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I'm curious how the following email by Harriman to the Hsieh's affects your opinion of the thickness of his skin, particularly what's in bold:

I don't know why West took down his post about the NoddleFood posting regarding the controversy, but I thank him for supplying the link. In that post there is a letter from David Harriman saying that he cannot support Whewell because Whewell was a 19th century Kantian. I have the same views on Whewell and do not understand why an Objectivist or a rational man would continue to support Whewell over Dr.Peikoff and David Harriman who have solved the problem of induction. So, I definitely see no reason to support McCaskey. But I will add that I cannot condemn him at this point since he doesn't seem to be promoting the Kantian aspects of Whewell. In other words, I am in the same position as before the NoddleFood post: I see no reason to support McCaskey on intellectual grounds and I don't see the evidence that he is a good Objectivist, his work at ARI and Anthem notwithstanding. Here's the link to the NoodleFood posting: http://blog.dianahsieh.com/2010/10/resignation-of-john-mccaskey-facts.html

Those interested in Whewell, and especially the debate he got into with John Stuart Mill over the nature of induction, may find interesting Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society by Laura J. Snyder, the author of the SEP article. I wrote a review of it for The Objective Standard. For your discussion about the relevance of an epistemologist's metaphysical views, see especially the discussion on page 131 regarding Mill's idealism. He considered himself a follower of Berkeley -- "To be is to be perceived" -- and defined matter as "a Permanent Possibility of Sensation." There is now a book that examines the history of the debate over the substance, depth, and breadth of Whewell's Kantianism, Whewell's Critics by John Wettersten. I can't recommend the book generally, but it's a place to turn if you want to study this long-running debate about how Kantian Whewell was and whether it matters. Also, do not overlook that what makes Whewell so interesting in the history of induction is that he was the most mature in a line of thinkers developing Francis Bacon's theory of induction. Do not overlook Bacon's own Novum Organum and other works in the Baconian tradition, especially those by Thomas Reid and John Herschel. It's best to see Whewell as he saw himself, as a Baconian struggling with (what we'd call) axiomatic concepts and how it is that perceptions and not sensations are the foundations of human cognition and how it is that new concepts get formed. You'll understand Whewell better that way than if you read him as a Kantian and then try figuring out whether his deviations from Kant were fruitful or not.

I think Seasteading is the best hope for freedom in the short run. A successful micronation like the original Republic of Minerva could work if its founders were willing to fight for their freedoms. We should build an island and set up industry for export initially. If someone or some nation attempts to annex our country, we should respond with every available weapon.

I'm not against McCaskey's academic work per se. Judging from the papers available on his website he writes well and intelligently. I can see him supporting Bacon, as Bacon did provide many great leads on how to do science via Induction, but I don't know why he is supporting Whewell, but I don't know much about him. However, since McCaskey is recommending a book written by the author of the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Whewell, he must agree that the article is written well, and I see nothing to support there or in McCaskey's own writing on Whewell. So, it is more of a curiosity. I do think there is an injustice on his review of "The Logical Leap" because the book deserves better from an academician. But at this point, I am not outright condemning McCaskey because I don't see what he did that so upset Dr. Peikoff. His review on amazon.com came after Peikoff's letter, and he's been promoting Whewell for quite some time (as others have pointed out), so that doesn't seem to be the cause. But I also don't see anything written by him on Objectivism, so I can't judge that. So, I'm moderately against McCaskey given what I've said here and in this thread, but I'm not condemning him to hell either. Maybe he just doesn't see the value in "The Logical Leap."

This is interesting, and I appreciate the replies to my previous posts. It seems as if some people are reading what I read on Whewell and coming to different conclusions. I basically said: THERE'S A KANTIAN IN THE ROOM! and others are saying: Paleese, he's not a Kantian, he's just mistaken. Even though Whewell seems to take the position that one's ideas control at least our perception of reality, some of you are saying this isn't Kantian. But our mind does not create reality, our physiology does make sensations into percepts, however it is not saying that ideas create percepts, and that is what I am questioning. If our ideas create perception and these ideas are innate, then what about the ideas that we do create as we observe reality? and how would this change our perceptions over time? or doesn't Whewell think this is the way it works? If our conscious mind creates perception, then we have no basis for being objective on the perceptual level without a method. In other words, if our conscious mind of ideas controls our perception, then we are in big trouble without an objective method of perceiving, and Whewell does not offer that in my reading of him. Unless Whewell is rejecting free will and all our ideas are automatic and create perception. But don't you see that if our conscious mind creates perception, then our vision of the world -- our perceptions -- would change as we gain knowledge, and this isn't the case at all. Getting sharper ideas doesn't improve our eyesight or give us super vision. Whewell's position undercuts the whole theory of knowledge, which has to be based on the automatic nature of perception that comes from physiology, not ideas. Ideas do not control, how we literally see the world. Philosophers have to be taken literally and not figuratively. If Whewell is saying our conscious mind controls perception and perception is our contact with the world, then he is effectively saying that our mind creates reality, which is a Kantian premise. So, again I lay down this challenge: If you want to defend Whewell as having something rational to say, then the onus of proof is on you to point that out. And if you are siding with McCaskey, and he is supportive of Whewell, then you have to show how Whewell is rational. I don't see it at all, unless one is going to be wishy-washy about the meaning of words. Taking Whewell literally, how is he rational?

Just what are the specifics, the relevant specifics in principle in relation to taxation and conscription, of this "contract voluntarily entered into" which you claim exists? And when and how do individuals voluntarily enter into it? Her caveat was not to the principle, but to the implementation of the principle. You are implying otherwise; do you not understand the difference? Rand was against both taxation as a means of funding the government, as immoral (See Taxation in the Lexicon), and she was against conscription, as immoral as well. (See Draft in the Lexicon) And she was right. But then she was not a pragmatist.