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CriticalThinker2000

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Everything posted by CriticalThinker2000

  1. I thought Ayn Rand appointed him as such. Is that not true? Also, I second Louie on the bold words. It makes my eyes jump around so much I just gave up.
  2. What in Objectivism says that it's wrong to want to know and understand the ideas and opinions of others?
  3. When I say Germany attacked Poland does that imply that every German citizen attacked every Polish citizen?
  4. Doesn't the positivist theory of meaning arise out of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy? I look forward to your thread.
  5. I think you've misunderstood the context of that famous phrase. In no way does it imply that defending yourself makes you as bad as the person who threatens you. It's just a short pithy way to explain the idea that physical coercion, to the degree that it is used against you, limits your ability to think rationally and manifest your thoughts in action. In other words, it limits your ability to act morally.
  6. I see now that this is logical positivism. Very perceptive of New Buddha to spot this a while ago. From the Wikipedia entry on logical positivism: "Theoretical laws would be reduced to empirical laws, while theoretical terms would garner meaning from observational terms via correspondence rules." Here is what Rand said about logical positivism: "Knowledge, they said, consists, not of facts, but of words, words unrelated to objects, words of an arbitrary social convention, as an irreducible primary; thus knowledge is merely a matter of manipulating language." Now from George's chapter on definition of terms: "The effect may be the same as an increase of capital. However, the increase in production is due to the increased power of labor, not capital. Increased velocity may give the impact of a cannon ball the same effect as increased weight. Nevertheless, weight is one thing and velocity another. Therefore, capital must exclude everything that may be included as land or labor. This leaves only things that are neither land nor labor. These things have resulted from the union of the two original factors of production. In other words, nothing can be capital that is not wealth. Many of the ambiguities about capital derive from ambiguities in the use of the inclusive term wealth. In common use, wealth means anything having an exchange value. When used as an economic term, however, it must be limited to a much more definite meaning. If we take into account the concept of collective or general wealth, we see that many things we commonly call wealth are not so at all. Instead, they represent the power to obtain wealth in transactions between individuals (or groups). That is, they have an exchange value. However, their increase or decrease does not affect the sum of wealth in the community. Therefore, they are not truly wealth. Some examples are stocks, bonds, mortgages, promissory notes, or other certificates for transferring wealth. Neither can slaves be considered wealth. Their economic value merely represents the power of one class to appropriate the earnings of another. Lands or other natural opportunities obtain exchange value only from consent to an exclusive right to use them. This merely represents the power given to landowners to demand a share of the wealth produced by those who use them. Increase in the amount of bonds, mortgages, or notes cannot increase the wealth of the community, since that community includes those who pay as well as those who receive. Slavery does not increase the wealth of a people, for what the masters gain the enslaved lose. Rising land values do not increase the common wealth, as whatever landowners gain by higher prices, tenants or purchasers lose in paying them." Finally we get to the following exchange in this thread: Or in other words, you can't separate the land from the dirt in reality. And I would add that it does not make any conceptual sense to do so. To which Jon responds, 'but look at my definitions.'
  7. Dogs and viruses are fundamentally different things, yet the differences you have offered between a human and a computer are not fundamental with respect to the type of causality at play, which is what we're discussing. When I say types of causality, I do not mean different laws of causality, of which there is only one: entities act in accordance with their identities. Rather, I am referring to a difference between inanimate entities, which can act in one way and one way only given the context they are in, and entities with volitional consciousness, which can choose between two fundamental options (focus or unfocus) in a broad range of contexts. To equivocate the two types is to equivocate volitional consciousness entities with inanimate unconsciousness entities. This is a very different understanding of 'metaphysically possible' than I and Ayn Rand have. Maybe you disagree with my interpretation of Rand but I think a re-reading of The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made would change your mind. I did not avoid answering it and the fact that you posed the above question, "What would lead you to in reality pick anything else than what you did the first time?", indicates to me that you still don't understand my position, and the position that I think Rand held. I choose whether to focus or not, and based upon this fundamental choice there are factors which cause me to pick certain things. Ultimately, it is me- the human entity- that leads me to pick or not to pick again what I did the first time. That is, my choice is a type of causation which arises by the identity of my nature. That you think my fundamental choice must be necessitated ('lead me to pick', as you state) by antecedent factors, as implied in your question and belief that I'm evading, proves to me that you are a determinist, despite your explicit claims to the contrary. In any event, I don't see this discussion really going anywhere. I did learn a lot by thinking my ideas through and discussing this with you and Harrison, but we might just have to agree to disagree on this topic.
  8. Did you make this thread just to discuss this again?
  9. Am I correct in understanding that you don't see there being any difference between a human and a computer, besides the complexity of mechanical processes and that man's thinking 'feels like' something? You also said: Does 'psychological process' essentially mean, it occurs in the brain? So far, the only differences I can see you drawing between man is a computer are that: man's mechanical processes are more complex than the computers we have, his mechanical processes occur in the brain, and that his processes are active (meaning it feels like something). If those are the only differences, and there is not an essential difference, then what you're saying is that man's choices are just as determined as a computer's selections. They could not happen any other way. The man-made vs. the metaphysical distinction is meaningless. What would lead me to make a different decision is whether I chose to make a different decision. My choice is the cause. As Ayn Rand said, "Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation." Yes, I get that you are ascribing a mechanistic form of causality to choice. You're saying (and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think this has gone on long enough that I'm pretty sure I'm not misinterpreting) that if I make a choice, the fundamental choice I make (whether to focus or not) must be necessarily determined by external factors. That is the essence of determinism. One other point. You keep using the phrase 'metaphysically possible', and I think we're using it in two very different senses, just as we used the word choice in two different senses. I also think that the way Rand uses the term agrees with how I'm using it but not how you're using it. In your above example, the computer is programmed to select the higher of two integers. It cannot, by the nature of its programming, select the lower integer. Now suppose it's presented with A=5 and B=2. Are you saying that it's metaphysically possible for it to return B as the answer? In my understanding of 'metaphysically possible', it is NOT metaphysically possible, as it would imply a contradiction in its nature, being a non-volitional, mechanistically determined entity.
  10. OK, so if humans are not complex computers because they need volition, I still don't know what you mean by volition. What is the difference between a human and a computer? Your thought experiment was: Yes, I probably would make the same decision. But the key is, I could choose to do otherwise. That's what it means to make a choice- neither option HAS to be selected.
  11. The fact that an entity containing the faculty of volitional consciousness can act in two different ways (focus or unfocus), under the same circumstances, is not metaphysical indeterminacy. It's range of actions is still delimited. Man must choose. Consciousness is still finite. It still maintains identity. I can only chalk this up to a misunderstanding of causality or a misunderstanding of identity. I am not saying that this is behaviorism. I'm saying that it is determinism- the application of the mechanistic causality that pertains to unconscious, non-volitional entities to volitional consciousness. According to the determinism being argued for here, there is no difference between the metaphysical and the man-made. When Rand draws the distinction, she draws it to show that that which is man-made did not have to be so. But according to the idea that man is mechanistically determined to make the choices that he does, there is no distinction. So I ask you and Louie the question, what is the point of drawing that distinction if free will doesn't exist?
  12. So if the computer is making a choice, then you've equated man with a computer. You have stripped the word choice of all meaning. When a complex series of switches are flipped the switches didn't 'choose' to flip anymore than a rock 'chooses' to fall to the ground when I drop it. The only difference I can see you drawing is one of complexity. Computers supposedly make 'choices' and humans are supposedly complex computers. How is this not determinism? Despite discussing this for a while, it is still completely unclear to me why an entity acting as a cause is a denial of the law of identity. It's really not difficult to figure out what entities are capable of making a choice- entities with volitional consciousness. It's not like I'm sitting here wondering whether my pizza is going to start floating into the air.
  13. I can definitely say that we're not going to be able to progress past this point because we have very different understandings of what 'choice' is. The problem is, as DonAthos pointed out, you're using the word choice where it is not applicable. The computer is not making a choice. It is not making a selection between two possible alternatives. Only one alternative for the computer is possible. A>B is the ONLY possible solution for the computer to return. Dr. Peikoff defines volitional: "“Volitional” means selected from two or more alternatives that were possible under the circumstances, the difference being made by the individual’s decision, which could have been otherwise." Could the computer's solution to your proposed example have been otherwise? No, it could not have been. From Galt's speech: "A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior." The computer in your example, being mechanistically determined, DOES have an automatic course of behavior. It's simply wrong to say that the computer has a choice. The computer's computation is merely the flipping of switches, each of which can act in one way and one way only- no other way is possible. Computers are not volitional beings. This keeps being asserted and I see no valid evidence being given. Why does identity imply that only one action will happen in a given context? I repeat, identity requires that an entity be finite and delimited, not that it must act in one and only one way under the same circumstances. Man, having the ability to choose (ie. able to make a selection that, under the same circumstances, could have happened in another way), can focus his mind or let his mind drift. His identity requires that he choose, but it does not necessitate the choice he makes. Choosing, therefore, is not an exception to causality. It is an expression of causality in that it is an expression of man's identity. Rand says: "Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation." You keep describing choice as probabilistic, but what does that mean? It means only that you cannot know in advance how man will choose. It does not mean that his identity is probabilistic- his identity is determined- he MUST choose. If an entity's identity were probabilistic then it would be in violation of the law of identity. It simply wouldn't have an identity. Yet you're conflating an entity's identity with the specific action it takes. Identity determines only what actions are possible for an entity to take, not what singular action it will take. The part where you said that computers following flow charts are making choices.
  14. Have you read the thread? The objectivist formulation of causality is different than the way causality is generally formulated. Choice is not an exception to causality. Edit: DW, he was making fun of determinism, I think.
  15. Sure. Land, like everything, does not have intrinsic value. It exists as a potential until it is actualized. Let's be very clear on this, are you asserting that land in the United States is not a value?
  16. OK... that's the law of excluded middle. That's true but I don't see how it justifies the two alternatives you presented, which were, either an entity acts in one way and one way only under a given set of circumstances, or it acts in ANY way under a given set of circumstances. The third alternative, that an entity's potential actions under a given set of circumstances are greater than 1 but still finite, is not ruled out by LEM. Since an entity falling under the third alternative would be 'not determined', LEM actually excludes the second option, that an entity can act in any way, which is a rejection of identity anyway.
  17. What do 'random, indeterminate, and unknowable' mean in this context? With respect to 'random', I think you're taking that concept out of context. I've been thinking a lot about probability lately, and with respect to volition, Rand had the following to say (with which I agree): "Because man has free will, no human choice—and no phenomenon which is a product of human choice—is metaphysically necessary. In regard to any man-made fact, it is valid to claim that man has chosen thus, but it was not inherent in the nature of existence for him to have done so: he could have chosen otherwise. Choice, however, is not chance. Volition is not an exception to the Law of Causality; it is a type of causation." What does unknowable mean here? To know something is to know it's identity. So long as an entity has identity, it is knowable. That doesn't mean you will know how the entity will act in a given circumstance (will man choose to focus or not?), but the entity's identity is still knowable. Well wouldn't you just apply the knowledge you have, just like every other piece of knowledge? In other words, if the entity does not have a faculty of consciousness, deterministic causality applies. It's not a mystery which entities are alive, let alone conscious. In any event, I look forward to your post.
  18. The aluminum was not a wage. A wage is something you're paid by another person in a trade for your labor. You're (are you the OP?) drawing a distinction where there isn't one. The land becomes a produced value when you start to extract the aluminum. I pressed OP on this point earlier. Make sure to note that OP is using 'land' to refer to an untouched strip of the earth. He responded: He compares the potential value, land, with the produced value, glass, and claims that there's a difference between the two. Of course there is. The correct comparison is between the land and the sand of which the glass is made, not between land and a glass. This all relates to the creation of new property, which is why Locke is talking about the creation of value out of a state of nature (out of a state in which no one already owned the land). Once the land is owned, what basis is there for initiating force against the owner and expropriating its value from its owner? Or is it claimed that land isn't a value? If that's the case, I'll be glad to take any land anyone owns off of their hands for free. The OP never answered, how can man have a right to his house if he doesn't have a right to the ground his house is on? How can you have a right to a field of planted crops but not a right to the field? When man discovered the existence of pools of oil below the surface of the ground, the government rightfully began to issue property rights over the discovered pools. Despite having existed prior to man, the oil became a value and this was the basis of the property right. It was only because of man's mind and the discovery of how to use the oil that the value was created and the oil became property.
  19. No, I'd say definitely not. Right, I see now what Louie was talking about with respect to method, which would make his sentence not a contradiction. That was my misunderstanding. Method is not something I've thought about enough to discuss intelligently. It seems to me like it's beside the point, though. Even if you thought the method was mechanistically determined, we're only one step removed from the question. Which is, can man under the same circumstances act in a different way, ie does he have the ability to choose. Whether the choice is regarding method, or if it's more fundamental like the choice to focus or not, it doesn't seem to change the issues involved (causality, identity, and choice).
  20. Could you expand on this point more? What do you mean by 'methodology'? This statement: "It is metaphysically possible to make a different selection, and it doesn't violate volition one bit to say that methodology only leads to one choice every time." It sounds to me like you're saying, it's possible that a different selection could be made under the same circumstances but the same circumstances lead to the same selection every time, contradicting the first part of the sentence with the second part. What is the concept of choice, if one always makes the same choice under the same circumstances. That's just another way of saying, the choice you make is determined by the circumstances. It's not a choice at all. Why? If an entity can act in two possible ways, under the same circumstances, it is still a finite entity. There are still limits to what it can and cannot do. It IS something.
  21. A human, possessing the faculty of consciousness, can choose to focus or not to focus in context X. If man can choose to focus or not to focus, it doesn't follow that man has no identity. His identity is to choose.
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