SpookyKitty

@DavidOdden Yes, I'd say you understand the formal definitions of tautology in propositional logic perfectly. However, we have a substantive point of disagreement where you say that formal propositions involve context-dropping and weasel-wording. When we assert a formal proposition such as "p or not p" we are not context-dropping but rather abstracting over all possible meanings of the atomic proposition P. You are further incorrect in saying that this has no connection to any non-formal notion of truth. The connection is that it does not matter what actual proposition you substitute for p in the formal tautological statement. When the substitution is done, the resulting proposition must be true. That such results can be proved is precisely why formal languages are so useful and general. You are correct in saying that sometimes it is not clear how to formalize certain natural language expressions. However, this does not imply an ambiguity or any other kind of problem in the formalism, but rather a possible ambiguity or confusion in the natural language expression. When interpreting a formal language over some object domain, a correct interpretation requires that every symbol have exactly one meaning, so no confusion can possibly result. Natural languages do not have this requirement, which is why miscommunication is such a common problem with them. (Also why you would never want to use a natural language to deal with mathematical abstractions if it can be reasonably avoided). This is an error in understanding in how to interpret statements in first-order logic. Interpreting a statement in first-order logic is a little bit more involved than interpreting statements in propositional logic. According to wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_logic If we restrict the domain of discourse to the integers {0,1,2,3}, then the statement “For all integers x, there exists an integer y such that 2x + 3 = y” is false, and is therefore not a tautology. This is completely wrong. So wrong that there in fact exists an effective method for determining whether a given first-order statement is a tautology, i.e., it's so easy that a computer can do it. Even if this is true, this only suggests a problem with the terminology and not the concept. in a similar fashion, just because the English language uses the same word to refer to both a kind of fish and a stroke of luck (fluke) that in no way implies a problem with either of the two concepts in and of themselves. No. Your circularity now just involves two statements instead of one.

Your reasoning is completely circular. To say that 2*3 + 1 = 7 is true because both sides specify the same quantity is to assert precisely that 2*3 + 1 = 7.

Neither are the two sides of 2*3 + 1 = 7, and yet it is true.

No it isn't. Nothing in the definition of either implies that the other is tautological. It's perfectly obvious you're just pulling this nonsense straight out of your ass. In fact, not only are not all statements of equality tautological, but there are obvious false ones such as 1 = 2. There is nothing "invalid" about substituting values for x or y which make the resulting statement false. In any case, you did not even remotely demonstrate that the given statement is a tautology because 1) you have not clearly stated the definition of a tautology and then 2) demonstrated how the given example meets all of the necessary conditions of being a tautology. You really have no understanding of the subject at all if you think that's all truth tables are. Yes, that counts.

Here is an example of a true statement which is not a tautology: "For all integers x, there exists an integer y such that 2x + 3 = y." I don't understand what's so complicated about the concept of a tautology. Have any of you ever studied any formal logic? Who here knows what a truth table is?

1) I did give evidence and arguments for Peikoff's rationalism. 2) Answering honest questions? You're the one who is making the discussion about ME and MY supposed tendencies No. When I refer to knowledge of reality I'm usually referring to knowledge of the current state of the external world. This is demonstrably false. This is also demonstrably false. I strongly disagree. There's no way you can get from Rand's theory of concepts to the above two statements unless you're as sloppy a thinker as Peikoff.

Why are you fixated on me? Why are you talking about people instead of ideas? I think that tendency is in itself telling.

That's not knowledge about reality, that's knowledge about logic.

An empty glass is still a glass. Something can be both a dichotomy and a tautology. Objectivism is not ratioanlism. Peikoff, on the other hand, is a rationalist who doesn't know that he is a rationalist.

I think I've figured out what's wrong with the OP. Value and disvalue can only be assigned to the possible states of reality, i.e. when you have a choice. Therefore, value or disvalue cannot be assigned to events that are inevitable (such as your own death). Hence, your feelings of despair about death are not valuations, they are emotions (of the whim kind). This suggests misintegration on your part.

Oh wait. I already have that superpower.

I would like to have the superpower to read and enslave Man's Mind.

Well, ok, I know you don't believe it. But you're making an argument as to why you ought to believe it, and part of that argument is that believing in an afterlife will make your life better somehow. So hypothetically, if you went through with this plan, and actually believed in an afterlife, then why not kill yourself? You did say you'd miss your friends and family, but you could kill them too.

@StrictlyLogical quick question: Why not kill yourself in order to get to this afterlife faster?

I meant to respond in more detail a couple of weeks ago, but forgot. Working on it now.

I don't know. It's just who I am. Peace of mind is boring.

If x is a higher value than y, that just means I would give up y in exchange for more x. Not for me.

For me, Truth is a value higher than pleasure, love, happiness, and even life itself. So I am perfectly happy to accept the limits of my existence, such as the inevitability of death.

Peikoff is hopelessly confused. A tautology is a statement that is true by virtue of its form alone. For example, "The moon is made of cheese or it is not made of cheese" is a tautology. You don't have to know ANYTHING about the moon, cheese, or any part of reality to know that it is true. An analytic statement is one that, once you replace its subject by its definition, the result is a tautology. He doesn't even realize that this is 100% unadulterated Leibnizian rationalism.

Motive still unknown.

It all depends. Each time I did marijuana was different. Not every effect listed below occurs on every use. (Also as a disclaimer, I almost always drank quite a bit of alcohol before use, so that might also have an effect). Just pick a random combination of at least three of the following: 1) Rapid heart rate. One time, so rapid, that I thought my heart would explode. 2) Severe anxiety. (This starts after about five minutes and goes away after like the first 20 minutes) 3) Intense euphoria. (This can get annoying after a while) 4) A loss of awareness of time. One time at a party I had to use the bathroom. For me it felt like 3 minutes. My friend later told me I'd been in there for 3 hours! 5) A loss of short-term memory. 6) Inability to focus on anything. Your thoughts just wonder like crazy. 7) A sensation of constantly falling or dizziness. 8) Impaired motor control. General clumbsiness and inability to walk. 9) Loss of consciousness (very short blackouts). As far as I can tell, it isn't even a little addictive. Cigarettes on the other hand... I told myself I'd try just one, and now I've been a smoker for 4 years.

It definitely has more to do with the phrasing. More specifically, it has a lot to do with popularizes of science not actually understanding QM, but, more seriously, physicists themselves didn't have a very good grasp of QM in its early days. So a lot of the old misconceptions have survived to the present day, even though quantum theory has moved on. With regard to states, nothing can ever be in two states at once. If a particle is in a superposition of two states A and B, then it is not correct to say that it is in both state A and in state B. Superposition really just means sum. So, for example, northeast is a superposition of the directions north and east (under vector addition). If you are traveling northeast, you are not traveling both due north and due east., obviously. Unfortunately, the probabilistic nature of quantum observables is inescapable.

That's an interesting argument, but it is flawed. The statements: 1) "Humans (its easier to talk about humans rather than men to avoid confusion) exist," and 2) "Humanity exists" do not have the exact same meaning, (even though I agree with you that the method of proving each is the same). Formally, I believe the distinction is as follows: 1) There exists at least one x which is an instance of Humanity. 2) There exists at least one x which is Humanity. I believe that your (and I think Rand's) mistake is that you are literally identifying Humanity with its instances. That's nonsensical because you are treating a noun and a predicate as though they were identical. The reason you are making this error is because you are failing to differentiate between a relation of identity and a relation of definition. I think it is correct (and I think you would agree) to say that 3) An abstraction x exists if and only if there exists at least one particular y such that y is an instance of x. This statement is a definition of the existence of abstractions. Thus, there is a material equivalence between 1) and 2) but no logical equivalence. It is important to make this distinction. Another way of explaining this error is like this. First, if two things A and B are identical, then the existence of one necessarily entails the existence of the other. However, one cannot flip this statement and say that because the existence of A necessarily implies the existence of B and vice versa, that therefore A is B. An obvious counterexample here is that the existence of the number 1 necessarily entails the existence of the number 2, and vice versa, but that does not mean that 1 is 2. I think you are jumping to conclusions. Saying that man is an abstraction no more implies that he is only an abstraction than saying that John is tall implies that John is characterized only by tallness.

Huh, I was thinking you were asking the second question and changed my response. Because, I mean, uhh, I concluded what I did because that is the logical conclusion?

I don't fuckin' know.