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Showing content with the highest reputation on 07/07/11 in Posts

  1. I realize you think this, but I am asking you, that if you claim that people are justified in believing things just because things seem that way to them, then why are you even arguing about anything? Are you trying to change the way things "seem" to us? But even if you were, if we already have a way of interpreting what you say according to what "seems" to be true, what makes you think you could get a point across? Okay, then give me the standard by which a belief can be said to "seem true".
    1 point
  2. I can't see why that's problem for the theory. It would be a problem for the theory if two contradictory beliefs could be true according to it, but that's not what it says. It only says that two contradictory beliefs can be justified for different people at the same time. I don't know what you're up to here, sorry. The criterion would be seeming true.
    1 point
  3. You're pretty much positing the analytic-synthetic distinction, dude. The truth of a claim is necessary because of its correspondence to reality, not because of the meaning of the terms. Consider that we could simply be mistaken categorically about number terms. For some reason, when we add 1 and 1 we always get 3. We would come to think, that's the order of things. Patently absurd with such elementary arithmetic, but some higher maths posit things that can be absolutely, deductively valid but we realize "Oh wait, we didn't compute the constituents right.". That's the real distinction you're looking for, though: 1 + 1 = 2 is deductive. It is, however, not more true or more obviously necessary, even if we perceive it to be that way.
    -1 points
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