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Jon Southall

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Everything posted by Jon Southall

  1. There is not much difference in our positions Don and DA. Thanks both for an interesting discussion/exploration of this topic. Don, what are your thoughts on the territorial aspects? Do you consider the idea of a borderless government to be one which would deserve as much recognition as say your hypothetical Alaskan state?
  2. Craig, " The first step in creating a man made object is to acquire the metaphysically given materials that make up the man made object. So how do you make your man made object without owning the metaphysically given materials in the first place? " Metaphysically given facts don't belong to anyone, so anyone can take what they want. In fact the act of acquiring metaphysically givens establishes initial ownership on a first come first served basis. This does not mean I can steal the bricks from your house; they are man-made facts and are governed by your property rights.
  3. SL, I believe I am using Ayn Rand's definition of property, and her distinction between metaphysically givens and man-made facts. My contention is not to depart from Rand's argument, but to realise it to the full. Therefore I cannot give you a contrast of my position compared to Objectivists; it should be one and the same. But I can tell you the mistake I think some Objectivists are making, and maybe even Rand herself. I will start with the positive aspects. Rand often used of the Law of Causality in her philosophy, which she defines as "the law of identity applied to action". The nature of an action is dependent on the nature of the entities that act, and you cannot have actions without actors. Rand uses this concept in a number of notable situations. One situation is where it comes to a person's character. A person's character is determined by their volitional actions. You learn something about the nature of a person by looking at the choices they have made, and this is what gives you an impression of their character. For example, someone who loves computing, chooses a career in this area and creates new technologies which are highly valued by society, could be judged to have a good character, at least insofar of their career choices. But more than this, the choices the person made are also facts about him, his volitional actions and the consequences of them belong to him. So as well as our pioneer justly taking credit for his career success, he also has to accept his responsibility for any misdeeds he has committed. Another situation is where it comes to a person's property. Just as a person's volitional actions determine their character, it also determines their property; specifically when it comes to the application of their thinking to create/produce values. And as in the case of a person's character, what belongs to a person is established by what they were the cause of. All man-made facts came into existence due to man, they are the consequences of the production of values. In order for values to be produced, there were producers, and they are to whom the property belongs. A person cannot claim, as his, something that was produced by someone else or no-one. It is not a fact of reality that the claimant was the cause of it. Such a claim is to try to take what does not belong to the claimant. Unless of course, a mutually consented to trade takes place, but then again the law of causality comes into effect. Traders can only trade man-made facts; this is in order for it to be a fact of reality that what they are trading does belong to them to start with. In a trade, both parties decide to act in their own interests by entering into some kind of exchange. Although literally each trader was not the cause of the values produced originally by the other, by agreeing to a volitional trade it is as for all intents and purposes as if they were. Rand expressed her reasoning via Galt, where she wrote: "The source of property rights is the law of causality. All property and all forms of wealth are produced by man’s mind and labor. As you cannot have effects without causes, so you cannot have wealth without its source: without intelligence...You cannot obtain the products of a mind except on the owner’s terms, by trade and by volitional consent." This concludes I suppose the "positive" aspect of it. The issue I have with the approach taken by some Objectivists (that I referred to earlier) is a failure to properly discriminate/make the distinction between metaphysically givens and man-made facts. This results in an error of reason where they accept the validity of claimed property rights over things which man was not the cause of. Now I know no real Objectivists would want to make such an error, but they do. We are all fallible. So for example, take the concept "land", defined broadly as metaphysical givens. Land is used as a factor of production, and from it we create things like farms, factories, homes and so on. The man-made facts are the farms, the factories, the homes. Full property rights exist for these, precisely as explained above. Distinct from this is what is still land, i.e. metaphysically given facts besides the man-made facts, to which no claimed rights can have a causal basis. Objectivists think that the farm owner, the factory owner and the homeowner also own the metaphysically given geographical land space, in addition to the man-made facts within a particular geographic location. The arguments given for why we should treat metaphysically given facts as property oddly share nothing in common with Rand's arguments for what the basis of property rights are. This interests me and exploring this is what this thread is for.
  4. Eiuol, nothing is wrong with your examples, they meet the ROC. Do you make a distinction between say "airways" and "airwaves"? In the case of a broadcast, the former is a metaphysical given, the latter is a man-made fact. Your examples were of the latter, distinct from the former. Does that clarify it sufficiently?
  5. Eioul, If something is being used productively, like farmland or broadcasting, it meets the ROC. What really interests me is Ayn Rand's explanation of property rights. She was always very precise in conveying her meaning. What I focus on in particular is her stated claims that rights are not to an actual object, but rather they conclude who gets to use it, keep it, dispose of it - they are rights of action. They are earned in the creation of whatever meets the ROC. Metaphysical givens can't be owned. The significance of this, for example, is what one owns when they say they own a farm. The owner does not own the territory, the earth, the wheat, the fertilizer in the sense of the physical existents. What he owns is a right to use, keep and dispose of them, to the extent he has earned them, that is to the extent that the farm is a man-made fact meeting the ROC. If one derives an income from a metaphysical given, it can only be due to forced-backed privelege. For example, take the claim of ownership of the airways, which are a metaphysical given, in order that the government can charge broadcasters. Or take the claim of ownership of metaphysically given territory, which people are charged for by landowners in order to occupy it. In the above two examples, to what extent do they meet the ROC?
  6. Agreed. End of discussion then? Some people would argue that some metaphysically givens can be owned. Even Objectivists actually. Two examples: 1. Geographic locations 2. Airways I would argue that no valid property rights exist as far as the above are concerned, using "Rand's Ownership Criteria" (ROC) in the OP. A claim of a property right in either regard can be taken as an admission of being in receipt of government force backed privileges. Who would disagree?
  7. "Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given, and could not have occurred differently or failed to occur; any phenomenon involving human action is the man-made, and could have been different." Lexicon Rand made a distinction between "metaphysically givens" and "man-made" facts. For example, a wilderness would be a metaphysically given fact of reality whereas a farm wouldn't be. Man-made facts occur as a consequence of the exercise and application of human volition. It is the law of causality which determines what is man-made and what is metaphysically given. "The source of property rights is the law of causality. All property and all forms of wealth are produced by man’s mind and labor." Ayn Rand The source of property rights is the law of causality, given the above criteria property rights can only apply to man-made facts. Discuss.
  8. Nicky, Obvious response - what stops private agencies from being prevented from carrying out such abuses "by all kinds of laws"? We were talking about agencies with the same powers as the government, if laws are what prevents the US gov from committing such abuses, why can't they stop agencies from doing so also. You have reframed the scenario, rather than explain how you think the abusive situation would come to be.
  9. Nicky, I have answered you repeatedly and consistently. You'll find I never wrote that the territorial approach was contradictory, you have forgotten again. What I actually wrote was that there are practical reasons why a territorial approach would be superior, but that it had not been shown to be a necessary condition. Go back and read it for yourself. Again, for maybe the third time now, you haven't answered the contradiction in your post where you asserted that pragmatics were more important than individual rights. You did use the word practical, but so do pragmatists, you did cite Objectivism but pragmatists also have to borrow from moral philosophies. Maybe you aren't a pragmatist, but your inability and unwillingness to consider a non-conventional state, an innovation of sorts, on the sole grounds that you assert it would be impractical, means you do have pragmatist lipstick on your collar, to borrow the phrase from Snerd. By the way, I find it disrespectful when you write in capitals, this is shouting. Normally people shout when their emotions are running the show and reason has taken a walk.
  10. Eiuol, What if the government was influenced by lobbyists and began shifting towards a slavery friendly position? I ask this not because I disagree with you. I feel that having an alternative of multiple agencies tasked with retaliatory use of force would be worse; I just don't think the decisive reasons why have been given yet. You touch on it in a sense; the need for a common standard of justice, respecting and protecting individual rights. This could be unduly influenced through markets with private agencies. Without a higher authority what would stop abuses - what would prevent a descent into constant civil war between competing forces? Yet with the alternative; a government, the fact is that any existing democratic government can vote in pseudo rights or vote away rights, politicians can be lobbied and influenced in ways which are contrary to what they are there for. Other forms of government can be much worse. A government that gets out of hand is very hard to get back under control precisely because citizens have meaningfully been disarmed - that's what it means when a government has a monopoly on force. The only argument that you can really make in favour of a government is that when it has been properly devised, it can offer the chance for greater stability and consistency in how the system of justice functions. In turn, where the government operates objectively, with recognition of and respect for individual rights, it is more likely to deliver justice than any other alternative. This would be preferable because the result would be less self-defeating conflict amongst people. Yet as you point out the next issue is the reality of multiple governments. On a global scale, these governments share basically the same dynamics as a system of multiple agencies do within a single nation. Within a nation, hypothetically moral individuals might employ and benefit from agencies which do a good job of providing justice, whilst others find themselves abused by agencies employed by people with immoral intentions, they are the ones who are unable to buy justice from competing moral agencies. Globally you have the same issue with governments and other forceful borderless organisations. Ultimately if man's aim is to live in his rational self-interest and live with others to mutual benefit, under a system as set out by Rand, this system would work best on a global scale. That seems to be where you end up if you follow the line of reasoning to its conclusion. Individual nations could create greater instability and inconsistency in the provision of justice and in the use of retaliatory force than a single government, therefore creating more opportunities for self-defeating conflict than a global government would. Now I would expect many here to reject that idea. So my question would be what is it that ultimately makes the nation state preferable, other than it is the form of government we are most familiar and used to - i.e. what reason other than convention can be put forward for it as the ideal?
  11. Nicky, You keep avoiding your contradiction. You asserted that the basis for the territorial argument is pragmatics. Rand mentioned a territorial approach but did not present an argument for why it must be so - so where are you getting this from? You argued before that pragmatics trumps rights, but I don't think you will find this argued for in Objectivist literature.
  12. Nicky, The issue you keep missing/avoiding is your assertion that pragmatics trumps rights.
  13. Nicky, I don't think that is the point Aziz is making - he is referring to organisations using retaliatory force that operate with the same authority as the government does - and not a delegated authority of any kind either. That is not the case in the US. Your point about abusive agencies applies just as much to abusive governments, only a government has a monopoly on force, whereas a single agency wouldn't have under capitalism. What would be easier for individuals to deal with if one became abusive? That is actually quite an interesting question. If you have further concerns about this you need to set them out rather than put words into other people's mouths. This would enrich the discussion and show due respect to contributors.
  14. Nicky, What you wrote was a contradiction. It's a simple fact. You can't have rights as the basis of government and then say rights only count when its practical, without contradicting yourself. You seem to have trouble reading my posts, or at least remembering what I have written. I support the kind of capitalism Rand was advocating. The problem is with your stating that the objectivist position on jurisdiction is territorial - then asserting pragmatics trumps rights - can you show me where you have concluded this from, given Rand's arguments on it?
  15. AlexL, In responding I firstly admit I have not read your links, so apologies if they address this. Let's take as our starting point two claims you seem to be making. 1) the legitimacy of a regime comes from respecting the individual rights of its citizens and 2) the jurisdiction of the regime territorially does not stem from what its citizens own. Have I got this starting point right? In this case, I would understand your claim to be that Israel would be legitimate not because the territory of Israel belongs to Israelis but because the government respects the rights of its Israeli citizens. At some point in the past, the land purchased was in a territory under a different government than the emergent Israeli state. Is your view that the justification for Israeli land owners establishing their own territory governed by its own state that the prior regime was failing to protect and respect the rights of those who later establised the Israeli state? If Objectivist land owners in America felt that their rights were being abused in various ways, for example by tax and regulations, and decided to establish a government that would not violate their rights, then given what they would create would be a better regime for protecting and respecting the rights of self-designated Objectivists, would this justify the creation of an Objectivist state separate from the US in your view? What would be different about this scenario compared to Israel?
  16. Nicky, What I actually wrote was this: " On the one hand you claim that the basis of national claim to jurisdiction is individual rights. That is a premise that I think the three of us are all in agreement with." The contradiction I pointed out was yours; your claim that pragmatics trumps rights. The basis of jurisdiction is rights, but when you make it about territory I believe you run into some problem areas. Some posters claim it is not who owns the property that makes a difference when it comes to territory, but then who has the right to call that territory their own? Or what community does? Also when it concerns wilderness, Ayn Rand liked the homesteading principle which requires that the government acts as custodian over some area of wilderness - custodianship based on what? It seems problematic integrating a rights based approach with a territorial approach. If you can shed some light on it, and would like to then be my guest.
  17. Don, thank you for your post on Sunday. I didn't think it was rambling and, in my view, it has enriched this thread. I hope readers here take the time to take in your points.
  18. Nicky, show me where I wrote a capitalist government following Rand would violate rights? You must have misunderstood. If you read through the thread you can see my purpose is to establish such a system - not to reject it.
  19. Nicky, I didn't see the reason why you asked me that in the first place. Why do you think I need to give an example of that? I would like to see a capitalist government (as described by Rand) come into existence because it does not violate individual rights. Whilst its an interesting take on the exclusivity of an Objectivist society preventing it from being free, I would challenge you on the basis that there is nothing about a society of Objectivists that would preclude it from dealing with people living within other societies, therefore for all practical purposes it would be free. I expect you will disagree with this; feel free to show me why you think I am mistaken.
  20. I'm not sure why, SL and Snerd, you have become pre-occupied with whether I am an Objectivist or not. For the record, I agree with Objectivism but it is not a complete or fully realised system; there are parts of it which still need work. These are the parts which interest me because by exploring them, I learn more and find it easier to come to a position on it. Surprisingly on Objectivist forums my experience has been that if you explore a topic in a way which means you have to think about things perhaps in a new or unconventional way, contributors find it easier to brand you something other than an Objectivist so they don't need to think differently than they have become accustomed to. This is basically thought evasion - if you are not an Objectivist then I don't need to think seriously about your reasoning - which leaves everyone poorer. Snerd - the reason I don't want to discuss it with SL is because I consider his position to be irrational. Furthermore I judge his responses to be driven by a desire to win an argument at all costs rather than to learn and develop his understanding. Given that is my judgment, why would I indulge him?
  21. Snerd, I will quote this from the Lexicon in full because I believe it will help you understand how I am using my terms - the same as Rand did. "Responsibility/Obligation In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as “duty.” There is only choice and the full, clear recognition of a principle obscured by the notion of “duty”: the Law of Causality. The proper approach to ethics, the start from a metaphysically clean slate, untainted by any touch of Kantianism, can best be illustrated by the following story. In answer to a man who was telling her that she’s got to do something or other, a wise old Negro woman said: “Mister, there’s nothing I’ve got to do except die.” Life or death is man’s only fundamental alternative. To live is his basic act of choice. If he chooses to live, a rational ethics will tell him what principles of action are required to implement his choice. If he does not choose to live, nature will take its course. Reality confronts man with a great many “musts,” but all of them are conditional; the formula of realistic necessity is: “You must, if—” and the “if” stands for man’s choice: “—if you want to achieve a certain goal.” You must eat, if you want to survive. You must work, if you want to eat. You must think, if you want to work. You must look at reality, if you want to think—if you want to know what to do—if you want to know what goals to choose—if you want to know how to achieve them. In order to make the choices required to achieve his goals, a man needs the constant, automatized awareness of the principle which the anti-concept “duty” has all but obliterated in his mind: the principle of causality—specifically, of Aristotelian final causation (which, in fact, applies only to a conscious being), i.e., the process by which an end determines the means, i.e., the process of choosing a goal and taking the actions necessary to achieve it. In a rational ethics, it is causality—not “duty”—that serves as the guiding principle in considering, evaluating and choosing one’s actions, particularly those necessary to achieve a long-range goal. Following this principle, a man does not act without knowing the purpose of his action. In choosing a goal, he considers the means required to achieve it, he weighs the value of the goal against the difficulties of the means and against the full, hierarchical context of all his other values and goals. He does not demand the impossible of himself, and he does not decide too easily which things are impossible. He never drops the context of the knowledge available to him, and never evades reality, realizing fully that his goal will not be granted to him by any power other than his own action, and, should he evade, it is not some Kantian authority that he would be cheating, but himself . . . . A disciple of causation is profoundly dedicated to his values, knowing that he is able to achieve them. He is incapable of desiring contradictions, of relying on a “somehow,” of rebelling against reality. He knows that in all such cases, it is not some Kantian authority that he would be defying and injuring, but himself—and that the penalty would be not some mystic brand of “immorality,” but the frustration of his own desires and the destruction of his values . . . . Accepting no mystic “duties” or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one’s promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men . . . . The acceptance of full responsibility for one’s own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of “duty.” They learn better, often when it is too late. The disciple of causation faces life without inexplicable chains, unchosen burdens, impossible demands or supernatural threats. His metaphysical attitude and guiding moral principle can best be summed up by an old Spanish proverb: “God said: ‘Take what you want and pay for it.’” But to know one’s own desires, their meaning and their costs requires the highest human virtue: rationality" When a person chooses to become a parent, he or she chooses to take on the obligation to care for their child. That is his or her promise to his child. My point is a parent must accept the full responsibility of that choice - whether it be become a chosen burden or a pleasure. Can you point out where this is in any way a statist position - I really can't see your reasoning.
  22. Ayn Rand asserted that " The right of “the self-determination of nations” applies only to free societies or to societies seeking to establish freedom; it does not apply to dictatorships. " (http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/self-determination_of_nations.html) This suggests Rand would agree that a society of Objectivists would have the right of self-determination. I wonder if she wrote more about this, if anyone knows and can share some sources it would be much appreciated, but if not I will research it myself. Snerd - you have the Objectivist research software; does it have anything on the matter?
  23. If you are honest with yourself, is it because you feel like you are in love with her? Why did she make such a significant impression on you? Is there anyone else who you know from the class who might know who she is?
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