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Everything posted by epistemologue

  1. Again, they could only be "perfectly entitled" to those things on the premise of nihilism and relativism in aesthetics and morality. If instead, these norms follow from their metaphysical base, then nobody who doesn't have that biological foundation could legitimately claim any of the norms which follow from it.
  2. Very well said, and unfortunately we see exactly this sort of subjectivism even among prominent "Objectivists" like Diana Hsieh, http://www.philosophyinaction.com/blog/?p=14774&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+noodlefood+(NoodleFood) This view of one's own mind as an unintelligible black hole, an unreasonable force of emotions, is actually quite sad... Ayn Rand did a lot of work to describe the connection between reason and emotions (especially in The Romantic Manifesto, as well as in Atlas Shrugged). She taught how one can understand their own mind in just this respect, but it seems to have been lost on the likes of subjectivists like Diana Hsieh.
  3. I would just like to make a point regarding aesthetic ideals and utilitarian optimization. You are trying to say that there is no meaningful connection between one's biology and one's behavior. I would say that is a form of nihilism and relativism in the realms of aesthetics and morality which is quite contrary to the philosophy of Objectivism. Starting from the metaphysically given, in this case one's biological sex, there are going to be certain choices which are more or less consistent with the ideal aesthetic form and with the optimal utilitarian function for the person with said metaphysically given characteristics. Let's just keep things superficial here and think only about a few of the statistically significant biological differences in the population of males vs. females to start with. For men: Grip strength Height Preference for rough-and-tumble play Throwing ability Upper-body strength https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/201711/the-truth-about-sex-differences Now what do these traits imply as far as the ideal aesthetic form and the optimal utilitarian function of males as opposed to females? Because of the differences in these metaphysically given characteristics in males, it is going to aesthetically consistent for them to choose to be physically big, strong, muscular, and physically fit (and it would be aesthetically inconsistent to choose otherwise), and because they have a competitive advantage in these functions, it's going to be more useful for them to be employed in these sort of roles in the home and in the economy. As I said, this is just a superficial example, this analysis can be applied much more deeply to the differences between men and women by nature and therefore in the differences in aesthetic ideals and utilitarian optimization which follow, and from there ultimately the differences in choice which would rationally and morally follow from an objective standard.
  4. Now obviously these deterministic machines aren't acting with any libertarian free will like we know humans do, so to that extent there are going to be issues with applying human terms which rely on volition. But I'm not sure what to say about these terms beyond that...
  5. The materialist conceptions of concepts, learning, and so on, have a very limited meaning, and can only produce limited results for that reason. "Learning" is the accumulation of regularities, and statistical estimates from there. "Concepts" are bundles of correlated properties grouped together according to statistical or pragmatic standards. A more Aristotelean or Objectivist conception of concepts or learning have a stronger meaning, and can produce much stronger results when implemented. Concepts are universals, which classify all units of a kind, and have a logical definition based on the rule of fundamentality. Learning is induction of universal concepts or propositions from particulars using the methods and within the limits of logic and non-contradictory identification.
  6. I think there is a valid concern here, but not in the way you're suggesting. I think there are practical, technological consequences to having a correct or incorrect philosophy. A philosophy based on materialist premises is going to imply a nominalist approach in epistemology, which as a technical approach, will lead to inappropriate forms of knowledge representation (e.g. Humean bundles of properties), and bad methods of inductive learning (e.g. cataloging statistical regularities).
  7. here you agreed with my characterization of you as a "positive utilitarian", despite having just said I don't anymore think that position is correct
  8. Can a button be added to the top banner like it used to be? https://tlk.io/objectivismonlinechat
  9. @JASKN have you had any chance to look at PHPFreeChat? or anything I can do to help? I'd love to get a chat back up here on OO again. maybe we could even do a regularly scheduled chat meetup on Sunday nights or something like that.
  10. This is one of the most dishonest, malevolent things I have ever read. You are a true representative of Objectivists these days.
  11. Plasmatic I comprehended the argument before I read Scott Ryan. The mini-critique of Oist epistemology in this thread was written before I'd ever heard of the book. Oist epistemology is broken and it's conclusions are unjustified. I'll have to take whatever this necessarily commits me to, if it's Platonic Forms with "bizarre abilities" - then they aren't so bizarre, if they are necessary for the justification of knowledge, are they? But I have no idea if that sort of thing is in the cards or not.
  12. It makes any general knowledge or induction unjustifiable. I don't know if I can say much more than I already have, I haven't studied enough metaphysics. In my opinion, Objectivism has a fundamental problem in metaphysics, and it's a fracture which runs through and corrupts the entire philosophy. I agree with Scott Ryan on that. I am still in the midst of reading his book. I don't know how much else I agree with him on (it may be a lot or a little), he seems to be "Absolute Idealist", which is some kind of Hegelian thing that I simply don't understand. I'm going to put forth a legitimate effort to study the field of metaphysics; I've bought a number of textbooks on the subject and will also consult various online articles and lectures. I want to improve my knowledge (virtually everyone in both threads keeps talking about universal "entities", I don't understand this at all), as well as improve my arguments, and refine my judgment on these matters and the individuals and philosophies involved. The philosophical system as laid out by Rand and followed by Peikoff and other major Objectivist figures I believe to be fundamentally broken, from metaphysics on up - though of course I agree whole-heartedly with it's spirit of non-supernaturalism, free will, rationality, egoism, Rand's list of virtues and values, and capitalism, among many other things (I also love Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead, I've read both 7 times each). The question at this point is whether to "reinvent" Objectivism from the ground up, keeping with Rand mostly only in spirit if not in philosophy, or else to abandon "Objectivism" entirely to the dust pile and work from some other, more suitable foundation, perhaps "Objective Idealism", as Scott Ryan calls it, or Brand Blanshard's "Absolute Idealism". or maybe something else entirely, or something new, I don't know. If anyone's interested in studying the field of metaphysics and corresponding send me a message. Otherwise I'll try to come back these threads and the various issues involved at a later time.
  13. I'm not saying that everything metaphysically given to us needs explanation *in order to exist*... are you serious? I'm telling you that without some metaphysically real universality, any identity between two units of a concept is logically inconsistent with one's premises. That is, on the metaphysical premise that everything that exists is particular, there is no *shared* identity between particulars.
  14. You either have to accept universals exist *metaphysically*, or else any similarity between concretes is inexplicable and unnecessary; any particular from one point in time to another can't even be justified as "the same", if *all* you believe is metaphysically basic is the particular itself, and nothing is metaphysically real on a higher order that guarantees identity between any two particulars, or between any "one particular" at one point of time and another.
  15. "Metaphysical" does not mean "material". Gravity exists metaphysically, but it's not "just another concrete". So you've got a fundamental problem here.
  16. https://rocket.chat/ Someone wrote: "It's possible [to integrate Rocket.Chat with IPS4] with Oauth plugin from Marketplace. A friend of mine already did it and it looks stunning." Another person: "I have it integrated in my site. Pretty easy with this free plugin" https://invisionpower.com/forums/topic/429968-oauth-server/#comment-2638024 Here's how to configure the OAuth Server application to integrate IPS4 with Rocket.Chat. Rocket.Chat Install and setup Rocket.Chat. A walkthrough is beyond the scope of this guide. Create an initial administrator user and password, then login as that administrator. Administration > OAuth > Add Custom OAuth button (at the very bottom). Enter a unique identifier for this integration (ex: ips4) Find the Custom OAuth: <IPS4> section and expand it. Make a note of the Callback URL, e.g. https://your.rocketchat.com/_oauth/ips4 IPS4 Site ACP > Community > OAuth Server > Applications > Add Application. Enter a unique name for the integration (e.g. Rocket.Chat) and the Callback URL you obtained from Rocket.Chat above. Click Save. Select the user groups you wish to be able to authenticate against IPS4 for this integration. Do not select Guest! Click Save. Click on the Edit pencil again and take note of the Client ID, Client Secret, and 3 integration URLs. Rocket.Chat Change the following settings: Enabled: True URL: Top-level URL for your IPS4 site, such as https://your.ips4.com/. If your site is not installed at the root of the webserver, include any subdirectory here, such as https://mysite.com/ips4. Token Path: applications/oauth2server/interface/token.php Identity Path: applications/oauth2server/interface/me.php Authorization Path: applications/oauth2server/interface/authorize.php Token sent via: Payload or Header both work, it doesn't matter. ID: your Client ID from IPS4 here Secret: your Client Secret from IPS4 here Login Style: I recommend Popup Button settings as you wish. You may have to restart the Rocket.Chat server at this point. I had to, but I cannot guarantee that is is mandatory. Logout as Administrator and use the new button to log in as an IPS4 user. Log back in as the Administrator user and give admin access to your IPS4 user (#general chat > people icon on the right > click on user > MAKE ADMIN). (Optional) Disable username/password login for Rocket.Chat: Administration > Accounts > Show Form-based Login set to False. WARNING: Do not do this until you have made at least one IPS4 user an administrator or you will lose admin access to your Rocket.Chat server!
  17. What I'm asking is, what does this substantively add to the characterization? I haven't read the article you linked yet.
  18. I really don't understand the significance of this semantic distinction. in other words, so what?
  19. Thanks. From the article: "It’s not that you must presume uniformity in order to classify. It’s that you classify to find uniformities." The whole problem with this is that you haven't "found" any more uniformity than you had to begin with! You're still in *exactly* the same position as he agreed with earlier in the article: "The Scholastics lamented (rightly) that unless you had surveyed all magnets or all animals, the inference was not certain" "If you have good guidelines and follow them, you can be certain that someone absolutely cannot contract cholera unless exposed to the bacterium Vibrio cholerae, certain that all men are mortal, certain that the angles of all planar triangles sum to 180°, and certain that 2+3=5. And you don’t need any unjustifiable uniformity principle to do so." No, you cannot be certain of any of those things without some kind of "uniformity principle". The author hasn't justified this at all, and it's contradictory on its face the way it's presented in this article. "But soon the child learns the difference between truth and make-believe—and the difference between staying the same and changing... The child learns that you can’t rely on some global uniformity principle." - without relying on the existence of some uniformity principle, the child hasn't *learned* anything! Those "things that stay the same" are believed to *stay the same* on the basis of there being such a thing *as* uniformity, that is the very meaning of having such a "uniformity principle" in the first place! "The realization that some things stay the same and some don’t is what, he thought, makes induction possible and necessary" - how can any thing stay the same, by the nature of the thing - i.e. in *principle* - if there is no such thing as a principle of uniformity? That's just blatantly contradictory. He wants to find principles of uniformity while denying there are any principles of uniformity. Come on!
  20. That's exactly the issue I'm addressing. "Rand believes we can form meaningful abstractions *without* such universals having a metaphysically basic existence in reality, which I believe is unjustifiable". That's exactly what you quoted. Why they are needed I answered in my last post, under "Why are these supposed "universals" even necessary?". What does that mean? Why does it sound that way? Sometimes she says this (she relies on it while denying it, so she's inconsistent at different times), but she explicitly denies any intrinsic identity or metaphysical universality, and her justifications all eschew these principles, relying instead of subjective and/or pragmatic criteria, from which objective truth, knowledge, or success in induction cannot be justified. No, that's intrinsicism. You can't go around explicitly *denying* metaphysical essences or universals, denying that such a thing as "manness" or "roseness" exists, justifying your definitions on such grounds as utility, brevity, and differentiation within one's particular context of knowledge at a given time, etc., and then try to tell me that the epistemology *does* refers to metaphysically basic universal identities. You're contradicting what I just said above, "Don't metaphysical essences imply that we acquire concepts "by no means"?" I said in that section, "I don't have any general problem with the empirical practice of observation, differentiation and integration, measurement omission, or the process of concept formation in general... in general, this is the normal way humans form concepts". Well as I've said, Rand inconsistently maintains both an intrinsicist view, when she says things about how concepts are abstract and there is a real *kind* of thing in reality to which they refer, while also maintaining a nominalist view - which is what all of her justifications depend on, as I've described here: http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?/topic/30636-subjectivity-and-pragmatism-in-objectivist-epistemology/ Universal meaning (as in conceptual knowledge or general propositions) is based on the definitions of the concepts, which are defined according to subjective and pragmatic criteria in her epistemology as opposed to being grounded in metaphysical essences / natural kinds / some metaphysically basic universal, and thus don't have any real meaning or any real truth, outside of the observations of the particular concretes which have been previously observed and the nominalistic categories and descriptions derived from there.
  21. I would just like to clarify a few of points. Are "metaphysically real universals" some kind of supernatural entities, located in another dimension? "Metaphysically real universals" does not imply that there are supernatural "entities" floating around in some other dimension. "Metaphysical" simply means that something is in the nature of reality, it's in the nature of our universe for something to be a certain way. As for "universal", take for example the proposition that "all balls will roll" (taking for granted any characteristics you want to use to specify that so that it comes out to being an absolute and universal claim). So it's not just a claim about particular balls, it's a claim about all balls. So there is some metaphysical meaning and necessity to what a "ball" is. There is something, some term somewhere in the nature of this universe, corresponding to "ball" in general, at least in so much as *all* balls will roll. If it's not contingent on other facts of the matter, if it really is universal, then there is something about it in the nature of reality (i.e. "ball", the abstraction, "ballness", has metaphysical meaning). I am not positing any kind of supernatural "entity" or any "other dimension", that sort of thing is not intrinsically a part of this claim, even if some philosophers in the past may have taken it that way. Don't metaphysical essences imply that we acquire concepts "by no means", that consciousness has no identity? The fact of universals existing in an ontologically basic way does not imply that we acquire them "by no means", or that consciousness has no identity, or anything like that. I don't have any general problem with the empirical practice of observation, differentiation and integration, measurement omission, or the process of concept formation in general. I have a number of issues with Rand's account of this process, but in general, this is the normal way humans form concepts, and that is perfectly consistent with there being a real meaning *out in reality* of the universals to which our concepts refer. (again, this sort of thing is not intrinsically a part of this claim, even if some philosophers in the past may have taken it that way) Why are these supposed "universals" even necessary? Metaphysically real universals are absolutely necessary to an objective philosophy. The whole issue at stake here is that Rand believes we can form meaningful abstractions *without* such universals having a metaphysically basic existence in reality, which I believe is unjustifiable. Without something real to which abstractions can refer, we are left with a process of forming abstractions guided by subjective and pragmatic concerns, with the end result being nominalist categories that are incapable of any universal meaning, and therefore with induction (and ultimately, rationality itself), being impossible.
  22. I'll look into this over the next few days.
  23. welcome, drop into the chat sometime! http://forum.objectivismonline.com/index.php?/chat/
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