpose of a living being and the sole measure of the worth of existence. The problem is that an individual's survival is impossible given a long enough time frame."

In Objectivism for every living being his life is standard of value. But animals cannot live as plants and man cannot live as animal. Man's standard of value is man's life, that is-life as rational being, not mere existence. Even if one day man would be able to live forever, but will spend his days and centuries as a brainless parasite, his life would be worse than death.

[human_murda]

In Objectivism for every living being his life is standard of value. But animals cannot live as plants and man cannot live as animal. Man's standard of value is man's life, that is-life as rational being, not mere existence. Even if one day man would be able to live forever, but will spend his days and centuries as a brainless parasite, his life would be worse than death.

You forgot that the choice that a rational being has, regarding life and death, makes value possible [in Objectivism, i.e. ; "[i]The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action."[/i] -Galt]. In your example, the only choice is life and whatever you are [even a brainless parasite] is irrelevant to your existence. The problem is that you applied the properties of inanimate matter to life, when Rand made the difference quite clear : "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms".

"An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil." -Galt
But according to your situation, the brainless parasite is not just capable of surviving for a few years but, it turns out, forever. Since his actions don't threaten his life, it would mean that they are not evil [according to Objectivism]. The point is that Objectivism breaks down if you assume that your actions in life won't ultimately affect your existence. Since this is the case in your situation [which is light years away from reality anyway], Objectivism doesn't apply. So your conclusion that "his life would be worse than death" is based on a value system outside Objectivism [I do agree to it's truthfulness : but not due to Objectivism. But since the situation is unrealistic anyway, that wouldn't matter].

Edited by human_murda, 01 May 2012 - 11:02 AM.

[Leonid]

You forgot that the choice that a rational being has, regarding life and death, makes value possible [in Objectivism, i.e. ; "[i]The existence of inanimate matter is unconditional, the existence of life is not: it depends on a specific course of action."[/i] -Galt]. In your example, the only choice is life and whatever you are [even a brainless parasite] is irrelevant to your existence. The problem is that you applied the properties of inanimate matter to life, when Rand made the difference quite clear : "There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe: existence or nonexistence—and it pertains to a single class of entities: to living organisms".

"An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil." -Galt
But according to your situation, the brainless parasite is not just capable of surviving for a few years but, it turns out, forever. Since his actions don't threaten his life, it would mean that they are not evil [according to Objectivism]. The point is that Objectivism breaks down if you assume that your actions in life won't ultimately affect your existence. Since this is the case in your situation [which is light years away from reality anyway], Objectivism doesn't apply. So your conclusion that "his life would be worse than death" is based on a value system outside Objectivism [I do agree to it's truthfulness : but not due to Objectivism. But since the situation is unrealistic anyway, that wouldn't matter].

In objectivism the meaning of man's life is life qua man, that is-rational being. The choice is between life of man qua man and physical existence which is lower than that of plant. The first is good and the second is bad, although it doesn't lead to the physical non-existence because the outcome will be a suffering which is worse than death. This is also a foundation for the value system in which the standard of value is man's life qua man.

[bluecherry]

"@bluecherry : So you are saying that Objectivism would neither say you have to continue to live nor would it say that you have to die, as both are supposedly inconsistent with who you are. Since one of the two has to be chosen, Objectivism isn't applicable."

Kind of. Objectivism is about what to do to achieve something which in this cancer situation is unattainable. There is no good option left, just two bad ones. All that's left is to pick your poison. Objectivism is as useless and inapplicable here as tap dancing instructions are for somebody paralyzed from the neck down. As far as picking your poison goes, there is no standard, nothing to determine what poison you "should" pick. You just do whatever you prefer for whatever reason or no reason at all and that's that. Remember, Objectivism near the very start talks about how living (which cannot be done as nothing in particular, it has to be done by something and that something has to follow its nature to keep on keepin' on as much as anything else has to follow its nature) is *the* ultimate, fundamental alternative out there. If you don't really have much of a say in that alternative, there's no other system of standards you can just hop on over to which can tell you what you should do - not based on any facts at least.

Speaking of Voldemort, he was a regular ol' human being (well, no more abnormal than plenty of other people in the story anyway) at one point before and as a human being, murder would not be ok with his human nature. He was almost immortal, but still not quite obviously. He tried to exist in ways that were contrary to his human nature, hoping to live longer. Instead he got 1) almost annihilated once and 2) was barely hanging on for years, then 3) had to hide out on the back of a pathetic underling's head, sharing his body, 4) he spent most of his time suspicious of everybody around him or otherwise unhappy with them, 5) in hiding and on the run and fighting to keep himself together most of the time when he wasn't bodiless, 6) he had an obsessively bitter collectivist hatred that drove him to disrupt the productivity of society which otherwise could have helped him, 7) he was pretty much alone no matter how many underlings he collected around him, and last but not least, 8) he ultimately died much sooner than he probably would have if he'd just lived a normal life. Plenty of people think that morals are just obstacles to successful living and throwing out all moral concerns will let them operate more effectively. Not so. Rationality is a moral thing for human. We rely on it to deal with the world. Throwing that out and letting the contradictions in is inviting crashing and burning. Also, Objectivism can't really tell of a way for Voldemort to get back on the right track after he's murdered somebody, to get back to living as his nature would demand - he's beyond saving. We CAN morally judge him according to Objectivism though. As I said, he was a human like everybody else when he started his murdering spree. That's a HUGELY immoral thing. Somebody should get him out of commission ASAP (and they do eventually.)

" . . . living with cancer [non-terminal] is well within your own nature as an individual human being."
Assuming the cancer doesn't come with cripplingly awful pain that no medication can make tolerable, I agree with this and have never meant to imply otherwise. I've only been talking about terminal cancer so far. If the chance of survival is really low though, it is just delusional to try to act like things are otherwise. This is sufficiently bad odds to have exited where Objectivism applies. So, hang on and hope while in terrible pain or decide not to, do as you will. When I'm talking about hanging on or not when it comes to terminal illness I mean whether they try to wait it out as log as they can before the diseases forces them to die or if they decide to pursue suicide before that time comes.

Persistent vegitative state? Assuming they are brain dead, the actual person that they were has effectively ceased to exist. All that is left is a warm corpse. If they may recover, then that's a more complicated question depending on things like what the odds are, if they have a living will that says what to do in such a case and/or if somebody is designated with power of attorney for them in such a case, etc.

[Dante]

That said, love for power is not Voldemort's greatest fault. His greatest fault is that he condemns positive emotions. To understand this, we can compare him to Grindelwald, who had the same weakness for power but was later redeemed because of another positive emotion he could feel : remorse. This is the only difference between Grindelwald and Voldemort. This difference is also clear in another way : it is said that Voldemort would have to risk death if he were to feel remorse. So he chose life over this positive emotion. This is in direct contrast what Lily Potter did : she would die for her baby because of the love she harbored for him. [This love is different from Rand's love which was more limited : an acknowledgement of values and ability reflected in another person]. (Basically : positive emotion is the fundamental, while survival is the derivative).

But as soon as you say "positive emotions" you've already assumed an implicit standard right there, without which your 'fundamental' provides no guidance. I'll use your other example of a positive emotion here, remorse. Now, in both these cases (Voldemort and Grindelwald), the remorse would be over things deserving of it, which makes it a positive emotion. However, plenty of people feel remorse over things they shouldn't; they feel remorse about being born with more opportunities than others, about surviving incidents in which others have died (survivor's guilt), about having to kill another when the situation required it (the remorse a soldier often feels coming back from war), etc. In each of these cases, remorse is a negative emotion, because it is directed at something it shouldn't be. The good, proper course in each of these situations involves the person really coming to understand that the remorse isn't deserved, and shedding it. This is what I (and Rand) mean when we say that this is why emotions cannot provide fundamental guidance, that they are not "tools of cognition" in her words. We need a preexisting standard of the good in order to evaluate our emotions.

Now, let's be clear that Lily Potter sacrificing her life for her son is entirely appropriate and moral according to Objectivism, even though it resulted directly in her own death. This comes from the difference between (long-term) survival as the standard and survival as the goal. We should choose our values during our lifetime according to what is good for our lives and happiness. We should choose careers that are fulfilling; friends and romantic partners that treat us well and make us happy; etc. As we live our lives, naturally we become emotionally invested in these particular values. We would bear great cost to protect them (isn't this part of what it means to care about someone or something?). Ultimately, with the things we care about the most, we might even be willing to die for them. This is a result of how much we are invested in the things and people we care about. The point of the Objectivist ethics is not that, at this point, we should choose our own lives over the things we care about, if they are in peril, simply for the sake of 'survival.' The point is to make sure that we've formed our values the right way, that we've invested all this in things that are actually worth dying for. And the meter for that determination has to be our own lives.

[human_murda]

The choice is between life of man qua man and physical existence which is lower than that of plant.

Wrong. I doubt you read what I said anyway.

"Life or death is man’s only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course." -Rand

[DonAthos]

But as soon as you say "positive emotions" you've already assumed an implicit standard right there, without which your 'fundamental' provides no guidance.

Hey Dante, (though anyone interested is invited to contribute)

I believe, based on my experiences thus far on the board, that you and I have a similar understanding of ethics. However, I'd like to play a bit of devil's advocate here, and take up some of human_murda's critique, because the precise formulation of some of this has been and remains a little fuzzy in my mind. Furthermore, recent experiences in other threads have led me to believe that a precise formulation of one's ethical standard is ultimately very important in terms of subsequent application. So I would like to see these issues delved into somewhat deeply, if possible, and the objections framed in the strongest possible terms so that they can be handled decisively. I hope to contribute to this effort, if I can.

I'll use your other example of a positive emotion here, remorse. Now, in both these cases (Voldemort and Grindelwald), the remorse would be over things deserving of it, which makes it a positive emotion. However, plenty of people feel remorse over things they shouldn't; they feel remorse about being born with more opportunities than others, about surviving incidents in which others have died (survivor's guilt), about having to kill another when the situation required it (the remorse a soldier often feels coming back from war), etc. In each of these cases, remorse is a negative emotion, because it is directed at something it shouldn't be. The good, proper course in each of these situations involves the person really coming to understand that the remorse isn't deserved, and shedding it. This is what I (and Rand) mean when we say that this is why emotions cannot provide fundamental guidance, that they are not "tools of cognition" in her words. We need a preexisting standard of the good in order to evaluate our emotions.

Agreed.

Now, let's be clear that Lily Potter sacrificing her life for her son is entirely appropriate and moral according to Objectivism, even though it resulted directly in her own death. This comes from the difference between (long-term) survival as the standard and survival as the goal. We should choose our values during our lifetime according to what is good for our lives and happiness. We should choose careers that are fulfilling; friends and romantic partners that treat us well and make us happy; etc. As we live our lives, naturally we become emotionally invested in these particular values. We would bear great cost to protect them (isn't this part of what it means to care about someone or something?). Ultimately, with the things we care about the most, we might even be willing to die for them. This is a result of how much we are invested in the things and people we care about.

Before I probe this position, I'd like to preface with a quote from Rand and then commentary by David Kelley on the salient issue. (I expect some of this has already been quoted in the thread, but I'd like to have it all together.)

From "The Objectivist Ethics":

An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means—and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil.

Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals or means: a series of means going off into an infinite progression toward a nonexistent end is a metaphysical and epistemological impossibility. It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action.

From The Logical Structure of Objectivism ("Flourishing and Survival"):

Although Ayn Rand made it clear that she meant her morality to ensure a rich, fully human life, it is the bare fundamental alternative of survival versus death that stands at the root of all values.

Several admirers of Rand’s approach to ethics have debated the sense in which survival can serve the most basic criterion of ethics. Here we have argued that survival is the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence.

Okay. Against this backdrop, let's go over your position regarding Lily Potter's "sacrifice."

Now, let's be clear that Lily Potter sacrificing her life for her son is entirely appropriate and moral according to Objectivism, even though it resulted directly in her own death. This comes from the difference between (long-term) survival as the standard and survival as the goal.

I'm not certain I understand the distinction drawn between "survival as standard" and "survival as goal." Since Rand employs both terms in her quote, here it is again (with emphasis added):

An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means—and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil.

Taking the above, I understand life (i.e. "an organism's life") as being that ultimate value, that final goal, that end-in-itself which qualifies it to be that organism's standard of value. It seems to me that there's no meaningful difference here between treating an organism's survival as its goal, and that organism's survival as its standard of value. Instead, the organism's survival is its standard of value because it is its goal.

So when you speak of "the difference between (long-term) survival as the standard and survival as the goal," I shall need that difference to be explained a bit more.

We should choose our values during our lifetime according to what is good for our lives and happiness.

Don't the Rand and Kelley passages, taken together, make clear that an organism's values can only be good insofar as they serve the ultimate value of it's life, which is survival, "the literal alternative of life versus death"? So per Objectivism (as understood through these Rand and Kelley quotes), wouldn't it be more correct to say that "we should choose our values according to what is good for our survival"? (And note: this is not "survival qua organism," and not "survival qua man," but the literal survival of the organism which is meant to hold values, and make decisions/take actions there upon. Thus, Objectivist Ethics would never call upon me to sacrifice myself for "a human life, as it should be"; my ultimate value is quite literally me.)

We should choose careers that are fulfilling; friends and romantic partners that treat us well and make us happy; etc.

Insofar as that happiness is evaluated as "good" against the ultimate value, yes. "[T]hat which furthers its life is the good." A given career, friend or romantic partner -- even one's happiness -- would not be good, but bad, if it did aught but further one's life, which is survival.

As we live our lives, naturally we become emotionally invested in these particular values. We would bear great cost to protect them (isn't this part of what it means to care about someone or something?). Ultimately, with the things we care about the most, we might even be willing to die for them. This is a result of how much we are invested in the things and people we care about.

If this is the case -- and if survival is our ultimate value and our standard of value -- then isn't it evil (that is: contrary to one's ultimate end and goal) to allow one's self to become emotionally invested in any particular value, such that one would ever be willing to sacrifice itself (the greater value; the ultimate value) for the lesser end of that particular value -- the things and people we care about? Doesn't a certain detachment, in the name of one's own survival, become the good?

Besides that... suppose I were emotionally invested in this manner in my wife. If I were willing to "sacrifice" myself for the sake of my wife, then could I reasonably say that my life (i.e. my survival) remained my ultimate value? Or if not... then aren't I implicitly appealing to some standard apart from survival alone as my standard of value?

***

Since we're here, regarding the "cancer argument"...

There is no commandment that one commit suicide at any time, just recognition that conditions may become such that the standard of life qua oneself is no longer realistically feasible and when and if such a point comes up you've exited the realm in which Objectivism is applicable. When such a point has been reached depends on those above mentioned variables, but once that point has been reached, it means Objectivism can't say what one should do nor can it condemn one for what choices one does make. It's kind of like life boat situations or inseparable conjoined twins.

Ethics are a guide to action, are they not? And I would expect that a rational philosophy for a rational animal would entail a rational ethics. If we say that "Objectivism can't say what one should do" in certain situations, does that mean that there is no reasonable way to determine whether one should ever commit suicide, or "sacrifice" oneself for a loved one? That such momentous decisions are therefore based upon a whim? Because I don't think I can agree with that.

If my wife suffered from some terminal disease (which we can call cancer, if we'd like) such that she would suffer great torment for the rest of her days with no reasonable hope of recovery, I would like her suffering to end sooner rather than later. If she said, "but no -- my survival is my ultimate end, so to commit suicide, even now, would be evil," I would call that nonsense (or probably something far worse). And yet... that does seem to be the Objectivist position, as stated above. And it would make me very unhappy should she take it seriously enough to try to bear through such unremitting pain. Insofar as I think my advice of suicide in such a case would be reasonable, I believe that I am appealing to a rational standard of value, which appears to imply a rational ethics, though with some other (yet unrecognized) ultimate standard of value apart from "survival."

***
What is more, in another thread I made an attempt to defend pleasure as "good" with respect to life as the standard of value. Honestly, I never thought I would be called upon to have to defend pleasure, as such, but perhaps this confusion as to the ultimate goal, or standard of value, helps to explain why an Objectivist might need to see verification that pleasure is anything worth seeking at all.

In searching for Ayn Rand quotes to try to explain what role I think pleasure itself might play in Objectivist Ethics, I found this, on the experience of art, from "The Goal of My Writing":

The importance of that experience is not in what he learns from it, but in that he experiences it. The fuel is not a theoretical principle, not a didactic “message,” but the life-giving fact of experiencing a moment of metaphysical joy -- a moment of love for existence.

I'd already quoted this much to provide my background for asserting that physical pleasure acts in similar fashion. There was a stronger case I could have made, but I did not want to invite a tangent into that discussion. But that tangent finds its proper home here. Rand continues:

No matter what its consequences, that experience is not a way station one passes, but a stop, a value in itself. It is an experience about which one can say: “I am glad to have reached this in my life.”

If Rand means what she says here -- if there exists "a value in itself," something that is to be experienced "[n]o matter what its consequences" (including, presumably, for the survival of the organism), then how can we speak of the Objectivist Ethics as though there is one "ultimate value," which is survival, "the literal alternative of life versus death"? In speaking here of "a value in itself," in recognizing that one may reasonably choose suicide (I seem to recall her discussing Toilers of the Sea in that context? or maybe I misremember?), in recognizing that a reasonable man may "sacrifice" himself for a loved one, isn't Rand implicitly recognizing that "survival" is not the ultimate value for a rational ethics?

***

Finally, I don't mean to imply that I think that David Kelley's reading of Rand's Ethics is necessarily correct. I'm open to the possibility that he is mistaken. However, I would still like to address my critique towards his interpretation, which I think is apparently supported by at least the quote of Rand's I've provided, appears to be the source of this thread's questing, and is potentially a common misread, if it is a misread at all.

Edited by DonAthos, 01 May 2012 - 11:57 PM.

[human_murda]

But as soon as you say "positive emotions" you've already assumed an implicit standard right there, without which your 'fundamental' provides no guidance. I'll use your other example of a positive emotion here, remorse. Now, in both these cases (Voldemort and Grindelwald), the remorse would be over things deserving of it, which makes it a positive emotion. However, plenty of people feel remorse over things they shouldn't; they feel remorse about being born with more opportunities than others, about surviving incidents in which others have died (survivor's guilt), about having to kill another when the situation required it (the remorse a soldier often feels coming back from war), etc. In each of these cases, remorse is a negative emotion, because it is directed at something it shouldn't be. The good, proper course in each of these situations involves the person really coming to understand that the remorse isn't deserved, and shedding it. This is what I (and Rand) mean when we say that this is why emotions cannot provide fundamental guidance, that they are not "tools of cognition" in her words. We need a preexisting standard of the good in order to evaluate our emotions.

This post needs to be addressed in more detail. Yes, I can't derive my fundamental from first principles apart from saying that it is positive emotions that make our life/existence worth living. But that is not to say, there is no proper derivation. I am also talking about the necessity of this fundamental. This fundamental is strictly for humans and a very deep understanding of our psychology is needed before we can cough up any explanations/derivations for it. I have already implied several times that I don't consider emotion as a "tool of cognition". Rather reason is still the tool of cognition. But the goal is "positive emotions". Merely an avoidance of negative emotions is not in tune with this "positive emotion" fundamental. Rather, reason [which takes your psychology into consideration] is the best way to determine the way to achieve a variety of these positive emotions.

In the situations you are talking about [ - remorse about being born with more opportunities than others, about surviving incidents in which others have died (survivor's guilt), about having to kill another when the situation required it (the remorse a soldier often feels coming back from war), etc - ], the problem is that these people could not control what happened to them [they didn't have much of a choice/free-will] and things out of your control is outside any kind of morality. So I can't condemn them for being evil [as it is outside the jurisdiction of morality even though they have arrived at negative emotions]. The only way to rectify the problem would be to appeal to their psychology and make them understand that the situation was outside their control [they didn't really choose the negative emotion that they are experiencing]. The case is very different for Voldemort and for Lily Potter as well. She had a very real choice between positive and negative emotions. If she lived, she would have to live with a survivor's guilt which is very real, as it is based on her choice [Rowling said that Voldemort would have let her live if she had chosen to stand aside. It is exactly this choice that enabled the magical protection on Harry]. Now, I don't understand how "Lily Potter sacrificing her life for her son is entirely appropriate and moral according to Objectivism". Aren't we sacrificing the protector for the sake of the protected; a being with higher values for a baby with lower values ["values" according to Objectivism]? Quotes by Rand that could be relevant, [potential=Harry]

Remember also that a potentiality is not the equivalent of an actuality

To equate a potential with an actual, is vicious

Again can Lily Potter's love be considered to be in the same range as the "purer" love [i.e, one where your sacrifice would be for a higher value] Rand was talking about? Also when exactly, according to Rand, do your values become more important that the very thing (life) that gives you your values?

The point is to make sure that we've formed our values the right way, that we've invested all this in things that are actually worth dying for.

Are you implying that growing with Objectivism is like raising a pig for slaughter? [Trying, by building values, to achieve something knowing full well that it can't achieved. Inevitability of death is also very relevant here].

[Leonid]

Wrong. I doubt you read what I said anyway.

"Life or death is man’s only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course." -Rand

This is true. But what would happen if we change the course of nature, as we usually do. The immortality presents exactly such a case. Would Objectivist ethics become inapplicable? I don't think so because man's life qua man is much more valuable than simple vegetative existence. The alternative stays.

[softwareNerd]

BTW, there are two previous threads which have discussed something similar: here and here.

[bluecherry]

human_murda, you are a little behind on my posts in this thread. I've tried already to clarify in a more recent post that Objectivism would *not* - and furthermore could not - say it was evil to commit suicide rather than just wait to die soon while in awful pain from terminal illness and why this is so. You've got to keep in mind that the standard isn't mere continued existence in any form, it must be done in accordance with your own nature. If one can only achieve the former and not the latter of those, then one doesn't need to stick around among the living anymore. Do as you see fit in such a case. I think one of the threads softwareNerd linked might contain some further discussion on the thing about dying in the face of loss of a loved one and why such a thing may not

[Eiuol]

Are you implying that growing with Objectivism is like raising a pig for slaughter? [Trying, by building values, to achieve something knowing full well that it can't achieved. Inevitability of death is also very relevant here].

You are phrasing as though you believe Objectivism advocates a utilitarian approach to long-term survival, where maximizing your span of being alive is the moral yardstick. Objectivism incorporates more, especially the idea that life itself provides value in the form of what you call positive emotions. Those positive emotions cannot sprout of no where by sheer willpower. That quality of life comes from not just existing, but from living to your fullest and best ability. While Voldemort existed and surely survived to some extent by his cleverness and manipulation, but the result of that is a great of pain and unhappiness which didn't let him achieve any values. The goal is not to *stop* death, but to live life because of the enjoyment and positive emotions it brings. Mind and body are integrated according to Objectivism, so a failure to live well leads to one's suffering, and a success at living well leads to happiness. Pursuing positive emotions and pursuing life are one in the same.

[DonAthos]

BTW, there are two previous threads which have discussed something similar: here and here.

I tried to find something to comment on from both threads for the purpose of this one. This is what I've come up with, from the second-linked thread, first:

"If one wishes to die, there is no reason to care that you must use your life in order to die.” Indeed. I just brought this up as an example of independence of the value of life from the consciousness. Objectively life is valuable even to suicide bomber. He has to be alive in order to complete his mission. If, say, before mission he becomes sick, must probably he would seek the best available treatment in order to get well soon, so he would be able to proceed with his mission.

I've already spoken about the suicide bomber example, I believe, where I tried to make the distinction between consciously valuing life and implicitly valuing life in some respect. I'll try to be more clear and connect that point with what I just said.

For any person that has any purposes at all, any whatsoever, they implicitly place value on their own life, if only as a means to whatever their end is. So, if I have purposes, I implicitly value life.

It is possible for my conscious purposes to conflict with the implicit value I have placed on life. This is the case of the suicide bomber.

Isn't this also the case of Lily Potter, whose conscious purpose (protecting her child) conflicts with the implicit value she has placed on life (i.e. her own survival)? And if so, then doesn't your critique of the suicide bomber's ethics hold suit for Lily Potter's as well? Meaning:

Here, the suicide bomber holds a contradiction in his thinking and in his hierarchy of values. Any person who does not wholly and explicitly value life holds a contradiction in their hierarchy of values.

Which is not to say that I would claim no moral difference between Lily Potter's actions and that of the suicide bomber (nor are they somehow "outside the bounds of ethics" because they have chosen to value their own literal deaths as the means to some end), but that I don't think that what tells that difference between them is their commitment to their own survival as the standard of value, or holding the resultant hierarchy of values without contradiction.

Now, from the first-linked thread, second:

Two observations.

1.) Man has volition, and thus that which man values will be nearly limitless. Which values are conducive to a proper life is a different story.
2.) The English language is a poor language when it comes to the term life. Tara Smith correctly identified Aristotle's use of the term eudaimonia to denote where a proper ethics leads you-for the purpose is not merely life, or not merely to live, but to flourish, to increase and grow. Sometimes a plant can be hardy enough to make it through the winter, but it is during the spring that they "flourish", growing, expanding, constantly. This is because life constitutes actions, and as such can never be static.

Regarding eudaimonia, Kelley says:

Here we have argued that survival is the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence. Others, however, argue that this stark alternative is too restricted a foundation for ethics. Instead, they argue that morality should be based on the idea of a good or proper life, also known as a flourishing life. Advocates of life-as-flourishing include the potentialities or capacities of man in their idea of human life. For them, a person only truly lives when he is prudent, productive, benevolent, courageous, and so forth.


[...]

But [such a standard] is not adequate, and thus does not form part of the logical structure of Objectivism. The essential reason for this inadequacy is that, like the ethics of self-realization it resembles, the content of the Flourishing standard is arbitrary. After all, what gets included in the expanded idea of “human life?” Without an established procedure for determining what the good life is, it is hard to tell how one would exclude any kind of commonly observed behavior from “the good life.”

[...]

Properly understood, a “flourishing” life is a good life, but only because the capacities that are exercised in flourishing are in fact conducive to survival.

I think it must be said that Lily Potter's capacity for self-sacrifice for the sake of even those she loves, like Harry, is not, in fact, conducive to her survival. I do not see any logical way from Kelley's interpretation of Rand's ethics -- "the literal alternative of life versus death, existence versus nonexistence" as the standard of value -- to Lily Potter's self-sacrifice as good (or, really, anything other than "evil").

The problem of hedonism is a different story, and stems largely in part due to whim-worship or range-of-the-moment thinking. In essence, a hedonist enjoys the pleasure of the moment with no conception of the future. That donut looks tasty and will surely be a pleasure to eat! I am going to eat it!. The next day: my, that donut looks tasty to eat! Five years and 100 pounds later: my, that donut looks tasty to eat! The essence of ethics, however, remains the same. Actions, actions, actions.

I like donuts. Sometimes I even eat them (after all: they look tasty)! Does that make me a hedonist? (I think some Objectivists might think so! ) Perhaps "pleasure" and "hedonism" will ultimately require their own thread? But I'll comment here, because I think there might be some sort of fundamental application in our assessment of what constitutes "the good life" or "life qua a rational man" versus "life as survival -- the literal alternative."

Suppose I were visited one night by the glowing spirits of Anakin Skywalker, Ayn Rand, and the Prophet Muhammad, and they said to me: "DonAthos -- since you've done such an incredible job in pointing out some of the problematical formulations, interpretations, and missteps of the extant work on Objectivism, we're here to reward you with information... currently you eat donuts on occasion. However, if you choose to stop eating donuts forever, from this moment hence, you will live a longer life -- by three hours!"

Well! With my survival as my standard of value -- my ultimate goal, and end-in-itself -- is there any question that to abandon donuts for the sake of those three hours is the good? And yet... and yet... suppose, as I project into the future a life without donuts, though with three hours more of it, and I find that less appealing overall than a life with donuts, yet three hours less? What makes the essential difference between these two conceptions of my life? Isn't it an estimation as to the worth of the physical pleasures that I'll take over the course of what time I have? I.e. the quality of my experience of life, which fundamentally has to do with things such as pleasure?

Would such a calculation be perverse, hedonistic, or death-worshiping?

Suppose, on the opposite end, we developed Soylent Blanc, which we can imagine as an unappealing, horrible-tasting goo (but "People-Free"! ) yet designed as a perfectly nutritional food-alternative; the only thing a person needs to eat for the purpose of maximizing his physical survival, and superior in that respect to any other food. Would a rational standard of value demand one abandon the physical and spiritual pleasures of good food, which carry attendant risks (apart from dietary and nutritional concerns, there are choking hazards, etc.), for the sake of Soylent Blanc (all else being equal in terms of convenience and cost)? Is pleasure, in itself and without some relational value to life-as-survival, ever a rational ethical consideration? Is it wrong to wish to maximize one's experience of life, if that maximization may threaten one's literal longevity?

Edited by DonAthos, 02 May 2012 - 01:13 PM.

[human_murda]

But what would happen if we change the course of nature, as we usually do. The immortality presents exactly such a case. Would Objectivist ethics become inapplicable?

You are making the exact same mistake again : applying properties of inanimate matter to life. All living organisms need to use energy to survive. To use energy, you must use rationality [in the case of man]. Now you are assuming that you can still survive without using energy so that you will continue to obtain energy from the environment even without planning it properly [in the case of brainless parasites]. Just because science could make you live longer doesn't mean that you can throw away all work and still expect to be alive. A different coding of your genes cannot make you a supernatural being that can exist without using energy. You assumed that you can and if a being can somehow be transported to super-existence, Objectivism would break apart. Objectivism says : the choice is between life-qua-man or death. A Leonard Peikoff comment that could be relevant here:

No argument will get you from this world to a supernatural world. No reason will lead you to a world contradicting this one. No method of inference will enable you to leap from existence to a “super-existence.

I don't think so because man's life qua man is much more valuable than simple vegetative existence.

Could you prove that [using Objective reasoning], assuming you could become a supernatural being. If you could become a supernatural being, life can never become a standard for value as death is not an option. Nothing can threaten your life and nothing can be evil [within Objectivism]. Nothing can further your life and nothing can be good [within Objectivism]. But the positive emotion fundamental always exists, as long as a being can have positive emotions.

[human_murda]

Mind and body are integrated according to Objectivism, so a failure to live well leads to one's suffering, and a success at living well leads to happiness. Pursuing positive emotions and pursuing life are one in the same.

Positive emotions are a derivative of pursuing life and are very limited if pursuing life is your fundamental. However the problem lies with assume that there is either a success or a complete failure. The pursuit is to find a balance where productivity is only so much so that you can pursue positive emotions. A productivity below this will lead to altruism and above this is useless. And yes pursuit of positive emotions do need "sheer willpower". Only a limited amount of positive emotions can be obtained from Objectivism. The rest have to be pursued using your rationality [with positive emotion as the ideal]. Now consider the amount of work needed to achieve the limited positive emotions in Objectivism. The work could be higher when pursuing curiosity outside survival ideal. You can only imagine the work needed to gain a full range of positive emotions. Now you assumed that you can achieve positive emotions by merely thinking about it. The point is that this is merely an avoidance of negative emotions and is momentary. It is not viable in the long term. Dumbledore's comment still applies : "It does not do to dwell on dreams and forget to live". The point is that you should not simply dream about positive emotions. Dreams are only longings that are unattainable until you start working for it. They cannot replace "positive emotions" as such and have to be worked upon, with a long-term goal in mind. Furthermore "positive emotions" are attainable if you work hard enough [unlike long-term survival]. The point is that, although we must work to attain these positive emotions, only some of this work is associated with survival. Now, if the work is limited, the emotions you gain are also limited. So positive-emotions, rather than survival should be the fundamental.

human_murda, you are a little behind on my posts in this thread.

What exactly are you referring to? Is there a contradiction?

Edited by human_murda, 03 May 2012 - 01:19 AM.

[bluecherry]

Your latest post to me was addressing a quote from the end of April and I had already made another post on May 1st which I think addresses things you said in response to text from my earlier post from April.

[human_murda]

Okay. @bluecherry : Voldemort's plan wasn't that bad. I mean, he had seven lives didn't he? The only reason he collected allies was to make sure that he would have the upper hand in terms of power [and did have that]. But what was the ultimate thing that destroyed him? his ignorance of positive emotions. This ignorance is what made him [DD : "if he had been able to understand, he could not be Lord Voldemort, and might never have murdered at all"] and what ultimately killed him [DD : "If he could only have understood the precise and terrible power of that sacrifice, he would not, perhaps, have dared to touch your blood..."].

Now, as for the poison in case of [terminal] illnesses, this is similar to the condition of Macbeth I mentioned in post #22 [i.e, committing suicide vs. somebody else killing you]. The question is how exactly a "human nature" comes into play in Objective ethics: (quote by Galt:)

The key to what you so recklessly call “human nature”, the open secret you live with, yet dread to name, is the fact that man is a being of volitional consciousness.

So taking the definition for “human nature” from this, your second condition is only a restatement of your first and not a separate concept. So Objectivism still applies to fully conscious [terminal] cancer patients. So I'll be quoting Nicky here [something I never thought I'll do] as it could be relevant:

Just because we won't live forever, that doesn't mean we don't need to act to avoid death tomorrow, or a year from now, or 20 years into the future.

& what about this Rand quote?:

"Man's survival qua man which means the terms, methods, conditions, and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan -- in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice."

Here the "whole of his lifespan" phrase is relevant. You have to make rational decisions until you die [You may ask "What's the point?". But death is an inherent limitation in Objectivism and apparently, you have to live assuming death is never outside your control, which is actually false. So your closeness to death is irrelevant to your actions as I understand it]. The point is that human psychology is only a derivative in Objectivism. It cannot be given a primary importance. The problem [from your perspective] could be that your understanding of "human nature" is different from an Objective definition of it.

[Spiral Architect]

It is not the fact that you should live assuming death is "never outside of your control". The point is that you should live assuming that your life is yours to control and the good is to live it. You only get one shot at life so live it. Live to the best you can with the time you got. Death is a metaphysical fact no one can avoid. I'm sot sure I would want to even call that a bad thing since the option of death is what moves us to live. Don't focus on the negative fact we will someday die, but focus on the fact that we need to live.

Now, how this plays out for someone who is later in life moving close to joining the choir invisible is contextual. One thing is very certain however, one should live by one's own standards and death only needs to be the last thing you do.

[Leonid]

You are making the exact same mistake again : applying properties of inanimate matter to life. All living organisms need to use energy to survive. To use energy, you must use rationality [in the case of man]. Now you are assuming that you can still survive without using energy so that you will continue to obtain energy from the environment even without planning it properly [in the case of brainless parasites]. Just because science could make you live longer doesn't mean that you can throw away all work and still expect to be alive. A different coding of your genes cannot make you a supernatural being that can exist without using energy. You assumed that you can and if a being can somehow be transported to super-existence, Objectivism would break apart. Objectivism says : the choice is between life-qua-man or death. A Leonard Peikoff comment that could be relevant here:



Could you prove that [using Objective reasoning], assuming you could become a supernatural being. If you could become a supernatural being, life can never become a standard for value as death is not an option. Nothing can threaten your life and nothing can be evil [within Objectivism]. Nothing can further your life and nothing can be good [within Objectivism]. But the positive emotion fundamental always exists, as long as a being can have positive emotions.

Suppose one has an internal source of energy which can last very long time. Does this make Objectivist ethics inapplicable to him? You and Peikoff would say "YES" . I say "NO" because ethics is code of values accepted by choice and the standard of value is man's life qua man. Any animal or plant can act in order to get energy, but man's values are different, they not necessary have to include only acts for mere survival. For man some values are bigger than physical survival. Without these values such a survival would be meaningless. That why immortality could be compatible with Objectivist ethics. Even immortal man would need all Objectivist values and virtues in order to live qua man.

Edited by Leonid, 04 May 2012 - 10:47 AM.