rowsdower

Diddy and Dixie live on DK Island and eat bananas by peeling them. At first, the island has no patents and they both independently peel and eat their bananas. One day, Cranky sets up himself as the government and declares that he will let islanders patent their ideas. He warns the islanders that if they violate a patent, they will spend a year in a barrel. Scared of this prospect, Diddy and Dixie both rush to patent their method of eating bananas (by peeling them first). Scenario 1: Diddy arrives at the patent office first and gains the sole right to peel bananas. Dixie, unable to peel her bananas, chokes do death on a peel. Scenario 2: Diddy slips on one of the island's many banana peels and is delayed. Dixie patents peeling bananas. Diddy chokes to death. Assuming that IP is based on rights, how does Diddy's lateness remove his right to peel bananas? How does Diddy's earliness remove Dixie's rights? Why are their rights a zero-sum game at all?

In deduction, that is known as a "for-all" statement. You could say, "For all x in [0, 1] ..." or "For all x such that 0 <= x <= 1 ..."

When I say "random", I mean "uniformly random" such that the probability is a constant within the range you are choosing from. Now I am about to spawn an integer 1-10 from my volitional consciousness. It's gonna be 3. Now that I've told you this, it's not random; it has a higher chance of being 3 than being 7. (Do you trust me more than 10%?) Oh, and: "3".

If you already have a number written down, it is not random to you. But if I know that you are about to give me a number in the range 0-1 and I have no way of knowing anything about it except for that (harder than it sounds), then it is random to me. We can extend this to the "axiom of choice" by taking this set, the reals 0-1, and putting two of it into a set. Then we have our set of sets, { 0-1, 0-1 }, and can produce one element of each; for example, (0.5, 0.4). That would be a random pair of reals 0-1. Now say we want a function whose domain is 3 and 7. Let the pair's first member be f(3) and the second be f(7). That would be a randomly chosen function. Note that every time we chose something randomly we do so from some set; in this case, the set of functions whose domain is { 3, 7 } and whose range is 0-1.

If you get that, you know what I mean by 'random'. No need to turn it into a debate.

A uniform random selection of a set S of size N has an equal chance, 1/N, of choosing any element. If the set is permutations of 1-3, then [1,2,3] is just as likely as [2,3,1].

Any set of ordered pairs can represent a function (as long as there are no duplicated xi), but you are missing a few parameters. What are xi and yi chosen from? How many pairs are there? Do you really want to be randomly generating functions with "holes" in them where no xi was generated? One example of random generation of functions is noise in digital audio. The domain is a set of times, and the range is -amplitude to amplitude. No sequence is inherently random. But a perfect 1-10 can be just as random in origin as [1,7,6,3...] even if it doesn't seem as "random".

What you want is, a random member of the set of all functions (from some domain to some range). It maps each value in the domain to a random value in the range. Say the domain and range are both { 0, 1 }. Then the set of functions is: 0 -> 0, 1 -> 0 0 -> 0, 1 -> 1 0 -> 1, 1 -> 0 0 -> 1, 1 -> 1 A random function in that context is a random one of those four. As Nicky pointed out, you can't say that randomness is within a function. But you can randomly choose your function, which is then deterministic.

By non-conscious, do you mean: 1) It is not consciousness, e.g. a rock 2) I am not directly conscious of it, e.g. my breathing (before writing this!) 3) I am never directly conscious of it, e.g. my fingernails growing 4) A form of consciousness that I am not (reflectively) conscious of, e.g. this sentence (before I proof-read it) 5) A form of consciousness that I am never (reflectively) conscious of, e.g. the method of automatic perception

The paper has bad metaphysics. It describes the 'simulation' of a game, and hints at implication for the simulation of real things; these are two very different types of simulation! I disagree with point 4.6 strongly, but that may be a matter for another thread. And what about the paper's objections to the definition? For example, if I have a computer running a simulation of the GoL, I could have it produce a deductive proof that its simulation is correct at the same time (at a huge cost in speed).

To be technical too, a state of consciousness is a condition of the faculty which is aware of things. You are using the phrase "conscious state" to refer to consciousness of consciousness, AKA reflection.

Binswanger seems to be talking about sensations as in, I enjoy the sensation of a cool drink (as opposed to the perception of a cool drink, which would simply be a matter of fact). You're using the word differently. There may be no actual disagreement here.

What is the difference between simulation and "a priori" analysis? Is a simulation not just an analysis that takes many, many steps?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formation_and_evolution_of_the_Solar_System. Either something was somehow alive throughout the whole process, or, what I think is more reasonable, life started some time after the formation of Earth.

I think there could be value to a hypothetical if it is more simple than reality could ever possibly be. Such as a physicist considering when two perfectly rigid, perfectly elastic spheres collide in outer space.

The latter is idealism and hardly comes from the perspective of Objectivist epistemology. As you are merely trying to argue, and are not arguing for anything or from a perspective you actually believe, there's no point continuing.

Here are 3 principles I expected agreement with around here: 1. Your idea of something is not the thing itself. 2. A concept is not its definition. (So, just that concepts are mental integrations, does not mean that every mental state that might be described as an integration is a concept.) 3. A concept integrates things external to itself. You appear to actually be arguing for words being completely identical to concepts. Is this correct? If so, this is a different metaphysical position as well as an epistemological one, because I see words as "out there" and concepts as "in here".

Are you arguing that a word must be a concept because I can mentally integrate its components? I can mentally integrate the components of a pizza (crust, sauce, cheese), but a pizza is not a concept!

By letting [A] take the place of an arbitrary concept, and making claims about it, you do seem to be making claims about all concepts. Now I'm going to ignore C and D and temporarily accept what I believe to be a simplified version of your claims: That for any arbitrary concept [A]: 1) There is definitely one word denoting [A]. 2) [A] does not exist if does not exist, or if doesn't denote [A]. Since [A] exists, this is logically just a more complicated way of saying that exists and denotes [A], AKA 1). 3) [A] is called . This is a simpler way of saying 1). So we really only have one statement: Every [A] has an associated . Or, there is a 1:1 mapping from [A] to . But we don't know if this mapping is onto. Okay, now I have an arbitrary word [W]. Can I make any claims about it? Not on the basis of the above. P.S. Concept: A mental integration of existents. Word: A lexeme; You may also consider putting punctuation marks in this category depending on whether you agree with previous posters.

Okay, this is not a straw-man. But what do you think about the rest of this thread? I have addressed the argument from your having a concept of a word.

Knowing something about all concepts does not entail knowing something about all words. That all As are better off associated with a B does not mean that all Bs are As. For example, this is illogical: "Two people in love are unified by a ring" -> "This is the purpose performed by a ring" -> "A ring is a marriage".

A "right" to food, water, education, health-care, is a duty on someone else. Having to "earn" one's right to freedom is also a duty.

"Words are concepts" is a straw-man position. Rand also corrected herself about saying a concept is its referents. Try using more specific terms such as "represents" or "is described by".

I have to be very careful with this. The goal of the logic language is to apply boolean operators to variables, aka concepts to referents. You recognize some distinction, in this simplified language, of the difference between a referent to which concepts are applied, the concepts themselves, and the syntax of expressing the application of concepts to referents. You recognize the meaning of the sentence to be something distinct from the list of symbols used to express it. You recognize that the idea conveyed is separate from your idea of the method of conveying it. Is this all correct?

So which one do you pick?