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human_murda

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  1. Haha
    human_murda reacted to SpookyKitty in Do Algorithmically Non-Trivial Definitions Refute Measurement-Omission Theory?   
    This is actually a very sexy calculation. I am impressed.
  2. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from SpookyKitty in Do Algorithmically Non-Trivial Definitions Refute Measurement-Omission Theory?   
    I don't think it matters to Rand's theory what quantities are directly measurable or not. Side-length is a measurement, average of side-lengths is a measurement, angles are measurements, sines and tangents of angles are measurements. These are all characteristics of a triangle, even if we might need to perform some computations to find them out.
    It's possible to restate your definition in terms of quantities that are "directly measurable": we just need the ratio of a triangle's side-length to its perimeter (which is "directly measurable") to be between 0.9/3 and 1.1/3. However, even here we need to "compute" the ratio (which isn't directly measurable). The measurement omission here is the fact that only the ratios matter, not the actual lengths.
     
    This isn't actually necessary. It was just the easiest way. Since we know for a fact that only the ratios matter, we can discard all length measurements as a first step (and instead just look at angles). Thus, even without computing averages, we can omit all length measurements (since they're just indicators of scale).
    Then, based on the law of sines, we can apply the following conditions:
    0.9/3 < sin(A)/(sin(A)+sin(B)+sin(B)) < 1.1/3
    0.9/3 < sin(B)/(sin(A)+sin(B)+sin(B)) < 1.1/3
    0.9/3 < sin(C)/(sin(A)+sin(B)+sin(B)) < 1.1/3
    Even after this, there are additional measurement omissions (only ratios of sines matter, not the actual values of the sines. The exact value of the ratio also doesn't matter and only a certain range matters).
    The idea that we need to compute averages before any measurement omission is incorrect. It's possible to get rid of length measurements first and then do other computations. However, calculating averages first is easier (and it honestly doesn't matter. The average is as much a property of a triangle as a side-length).
  3. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in Cultural Parasitism   
    Despite the existence of Katie Dippold's twitter page, Paul Feig and Ivan Reitman are still men. Who are they taking revenge against? Also, the Ghostbusters movie is about women in media. BLM is irrelevant here and doesn't prove any point about women taking revenge against men (the director and one of the producers are men). Sure, there are women in the team but that's not relevant to the point that these movies are supposedly ways of taking revenge against men.
    And they could have written totally different and better stories with pansexual, brown, female leads but they didn't. It's easy to talk about how imaginary movies would have been better, but given how the 2016 movie was a lazy sequel, they would have produced a shitty movie with straight, white male leads. You are blaming the problems of the movie on the fact that they have non- straight, White male leads (or the politics behind it) when the actual problem is that they just used that as a selling point and did not try to be original. They tried to sell the movie with politics but the problem is not the politics, the problem is that they were lazy (and they would have been lazy no matter who the leads were).
    Similar stuff could be said about the recent Aladdin movie. It was a remake and wasn't that well done (from the Genie's CGI to the costumes looking home-made to the casting). Jasmine was specifically supposed to be Persian, but they did not cast someone Middle-Eastern (and she was probably the only famous Middle-Eastern character in Western media who wasn't a terrorist, apart from Jesus). Is this because the casting was done by the alt-right trying to make Jasmine whiter? No, it was because Naomi Scott (who doesn't look Persian) was more famous and could sing and because the film was a remake and kind of lazy. The film wasn't bad because Disney was infiltrated by the alt-right or because of politics. It was bad because it was a lazy remake.
    There are also examples on the opposite end of the spectrum, like Hollywood casting light-skinned actors to appeal to China. Has the alt-right infiltrated Hollywood?
  4. Like
    human_murda reacted to Eiuol in Cultural Parasitism   
    When has this happened? I mean, it seems like the Magnificent Seven remake was the forgotten one... And if the original was forgotten, it's not because it was canceled.
    The logic seems to go like this:
    1) companies that are rational make money
    2) companies that are not rational don't make money
    3) therefore companies that make money are rational
     
    4) since it is not rational to make parasitic movies, the companies that make such movies won't make money
    5) therefore the companies make these movies for reasons besides money
     
    1-3 is circular (Why they rational? Because they make money. Why do they make money? Because they are rational.)
    4 misses the fact that you can make money this way.
    5 indicates a hidden premise that no one who is irrational tries to make money or will always fail to make any money. 
     
    Sometimes it's hard to accept that companies can be manipulative. You can make money off of marks and do quite well. The progressives are the marks. 
     
     
  5. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from AlexL in Why Do Most Philosophers Not Know Of Noethers Theorem And Its Implications   
    There's nothing particularly quantum mechanical about Noether's theorem (it was proven just before quantum mechanics was widely accepted). It applies to classical mechanics too.
  6. Like
    human_murda reacted to Harrison Danneskjold in Immigration restrictions   
    Then we should make it easy to immigrate and become a citizen but very hard to gain enfranchisement.
  7. Like
    human_murda reacted to Doug Morris in The Case for Open Objectivism   
    Azrael Rand:
    You speak of "national self-interest".  What is important is individual self-interest.
    You have made it clear that you think our self-interest requires restrictions on immigration and letting race be a consideration in setting public policy.  But I don't see how you have proven this.  You have not sufficiently considered the point that we must think of people and treat them as individuals, not as members of collectives, whether defined racially or otherwise.
    When I spoke of rape culture I did not mean in the whole society or a whole university.  I was speaking of what might be called a subculture, a cultural attitude that seems to exist among some American male college students that encourages rape.
    If one-fifth of Africa's population (about a quarter of a billion people) decide to enter the United States in the next year or so, where exactly would they go?  No private property owner would have to let them onto his or her property.  Even owners who were willing to accept some of them would probably have a limit to how many they would accept.  If they are squatting on or clogging government property, the government would have the right to require them to leave, and if there is no place here for them to go, that would mean sending them back. 
  8. Like
    human_murda reacted to Alethiometry in Black Swan   
    The contrast between Lily's and Nina's character is not about "fixing" anything.

    Yes, going out with Lily did not help Nina. I'm not arguing that going out with Lily was a good thing for Nina to do, or that it should help Nina in some way. You are completely missing my point.

    Throughout the entire movie, you are beaten over the head with the differences between these two girls. Nina is mentally unstable and on a quest for perfection. Lily doesn't care about perfection, is hedonistic, but comes out looking more mentally balanced in the end. Nina ends up stabbing herself, Lily doesn't. Lily congratulates Nina on her excellent performance in the end and isn't psychotic.

    The connection between insanity and a quest for perfection is made because both of these elements are present in Nina's character. The connection between "balance" and mental stability is made because both of these elements are meshed together in Lily's character. These two characters foil each other: you get compromise and mental stability, or a quest for perfection and insanity.



    That's part of what's going on with this movie. But the other part of what's going on is that her quest for perfection is linked to her mental illness. The more she struggles to be perfect, the greater her mental illness.

    I do see a problem with showing this futile quest for perfection as the main characters struggle. In the Romantic Manifesto, Rand writes:

    "Since a rational man’s ambition is unlimited, since his pursuit and achievement of values is a lifelong process—and the higher the values, the harder the struggle—he needs a moment, an hour or some period of time in which he can experience the sense of his completed task, the sense of living in a universe where his values have been successfully achieved. It is like a moment of rest, a moment to gain fuel to move farther. Art gives him that fuel; the pleasure of contemplating the objectified reality of one’s own sense of life is the pleasure of feeling what it would be like to live in one’s ideal world."

    What kind of man wants to see a film or a work of art where the plot revolves around a futile quest for perfection undertaken by a crazy person? Who wants to see a film that connects perfectionism to insanity, and compromise to mental health?
  9. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Easy Truth in My senses fool me - How could the senses be self-evident?   
    The entire problem with your argument is considering the actual, the concrete to be an "appearance" while considering your abstractions to be "actual" reality (and somehow invalidates the former or relegates them into an "appearance"). This is easily resolved since abstraction, as such, do not exist.
  10. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Uummon Beeng in Veganism under Objectivism   
    And need is a sanction to violate others' rights?
  11. Like
    human_murda reacted to Tenderlysharp in Why follow reason?   
    "You don’t think through another’s brain and you don’t work through another’s hands. When you suspend your faculty of independent judgment, you suspend consciousness. To stop consciousness is to stop life. Second-handers have no sense of reality. Their reality is not within them, but somewhere in that space which divides one human body from another. "-Ayn Rand, For The New Intellectual
    A living person is to parrot someone who has died... for a philosophy of life?  I don't believe any living Objectivist claims to be Ayn Rand.  Only you can direct the action you take to quote her.  If it were all quotes it would be like she was just here talking to herself... 
  12. Haha
    human_murda got a reaction from StrictlyLogical in Socially competitive subtleties   
    I heard that when a lion takes over a pride, it kills the cubs of the previous leader. You could try it sometime. Very Alpha 👌. The behaviour of tribals and animals are, of course, quite exemplary.
  13. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Tenderlysharp in Race Realism   
    @Sameak I'm from South India. What do you think my race is? What race are Dravidians/Malayalis? I'm curious to know.
  14. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from DonAthos in Universals   
    If your question is how anyone can say that an entity/attribute belongs to a specific category if the criteria for belonging doesn't exist "out there", I'd say your question is wrong. The implicit assumption in your question is that similarity doesn't exist "out there" but only in your perception (and hence if classification is on the basis of similarity, not something identical which exists in objects, that is meaningless). This is wrong. Similarity has both a metaphysical and epistemological meaning. If you ask what makes things similar, in reality, that has a scientific meaning that is enough to justify your ability to state facts about them.
    For example, consider the universal attribute of length. What criteria exists "out there" that qualifies objects with different lengths to be said to possess the same attribute (length)? The capacity to be measured against a metre scale (or its equivalent). What makes objects possess the universal, length? The capacity to be measured against a metre scale (or its equivalent). This is what makes the objects similar. Similarity is a metaphysical fact. However, at the end of the day, the identities of these objects are only similar, not necessarily identical. You can say that objects are similar (as a metaphysical fact) without them possessing a single identical characteristic.
    In the realm of identifying colors of an object, the yardstick that you use is your perception. An object is measured by your perception and you check whether the colours are similar in the scale of your perception. Just because the yardstick that you use is your perception does not make it primarily epistemological (as you seem to think). It is as valid as a metre scale and just as scientific and metaphysical.
    This is the metaphysical validity of similarity: the capacity to be measured against a standard. It doesn't matter if the yardstick is a metre scale or your perception. Your perception exists "out there" as much as a metre scale and isn't any less valid as a yardstick for linear measurements (and surely not just epistemological). The key is to reduce an attribute so that you can speak of it in degrees (linear measurements). The yardsticks may not be mixed. There is no dichotomy between the validity of yardsticks of perception and the ones used for scientific measurements (the latter maybe more precise).
    The capacity to be measured against a standard is an invariant fact. It is the metaphysical fact used to judge similarity. Color perception and metre scales are two different standards that may be used. Your criticism that one cannot state facts about universals if they do not exist out there qua universals is invalid.
    There are so many other considerations about the validity of Universals as Rand defined it, but would take too long to post. The only important bits are: if identical abstract universals did exist out there, that makes the problem of universals trivial. In my opinion, a good statement of the problem of universals is: "if things in reality aren't identical, how can they be considered to belong to the same category" (for eg, people may be considered to belong to the same race even if they do not possess a single identical gene that other races do not have). Also it is an absurd claim to suggest that things in reality are pre-classified for the sake of humans (which is what universals existing inside objects would amount to). Humans can classify objects without that classification already existing out there in nature. The classification would still be valid and still capture a metaphysical fact about the object.
    Universals qua universals don't exist. Universals exist as instances (but not inside objects). Similarity is a metaphysical fact (which is just as valid metaphysically (as a fact "out there" about the object) even if you simply use perception).
  15. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Grames in The Royal Family of Nominalism   
    I completely agree with this. They usually provide two (mutually contradictory) justifications for why nobody can contradict them:
    1)  From evolutionary psychology: the idea that this "feeling" (actually: identification) of who they are is obtained through genes or some means other than perception. Such inheritance can be random, is not derived from reality and may eventually be discovered to be in conflict with physical reality. They may claim that they are physically a man but their brain comes with the identification that they are a woman. Since the identification is obtained through means other than perception and "cannot be helped", they claim that these identifications (of themselves as male or female) are as valid as a person whose genetic consciousness is "cis" (people who get a transmitted consciousness which identifies their biological sex correctly but don't have a choice in their identification either, since that part of the consciousness [which identifies their own biological sex] is transmitted genetically and is not derived from perception).
    2) The idea that gender has nothing to do with biological sex and is a social convention. Under this paradigm, gender is a man-made concept. Hence, it is arbitrary. Hence, they're all equally valid. The concepts are considered to be derived from reality but in a loose sense: through social agreement. What is considered is "normal" or correct is also part of this agreement and has no basis in reality and must be fought.
    The latter argument can also be applied to all concepts: all concepts are man-made (true) and hence, arbitrary (false) but are given meaning and made "real" by society (false).
    Both justifications cut off consciousness (identification) from reality (one says identifications are hereditary; other says they are arbitrary.) and they contradict each other. There are still more (less important) arguments.
     
    Definitions: sex and gender are two different concepts but your sex determines your gender. Some heuristic definitions can be given:
     
    sex: biological sex of all animals
    gender: biological sex of humans
     
    male sex: male & animal
    female sex: female & animal
    male gender = male & human
    female gender = female & human
     
    man = male & human & 18+
    boy = male & human & 18-
    woman = female & human & 18+
    girl = female & human & 18-
     
    For example, a cow is female but not a woman. A bull is male but not a man. This is the only distinction between sex and gender. Humans can be referred to by their sex as well as gender. Your biological sex and the fact that you are human (and hence your gender) are determined by your physiology and is not an arbitrary choice open to debate.
    Note: saying something like "that female offered me candy" is a bit dehumanizing so the latter is more preferred [gender contains the implication that you are human]. But both are correct. This doesn't mean that gender has any additional special non-physiological attributes. Gender is preferred over sex (when referring to people) for the same reason that "those gay men are playing in the field" is preferred over "those gays are playing in the field". The only thing gender adds to sex (and "gay men" adds to "gays") is personhood (the fact that you are human). The addition (of personhood) makes sure that you are not reduced to your biological sex or sexual orientation while somebody else is referring to your biological sex or sexual orientation. It is a respectful way of addressing people (but it is not a title or indication of social status as some "constructionists" would want you to believe). There is no mystical undefinable element. Gender is a respectful way of referring to a person's biological sex by including the fact that they are human. The same thing happens with "gay men" or "gay person" as opposed to just "gays". Both sex and gender refer to biological sex but for different classes of species. Sometimes the word "man" refers to all humans emphasizing the personhood and getting rid of the biological sex. This is more evidence that what the words man/woman add to the table is the concept of being human, not some BS social convention.
    Also, English isn't my first language, but this is how I understand these words (male, female, man, boy, woman, girl). It seems extremely simple to me. But pretty much all native speakers seem to have some problems with this. I don't understand what their objections are to this (I have heard some say that since gender roles are made-up and different throughout the world [eg: marumakkathayam in Kerala], the concept of gender is false. That's faulty logic. Gender and gender roles are two separate concepts. The validity of gender roles has no implications for the validity of the concept of gender). To summarize: gender is a different concept from sex (which is broader) but if you are human, your sex determines your gender.
  16. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from splitprimary in The Royal Family of Nominalism   
    Neither. Such statements are normative. Gender and sex identify metaphysical characteristics but ideas like "a rational woman cannot want to be President" are different.
    For example, it is incorrect to say that "human beings are selfish". It would be correct to say that "humans should be selfish". In a similar way, it is incorrect to say that "girls play with dolls". It would be correct to say that "girls should play with dolls".
    I'm not sure what word I would use to denote such normative characteristics. Perhaps, "feminine" and "masculine" would be good terms. In popular usage, "feminine" may denote some characteristic that is "becoming of a woman" (woman qua woman). It is normative. For reference, Cambridge Dictionary defines "feminine" as "having characteristics that are traditionally thought to be typical of or suitable for a woman". The "suitable for a woman" part is normative. Of course, other dictionaries define things differently, stressing qualities traditionally associated with women, but that definition may be derivative (derived from the traditional standards of society).
    These 2 words come the closest. I think this is also the way AR used the words 'feminine' and 'masculine'. In this sense, these two words do not identify characteristics that humans universally possess. They refer to virtues (in the same way that "selfishness" refers to a virtue everyone need not possess). They refer to characteristics that one must possess. Femininity and masculinity are treated as virtues in popular usage (validating their usage as normative concepts. By comparison, gender isn't treated as a virtue. It is a metaphysical concept). However, the dictionary definitions aren't very good.
     
    So new definitions: male = male animal; female = female animal; man = male human; woman = female human (of a certain age); feminine = characteristics that are becoming of a woman; masculine = characteristics that are becoming of a man.
    Male/female are sexes. Man/woman are genders. Feminine/masculine are virtues. Sometimes, the term "manliness" is also used to denote the corresponding virtue. Virtues aren't arbitrary.
    (Again, disclaimer: English isn't my first language. I don't even know what a subjunctive is. I can only talk about the simple, obvious meanings of these terms)
  17. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from intrinsicist in The Royal Family of Nominalism   
    I completely agree with this. They usually provide two (mutually contradictory) justifications for why nobody can contradict them:
    1)  From evolutionary psychology: the idea that this "feeling" (actually: identification) of who they are is obtained through genes or some means other than perception. Such inheritance can be random, is not derived from reality and may eventually be discovered to be in conflict with physical reality. They may claim that they are physically a man but their brain comes with the identification that they are a woman. Since the identification is obtained through means other than perception and "cannot be helped", they claim that these identifications (of themselves as male or female) are as valid as a person whose genetic consciousness is "cis" (people who get a transmitted consciousness which identifies their biological sex correctly but don't have a choice in their identification either, since that part of the consciousness [which identifies their own biological sex] is transmitted genetically and is not derived from perception).
    2) The idea that gender has nothing to do with biological sex and is a social convention. Under this paradigm, gender is a man-made concept. Hence, it is arbitrary. Hence, they're all equally valid. The concepts are considered to be derived from reality but in a loose sense: through social agreement. What is considered is "normal" or correct is also part of this agreement and has no basis in reality and must be fought.
    The latter argument can also be applied to all concepts: all concepts are man-made (true) and hence, arbitrary (false) but are given meaning and made "real" by society (false).
    Both justifications cut off consciousness (identification) from reality (one says identifications are hereditary; other says they are arbitrary.) and they contradict each other. There are still more (less important) arguments.
     
    Definitions: sex and gender are two different concepts but your sex determines your gender. Some heuristic definitions can be given:
     
    sex: biological sex of all animals
    gender: biological sex of humans
     
    male sex: male & animal
    female sex: female & animal
    male gender = male & human
    female gender = female & human
     
    man = male & human & 18+
    boy = male & human & 18-
    woman = female & human & 18+
    girl = female & human & 18-
     
    For example, a cow is female but not a woman. A bull is male but not a man. This is the only distinction between sex and gender. Humans can be referred to by their sex as well as gender. Your biological sex and the fact that you are human (and hence your gender) are determined by your physiology and is not an arbitrary choice open to debate.
    Note: saying something like "that female offered me candy" is a bit dehumanizing so the latter is more preferred [gender contains the implication that you are human]. But both are correct. This doesn't mean that gender has any additional special non-physiological attributes. Gender is preferred over sex (when referring to people) for the same reason that "those gay men are playing in the field" is preferred over "those gays are playing in the field". The only thing gender adds to sex (and "gay men" adds to "gays") is personhood (the fact that you are human). The addition (of personhood) makes sure that you are not reduced to your biological sex or sexual orientation while somebody else is referring to your biological sex or sexual orientation. It is a respectful way of addressing people (but it is not a title or indication of social status as some "constructionists" would want you to believe). There is no mystical undefinable element. Gender is a respectful way of referring to a person's biological sex by including the fact that they are human. The same thing happens with "gay men" or "gay person" as opposed to just "gays". Both sex and gender refer to biological sex but for different classes of species. Sometimes the word "man" refers to all humans emphasizing the personhood and getting rid of the biological sex. This is more evidence that what the words man/woman add to the table is the concept of being human, not some BS social convention.
    Also, English isn't my first language, but this is how I understand these words (male, female, man, boy, woman, girl). It seems extremely simple to me. But pretty much all native speakers seem to have some problems with this. I don't understand what their objections are to this (I have heard some say that since gender roles are made-up and different throughout the world [eg: marumakkathayam in Kerala], the concept of gender is false. That's faulty logic. Gender and gender roles are two separate concepts. The validity of gender roles has no implications for the validity of the concept of gender). To summarize: gender is a different concept from sex (which is broader) but if you are human, your sex determines your gender.
  18. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from DonAthos in The Royal Family of Nominalism   
    I was referring to syntax.
  19. Like
    human_murda reacted to MisterSwig in The Royal Family of Nominalism   
    The first step toward full-blown physical bondage, is mental bondage. And the first step in mental bondage, is accepting that someone else is inherently, mystically superior to you in some way.
    "Non-binary" people claim to have knowledge unavailable to "binary" thinkers. They know of a third "gender." Their "gender." And their "gender" class possesses this special knowledge via feelings. They simply feel (or somehow know) it in their souls. They divine it from somewhere. They can't tell you where. It just comes to them. It's been there since childhood. They don't know why. But it's a fact.
    If you don't feel this fact, this revealed truth, then you are spiritually inferior and should defer to their experience, their feelings, their knowledge, their belief system. You should rewrite your biology books, alter your language, and update your legal system, all in accordance with the feelings and demands of the superior class of "non-binary" diviners of essential truth.
    That is mental slavery. It is you surrendering your mind to someone else's feelings. It's only a matter of time before you surrender your body too.
  20. Thanks
    human_murda got a reaction from MisterSwig in How Nazis Recruit Normie Conservatives For Meme Wars   
    The problem is that these particular men exist within these groups. So your arguments do apply to particular men. You're just not identifying them.
     
    There is no such explicit dichotomy. Every statement about the group is derived from individuals and every statement about an individual implies something about a group. A group doesn't have a higher, separate existence. You wouldn't be able to say that '99% of the people in this group are colour-blind, but I'm saying nothing about individual men'; by that statement, you would be saying something about individual men, but you're leaving them unidentified (i.e., you don't know which particular men fall under the 1% and which particular men fall under 99%. However, just because you don't know who they specifically are doesn't mean that you're not referring to them. You're still referring to particular, unidentified men). If you say "capitalists are evil", you're not talking about any particular men (say Amit or Dhruv). But these particular men exist. Statistics isn't exempt from this.
     
    You are claiming that you would never judge any particular individual you encounter in real life because you don't know which part of the curve they fall on. But you're still making an important claim: that a lot of specific, particular, unidentified men have a tendency to have a low IQ, because of their race.
    'Specific' and 'unidentified' aren't two mutually exclusive categories. They are related by the theory of measurement omission (that is the way statistics works too, since they are an abstraction):
    "Bear firmly in mind that the term “measurements omitted” does not mean, in this context, that measurements are regarded as non-existent; it means that measurements exist, but are not specified. That measurements must exist is an essential part of the process. The principle is: the relevant measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity".
    In summary: you are referring to particular individual men. You are just not identifying who these particular individuals are. Just because you don't know them personally or are not identifying them individually doesn't mean you're not making claims about particular, individual (unidentified) men. Without reference to any particular men, what you would have is a floating abstraction. Statistics isn't a floating abstraction.
     
    Also, at times, your "arguments" boil down to this: since we know that humans differ in their inessential characteristics (some have dyslexia; others don't), isn't it possible that humans differ in their essential characteristics (capacity of reason) as well? You are evading what a difference in such an essential characteristic would imply: they are not human. You're not saying that some humans differ in their essential characteristics by degree. You're making a categorical distinction ("unable to understand capitalism"). This is like saying that: we know chairs differ in their inessential characteristics (differences in color for example); isn't it possible that they differ in their essential characteristics as well (isn't it possible that some of them aren't made to be sat on)? This is nonsensical.
     
    Regarding success, you are also ascribing innate guilt to some groups of people: because your ancestors haven't achieved something in the past, you're never going to achieve something in the future. This isn't how humans work. Humans don't necessarily inherit the concrete methods of functioning of their ancestors.
  21. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in My senses fool me - How could the senses be self-evident?   
    No. It is a new, unique sensation; but the same percept. Perceptions are retained. It doesn't need to be a concept.
    You seem to have to blurred the distinction between percepts and concepts. It is possible to have a percept for a chair. It is also possible to have a concept for a chair. This doesn't mean that percepts are a form of concepts. Percepts aren't first level abstractions.
  22. Thanks
    human_murda got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in My senses fool me - How could the senses be self-evident?   
    That one sentence isn't the entirety of my argument. It is an opening statement.
     
    There is no such distinction as an "actual motion" and an "appearance of motion". All motion is relative (from relativity, there's no such thing as an "absolute" motion). The distinction of causality/force is irrelevant. We're talking about motion.
     
    And this "vacuous" notion of "I see the Sun moving" is the conceptual statement of what you perceive (this is perception by the way, not sensation). The question of what revolves around what is at an entirely different level.
     
    Exactly. The physical phenomena which produce perception is real too. There is no such thing as perception without the apparatus of perception. Some phenomena in the eye produced that illusion. To deny that would be to claim that you are blind because you have eyes. You need some means of perception before you can perceive something. You cannot perceive something "directly". That is not perception. The "illusion" is physically real (although fake). It exists.
     
    Yes
     
    You are here talking about the relation between what exists (what you call "appearances") and what you know (what you call "actual reality"). Sensations are of something which exists (whatever it is: hallucinations, simulations, etc) and you are conscious of it. Existence and consciousness are implicit in sensations. Hallucinations are real: as hallucinations. Simulations are real: as simulations. Simulations cannot be produced without the apparatus that produces it. You know that something exists. The light that hits the retina in a Virtual Reality or impulse that travels through the nervous system and finally enters the brain: some physical phenomena exists. Otherwise, you can't sense it. This is the self-evident validity of the senses.
    As for the question of what something actually is, whether it is an illusion or if it is fake, etc: that is the issue of proof. It is fully at the conceptual level. This has nothing to do with the validity of the senses (something exists and you know it).
  23. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from splitprimary in Is Dignity a Right?   
    Changing the conditions of your work in a way that is different from your contract could be construed as an initiation of force/fraud (and a contract is definitely needed in situations like these).

    And there would be legal issues associated with holding you ransom. You might say that the corporation didn't force you to stay there. But the issue of force is determined by the nature of reality. If somebody locked you in a room only they can open, you would essentially be held as a prisoner. By the nature of reality (i.e., by the constraints placed by the fact that you are physically unable to leave), the situation is very similar and legal issues can be involved.

    Also another thing: if this is the mentality, I doubt they would be the first to do anything in space. So situation is very unlikely as well.
  24. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from Plasmatic in Is Dignity a Right?   
    Changing the conditions of your work in a way that is different from your contract could be construed as an initiation of force/fraud (and a contract is definitely needed in situations like these).

    And there would be legal issues associated with holding you ransom. You might say that the corporation didn't force you to stay there. But the issue of force is determined by the nature of reality. If somebody locked you in a room only they can open, you would essentially be held as a prisoner. By the nature of reality (i.e., by the constraints placed by the fact that you are physically unable to leave), the situation is very similar and legal issues can be involved.

    Also another thing: if this is the mentality, I doubt they would be the first to do anything in space. So situation is very unlikely as well.
  25. Like
    human_murda got a reaction from StrictlyLogical in Is Dignity a Right?   
    Changing the conditions of your work in a way that is different from your contract could be construed as an initiation of force/fraud (and a contract is definitely needed in situations like these).

    And there would be legal issues associated with holding you ransom. You might say that the corporation didn't force you to stay there. But the issue of force is determined by the nature of reality. If somebody locked you in a room only they can open, you would essentially be held as a prisoner. By the nature of reality (i.e., by the constraints placed by the fact that you are physically unable to leave), the situation is very similar and legal issues can be involved.

    Also another thing: if this is the mentality, I doubt they would be the first to do anything in space. So situation is very unlikely as well.
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