KALADIN

Is this thread a joke? I don't think I've ever seen such a messy hodpodge of personal misunderstandings, clunky symbolism, and arbitrary assertions cobbled together to posture as a "critique".

When you said... and reiterated your point here... I took and am taking both these statements as generalizations amounting to the moral condemnation of border walls as such. My interest was solely in the moral status concerning national border walls and not really any specific policy surrounding them and their application; hence my ignoring everything after the first four sentences of your original post which I responded to. If what I wrote - - was not sufficient to refute the notion given in your two comments quoted at the top of this post then I would very much like to be corrected.

You are subtly equivocating here on the meaning of "behind". The right to put criminals behind walls ultimately derives from the moral principle that self-defense is just in all contexts. The legal justice imparted to criminals takes the form of imprisonment and which effectively renders it impossible for the imprisoned to continue to violate the law and the rights of the innocent by virtue of the fact that they are "behind walls". The action of putting criminals behind walls necessarily takes the form of physical force and so can not be understood when distenangled from an enforcing subject. It is true that both criminals and innocent people behind border walls suffer the restriction of movement but the restriction involved with the former is imposed. With innocent people there exists no party or person playing the role of enforcer so it is unjustified to consider the imposed station of criminals and the station of innocents as equals. There is a distinction to be made between the actions concerning peoples being kept behind walls in order to prevent them from leaving and peoples finding themselves behind walls in order to be prevented from entering; intentional relations are not accidental ones. In fact the only way to make real sense of your dual-usage is to subsume the entirety of the world outside a nation's border walls under the concept of "prison" but even here too we still lack an imprisoning subject. I imagine the right to erect border walls likewise ultimately derives from the principle of self-defense insofar as it can be demonstrated that certain immigration poses a threat to a nation and her peoples. How to go about this demonstration I have no idea but I see no reason why the idea of erecting a wall should be dismissed out of hand as violating the rights of the innocent.

I have two questions which are perhaps interrelated. 1) I have thrice now encountered criticisms of Objectivist Epistemology where it is claimed Rand is unambiguously ambiguous in her usage of the word "unit" (see: Steven Yate's Ayn Rand on Units, Essences, and the Intrinsic, and Merlin Jetton's Omissions and Measurement). They claim she uses it to serve both as a concept which refers to a distinct existent as member of a conceptual classification, "as a separate member of two or more similar members", and which refers also to totally invented standards of measurement such as the yard, pound, or watt. This latter group is usually characterized as units of measurement and rings of the colloquial understanding of "unit". The purpose of pointing out (I guess) this so-called ambiguity is to identify the important difference between something's status as a unit in virtue of being similar to the other members of a conceptual classification and something's status as a unit in virtue of being an invented, arbitrary standard of measurement. Does this criticism actually mean or entail anything important and does Rand's analysis in ITOE in anyway suffer from it? Could we also employ the "principle of two definitions" here, in saying that the same word is used to "preserve the unity of knowledge" (Piekoff) because the same referents are being referred to? Namely, instances of a given concept (yards, pounds, and watts can all be understood as instances of the identification of a relationship, i.e. as units of measurement). 2) The "principle of two definitions" says that no equivocation takes place because the same referents are specified and in Objectivism the meaning of a concept are its referents, i.e. two different meanings are not being employed. Now say my friend says power over others is a value (using the basic definition of value) because it is something he acts to gain and/or keep and I say power over others is not a value (using the definition of value wherein the normative perspective of Objectivism is imported - "...neither love nor fame nor cash is a value if obtained by fraud..."). He is referring to the fact that he acts to gain and/or keep power over others and I am referring to the fact that he acts to gain and/or keep something non-conducive to man's survival qua man. Power over others and something non-conducive to man's survival qua man here refer to the same thing yet it would seem like the two of us mean something very different. He is saying power is a value and I am saying power is not a value despite that the fact that both of us mean the exact same thing (colloquially, this assertion would be baffling to most people I'm sure). Therefore what word or concept should be used to explain our differences since it is not true that we mean different things (perspective?) and/or do propositions take on or add an element of meaning beyond that of its constituent concepts? Thanks in advance. It is usually a great help to not have to think through these things totally on my own.

Thanks for the correction.

You can not prove any axiom is an axiom. No axiomatic concept can be proved because there is no way of escaping the importation of those axiomatic concepts into the premises on which your proof necessarily depends, i.e. there is no way to escape circular reasoning. Volition's status as metaphysically given can not be proved because it is its status and reality as being metaphysically given that makes possible the concept, application, and method of any and all proofs. Volition is the means by which we direct/steer our cognition and assign the status of things like "true" and "proved" and so volition can not then itself be judged as true or be proven.

By "metaphysically causal" do you mean external pressures and compulsion and by "epistemically causal" do you mean internal causation by the conceptual faculty and its contents?

The denial of a thing as itself subsumes the affirming of a thing as that which it is not. There are and I haven spoken with many ardent Communists who describe private property as theft, i.e. deny that a thing is itself. There are also millions of people who believe God exists, i.e. deny that a thing is itself (in this case our subject is nonexistent). The Law of Identity is necessarily called upon in every claim and is the precondition to any claim retaining a status as meaningful. A failure to grasp the axiomatic and thus ever-pervasive effects of the LOI does not make those effects disappear. While it is probably true that the LOI itself has little conscious effect on most people, the denial of the LOI scarcely has any rivals with respect to its impact on anybody and everybody's life. It has long been known that Rand attributed to Aristotle a formulation of the LOI which he never presented. No.

Hello Grames. I am a huge fan of many of your previous posts regrading topics of causality, volition, and perception specifically. Will you be returning to post more on the forums?

I am not advocating a personal theory of value apart from the Objectivist understanding. The point here was just to imitate Rand's discussion of the intrincisim/subjectivism/objectivism trichomoty but with the concept of exchange value as opposed to the concept of value with the Objectivist importation of the normative standard of man's survival qua man ("value is that which is conducive to Man's life"). I am however interested in your suggesting a relationship between volition and objectivity on the axiological level. I understand that objectivity on the epistemological demands a willful, volitional adherence to a logical methodology. I am not acquainted however with the ties between volition and the having or not having objective values (do you mean values which are or are not promoting the moral standard of man's life?). No, I am totally unfamiliar with Piekoff's position. I just adopt what I belive to be the Objectivist stance. I understand metaphysical objectivity as referring to those existents which exist independently of any and all minds. I understand epistemological objectivity as referring to a specific cognitive methodology (a logical, i.e. reality-oriented one) whose end product necessarily consititues knowledge. Both the method and its products are "objective".

Any economic theory of value resolves usually to account for and explain one thing: the phenomenon and nature of exchange value. I hold Orthodox Marxists as being intrinsicists in that they ground exchange value in an absolutist theory of value wherein value is a function of a commodities' "congealed, socially necessary labor time", irrespective of any and all valuers as such. I hold Austrians as being subjectivists in that they ground exchange value in the valuer's subjective state, irrespective of any consideration of the object of evaluation as such. The concept value presupposes a valuing agent and a purpose for valuing. Marxists omit the agent and hold value to inhere within commodities. Austrians omit the purpose and hold value to inhere within the minds of men. Following Rand's thematic lead in her essay, "What is Capitalism?" and with an understanding of the relational nature of value, we can escape this false economic dichotomy. An evaluation is a function of a relationship between a valuer and an object of value. All objects of value serve to (or have the potential to) satisfy some end or purpose of a valuer. Thus value, in fashion similar to that of the concept of "unit" in ITOE, does not exist in commodities qua commodities, nor purely in the mind, but in an objectively (whether or not the attainment of some object engenders or constitutes the fruition of some held end can be determined by reference to the facts of reality) demonstrable relationship between commodity and the mind which values it. Economists have long been puzzled as how to understand the mechanics underlying the exchange of commodity X for commodity Y. Marxists have answered that there is a fundamental unit of value (socially necessary labor-time) congealed within the commodities in exchange and that exchange is only possible where there exists an equality between this labor-time congealed in X and Y. But if we take the relational nature of value into account, we see that the possibility of exchange is not a function of a given amount of commodities' concomitance of shared intrinsic value, nor of a given amount of exchangers' concomitance of shared subjective valuing, but of the objective concomitance of the the double (or more) inequality of value (between exchangers) any given commodity holds in relation to any given exchangers. In other words, exchange is made possible only because each party involved in the exchange stands (or believes) to gain from the exchange; the exchangers value what is being exchanged differently. In still other words, exchange is made possible not because two objects of exchange represent intrinsic values of equal measure, nor because two objects of exchange are subjectively valuable for any or no reason, but because each object of exchange holds a differing objective value in relation to different valuers/exchangers. Economists haven't been looking in the right places for value. What precedes and makes possible exchange is not the concomitance of equal value in the commodities exchanged (there's no such thing), nor even the concomitance of some kind of intensity of subjective valuation of exchangers, but the objective concomitance of each person in exchange standing to gain from it. For exchange between X and Y to occur, it does not matter how much some owner A of X values X or how much some owner B of Y values Y, only that 1) A values Y more than X, 2) B values X more than Y, 3) A values Y more than B values Y, and 4) B values X more than A values X. Exchange is made possible by the conceived or real potential for win-win interaction, not by an equality of disembodied values, nor by an equality of intensity between the subjective valuers' valuing of what they exchange away. Questions/comments/critique?

4 different posts completely absolved my confusion. Thanks for the responses.

First, let me establish the Objectivist concept of causality (which I agree with) before proceeding to a question which derives from it - The Law of Causality is the Law of Identity applied to action : to be is to be something and to be something is to act in accordance with one's nature as that something. A thing can not act as that which it is not for it can not be that which it is and that which it is not at the same time and in the same respect. Plants perform photosynthesis and men do not and can not while men perform reasoning and plants do not and can not; causality is identity in motion. My question is this: Is the application of causality and causal efficacy delimited to entities only, as opposed to the relationships or attributes they make up or have or establish? In John Galt's speech, Rand writes, "The law of causality is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act...". In this formulation, it seems that the first two sentences can be combined to read, "The law of causality is the law of identity applied to that which is caused by entities", from which I infer that the Law of Causality is delimited to the action of entities; causation is an attribute of entities, i.e. only things cause and are caused. In light of this, and to borrow a popular example employed by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, would it be improper to say something like, "the attainment of health is the cause of my walking" without ever qualifying that the value "health" is embodied, ultimately, in some neural substrate (to which, supposedly, the actual locus of causal power must be attributed)? If the answer to the just phrased question is "yes", I believe we run into some perhaps tricky questions such as, "does gravity cause the elliptical orbits or planets?". Colloquially, this sort of phrasing seems perfectly innocuous, but since gravity, or the gravitational force, is not an entity, but a relationship which holds all matter is attracted to all other matter, I believe, if we are still committed to the "yes" above, it would be a mistake or illogical to say such things. Since there is no such thing as gravity, but rather, gravity is a force born of the interaction of and between things, the nature and cause of planetary orbits is to be found in the orbiting planet and that which it orbits. Basically, my question boils down to what is the causal role, if any, of relationships, especially those fundamental and ever-pervasive relationships like the forces of gravitational attraction or magnetism? This has been bugging me for a bit so any and all answers greatly appreciated.

It seems, in the end, that it is impossible to articulate and defend determinism without concept-stealing, since determinism implies the impossibility of knowledge, and that is also impossible to scientifically articulate how an immaterial, non-physical entity, can have physical effects. So,free will is axiomatic as it can not be denied without the implementation and premise of a volitional mind, yet, as of now, there seems no way to explain the making of the "magic".

Is this not premised on the validity of volition?

You're absolutely right. The color example was poor. However, I still think the essence of my argument remains intact. How could a metaphysical impossibility have arisen in a deterministic universe to where it has become so deeply ingrained and introspectively evident in man, yet an illusion? I also think my statement, "That which is conceptually possible, must be metaphysically possible.", remains unchallenged. Gods and demons are inherently outside the metaphysical nature of reality, simply by being a demon or god. Yes, it is possible to conceive of such, but not in the context of our reality. They suspend or are outside of it. You can't really conceive of a being which is outside of reality, in reality. You have no way of acquiring knowledge about such a realm. Therefore, you have no way of rationally conceptualizing of such an entity, spirit, being, whatever. You can't conceive about that which you have no real sensation of, as you've pointed out. Those who say they can conceptualize of a being who is outside of metaphysical reality, in a mind which is a product and interpreter of a totally different, parallel metaphysics is either wrong, lying, or both. An amendment: "That which is conceptually possible, and is inherently within the known, natural universe, and subject to the same reality as our own, must be metaphysically possible." If you can truly conceive of something which is subject to and within reality and this universe, and is still metaphysically impossible, I would gladly hear it. One may say that the idea of free will is thus mute as it is inherently outside the known, natural universe, as with God. I would respond by asserting that something so blatantly a fundamental part of human existence is certainly not outside reality and is necessary for one to even form the concept of reality and free will, unless someone is willing to show otherwise. Unknowable, invisible demons, and omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent entities are not so obvious. Additionally, I don't see why I couldn't simply say, "No. You can't and don't really, definitively conceive of them. If such was possible, they are not demons or gods." It then becomes a matter of how honest someone is when saying they conceive of something.

This thread has been very helpful. Thanks. I still do not understand how concept-formation is possible in a universe in which everything is made necessary by antecedent, physical causes. Does not the very act of identifying a pen as a pen, require a volitional act of focus and identification as such? How does the physical presence and being of the pen initiate thought, if everything, including concepts, are the result of physical reactions? What physical intermediary is present which contains the power to manipulate the neurons within your mind, which in turn provide the physical structure which produce the concept of "pen"? I do not understand how any physical reaction could or should take place, seeing as the pen is external to the body, and obviously external to the mind, where concepts "exist". Essentially: If I do not possess the volitional power to initiate thinking and in turn, to identify and recognize a pen as a pen, whence cometh thinking and concepts? One more question. I will assume that everyone possess the "feeling" of free will. Namely, the sense that one could have abstained from eating that last piece of cake, and done so. That you could, right now, stop reading this post and go about your way. I assert that this "illusion" or "delusion" of volition is irrefutable, introspective evidence for the existence of free will. Why? That which is conceptually possible, must be metaphysically possible. If you think such is not the case, I encourage you to try and think of a new color. You cannot conceive of that which cannot exist, in the most literal sense. One cannot conceive of square-circles or three-sided cubes. These things simply can not exist, by virtue of what a circle and a cube is. If volition is metaphysically impossible, in the literal sense, man should not possess any sort of conceptual understanding of free will. As we cannot conceive of three-sided cubes, we should likewise be unable to conceive of multiple futures and real choices, being metaphysically incompatible with reality. Saying free will is an illusion merely serves to elucidate that free will is conceptually, and therefore metaphysically possible. So, where does this "delusion" originate in a deterministic universe? Any answers greatly appreciated.

As of yet, with my fairly elementary understanding of the philosophy of Objectivism, I remain unsatisfied regarding the vindication for existence of "free will". The reason this debate still persists, is because no one has been able to formally propose and/or explain where/how/why "decision-making" violates, is an exception to, is another form of, or outright supersedes causality. Determinism has been adequately ridiculed and debunked, being a compendium of stolen-concepts, self-refutations, and outright contradictions. This is not the issue. Much in the same way that debate over whether a Creator exists or not, the determinism debate is born out of man's ignorance regarding the process of creation through/by thoughts and choices. Many before us have shown that a "Creator" is incompatible with reality, and that merely ignorance of how the universe began is not a license to champion the supernatural, the causeless, or the irrational. Similarly, merely ignorance of how conceptualization and consciousness are "outside" causality, is also not a license to champion the supernatural, the causeless, or the irrational. If free will is to ever be as stone solid as the Law of Identity, there likewise needs to be a stone solid proof of it. Rand's texts and my own personal research have yet to provide such. If anyone has any sort of reference, material, or information whatsoever regarding not the non-validity of determinism, but the validity of an unchained will, I would greatly appreciate it. On to the main point of this post. How & why can any serious intellectual even begin to accept physical determinism? I've come to the conclusion that a very simple thought experiment is enough to eradicate the position in its entirety: If all things are physically necessitated, through caused, predictable, defined, objective, natural laws, inherent to the universe, and that man's mind is no exception to this (as it is the product of a physical brain), then discussion, and the exchange of ideas is impossible. Not improbable. Not difficult. Impossible. As you read these words, your mind integrates and manipulates the definitions and structure of this sentence into a conceptual understanding of what it means and says. How in the hell could this identification, integration, and manipulation of any idea occur, if all things are the result of antecedent, physical reactions? Does your physical brain have any connection with the physical nature of your screen? Are the photons and particles which allow you to recognize and read this text in any way, whatsoever, directly related to the physical reactions taking place within your brain right now? Is there absolutely any way that when someone speaks to you, that some magical, physical intermediary is going to turn their voice and vibrations, into concepts which you can comprehend and acknowledge? Do someone else's ideas have the power to physically initiate thinking within your own mind? Does someone else's argument and or refutation of something contain the power to physically initiate you to focus on said argument and determine (pun unintended) if their criticisms are valid? Is there anyway, at all, if all existence is really a bunch of billiard balls, whizzing on their predestined, physically ordained way, that billiard balls can move one another while never hitting, interacting, or even residing on the same "table"? The obvious and irrevocable answer: NO. Your mind is equipped with the power of manipulation and conceptualization within the Cognitive Realm (my label for where said integration, manipulation, and formation of concepts occurs). It has the ability to introduce, move, replace, and destroy certain billiard balls, if you will. Why has ignorance of how and why things occur or initiate (if such a thing is coherent) in the CR become a denial that it even exists? Why has something so blatantly self-evident even become a point of philosophical contention at all? Why has this "forgotten space" (the separation between your mind, the CR, and physical reactions outside the body) been forgotten? All of it just seems very silly, and that any part of neuroscience and modern academia embraces such a fallacious premise astonishes me. Thoughts?