SpookyKitty

Ohhhh.... now that is much clearer, thank you. Alright the source of the disagreement is that you are confusing possibility with plausibility. Any statement which is not a contradiction is possibly true. For example, it is possible that "Zeus exists", however it is not plausible that "Zeus exists". If "Zeus exists" is impossible, then any evidence which supports "Zeus exists" would itself have to be false. But then it would not be evidence, and we would be in contradiction. If, however "Zeus exists" is merely implausible, then any evidence which supports "Zeus exists" would simply make the statement more plausible, and there would be no contradiction.

I still don't see what that has to do with a statements possibility of being true,

What about it? I'm afraid I don't understand what it is you're trying to say here.

A statement which cannot possibly be true can never have any evidence that supports it, by definition.

There is no "minium threshold for being possible." Any statement which is not a contradiction is possibly true. To say that "x is possible" in no way bars evidence that x does not exist. The only point at which a statement becomes impossible is when its negation is proven to be true. If "A dog barks" is A, then not-A is "A dog doesn't bark", not "A cat meows". If "A cat meows" is not-A, then A is "A cat does not meow" not "A dog barks". "A dog barks" and "A cat meows" are not logical negations. There is no reason why it cannot be that both are true.

You are right that x cannot both exist and not exist. But what human_murda is saying is that the statement "it is possible that x exists and it is possible that x does not exist" is a contradiction, which is simply false.

To say that it is possible that A is true and that it is possible that not-A is true is in no way a contradiction. The only contradictions similar to this statement are "It is possible that A and not-A is true" and "Both A and not-A are true". You are confusing integration and justification. How you come up with a claim is irrelevant to the truth of the claim. Furthermore, from your previous posts it seems that you reject deductive logic as a valid form of philosophical investigation. The "If's" you speak of (called premises) are not plucked out of the air. They are usually things somebody already believes. Arguments in philosophy are made so that either new conclusions (and hence knowledge) can be derived from already existing knowledge, but also to examine the consistency of the beliefs we already hold. For example, if you agree with the premises but reject the conclusion, then, assuming that the argument is valid, you must reject at least one premise or else you have to come up with a completely new framework for understanding the subject at hand (this is the part where concept formation comes in). But after you have formed those concepts, the process of integration is still not a justification for your new conclusions. You have to come up with new premises (based on your new concepts) and arguments. In philosophy, arguments are everything.

I have not corrected myself. That's what I meant when I said one should not listen to arguments, it's just that you insist on engaging in the childish tactic of reading your interlocutor's statements as uncharitably as possible. You yourself have said that the arguments of socialists should be dismissed in general, so your requirement that I point to specific arguments you have dismissed is just moving the goalposts. A standalone statement is not an argument, and is incapable of being or not being a strawman. It is definitely a strawman because it fits the definition of a strawman, and whether or not it is factual is irrelevant in that regard.

But in all seriousness.... My standard for dogmatism is the dismissal of arguments after they have been presented, and then proclaiming that the conclusions of those arguments must be false. A straw-man is a type of informal fallacy. The statement above is only a straw-man when it is used in an argument which attempts to claim that all socialism is the same as the kind practiced in North Korea. Neither. It's that socialists often present straw-man arguments against capitalism by pointing to examples of cronyism.

What was that Nicky? I'm sorry, I don't have the time to listen to your argument as its probably wrong anyway.

Wait your turn, please. I'm currently too busy responding to people who actually have something to say.

It's never a good idea to not listen to arguments, because at that point you've decended into dogmatism. And yes, unless that socialist is actually a supporter or apologist of Juche, pointing out that North Korea is a prison state is a straw man. It's the same when socialists point to examples of cronyism as if it was the same thing as capitalism.

What point is that? I think you are the one who has completely misread Hurd's OP.

Uhhh.... no..... The Objectivist should not assume the position of "educating" his opponents on what their beliefs are (assuming that that is what you indeed meant to say). He should do more of the exact opposite. Namely, educating himself about other's position by asking them questions. What position Hurd is and isn't arguing is beside the point. That was just an example of how and why common straw-man arguments issued by Objectivists and libertarians (don't) work.

When one makes a case for freedom and capitalism by arguing against socialism and statism, then one should do so by criticizing the actual arguments that socialists and statists make, and not the conveneint versions of those arguments that are easy to refute. Strawmanning is a form of dishonesty/intellectual laziness that one must be careful not to engage in because it is so easy to fall into that trap. As an example, consider the following typical argument: P1) Liberals believe that taxes are acceptable or necessary and sometimes beneficial. P2) Taxes are a form of initiation of force (committed by the government) and, specifically, a form of theft. C3) Therefore, liberals believe that theft is acceptable or necessary and sometimes beneficial. Why is this argument wrong? Note that both P1 and C3 are statements about what liberals believe, whereas P2 is not. This means that the argument is actually invalid (that is, the conclusion does not actually follow from the premises even if they are true), and only appears to be valid because one is tempted to assume: P2*) Liberals believe that P2. Only when one replaces P2 with P2* in the above argument does it become valid, but then the problem is clear. Liberals simply do not believe that taxes are a form of theft. When you actually ask them, you find that they tend to believe in social contract theory, and that any actions taken by the government that are permitted under the constitution are legitimate. Hence, taxes, they say, are not a kind of theft. Objectivists will never appeal to more informed opponents if it continues to rely on strawman arguments like the one above.

A "straw-man" argument fallacy is what you do when you claim that you've refuted an argument by creating a completely different argument that is easy to refute. Everyone across the political spectrum does this. People on our side typically argue against socialism by pointing out the iefficiencies or injustice of Big Government. But socialism is not nanny-state liberalism. So if the starting point of your argumet is that it is, then you will definitely be engaging in a straw-man. As for your other points: Socialists have a different concept of "coercion" or "force". Yes, that is also a straw man. Liberals do not consider lawful actions of the government a form of force. That's ridiculous. When somebody accuses you of making a straw-man argument, the correct approach is definitely not to double-down on your straw-man. Your role, as an honest debater, thinker, and defender of capitalism, is to 1) state clearly what you think the opponent's position actually is, and ask them if you have it right 2) If they tell you that your characterization is right, then proceed, 3) But if not, then ask them to explain their position as clearly as possible and go from there.

I'm not sure that there even is a commonly held position on essence amongst non-Objectivist philosophers. I think I am proposing something new.

No. A substance is often defined as either an object whose essence consists only of that substance, or as an object which has no essence, but nonetheless has properties and is somehow distinct from other substances. An essence is not an object. What arguments lead to the abondonment of essentialism? EDIT: And no, my position is in no way religious in nature.

Sorry, there was something else I wanted to say about this, but forgot to include it. In the way we commonly use the word "essence" nowadays, that seems to be the intended meaning. Specifically, the common meaning of the "essence of a thing" is the "most important" characteristic of that thing, whether that characteristic be some property of the object, or a part of its definition. Regardless, this common usage is imprecise and should be avoided. When I speak of the essence of an object, I am not using it in this common-usage way, but in a technical sense, similar to what Aristotle had in mind and precisely defined in the OP and a couple of my other posts.

An essence is a metaphysical entity which is not an object. They are quite tricky entities, because unlike objects, they cannot be interacted with directly. They are not sensible. Every essence is in some object, and an essence cannot be separated from the object it is in. To put it simply, no, an essence cannot be "identified" in the same sense that an object can be "identified". You can never point to a thing and say "That's an essence." The existence of essences and the relation of an object's essences to their object can only be inferred. As I've said before it is important to draw a distinction between the actual essence of an object and one's beliefs about what the essence of this or that object is. I say this because this confusion between the definition of a thing and its essence keeps popping up. A definiton is the epistemological "entity" which refers to the essence of an object. A definition can fail if it does not correspond to the actual essence of an object. The relation of essence to a definition, as I've said before, is rather like the relationship between facts and statements. The essence makes a definition valid, in just the same way as the fact that snow is white makes the statement "snow is white" true. The statement "snow is white" is not the same thing as the fact that snow is white, and similarly a definition is not the same thing as an essence. Alright, well I'll get back to you on that as soon as I get some time.

I take it you two mean that the nature of an object and the nature of our sense organs together determine our experience of the object. I can agree with that. That's fine, but it's not what the issue is. The problem is that if objects do not have essences, then there is no reason whatsoever why we should expect for the sensory data that they cause to be identical under identical circumstances. In answer to the above problem, Eiuol, you have claimed that it is our minds which are the source of the regularity we observe in the world. But this cannot be the case, since that would mean that reality would decend into metaphysical chaos if there were no conscious entities around to participate in the "identification" of objects. I think we can all agree that that is not at all what would happen. Reality would continue on as it is if all consciousness in the universe were to be extinguished. In this sense, the nature of reality is independent from our minds. And this means that objects must have natures which are what they are regardless of whether or not there is somebody there to "identify" them. This inherent nature is what is called an "essence". An essence is not a means, and it is not a mental phenomenon. An essence is an ontic entity. There may not be a "single" characteristic which makes an apple an apple. The essence can consist of a multiplicity of characteristics. The only requirement is that these characteristics be individually necessary and jointly sufficient. What is important to recognize is that we can be wrong about what constitutes the essence of an object.

I take it that by this you mean to say that the relation between sensory organs and objects that gives the objects their characteristics is fundamental? But this is even more troublesome because it implies that reality is dependent on our sensory organs. I can certainly believe that our experience of reality depends on our sensory organs, but I find it difficult to swallow that the nature of reality itself depends upon our sensory organs.

The nature of a thing is its essence. "The nature of a thing" is what the word "essence" means. That's why I find it surprising to find out that Objectivism rejects essentialism.

The fact that apples don't suddenly turn into water. What makes the relation between the apple and my sensory organs hold true if not the essence of the apple and the essence of my sensory organs?

That is genuinely surprising, because if essences don't exist, the what do our concepts refer to? If they refer merely to collections of sensory perceptions, and if metaphysical essences don't exist, then what gives regularity to our sense perceptions? What I mean is this. According to the above post, we experience some sensory perceptions, and over time, we integrate those perceptions into the concept of an apple, say. The concept of apple consists of the sensory perceptions of redness, smoothness, sweetness, etc. However, no apple ever suddenly starts spewing out the sensory perceptions of clearness (like water), saltiness, and roughness. Why? What prevents an apple from suddenly turning into water? If reality exists as such independently of the mind, then no mere concept is capable of preventing the apple from suddenly turning into water. Essences must exist, because they are precisely what keep an apple from suddenly turning into water. The essence of the apple determines what sensory perceptions the apple can cause. Once the mind integrates these sensory perceptions into a concept, then the concept must refer to the essence of the apple.