Hal

No, I mean what basis do you have for asserting that this is not how existence is?

Similar, although Kant's transcendental arguments are epistemic in nature (what is required for cognition) and don't claim to make statements about noumenal reality, wheres Rand's are intended to be metaphysical. They do play a role in deduction, however it is a 'negative' role rather than a 'positive' one. Deductions are generally not made directly from axioms of this sort, however the axioms allow one to tell when there has been a mistake in one's reasoning. Think of it as being like a reductio ad absurdum argument in mathematics. If a certain position can be shown to imply statements that are in fundamental violation to a set of axioms, then you know that the position is incompatible with said axioms and must be rejected as long as the axioms are taken to be true. For instance, if a certain set of statements taken together imply that consciousness doesnt exist, then you know that a mistake has been made somewhere. Without taking some statements as axiomatic in this sense, any form of indirect proof would be impossible and there would be no solid basis for discounting arguments regardless of what they implied. e.g. axiom a: Existence exists. (corollary c: Non-existence does not exist) p: The universe was created at a definite point in time (c & (p => ¬c)) => ¬p

This is an assertion, not an argument. Why can it not be in the nature of matter to act in a non-deterministic manner? Obviously non-volitional entities are not going to make volitional choices, but there may be other types of indeterminism in nature (such as metaphysical randomness). If you are allowing certain types of entities to function indeterministically without violation of identity, then it seems a bit presumptious to immediately claim that indeterminism is prohibited for all other types of entity on account of identity. "Man functions non-deterministically because it is the nature of man to make choices" "Electrons function non-deterministically because it is in the nature of electrons to move randomly" What is the fundamental difference? No, and I'm not entirely sure what you're getting at here.

If we accept a volitional entity can act differently under the same physical circumstances without violating identity, then why is it logically impossible for a non-volitional entity do likewise? If part of the nature of man (for instance) is to make free choices and identity involves an entity acting in accodance with it's nature , then why can't an aspect of an electron's nature (for instance) be to move in a non-deterministic manner?

The highest goal is happyness. Knowledge is useful to you, to the extent that it can further your happyness. Think about it from an academic perspective: you might enjoy physics and dedicate your life to studying it - would you then say that 'knowledge' is your highest goal? If so, then why do you not take an interest in Sumerology, Neuroscience, or Philology? All of these fields contain a great deal of accumulated human knowledge, and yet you have no desire to study them. Why? Probably because what you seek is not 'knowledge' in general, but rather knowledge of the specific things which you happen to find interesting. You wouldnt pursue knowledge relating to a field you didnt enjoy studying (unless there were other motivating factors), because that wouldnt be likely you make you particularly happy.

Actually ignore my above 2 posts, I'm not entirely sure what I'm trying to say. I've never been totally happy with universals (mainly the way the problem is phrased), and I think I'm tripping over my language just now. I'm going to think about this a bit more.

You have to click on the 'data' link http://www.kano.net/javabench/data In all honesty, I'm not sure. Language benchmarks are notoriously difficult to do objectively.

Actually, I think we might be talking at cross purposes here. One of my objections to the traditional problems of universals is that it confuses 2 very different kinds of universals. I think that the cases of universals like 'redness' or 'length' are very different from things like "manness" or "catness". On my reading of IOE (which as I pointed out, I'm going to reread), Rand gave an account of where we derive our concepts of things like 'man'/'manness', namely by noting similarites between objects and omitting measurements. In a sense, I think Rand would be classed as a nominalist with regard to these (although she thought the concept of man was formed by reference to objectively existing data of experience, I doubt she'd have said that 'manness' itself exists). However I dont think she gave an account of what something like 'redness' or 'triangle' is - she tried to explain how our concept of red was derived from experience, but again, that is a different question to whether 'red' itself exists (and if so where).

That would be a very extreme version of nominalism. Read the whole page you cited, particularly the part about resemblence nominalism. Ok, this sounds like moderate realism (read the same page you cited). In any case the point is that THIS is your answer to the problem of universals, ie that they exist outside the imagination. Once you have decided upon what universals are, THEN you can go on to talk about concepts of universals. However the theory of concepts is not an answer to the problem of universals as such - it is an explanation of how we come to acquire knowledge of universal concepts, ie an epistemological account rather than a metaphysical one. You have already gave your answer to the strict problem of universals, namely by saying they exist outside the mind (or are formed in a relation between the mind and reality). On a sidenote I think the claim that all horses share certain characteristics is false, and I don't think that its one that Ayn Rand made anywhere in IOE. For instance, although Ayn Rand held that the definition of man was 'rational animal', it is clear that not all men are rational animals, and not all rational animals would have to be men. "Rational animal" would be the essence (in a non-metaphysical sense) of the concept man, not something which has to be possessed by every single man.

I would say they are more are less equivalent. If I see a single horse, I know that horses exist. Likewise from the fact I have consciousness, I know conscousness exists. Phrasing it as "I exist possessing consciousness" or "my consciousness exists" would emphasize that consciousness doesnt exist in itself - only in individual subjects (ie there is no Absolute mind or floating consciousness detached from any particular bodies). I'd maybe compare it to the difference between saying "redness exists" and "red things exist" - both are pretty much identical in most situations, but in certain technical philosophical discussions you might prefer one to the other. On the other hand, "my consciousness exists" sounds more sceptical. It seems like youre laying the ground for an "other minds" argument by saying that you only know your own consciousness exists rather than any else's. If someone said that phrase to me, I'd almost certainly assume this was his intention.

I would agree that the Greeks, as a culture, had a very different view on the world than we do today, and I would expect this to be reflected both in their philosophy, and in their language itself. I don't think this is specific to the Greeks - most cultures have different world-views and break things up in different ways linguistically. So I'm in agreement with Heidegger on this point. What I would disagree with however is the claim that the Greek's understanding was somehow superior to ours, or that their world-view was more primordial. I also agree that many insights from the Greeks have been lost. I think that the term forgotton is incorrect - it is not that the knowledge of the Greeks has been forgotten - quite the opposite. As Heidegger points out, it has become commonplace to the point that people rarely feel the need to think about it anymore. For instance, look at Aristotle's account of Being in his metaphysics. As Heidegger points out, these ideas, although new and original at the time, quickly became widely accepted and became the general view - it became almost impossible to imagine that others could view the world in any different way. To an extent, it saved people the need to discover these questions for themselves - it had already been done, and the answers were available for everyone. (Think how different a mathematics problem looks once you know the answer to it). Heidegger distinguishes between the disinterested knowledge that comes from merely being 'told' something, with the knowledge that comes from really grasping it - from discovering it yourself. To take some examples (mine, not Heideggers), consider the proverbs parents often tell their children ("It's better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all" etc etc). Although you will know them off by heart as a child, and might even think they make sense, it's often not until youve grown up and encountered the situations that led to them first being formulated that you actually begin to understand their true meaning. Or as another example - you might read a book by a philosopher like Robert Nozick and appreciate his abstract arguments for capitalism. You might even be persuaded he's correct, and become a supporter of capitalism. But compare this supporting of capitalism with that which is had by a reader of Atlas Shrugged who has, in a very real sense, SEEN what these arguements mean rather than simply being told them in a disinterested way. Heidegger thought that when our knowledge is 'handed down' to us, our grasp of it is always inferior to knowledge we have learned for ourselves. In this way, he thought that the ideas of Greek philosophy have been lost. If the above is a correct interpretation of Heidegger's general view, I can see why he would think the original meanings of Greek words have been lost. Once we have learned to see the world in one way, there is a tempation to forget that past cultures saw it entirely differnently, and this may affect how we interpret their philosophical enquires and the language they use. This is where I think he brought in the idea of logos. He wanted to 'point out' things that underlie our experiences - the things that in a sense we already know, but are hidden precisely because we know them so well. (the above is my reading of Heidegger, I find him a difficult philosopher to understand so it's certainly possible I have grasped his meaning wrong. I'm also basing this entirely upon Being and Time since I havent read any of his later work other than "What is Metaphysics", which I found completely incomprehensibe)

I agree that we represent unicorns in various ways (both as pictures and concepts, as you mention). However, there are no unicorns themselves. Pictures depict unicorns - unicorns do not exist in pictures. If the Eiffel Tower were to be destroyed tomorrow, then it would not continue to exist in pictures and in people's minds, although pictures and concepts of the Eiffel Tower would certianly still exist Think how strange your phrasing sounds in other contexts: "your wife exists in your head", "santa claus exists in local supermarket", "God exists on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel". If you said that to someone in the street they'd think you were crazy. What does it mean to exist as a fictional creature? Where do fictional creatures exist? I know what it means to say that a physical object exists, and I know what it means to say that a mental object (such a concept or image) exists. I have no idea what it means to say that fictional entities exist. Take a specific example - a character such as Howard Roark in the Fountainhead. Ayn Rand had the image for a character, which she decided to call Howard Roark (the idea of Howard Roark existed in her head as a mental object). She then wrote a book about this character. These books (which exist as physical objects) contains words which, when read by an English speaker, cause him to also form an idea in his head, which he labels as 'Howard Roark' (ie the words 'create' a mental object - an idea - in his head). So, our existing objects here are physical books, and mental images. Howard Roark himself does not exist. To quote Ockham, do not multiply your entities unnecessarily. No. This is the question which a nominalist will ask after he has ascertained that universals, in the sense I described, do not exist. If you think that the universal is the concept, and has no existence in itself, then you are a nominalist. That was my mistake. The red things are particulars, and the 'redness', which is common to them both, is the universal. Regarding Ayn Rand's theory of universals/concepts, I'm going to leave this one for now until I've read some parts of IOE again. Part of the reason I joined here was to ask some questions about Rand's approach to universals, but it wasnt my intention to do so in this thread and I haven't read the work closely enough to post a seperate thread yet.

I think he means that you've chosen riches and success as being the ideal for mankind, rather than saying that you're responsible for everyone else choosing to be rich and successful. In other words, Sartre means that youre choosing for mankind in the sense that Christians believe that everyone should try to be like Jesus, or Ayn Rand thought people should try to be like John Galt (sort of, you get the idea). If humans have no fixed essence then (according to Sartre), if I choose something for myself, it must mean that I believe that this is the best way for man to live - all the actions I perform create my vision of "man as he could and should be", whether I want them to or not. At least, that's how I read him.

Wow, I didn't know it had that many diverse uses - I was under the impression that it was normally used to mean 'rational enquiry/discourse'. Thanks. Yeah, I know Heidegger is often criticized for his creative approaches to etymology. I'd never really thought about what was lost in word-for-word translations before, unless I read a passage where he tried to explain what he took logos to mean. I don't have it to hand, but he essentially claimed that it meant the 'pointing out' of something in a discourse - something which was always latent or implicit but which might not have been noticed before, since it was so obvious ("the best way to hide something is in full view of everyone" etc). It seemed interesting and there certainly isnt a word in English that corresponds to that idea.

Ocaml sometimes produces faster code than C++ and a lot of other languages come close (see here for some fairly comprehensive benchmarks). In terms of popular programming languages there isnt that much difference between properly compiled Java and C++ in terms of speed for most normal tasks these days, although obviously you wouldn't use java for things like graphics routines where speed is a priority. Check here for an in-depth discussion of java v c++ in terms of performance. Java done badly in the above benchmark but see here for more recent tests).

I suppose C++ is all-purpose in the sense that it's equally bad at everything. For which specific tasks would you say that C++ is the language of choice? It's too low level to be properly used for most high-level functions (ie 99% of programming tasks), and inferior to Objective C for combining OO with C. I suppose you could use it for low level programming if you really didn't like C, but how much programming is actually done at that level? I'm not sure what you mean here. Both langauges are turing complete so by definition anything you can do in one, you can do in the other. What do you think you can't do in perl? (if you think theres something specific that perl can't do, check on CPAN first). If you mean that you can't do things in perl as fast as you could in C++ then yeah, you're right. I'm not saying that I'd advocate using perl for everything - quite the opposite. Perl was designed with a clear set of goals in mind, and it achieves them well. C++ was an attempt to make a language that "does everything", hence why its ended up as jack of all trades and master of none. Yeah, its very much like Java. Almost identical really, but from my (admittedly brief) experience with .NET, its preferably to the standard java APIs. You also don't have to rely on your users having a JRE installed, which makes it more feasible for client side apps.

Perl is infinitely superior to C++ and would also be easier to learn, but I don't think I'd recommend it for a first language. I would personally go with David's advice and start with C# - its a powerful language which is relatively easy to learn, and it'll allow you to begin writing graphical applications very quickly. If you're interesting in learning theory as well as writing applications (by theory I mean the sort of things you would do in a computer science degree), I'd also take a look at some of the less mainstream functional languages, Ocaml in particular. However I'm not sure I'd recommend this for a first language either, since its lack of popularity will make it difficult to find textbooks and help if you require it. I wouldn't sweat too much over the language to be honest - once you've grasped the basics of programming (which you can do in pretty much any language) its a lot easier to learn new languages. Just don't go near C++ Perl isnt a difficult language to learn. It has a lot of notational devices which save space, hence it can be difficult to read the code of others if they have decided to take advantage of a lot of them, but there's no reason why you cant write perl code which is legible, neat and elegant. It's probably not a good choice for a first language though since it tends to gloss over things which I think a beginner should get experience with as soon as possible (eg it has dynamic typing). It also takes a lot longer to be able to write 'fun' programs (with GUIs etc) in perl, which can make it a bit dull.

To those who know Greek and read Greek philosophy - to what extent do you think reading in the original language aids your understanding? I realise that for literature and poetry something will always be lost in translation, but does this apply to philosophy also? I ask merely out of curiosity - I have no interest in learning Greek (I don't have that much free time). Heidegger, whose work I find interesting, often uses Greek terms which he claims have no direct modern day equivalents - to what extent would you agree with this? Is it possible to translate words such as logos and aletheia into English without losing most of their original meaning?

What speech do you mean, Existentialism as a Humanism? Here's the relevant parts: I've not read Being and Nothingness so I'm not sure if he develops this idea further in there (or at least gives arguments for it), but as it stands, I think the first passage is ludicrous. The second passage seems to make sense at first, since you could interpret Sartre as saying that my political freedom depends on the political freedom of others (eg it is to my advantage to live in a society where there is not political coercion), but this is not the sense in which Sartre normally uses the term freedom and its extremely unlikely that this is how he is using it here.

punk, I think Stephen meant that aleph-0 etc are not definitions of infinite, but rather specific examples of transfinite cardinal numbers (in the same sense that 2 and 3 are examples of integers, rather than being a definition of an integer). A mathematical definition of infinity would be something along the lines of "a set S is infinite if the elements of a proper subset of S can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the elements of S" (from mathworld) or "greater than any specific integer".

Not to me, if I was the eye-witness. I was giving you an example of a case where the vigalante would have access to information the jury wouldnt, hence allowing him to be sure about the suspect's guilt even if the court wasnt. If I watched my friend getting beaten up, I would know beyond all reasonable doubt that the suspects were guilty. Since the jury would only have access to my word, rather than my experiences, there's a decent chance my testimony would be rejected causing the suspects to be found innocent.

Eye-witness testimony being disbelieved? If I watched my friend being beaten up by a group of thugs but the evidence wasn't strong enough for a conviction (for instance, if it ended up as our word against theirs), I would certainly know they were guilty. I'd also probably support my friend if he were to seek revenge afterwards. As to whether this is constiutes the promotion of anarchism, I don't believe that it does, unless you wish to declare that all criminal activity furthers anarchism. If I were to help my friend, I would be committing a crime in full awareness that my actions were illegal, and (under these circumstances) would understand why the state would have to take action against me if I were to be caught. I wouldnt be disregarding the law or questioning its existence, and indeed I would even support it in this case. I would simply be choosing to disobey it, as any criminal does.

Aren't a lot of Christians attempting to kill Christmas in the sense you define it? Every year, I hear time and time again that it is wrong to view Christmas as a time of indulgence and guiltless pleasure. I also hear it often claimed that we should get back to the "true meaning" of Christmas - celebrating the birth of Christ. It isnt liberals who say all this however, and the number of liberal attacks on materialism at Christmas pales in comparasion to the number of attacks coming from Christians. I agree that Aquinas' Christianity is far more healthy than modern Islam. But then how many modern Christians are Thomists (or have even heard of him)?

My mistake, thanks for correcting me - I thought it was banned. I'm unsure where I got this impression - I think the withdrawal of funding, in addition to the US trying to get the UN to ban it globally, caused me to assume that it was prohibited in the US.

I'm not sure whether you're asking for my beliefs on universals, or simply how I am defining the term. Assuming the latter, a universal is a property that can be predicated of multiple particulars. For instance 'red' or 'being five foot tall'. Yes. I think that statements such as "centaurs exist in the mind" are nonsense. The concept of a centuar is a mental existent, but not centaurs themselves. If I have a picture of the Eiffel Tower on my kitchen wall, I cannot say 'the Eiffel Tower exists in my house' (or 'the Eiffel Tower exists in the picture'). The picture of the Eiffel Tower exists. The picture contains a representation of the Eiffel Tower. A philosophical system should be internally consistent. If someone believes that the existing systems he encounters are correct in some places but wrong in others, then it is his task to change the parts he thinks are wrong and to integrate the parts he thinks correct. The phrase 'pick and choose' is misleading since it implies simply picking the parts which strike your fancy, while paying no consideration to coherence or truth - in other words, it presupposes disintegration. I'm not sure why this last question is relevant, since I'm not questioning Rand's theory of concepts in this thread. I'm saying that it is not an answer to the traditional problem of universals.