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epistemologue

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  1. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from StrictlyLogical in The Trolley Problem   
    If you are placed in the hypothetical "trolley problem", where a train is barreling toward a group of people tied to the tracks, and you happen across a lever with which you could divert the train onto another track on which only one person is tied to the tracks – do not pull the lever.
    Do not take an action in which you direct a train toward a person to cause their death, because intentionally taking an action to kill an innocent person is murder, and murder is morally wrong.
    If the train simply continues on its prior course without any intervention and a tragedy happens, there is no moral responsibility for the person who happened to be at the lever; tracing the chain of causality back from the tragedy, there is no point at which you can point to the person at the lever causing what followed: they made a choice, but they took no action to cause this tragedy, and they are not morally responsible for what happened.
    An example of this kind of "moral jurisdiction" is in Atlas Shrugged, in the scene where Ferris talks to Galt:
     
     
  2. Thanks
    epistemologue got a reaction from Easy Truth in The Humanitarian with the Trolley   
    Tracinski states,
    This is not what Ayn Rand says in her essay "The Ethics of Emergencies".
    The essay begins with her asking us to consider the implications of someone who begins their approach to the subject of ethics with lifeboat scenarios - which she regards as a disintegrated, malevolent, and basically altruistic approach to the subject, that cannot ultimately yield a rational system of ethics.
    She did not say that lifeboat scenarios are "irrelevant", that they are the 0.01 of cases that morality is "not intended for", she says exactly the opposite:
    And she absolutely did not say that moral principles are "intended for the 99.9% of existence":
    She does not say to act in accordance with your hierarchy of values 99.9% of the time, she says always. Sacrificing a greater value to a lesser one is not okay 0.01% of the time, it's never okay. She did not say that moral principles apply to 99.9% of one's choices - she says they apply to all choices.
    She then goes to take those principles of ethics that apply in the 99.9% of existence in which one is not in an emergency, and proceeds to apply those very same principles to emergency situations:
    As we can see in this example, the virtue of integrity, which applies in the 99.9% of existence in which one is not in an emergency, also prescribes what one ought to do in the 0.01% of life in which one is in an emergency, too.
    I started a separate thread answering what one ought to do in the trolley problem here:
     
  3. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from softwareNerd in Psychological issues common in Objectivists   
    Dustin explained issues he has had in another thread:
    Issues like these are so common they are almost epidemic among Objectivists.  See for example what Nathaniel Branden wrote, in 1984:
    http://web.archive.org/web/20120106060148/http://www.nathanielbranden.com/ayn/ayn03.html
     
    An Objectivist popped into the chatroom just the other night discussing their psychological issues with me. They were seeing a therapist because they were overloaded with stress from work, essentially because they were over-valuing material independence, and the therapist was having trouble helping them.
    What I had to say to this person is this:
    The virtue of independence doesn't pertain to material independence primarily. Virtues are about how you think and act, not about your material circumstances. It doesn't make sense to describe material independence as a "virtue"; that's a consequence, not an action. Virtues describe principles of action.
    If you read Rand's description of independence, she's talking entirely about judgment and the mind: "yours is the responsibility of judgment", "no substitute can do your thinking", she rejects "the acceptance of an authority over your brain" - these do not comment on material dependence, or say anything negatively about relying on others, but rather they are focusing in on a particular issue of how you use your own mind.
    When she talks about independence, she's talking about that virtue of using your mind, acquiring knowledge the best you can, thinking the best you can, and being able to come to judgments based on that thinking and knowledge. In essence, she's focused on how to think and act to the best of your ability. That does not preclude either material dependence, or relying on others in general. Virtues are not negative principles, they aren't there to instruct you what not to do, they are there primarily to talk about what you should do, based on what's possible to you simply by nature. By nature we are all capable of thinking, acquiring knowledge, and forming judgments - and morally, we should.
    Independence as a virtue is a matter of sound mind and sound action, not a matter of a trade-off of material values. And if material independence were held as high in one's mind as a virtue of character, that could lead one to make bad trade-offs in one's life, such as pursuing material independence at the expense of other values like a good social life.
    If one holds material independence - the outcome - to the standards of a virtue of one's character - which pertains to one's actions - that could lead to some serious distress and guilt, because one's esteem becomes tied to the material outcomes rather than to one's actual virtue and character. Imagine if Roark took working in the quarry as fault of his integrity; he wouldn't have made it out of there.
    Virtue needs to be completely separate from outcome.
    Consider this quote from Peikoff's lecture on "Certainty and Happiness":
    "Let’s consider here a moral man who has not yet reached professional or romantic fulfillment, an Ayn Rand hero, say Roark or Galt, at a point where he is alone against the world, barred from his work, destitute. Now such a person has certainly not “achieved his values”.
    On the contrary he is beset by problems and difficulties. Nevertheless, if he is an Ayn Rand hero, he’s confident, at peace with himself, serene. He is a happy person even when living through an unhappy period. He does experience deprivation, frustration, pain. But in a phrase that I think is truly memorable, from the Fountainhead, it’s pain that “goes down only to a certain point”.
    He has achieved, not success, but the ability to succeed. In other words, the right relationship to reality. So the emotional leitmotif of such a person is a unique and enduring form of pleasure: the pleasure that derives from the sheer fact of a man’s being alive, if he is a man who feels able to live. I’ve described this particular emotion as "metaphysical pleasure".
       
    Now metaphysical pleasure depends on one’s own choices and actions. And in that sense virtue does ensure happiness- not the full happiness of having achieved one’s values in reality, but the radiance of knowing that such achievement is possible."
    I think this quote from Peikoff is helpful because it illustrates what it means to have self-esteem based on your character, independent of where you actually are in life - that is, independent of the outcomes.
    ---
    Dustin is by no means alone in the issues he's having. Objectivists have had these issues for decades, and they still do even today.
    In Understanding Objectivism, Peikoff identifies another cause of this psychological problem in Objectivists: a concrete-bound mentality. As an Objectivist, one might hold themselves to the concrete elements of Rand's heroes instead of to the abstract moral principles the heroes exemplify. Since, objectively, one might not (and need not) value any of the particular concretes that her heroes value, the fact that one's emotions are not in line with such concretes can mistakenly lead one to the idea that one's emotions are out of control and must be repressed, which can lead to a great deal of distress and suffering.
    Here's an excerpt from lecture ten of Understanding Objectivism describing the issue:
     
    There is a similar issue known by the term "Howard Roark Syndrome", essentially the issue of taking Rand's heroes too literally, and thereby holding oneself to an impossible (or even an improper) standard. This was discussed previously on this forum:
    Another post:
    The consequences of this kind of problem can be an inability to act appropriately when dealing with other people (in the case of the second quote), or even broken relationships (in the case of the first quote), or in general, an under-valuation of other people, which can be a major factor in these psychological problems common to Objectivists.
  4. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from splitprimary in Psychological issues common in Objectivists   
    Dustin explained issues he has had in another thread:
    Issues like these are so common they are almost epidemic among Objectivists.  See for example what Nathaniel Branden wrote, in 1984:
    http://web.archive.org/web/20120106060148/http://www.nathanielbranden.com/ayn/ayn03.html
     
    An Objectivist popped into the chatroom just the other night discussing their psychological issues with me. They were seeing a therapist because they were overloaded with stress from work, essentially because they were over-valuing material independence, and the therapist was having trouble helping them.
    What I had to say to this person is this:
    The virtue of independence doesn't pertain to material independence primarily. Virtues are about how you think and act, not about your material circumstances. It doesn't make sense to describe material independence as a "virtue"; that's a consequence, not an action. Virtues describe principles of action.
    If you read Rand's description of independence, she's talking entirely about judgment and the mind: "yours is the responsibility of judgment", "no substitute can do your thinking", she rejects "the acceptance of an authority over your brain" - these do not comment on material dependence, or say anything negatively about relying on others, but rather they are focusing in on a particular issue of how you use your own mind.
    When she talks about independence, she's talking about that virtue of using your mind, acquiring knowledge the best you can, thinking the best you can, and being able to come to judgments based on that thinking and knowledge. In essence, she's focused on how to think and act to the best of your ability. That does not preclude either material dependence, or relying on others in general. Virtues are not negative principles, they aren't there to instruct you what not to do, they are there primarily to talk about what you should do, based on what's possible to you simply by nature. By nature we are all capable of thinking, acquiring knowledge, and forming judgments - and morally, we should.
    Independence as a virtue is a matter of sound mind and sound action, not a matter of a trade-off of material values. And if material independence were held as high in one's mind as a virtue of character, that could lead one to make bad trade-offs in one's life, such as pursuing material independence at the expense of other values like a good social life.
    If one holds material independence - the outcome - to the standards of a virtue of one's character - which pertains to one's actions - that could lead to some serious distress and guilt, because one's esteem becomes tied to the material outcomes rather than to one's actual virtue and character. Imagine if Roark took working in the quarry as fault of his integrity; he wouldn't have made it out of there.
    Virtue needs to be completely separate from outcome.
    Consider this quote from Peikoff's lecture on "Certainty and Happiness":
    "Let’s consider here a moral man who has not yet reached professional or romantic fulfillment, an Ayn Rand hero, say Roark or Galt, at a point where he is alone against the world, barred from his work, destitute. Now such a person has certainly not “achieved his values”.
    On the contrary he is beset by problems and difficulties. Nevertheless, if he is an Ayn Rand hero, he’s confident, at peace with himself, serene. He is a happy person even when living through an unhappy period. He does experience deprivation, frustration, pain. But in a phrase that I think is truly memorable, from the Fountainhead, it’s pain that “goes down only to a certain point”.
    He has achieved, not success, but the ability to succeed. In other words, the right relationship to reality. So the emotional leitmotif of such a person is a unique and enduring form of pleasure: the pleasure that derives from the sheer fact of a man’s being alive, if he is a man who feels able to live. I’ve described this particular emotion as "metaphysical pleasure".
       
    Now metaphysical pleasure depends on one’s own choices and actions. And in that sense virtue does ensure happiness- not the full happiness of having achieved one’s values in reality, but the radiance of knowing that such achievement is possible."
    I think this quote from Peikoff is helpful because it illustrates what it means to have self-esteem based on your character, independent of where you actually are in life - that is, independent of the outcomes.
    ---
    Dustin is by no means alone in the issues he's having. Objectivists have had these issues for decades, and they still do even today.
    In Understanding Objectivism, Peikoff identifies another cause of this psychological problem in Objectivists: a concrete-bound mentality. As an Objectivist, one might hold themselves to the concrete elements of Rand's heroes instead of to the abstract moral principles the heroes exemplify. Since, objectively, one might not (and need not) value any of the particular concretes that her heroes value, the fact that one's emotions are not in line with such concretes can mistakenly lead one to the idea that one's emotions are out of control and must be repressed, which can lead to a great deal of distress and suffering.
    Here's an excerpt from lecture ten of Understanding Objectivism describing the issue:
     
    There is a similar issue known by the term "Howard Roark Syndrome", essentially the issue of taking Rand's heroes too literally, and thereby holding oneself to an impossible (or even an improper) standard. This was discussed previously on this forum:
    Another post:
    The consequences of this kind of problem can be an inability to act appropriately when dealing with other people (in the case of the second quote), or even broken relationships (in the case of the first quote), or in general, an under-valuation of other people, which can be a major factor in these psychological problems common to Objectivists.
  5. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from suptiche12 in Psychological issues common in Objectivists   
    Dustin explained issues he has had in another thread:
    Issues like these are so common they are almost epidemic among Objectivists.  See for example what Nathaniel Branden wrote, in 1984:
    http://web.archive.org/web/20120106060148/http://www.nathanielbranden.com/ayn/ayn03.html
     
    An Objectivist popped into the chatroom just the other night discussing their psychological issues with me. They were seeing a therapist because they were overloaded with stress from work, essentially because they were over-valuing material independence, and the therapist was having trouble helping them.
    What I had to say to this person is this:
    The virtue of independence doesn't pertain to material independence primarily. Virtues are about how you think and act, not about your material circumstances. It doesn't make sense to describe material independence as a "virtue"; that's a consequence, not an action. Virtues describe principles of action.
    If you read Rand's description of independence, she's talking entirely about judgment and the mind: "yours is the responsibility of judgment", "no substitute can do your thinking", she rejects "the acceptance of an authority over your brain" - these do not comment on material dependence, or say anything negatively about relying on others, but rather they are focusing in on a particular issue of how you use your own mind.
    When she talks about independence, she's talking about that virtue of using your mind, acquiring knowledge the best you can, thinking the best you can, and being able to come to judgments based on that thinking and knowledge. In essence, she's focused on how to think and act to the best of your ability. That does not preclude either material dependence, or relying on others in general. Virtues are not negative principles, they aren't there to instruct you what not to do, they are there primarily to talk about what you should do, based on what's possible to you simply by nature. By nature we are all capable of thinking, acquiring knowledge, and forming judgments - and morally, we should.
    Independence as a virtue is a matter of sound mind and sound action, not a matter of a trade-off of material values. And if material independence were held as high in one's mind as a virtue of character, that could lead one to make bad trade-offs in one's life, such as pursuing material independence at the expense of other values like a good social life.
    If one holds material independence - the outcome - to the standards of a virtue of one's character - which pertains to one's actions - that could lead to some serious distress and guilt, because one's esteem becomes tied to the material outcomes rather than to one's actual virtue and character. Imagine if Roark took working in the quarry as fault of his integrity; he wouldn't have made it out of there.
    Virtue needs to be completely separate from outcome.
    Consider this quote from Peikoff's lecture on "Certainty and Happiness":
    "Let’s consider here a moral man who has not yet reached professional or romantic fulfillment, an Ayn Rand hero, say Roark or Galt, at a point where he is alone against the world, barred from his work, destitute. Now such a person has certainly not “achieved his values”.
    On the contrary he is beset by problems and difficulties. Nevertheless, if he is an Ayn Rand hero, he’s confident, at peace with himself, serene. He is a happy person even when living through an unhappy period. He does experience deprivation, frustration, pain. But in a phrase that I think is truly memorable, from the Fountainhead, it’s pain that “goes down only to a certain point”.
    He has achieved, not success, but the ability to succeed. In other words, the right relationship to reality. So the emotional leitmotif of such a person is a unique and enduring form of pleasure: the pleasure that derives from the sheer fact of a man’s being alive, if he is a man who feels able to live. I’ve described this particular emotion as "metaphysical pleasure".
       
    Now metaphysical pleasure depends on one’s own choices and actions. And in that sense virtue does ensure happiness- not the full happiness of having achieved one’s values in reality, but the radiance of knowing that such achievement is possible."
    I think this quote from Peikoff is helpful because it illustrates what it means to have self-esteem based on your character, independent of where you actually are in life - that is, independent of the outcomes.
    ---
    Dustin is by no means alone in the issues he's having. Objectivists have had these issues for decades, and they still do even today.
    In Understanding Objectivism, Peikoff identifies another cause of this psychological problem in Objectivists: a concrete-bound mentality. As an Objectivist, one might hold themselves to the concrete elements of Rand's heroes instead of to the abstract moral principles the heroes exemplify. Since, objectively, one might not (and need not) value any of the particular concretes that her heroes value, the fact that one's emotions are not in line with such concretes can mistakenly lead one to the idea that one's emotions are out of control and must be repressed, which can lead to a great deal of distress and suffering.
    Here's an excerpt from lecture ten of Understanding Objectivism describing the issue:
     
    There is a similar issue known by the term "Howard Roark Syndrome", essentially the issue of taking Rand's heroes too literally, and thereby holding oneself to an impossible (or even an improper) standard. This was discussed previously on this forum:
    Another post:
    The consequences of this kind of problem can be an inability to act appropriately when dealing with other people (in the case of the second quote), or even broken relationships (in the case of the first quote), or in general, an under-valuation of other people, which can be a major factor in these psychological problems common to Objectivists.
  6. Like
    epistemologue reacted to Harrison Danneskjold in If God Doesn't Exist, Then Why So Much Reverence for "Objective Reality"? [Atlas Spoilers]   
    "Living on the streets" is not the Objectivist analogue of hellfire. If anything, it'd be failing to truly live at all. That scene in the Fountainhead, when Keating tries to rekindle his love of painting and discovers that it's too late - that's the closest thing to an Objectivist damnation.
    I'm sorry if you feel (like Keating) that your life is over, but -dude- you're 28 years old. I don't know what kind of health problems you have but I seriously doubt you're actually as "broken" as you believe yourself to be. Considering everything else contained and implied by the statement "it's too late", I'd never pronounce it on myself and I wish you wouldn't, either.
    Regardless, though, it's not part of Objectivism.
     
    Speak for yourself, brother!
  7. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in If God Doesn't Exist, Then Why So Much Reverence for "Objective Reality"? [Atlas Spoilers]   
    From the intro to The Fountainhead:
    I think the emotion of worship *is* necessary, at least in general, it is the highest level of man's emotions that we are talking about here, and to sacrifice those would be suicidal. Ayn Rand does specifically talk about this emotion referring to man himself, however, but not to reality as such. I believe I've heard the same sentiment from her as Repairman has expressed, that reality is simply neutral, and not an object of reverence, though I can't place where I've read it.

    Rand also expressed reverential feelings about the world in some places, too:
     
     
     
  8. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from dream_weaver in Reblogged:Stealing Is No Longer a Crime in Italy, Not If You’re Poor   
    The justification for not stealing is based on the concept of individual rights which derive from the nature of man. It is not based on what seems most likely to support one's physical survival in the range of the moment; the ends do not justify the means.
    Now as a separate issue, suppose your goal is to support and prolong your physical life (a very fine goal to have), what is the best way to go about that? 
    Should you stomp all over the consent of other men, steal what they produce, negate their mind, and treat them as slaves? Is that actually going to be effective in the long term? It might be effective in the short term, just as cutting a man's throat to steal his wallet might buy you a meal today, but no, that is not going to be effective in the long run. In the long run to be successful you will need to trade with other men, voluntarily, and to mutual benefit, as rational producers who share a common nature (a rational mind), and a common cause (rational self-interest). The creative work of free men under capitalism, the political and economic system of individual rights, has done more than anything else could possibly do to extend the life expectancy and quality of life of man, through the advancement of knowledge, science, technology, and economic productivity.
    In the face of physical death, the only hope for man to rely on in the very long run is the nature of man's mind, and the benevolently lawful and intelligible nature of the natural universe. If man continues to choose to advance his creative work to the limits of what's possible in reality, and continues to hold the moral system which such work depends on, then, and only that basis, we may find that even overcoming of physical death (through some kind of resurrection) is possible in reality.
    So the best way to pursue this goal of supporting and prolonging your physical life in the very long run is to hold to the moral and political principles of individual rights and capitalism by refusing to steal from another man.
  9. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from Dustin86 in Reblogged:Stealing Is No Longer a Crime in Italy, Not If You’re Poor   
    That was not her answer. See from my post linked above...
     
    Why aren't you presenting the unequivocal statements of Ayn Rand in her original, definitive work, "The Ethics of Emergencies", written to address this very question, featured in the canonical book of Objectivist ethics, "The Virtue of Selfishness"? Why instead have they taken these other comments - which are highly contradictory to the canonical position of the Objectivist ethics, from an obscure Q&A session given years later, on a lecture concerning a very different subject - as not only the more important and more defining, but apparently the only position that you even bothered to consider here?
    As Ayn Rand states in "The Ethics of Emergencies" very explicitly: morality always applies, to all of one's choices. When one is dealing with the circumstances of an emergency, that is merely another instance where one must apply their moral principles. You can always have a "long-term outlook of flourishing" and act accordingly, regardless of what situation you find yourself in currently.
    Devil's Advocate makes great points -
    How can you say that morality applies on a desert island - and that it doesn't apply on a lifeboat?
    StrictlyLogical also points out the reality that emergencies are still situations where man has a choice and must act - and therefore where morality must apply:
     
  10. Like
    epistemologue reacted to Dustin86 in Reblogged:Stealing Is No Longer a Crime in Italy, Not If You’re Poor   
    Doctor, what was the alternative, him starving to death? But Objectivism says follow your self-interest. Objectivism says don't sacrifice. If he had just laid down and died and not "inconvenienced" anybody, that clearly would have been a sacrifice of his life by any reasonable definition. Or is sacrifice actually morally required in some cases in Objectivism? You can't have it both ways, Doctor.
  11. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from splitprimary in Objectivism and Political Action   
    I don't even think this is accurate. This is what Obama thinks his biggest problem is: he just hasn't been able to communicate his message to these Republicans clearly. It's exactly the opposite, Republicans have been clear on what his message is for a long time, and they simply disagree with it. Same goes with Objectivism. I think what we really need is to answer people's reservations and disagreements convincingly, and then the ideas will sell themselves. People's feelings and passions follow from their prior thinking and judgments. On this principle, ask yourself, why did Rand's fiction sell so much better than her non-fiction - i.e. what was it in her thinking, in her philosophy, that was different in one medium vs. the other? I think we ought to be a lot more introspective on what it is we are even trying to sell in the first place. For example, why are there as many different positions on Objectivist metaethics as there are people writing on the subject? If the logic of Objectivist metaphysics/epistemology/ethics/politics has inconsistencies, and there are other philosophies that give more consistent answers, Objectivism is going to lose followers to those systems.
  12. Like
    epistemologue reacted to Harrison Danneskjold in Objectivism and Political Action   
    I did not say "usually". It's something I've been trying to avoid - not because it makes me "incapable of reasoning" but because it hurts the quality of my reasoning, and I'd prefer not to make a public spectacle out of that.
    I'd like to drop it too, buddy, and will gladly do so as soon as you do.
     
    OK, then. Have it your way.
     
    Suppose we shut down some evangelical TV channel through nonviolent means (ala Black Lives Matter). That makes it into the newspapers, of course, and millions of people are first introduced to the Objectivist movement through the scandal of police barricades and lawsuits. The political backlash would take us one step closer to a civil war (in the same manner as the actions of Black Lives Matter) and I cannot even predict the depth of the cultural backlash - the possibilities range from very bad to an unmitigated disaster. Two or three more steps in that direction (we're talking about less than five years) and we will get that civil war.
     
    Our options are words or guns. Any middle road solution is a range-of-the-moment solution, which cannot work in the long run.
     
    Now, do you want to organize your thread around the nonexistent or do you want to "take chances, make mistakes, get messy" - and find some real solutions?
  13. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in Objectivism and Political Action   
    I don't even think this is accurate. This is what Obama thinks his biggest problem is: he just hasn't been able to communicate his message to these Republicans clearly. It's exactly the opposite, Republicans have been clear on what his message is for a long time, and they simply disagree with it. Same goes with Objectivism. I think what we really need is to answer people's reservations and disagreements convincingly, and then the ideas will sell themselves. People's feelings and passions follow from their prior thinking and judgments. On this principle, ask yourself, why did Rand's fiction sell so much better than her non-fiction - i.e. what was it in her thinking, in her philosophy, that was different in one medium vs. the other? I think we ought to be a lot more introspective on what it is we are even trying to sell in the first place. For example, why are there as many different positions on Objectivist metaethics as there are people writing on the subject? If the logic of Objectivist metaphysics/epistemology/ethics/politics has inconsistencies, and there are other philosophies that give more consistent answers, Objectivism is going to lose followers to those systems.
  14. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from Jon Southall in Contra Trump – by Harry Binswanger   
    Well that's barely the beginning of it. Someone should actually write up an explanation on how insane it would be to vote for Hillary as an Objectivist. I'll probably do it if nobody else does.
  15. Like
    epistemologue reacted to Devil's Advocate in Is Stealing to live Justified According to Objectivists   
    In looking back on your quote I came across the following, which I believe clarifies her overall position on maintaining moral principles in the context of dictatorships:  "... Nothing but a psycho-epistemological panic can blind such intellectuals to the fact that a dictator, like any thug, runs from the first sign of confident resistance; that he can rise only in a society of precisely such uncertain, compliant, shaking compromisers as they advocate, a society that invites a thug to take over; and that the task of resisting an Attila can be accomplished only by men of intransigent conviction and moral certainty." ~ ARL, Dictator
    This suggests to me that there is in fact, always a moral choice to be made when faced with adverse, abnormal conditions  for survival.  And that the choice to live requires an "intransigent conviction" to moral certainties about accepting or rejecting impediments to normal conditions; to "live" (uncertainly) on your knees, or to risk going down swinging.
  16. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from suptiche12 in Buffalo, NY.   
    Hey if anyone is interested in an Objectivism meetup in Buffalo, please send me a message
  17. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in Assertiveness   
    Nice, I hadn't seen this before.

    This interview aside, I agree completely that Objectivists do seem to have a problem with assertiveness.
    It almost seems like people have taken philosophical/political concepts of non-aggression and non-interference - i.e. avoiding the use of non-initiatory, rights-violating, unjustified violence against innocent people, by individuals and especially governments - and applied these more broadly, taking as general principles of behavior in their lives the idea that they ought not have any kind of assertiveness or aggressiveness in their personality at all. 
    These are critical personality traits for working with reality and with other people - especially for men. Seizing opportunity and pushing on people for answers to one's questions, for things you expect from them, to morally or aesthetically criticize (or endorse) their behavior or their work, or in general holding people to standards of reason and value.
    Just because someone has a legal right to be free from violent interference by you to do something immoral, wrong, sub-optimal, irrational - doesn't mean there is any legal or moral right whatsoever for them to be free from your assertiveness, insistence, advice, criticism, argument. In fact the moral onus is exactly the reverse - if you see something unreasonable or sub-optimal, in the world or in others around you, you owe it to yourself to *say something*, to push on it, to change it - and to insist as vigorously as you reasonably (and legally) can on what only makes sense, what would only make something better. The non-aggression principle is only the furthest edge at which you must *stop* - NOT a general prescription to avoid any kind of interference in general.
    Can you imagine a chief of operations in a company, say a railroad, whose principle of behavior was to allow anyone he employs to do things however they like, according to whatever standards they happen to hold, moral or immoral, rational or irrational - with *no* interference, assertiveness, or otherwise non-rights violating aggressiveness from him whatsoever - with his justification being that it's their legal right to be free from aggression? The company would dissolve into complete dysfunction and failure in no time at all. 
    Or what about a teacher or a coach who did nothing to guide, correct, or push their students or players to do better, to correct their problems, or to follow a proper method? It should be no surprise when they fail tests and lose games.
    Now imagine this on a societal scale, where there are no philosophical or moral leaders with any assertiveness. People are left directionless and swayed by whim when no one of any philosophical expertise or conviction is there to teach them, to guide them, to push them on what's morally right, what's rational, what's ideal - to push them to do better, to be better, to produce better work - because that's what makes sense, that's what's rational, that's what will bring themselves and those around them the most value, and advance their lives, happiness, and flourishing the most.
    Every Objectivist needs to read this essay by Ayn Rand from her book The Virtue of Selfishness:
    HOW DOES ONE LEAD A RATIONAL LIFE IN AN IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?

    https://campus.aynrand.org/works/1962/01/01/how-does-one-lead-a-rational-life-in-an-irrational-society/page1
    And by the way - this applies *especially* to men. 
    The world needs a lot more assertive, aggressive, pushy, masculine Objectivist men.
    Some of you were asking me in the gender thread for me to be specific about what are the normative moral principles of masculinity. Well here's a perfect example.
    The liberal, androgynous postmodernism of our time is an epidemic which is now doing great harm, especially among young people. It needs to be aggressively challenged by driven, principled, Objectivist leaders.
     
  18. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from Peikoff's Mullet in Assertiveness   
    Nice, I hadn't seen this before.

    This interview aside, I agree completely that Objectivists do seem to have a problem with assertiveness.
    It almost seems like people have taken philosophical/political concepts of non-aggression and non-interference - i.e. avoiding the use of non-initiatory, rights-violating, unjustified violence against innocent people, by individuals and especially governments - and applied these more broadly, taking as general principles of behavior in their lives the idea that they ought not have any kind of assertiveness or aggressiveness in their personality at all. 
    These are critical personality traits for working with reality and with other people - especially for men. Seizing opportunity and pushing on people for answers to one's questions, for things you expect from them, to morally or aesthetically criticize (or endorse) their behavior or their work, or in general holding people to standards of reason and value.
    Just because someone has a legal right to be free from violent interference by you to do something immoral, wrong, sub-optimal, irrational - doesn't mean there is any legal or moral right whatsoever for them to be free from your assertiveness, insistence, advice, criticism, argument. In fact the moral onus is exactly the reverse - if you see something unreasonable or sub-optimal, in the world or in others around you, you owe it to yourself to *say something*, to push on it, to change it - and to insist as vigorously as you reasonably (and legally) can on what only makes sense, what would only make something better. The non-aggression principle is only the furthest edge at which you must *stop* - NOT a general prescription to avoid any kind of interference in general.
    Can you imagine a chief of operations in a company, say a railroad, whose principle of behavior was to allow anyone he employs to do things however they like, according to whatever standards they happen to hold, moral or immoral, rational or irrational - with *no* interference, assertiveness, or otherwise non-rights violating aggressiveness from him whatsoever - with his justification being that it's their legal right to be free from aggression? The company would dissolve into complete dysfunction and failure in no time at all. 
    Or what about a teacher or a coach who did nothing to guide, correct, or push their students or players to do better, to correct their problems, or to follow a proper method? It should be no surprise when they fail tests and lose games.
    Now imagine this on a societal scale, where there are no philosophical or moral leaders with any assertiveness. People are left directionless and swayed by whim when no one of any philosophical expertise or conviction is there to teach them, to guide them, to push them on what's morally right, what's rational, what's ideal - to push them to do better, to be better, to produce better work - because that's what makes sense, that's what's rational, that's what will bring themselves and those around them the most value, and advance their lives, happiness, and flourishing the most.
    Every Objectivist needs to read this essay by Ayn Rand from her book The Virtue of Selfishness:
    HOW DOES ONE LEAD A RATIONAL LIFE IN AN IRRATIONAL SOCIETY?

    https://campus.aynrand.org/works/1962/01/01/how-does-one-lead-a-rational-life-in-an-irrational-society/page1
    And by the way - this applies *especially* to men. 
    The world needs a lot more assertive, aggressive, pushy, masculine Objectivist men.
    Some of you were asking me in the gender thread for me to be specific about what are the normative moral principles of masculinity. Well here's a perfect example.
    The liberal, androgynous postmodernism of our time is an epidemic which is now doing great harm, especially among young people. It needs to be aggressively challenged by driven, principled, Objectivist leaders.
     
  19. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from suptiche12 in Is Stealing to live Justified According to Objectivists   
    -Criticism of responses so far-
    To those of you saying morality does not apply, contrast the two positions taken by Ayn Rand here:
    and here:
    Why has nobody in this thread defended the unequivocal statements of Ayn Rand in her original, definitive work, "The Ethics of Emergencies", written to address this very question, featured in the canonical book of Objectivist ethics, "The Virtue of Selfishness"? Why instead have they taken these other comments - which are highly contradictory to the canonical position of the Objectivist ethics, from an obscure Q&A session given years later, on a lecture concerning a very different subject - as not only the more important and more defining, but apparently the only position that anyone has even bothered to really consider here?
    As Ayn Rand states in "The Ethics of Emergencies" very explicitly: morality always applies, to all of one's choices. When one is dealing with the circumstances of an emergency, that is merely another instance where one must apply their moral principles. You can always have a "long-term outlook of flourishing" and act accordingly, regardless of what situation you find yourself in currently.
    Devil's Advocate makes great points -
    How can you say that morality applies on a desert island - and that it doesn't apply on a lifeboat?
    StrictlyLogical also points out the reality that emergencies are still situations where man has a choice and must act - and therefore where morality must apply:
     
    -Answering the Question-
    - If the scenario is as dream weaver described, where you're in Alaska and there are cabins about with food stocked that are not in use, and it's the social convention that one lost in the wilderness in an emergency is expected to be able to use these resources, then it wouldn't really be stealing.
    - The original question is instead about a tent in the desert, where there's not necessarily any implied convention that you can use resources that you find because it's an emergency. Someone may even very well depend on those resources for their own life. But the original question is a little ambiguous - suppose you arrive at the tent on the verge of death, and nobody is home. The actions in that situation of a rational, benevolent person would be to share part of what they have with you given your desperate emergency, and in the absence of any definitive knowledge about their consent that's a fair assumption to make given a benevolent people premise (provided you assume this justly puts you in debt to them and will repay it on their terms).
    - To answer the question in the fullest sense, we have to ask what should one do given the premise that the tent owner is there when you arrive, and even against benevolence and rationality they still explicitly deny consent to take their things. How could following the non-aggression principle to your very death be consistent with holding life as the highest value?
    One might try to argue that holding life as the highest value doesn't simply mean a *physical life*,
    but rather a *moral life*, in the same sense that man's highest purpose isn't merely "that which gives me pleasure" but rather, that which is the expression of my moral values AND gives me pleasure:
    The attempt here would be to say that you *are* holding life as your highest value, by saying: by "life" you mean only a "principled life" - in this case a life of following the non-aggression principle.
    However, this still doesn't really answer the question in its fullest sense. The will to live is the most fundamental principle of morality by virtue of being the most fundamental aspect of man's identity - as an organism who by nature faces the life or death alternative. Therefore one cannot ultimately make the argument that the will to principle and morality somehow supercedes the will to live, when life-sustaining action is the root of moral principles. In order to answer the question one must show that the will to principle and the will to life are consistent - one must show that choosing to actually die for the non-aggression principle really is the best action to take in order to live.
    - The only way I know to answer this question is to say that death can be overcome and that we can have eternal life. By virtue of man's will to live, and the intelligibility and controllability of the nature of the universe, and given the lack of any complete proof of its impossibility and a benevolent universe premise, we should expect the progress of science and technology to, ultimately, reach the capability of immortal life and the resurrection of the dead.
    Just as Howard Roark says in the Fountainhead that,
    "The work of the creators has eliminated one form of disease after another, in man's body and spirit, and brought more relief from suffering than any altruist could ever conceive"
    and
    "The integrity of a man's creative work is of greater importance than any charitable endeavor"
    The most effective way to follow one's will to live is to respect the creative work and property of others through the non-aggression principle, even to the point of dying on that hill. The spiritual values one pursues are far more important and consequential than anything physical that one can accomplish. Following one's principles is more practically effective in order to live in the long run than anything one would be able to physically do by violating them just to live a little while longer. This is how to reconcile holding life as the highest value with the principle of non-initiation of force.
  20. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from DonAthos in Is Stealing to live Justified According to Objectivists   
    -Criticism of responses so far-
    To those of you saying morality does not apply, contrast the two positions taken by Ayn Rand here:
    and here:
    Why has nobody in this thread defended the unequivocal statements of Ayn Rand in her original, definitive work, "The Ethics of Emergencies", written to address this very question, featured in the canonical book of Objectivist ethics, "The Virtue of Selfishness"? Why instead have they taken these other comments - which are highly contradictory to the canonical position of the Objectivist ethics, from an obscure Q&A session given years later, on a lecture concerning a very different subject - as not only the more important and more defining, but apparently the only position that anyone has even bothered to really consider here?
    As Ayn Rand states in "The Ethics of Emergencies" very explicitly: morality always applies, to all of one's choices. When one is dealing with the circumstances of an emergency, that is merely another instance where one must apply their moral principles. You can always have a "long-term outlook of flourishing" and act accordingly, regardless of what situation you find yourself in currently.
    Devil's Advocate makes great points -
    How can you say that morality applies on a desert island - and that it doesn't apply on a lifeboat?
    StrictlyLogical also points out the reality that emergencies are still situations where man has a choice and must act - and therefore where morality must apply:
     
    -Answering the Question-
    - If the scenario is as dream weaver described, where you're in Alaska and there are cabins about with food stocked that are not in use, and it's the social convention that one lost in the wilderness in an emergency is expected to be able to use these resources, then it wouldn't really be stealing.
    - The original question is instead about a tent in the desert, where there's not necessarily any implied convention that you can use resources that you find because it's an emergency. Someone may even very well depend on those resources for their own life. But the original question is a little ambiguous - suppose you arrive at the tent on the verge of death, and nobody is home. The actions in that situation of a rational, benevolent person would be to share part of what they have with you given your desperate emergency, and in the absence of any definitive knowledge about their consent that's a fair assumption to make given a benevolent people premise (provided you assume this justly puts you in debt to them and will repay it on their terms).
    - To answer the question in the fullest sense, we have to ask what should one do given the premise that the tent owner is there when you arrive, and even against benevolence and rationality they still explicitly deny consent to take their things. How could following the non-aggression principle to your very death be consistent with holding life as the highest value?
    One might try to argue that holding life as the highest value doesn't simply mean a *physical life*,
    but rather a *moral life*, in the same sense that man's highest purpose isn't merely "that which gives me pleasure" but rather, that which is the expression of my moral values AND gives me pleasure:
    The attempt here would be to say that you *are* holding life as your highest value, by saying: by "life" you mean only a "principled life" - in this case a life of following the non-aggression principle.
    However, this still doesn't really answer the question in its fullest sense. The will to live is the most fundamental principle of morality by virtue of being the most fundamental aspect of man's identity - as an organism who by nature faces the life or death alternative. Therefore one cannot ultimately make the argument that the will to principle and morality somehow supercedes the will to live, when life-sustaining action is the root of moral principles. In order to answer the question one must show that the will to principle and the will to life are consistent - one must show that choosing to actually die for the non-aggression principle really is the best action to take in order to live.
    - The only way I know to answer this question is to say that death can be overcome and that we can have eternal life. By virtue of man's will to live, and the intelligibility and controllability of the nature of the universe, and given the lack of any complete proof of its impossibility and a benevolent universe premise, we should expect the progress of science and technology to, ultimately, reach the capability of immortal life and the resurrection of the dead.
    Just as Howard Roark says in the Fountainhead that,
    "The work of the creators has eliminated one form of disease after another, in man's body and spirit, and brought more relief from suffering than any altruist could ever conceive"
    and
    "The integrity of a man's creative work is of greater importance than any charitable endeavor"
    The most effective way to follow one's will to live is to respect the creative work and property of others through the non-aggression principle, even to the point of dying on that hill. The spiritual values one pursues are far more important and consequential than anything physical that one can accomplish. Following one's principles is more practically effective in order to live in the long run than anything one would be able to physically do by violating them just to live a little while longer. This is how to reconcile holding life as the highest value with the principle of non-initiation of force.
  21. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from splitprimary in Is Stealing to live Justified According to Objectivists   
    -Criticism of responses so far-
    To those of you saying morality does not apply, contrast the two positions taken by Ayn Rand here:
    and here:
    Why has nobody in this thread defended the unequivocal statements of Ayn Rand in her original, definitive work, "The Ethics of Emergencies", written to address this very question, featured in the canonical book of Objectivist ethics, "The Virtue of Selfishness"? Why instead have they taken these other comments - which are highly contradictory to the canonical position of the Objectivist ethics, from an obscure Q&A session given years later, on a lecture concerning a very different subject - as not only the more important and more defining, but apparently the only position that anyone has even bothered to really consider here?
    As Ayn Rand states in "The Ethics of Emergencies" very explicitly: morality always applies, to all of one's choices. When one is dealing with the circumstances of an emergency, that is merely another instance where one must apply their moral principles. You can always have a "long-term outlook of flourishing" and act accordingly, regardless of what situation you find yourself in currently.
    Devil's Advocate makes great points -
    How can you say that morality applies on a desert island - and that it doesn't apply on a lifeboat?
    StrictlyLogical also points out the reality that emergencies are still situations where man has a choice and must act - and therefore where morality must apply:
     
    -Answering the Question-
    - If the scenario is as dream weaver described, where you're in Alaska and there are cabins about with food stocked that are not in use, and it's the social convention that one lost in the wilderness in an emergency is expected to be able to use these resources, then it wouldn't really be stealing.
    - The original question is instead about a tent in the desert, where there's not necessarily any implied convention that you can use resources that you find because it's an emergency. Someone may even very well depend on those resources for their own life. But the original question is a little ambiguous - suppose you arrive at the tent on the verge of death, and nobody is home. The actions in that situation of a rational, benevolent person would be to share part of what they have with you given your desperate emergency, and in the absence of any definitive knowledge about their consent that's a fair assumption to make given a benevolent people premise (provided you assume this justly puts you in debt to them and will repay it on their terms).
    - To answer the question in the fullest sense, we have to ask what should one do given the premise that the tent owner is there when you arrive, and even against benevolence and rationality they still explicitly deny consent to take their things. How could following the non-aggression principle to your very death be consistent with holding life as the highest value?
    One might try to argue that holding life as the highest value doesn't simply mean a *physical life*,
    but rather a *moral life*, in the same sense that man's highest purpose isn't merely "that which gives me pleasure" but rather, that which is the expression of my moral values AND gives me pleasure:
    The attempt here would be to say that you *are* holding life as your highest value, by saying: by "life" you mean only a "principled life" - in this case a life of following the non-aggression principle.
    However, this still doesn't really answer the question in its fullest sense. The will to live is the most fundamental principle of morality by virtue of being the most fundamental aspect of man's identity - as an organism who by nature faces the life or death alternative. Therefore one cannot ultimately make the argument that the will to principle and morality somehow supercedes the will to live, when life-sustaining action is the root of moral principles. In order to answer the question one must show that the will to principle and the will to life are consistent - one must show that choosing to actually die for the non-aggression principle really is the best action to take in order to live.
    - The only way I know to answer this question is to say that death can be overcome and that we can have eternal life. By virtue of man's will to live, and the intelligibility and controllability of the nature of the universe, and given the lack of any complete proof of its impossibility and a benevolent universe premise, we should expect the progress of science and technology to, ultimately, reach the capability of immortal life and the resurrection of the dead.
    Just as Howard Roark says in the Fountainhead that,
    "The work of the creators has eliminated one form of disease after another, in man's body and spirit, and brought more relief from suffering than any altruist could ever conceive"
    and
    "The integrity of a man's creative work is of greater importance than any charitable endeavor"
    The most effective way to follow one's will to live is to respect the creative work and property of others through the non-aggression principle, even to the point of dying on that hill. The spiritual values one pursues are far more important and consequential than anything physical that one can accomplish. Following one's principles is more practically effective in order to live in the long run than anything one would be able to physically do by violating them just to live a little while longer. This is how to reconcile holding life as the highest value with the principle of non-initiation of force.
  22. Like
    epistemologue got a reaction from dream_weaver in Is Stealing to live Justified According to Objectivists   
    -Criticism of responses so far-
    To those of you saying morality does not apply, contrast the two positions taken by Ayn Rand here:
    and here:
    Why has nobody in this thread defended the unequivocal statements of Ayn Rand in her original, definitive work, "The Ethics of Emergencies", written to address this very question, featured in the canonical book of Objectivist ethics, "The Virtue of Selfishness"? Why instead have they taken these other comments - which are highly contradictory to the canonical position of the Objectivist ethics, from an obscure Q&A session given years later, on a lecture concerning a very different subject - as not only the more important and more defining, but apparently the only position that anyone has even bothered to really consider here?
    As Ayn Rand states in "The Ethics of Emergencies" very explicitly: morality always applies, to all of one's choices. When one is dealing with the circumstances of an emergency, that is merely another instance where one must apply their moral principles. You can always have a "long-term outlook of flourishing" and act accordingly, regardless of what situation you find yourself in currently.
    Devil's Advocate makes great points -
    How can you say that morality applies on a desert island - and that it doesn't apply on a lifeboat?
    StrictlyLogical also points out the reality that emergencies are still situations where man has a choice and must act - and therefore where morality must apply:
     
    -Answering the Question-
    - If the scenario is as dream weaver described, where you're in Alaska and there are cabins about with food stocked that are not in use, and it's the social convention that one lost in the wilderness in an emergency is expected to be able to use these resources, then it wouldn't really be stealing.
    - The original question is instead about a tent in the desert, where there's not necessarily any implied convention that you can use resources that you find because it's an emergency. Someone may even very well depend on those resources for their own life. But the original question is a little ambiguous - suppose you arrive at the tent on the verge of death, and nobody is home. The actions in that situation of a rational, benevolent person would be to share part of what they have with you given your desperate emergency, and in the absence of any definitive knowledge about their consent that's a fair assumption to make given a benevolent people premise (provided you assume this justly puts you in debt to them and will repay it on their terms).
    - To answer the question in the fullest sense, we have to ask what should one do given the premise that the tent owner is there when you arrive, and even against benevolence and rationality they still explicitly deny consent to take their things. How could following the non-aggression principle to your very death be consistent with holding life as the highest value?
    One might try to argue that holding life as the highest value doesn't simply mean a *physical life*,
    but rather a *moral life*, in the same sense that man's highest purpose isn't merely "that which gives me pleasure" but rather, that which is the expression of my moral values AND gives me pleasure:
    The attempt here would be to say that you *are* holding life as your highest value, by saying: by "life" you mean only a "principled life" - in this case a life of following the non-aggression principle.
    However, this still doesn't really answer the question in its fullest sense. The will to live is the most fundamental principle of morality by virtue of being the most fundamental aspect of man's identity - as an organism who by nature faces the life or death alternative. Therefore one cannot ultimately make the argument that the will to principle and morality somehow supercedes the will to live, when life-sustaining action is the root of moral principles. In order to answer the question one must show that the will to principle and the will to life are consistent - one must show that choosing to actually die for the non-aggression principle really is the best action to take in order to live.
    - The only way I know to answer this question is to say that death can be overcome and that we can have eternal life. By virtue of man's will to live, and the intelligibility and controllability of the nature of the universe, and given the lack of any complete proof of its impossibility and a benevolent universe premise, we should expect the progress of science and technology to, ultimately, reach the capability of immortal life and the resurrection of the dead.
    Just as Howard Roark says in the Fountainhead that,
    "The work of the creators has eliminated one form of disease after another, in man's body and spirit, and brought more relief from suffering than any altruist could ever conceive"
    and
    "The integrity of a man's creative work is of greater importance than any charitable endeavor"
    The most effective way to follow one's will to live is to respect the creative work and property of others through the non-aggression principle, even to the point of dying on that hill. The spiritual values one pursues are far more important and consequential than anything physical that one can accomplish. Following one's principles is more practically effective in order to live in the long run than anything one would be able to physically do by violating them just to live a little while longer. This is how to reconcile holding life as the highest value with the principle of non-initiation of force.
  23. Like
    epistemologue reacted to Anuj in Objectivist view on automation?   
    Check out Luddite Fallacy - "The Luddite fallacy is the simple observation that new technology does not lead to higher overall unemployment in the economy. New technology doesn't destroy jobs – it only changes the composition of jobs in the economy."
  24. Like
    epistemologue reacted to aleph_1 in Eddie Willers   
    There have been quite a few excellent posts on this thread but one word I have been looking for is missing: "Serf". Eddie Willers is a serf to TT. A serf is one who belongs to the land and their lord. Eddie belonged to TT, having sacrificed his sense of self. This was his failing and why he stayed with the train despite having opportunity to leave. He deserved his fate.
  25. Like
    epistemologue reacted to A is not B in Paralyzed by "why."   
    Jon, that is an excellent post and those were the thoughts behind my quest for clarity.

    I DO have "reasons, beliefs, etc" for why I like training. In the end they all seem like really complicated ways of saying, "because I like it."

    Short version: Strength training seems to be the one activity I am drawn to that explicitly requires my favorite virtues. Honesty, integrity, goal directedness and integration.

    Another very short explanation is that of "Strength training as a Kinesthetic concretization of philosophy" I.e. Art. We often think of art as a visual or auditory concretization of concepts so those concepts can be accessed perceptually. But training as a way of perceiving elaborate concepts like "what man could be and ought to be" doesn't happen for me "out there" on a wall or in a radio, it happens "in here," concretely and in my own body and I experience such concepts as "man the hero" on the perceptual level through the Kinesthetic sense. In a way, it is an artwork that has to be recreated each time it is to be experienced and it can ONLY be experienced by the one who creates it. Its art that is profoundly, uniquely, and selfishly MINE. And I couldn't give it away, even if I wanted to because sense perceptions can't be shared.

    ...or something like that.

    I also like watching other people strive for "man the hero." I was training the other day and I sat in a leg press machine my gaze fixed on a tiny old woman-- had to be 90 years old-- who was doing very laborous body squats while holding onto a set of blast straps to take some of the weight off her legs. That little old woman was trying so HARD and as I walked out of the gym I overheard her tell her daughter that she was bound and determined to be able to walk again before she dies.

    That's hardcore! That gives me hope for the human race. That insolent, defiance of her condition is the living example of what Dagny said to Galt, "We never had to take it seriously..."

    So... Those are a few reasons. Is that rational or emotion driven? I'm not sure, but I like it. Lol.

    By the way, my name is Bryan.
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