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KyaryPamyu

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    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from tadmjones in Determinism as presented by Dr. Robert Sapolsky   
    Brian Greene explicitly aligns with determinism. Kaku is indeed a defender of free will; I mistook him for someone else.
    Solvreven, I think the easiest way to get an opinion might be to provide your own short summary of Sapolski's view. I'm not familiar with his claims, so I searched on Reddit for a brief overview of his argument. I found one with lots of votes, so I'll extract the essential premise from it:
    "[O]ur bodies are subconsciously (unintentionally without our own input) acting on a series of electric waves in the brain and chemicals and hormones." (Source)
    I take the above to mean the following (which I'll write as if it were an argument):
    a) Everything that happens in my first-person perspective has a "twin" in the real world. Love and affection? Dopamine secretions. Anxiety? Cortisol. And so on. b) Dopamine and cortisol are physical things. c) Physical things act lawfully. If you drop a ball, it falls. If you touch an electric fence, you get electrocuted. d) Therefore, dopamine and cortisol act lawfully. e) Corollary: the mental "twins" of dopamine and cortisol (love and stress) also act lawfully. I will now give you my opinion on this.
    Physical things act lawfully. If a recording device observes reality for a quintillion years, it will only ever record physical things acting in a perfectly lawful manner.
    Now, let's put physical things aside for a moment. We still have one more thing to investigate: subjective first-person experience. For clarity, examples of first-person experience include: controlling how fast I'm walking on the street; deciding whether to get McDonald's tomorrow; and so on.
    Since our recording device can only observe one thing, namely physical objects, it is incapable (by design) to observe first-person subjective experience. It is cut off from some information, it works with incomplete data.
    However, human beings are privileged. They are not limited to observing their limbs, skin, toenails, organs. They have access to what is hidden from the recording device: subjective first-person experience. In addition to seeing everything that the device sees, they also know what it feels like to love, to jump, to look at a Raphael painting.
    We can now add the finishing touch: what you see introspectively is perfectly real. You really are controlling how fast you're walking, you really are deciding whether to get McDonald's. But science will deny this, and indeed, must deny this. Why so?
    Science, as it is today, does not consider introspection to be a form of faithfully perceiving something that exists. On the contrary: according to science, only the so-called outer senses (seeing, smelling, hearing, touching, tasting) record that which exists, while introspection is something that must be stripped away from science, to prevent poisoning the data with subjective elements. So for now, we must take refuge in philosophy.
    From a philosophical perspective, one possible solution to our problem can be simply stated as follows: the will is something eminently real.
    Of course, the will's existence cannot be inferred from physical objects. From the recorder's point of view, plants and animals just move in a determinate way, according to electrical and hormonal causes. However, from an animal's point of view, it acts exactly as it wants to act.
    With these results in hand, we can now look at what Objectivism claims, or rather, what Objectivists claim (since Rand wrote very little on free will).
    Some Objectivists think that "free will" is a pleonasm: where there's will, there's agency; conversely, where there's agency, there's will. This must be put to the test. Quoting my own example:
    Immediately, a new possibility shows itself to us, and it can be stated as follows: choice does not entail freedom. It just entails choice, period. Choice is choice, and nothing else.
    Human beings choose to focus, to live, to eat. This really does happen, it is no illusion. However, all choices can be traced to a sufficient explanation. It's up to philosophy to explain this harmony. I have already suggested compatibilism as a framework worth looking into.
  2. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from tadmjones in Determinism as presented by Dr. Robert Sapolsky   
    You will likely continue seeing even more, since this is the default, or "mainstream" position among popular scientists like Michio Kaku, Neil DeGrasse Tyson and Sabine Hossenfelder. Names like these will quickly pop up when you search for "free will" on YouTube.
    The meaning that Objectivism attaches to free will is quite fine and useful, namely: that you will not perform at your best in any endeavor unless you monitor yourself: "Will this sentence I'm writing get the meaning across without ambiguity?"; "Did I pick an over-complicated solution to a simple problem?" and so on. This type of self-monitoring is what Rand calls "focus," and it's not automatic. Doing it is up to you.
    Now, here's the thing. The ability to make choices, even the choice to focus or not, is not what most (philosopher) determinists typically deny. They make a much more reasonable claim: that all choices have a sufficient explanation. I will illustrate what I mean with a very general example.
    Let's say that you make a mistake. Did you do it on purpose? Of course not. Had you known in advance that you were about to make a mistake, you would have acted fast enough to avert the mistake. Now, onto the next question: what caused that mistake to happen? A sufficient reason will quickly come up: "I didn't know something like that could happen!". And what was the reason for that? "I had never encountered such a situation before, either in real life or in my education. But now I have, and will probably make use of the lesson in the future". And what is the reason for that? "Because I don't like problems." This can continue indefinitely.
    If one's definition of determinism aligns with this example, then it becomes clear that arguments like "I can make choices," or "I can focus" mean absolutely nothing. They do, however, point to the possibility of a compatibilist view (the belief that free will and determinism are mutually compatible).
    If you haven't done so already, check up Schopenhauer's prize essay, On the Freedom of the Will. It will put any modern arguments for determinism into perspective.
  3. Thanks
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in How To Be Happy   
    The mind-independent universe is mass-energy, not philosopher-armchair substance. Knowledge of mass-energy and evidence for its amount in the whole universe being conserved back to and including the Initial Singularity is a glorious fruitful quest of science alone.
    Whether there are extensionless points in spacetime is, in the armchairs of philosophers, as stuck in the mud as all the centuries they wasted over the question of whether matter was atomic or continuous. Science got the answers and subtleties of that and delivered a solid stage for bringing the world into our service.
    Elementary particle physics has it that leptons, in their particle mode, are extensionless particles, perfect points of mass. The old sayings of philosophers that extension is more fundamental than weight is sensibly (on account of modern science) left back in those moldy old armchairs.
     
    Additional Note
     
     
  4. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from tadmjones in How To Be Happy   
    A bit more context on the Will, from Frederick Beiser's Weltschmerz (2016).
    "When Schopenhauer wrote Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung in the early 1800, Naturphilosophie was in its heyday. Although Schopenhauer was critical of its wild and poetical speculations, he still makes clear in §27 of book II that he endorses some of its fundamental principles; he then proceeds to outline a conception of nature in accord with them. In the early 1800s, it was clear for Schopenhauer, and indeed most of his generation, that the mechanical view of the world had broken down entirely, and that it was no longer possible to explain matter as inert extension. The old Cartesian physics had shown itself to be utterly incapable of explaining the most basic phenomena, viz., magnetism, electricity and action at a distance. To overcome these shortcomings, it was necessary to adopt a dynamic conception of matter, according to which matter consists not in dead extension but in the interrelations of attractive and dynamic force. Even the occupation of space, which seemed primitive to the Cartesians, had to be explained in dynamic terms as the power to resist any body that would occupy the same place. Such was Kant’s argument in his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften, which was crucial for the development of romantic Naturphilosophie. However, the romantics (viz., Schelling, Baader, Oken, Eschenmeyer), went one significant step beyond Kant. They maintained that matter should be understood not only dynamically but also organically. A dynamic conception understands matter in terms of the interrelations of its forces; an organic conception conceives it in terms of an internal nisus, a spontaneous striving to realize an inner force. Only this organic concept of matter would explain—so it was argued—phenomena like electricity and magnetism, and only it could underpin the continuum of nature ruptured by Cartesian dualism.
    If we place Schopenhauer’s metaphysics in this context, then it ceases to appear like wild speculation. On the contrary, it was based on scientific orthodoxy, the best normal science of its day. Since it was founded on the latest thinking in the natural sciences, Schopenhauer could claim that his metaphysics is based upon the facts of experience after all. There is indeed nothing extravagant in calling the inner nature of inorganic things the will if we use the term in the broad sense that Schopenhauer recommends. The nisus was not simply energy or power, but also a striving, a spontaneous urging and impulse, just as Schopenhauer described it. Schopenhauer’s claim that self-consciousness of my willing is consciousness of the thing-in-itself then amounts to the thesis that the awareness I have of my willing is of the same striving, urging and impulse that is found throughout all of nature. The microcosm inside myself reflects the macrocosm outside myself (I. 238; P 162). This is hardly extravagant at all; it is at least a plausible hypothesis."
    ---
    ". . .In his Über den Willen in der Natur, which first appeared in 1836, he provided all kinds of evidence from every field of natural science—physiology, anatomy, botany, astronomy—to show that the will is the ultimate cause of organic and inorganic phenomena. If this were indeed the case, then Schopenhauer could claim that his metaphysics was keeping within his empirical guidelines, and that he was doing nothing more than interpreting and explaining appearances."
  5. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from tadmjones in How To Be Happy   
    Schopenhauer's contribution to eudemonology is the essay called Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life. I liked the second part (Counsels and Maxims) so much that I wrote a summary of the 53 pieces of advice, phrasing things in ways that aid my comprehension, and sometimes adding examples that are evocative for me. The audiobook version, narrated by the legendary David Rintoul, is a favorite listen of mine. ---   Counsels and Maxims I. General Rules 1. There is a sneaky trap built into the pursuit of pleasure: we enjoy things only in those moments when our lives are problem-free. For instance, imagine going to an art gallery with a stomach ache—your entire attention will be concentrated on getting relief from pain, and the paintings won't matter to you. However, people are naive: they're taught that it's worth incurring stomach aches (i.e. problems and complications) for the price of visits to the gallery (i.e. pleasure and joy). Those who see through the illusion will focus on escaping life unscathed, rather than on dazzling themselves. 2. When life is free of problems, our mind compensates by turning trifles into big issues. If you are annoyed by trifles, then consider yourself well off (as far as happiness goes). 3. It's a common occurrence to completely lose interest in a goal after you've already put a lot of effort into it. This is because humans are ignorant about what the future actually holds, and they assume that what they want right now is also what they'll want in the future. Therefore, instead of assuming too much, limit your plans to the not-so-distant future. II. Our Relation to Ourselves 4. In spite of the previous advice, you should have a rough plan for your life (youth, adulthood, old age). 5. Although it's wise to tend to your worries about the future, you must discipline yourself to have fun today. The present is all there is, every day is like a whole lifetime. 6. Avoid adding politics, the fate of humanity etc. into your list of preoccupations. Think about your own life instead. 7. If possible, pick intellectual hobbies, because with them, a lot less can go wrong. A side-advice: temporarily halt intellectual stuff if you're busy with practical matters. 8. Help your brain spot patterns in the chaos of life: review how your day went, every night before going to sleep. 9. Learn to be satisfied with your own company, if only to avoid the dangers associated with over-socialization. 10. Envy accomplishes absolutely nothing. Also, avoid envious people. 11. Before you set out to do something, plan well, and make preparations for unfairness and bad luck. But once you start doing, don't stop until you finish. You can't ask more than that of yourself, since you can't know in advance every possible contingency. 12. Awaken to the truth of determinism: none of your misfortunes could have been otherwise, given the knowledge and conditions you had back then. However, you should conscientiously identify your missteps and learn from them. 13. When you're stressed or tired, your brain will scare you with bogus fears. Leave plans for when you feel better. 14. Think about what it would be like to not have what you have. It's all a matter of perspective anyway. (And that's way better than fantasizing about what you don't have.) 15. Compartmentalize: do not think about things outside of the specific time you've allocated to them. 16. Tame your appetites. Don't multiply desires, decrease them. The world offers very little for people with insatiable gullets. 17. Take advantage of boredom: build something useful. 18. Your dreams of future fame and wealth are not real, they're delusions of the brain. The only thing that's real is knowledge and concrete plans. 19. The previous advice is a special case of this general principle: what is immediately present to us (a fantasy, a real-life event) tends to cloud our reason, to hide the forest and make us see only the trees. 20. Take care of your health. And don't over-strain your brain. III. Our Relation to Others 21. Character is innate and unalterable, so learn the art of putting up with people. 22. Men are united by common interests, and that's only natural. 23. Do not deal with fools and blockheads, period. It's not a growth-inducing experience. 24. People that spend their idle time thinking (instead of making noises to entertain themselves) are golden. 25. Admiration is connected with real world value, while love is often connected to bulls*it. 26. Avoid subtleties when you're around people that connect absolutely everything to themselves in some way or another, i.e. the easily offended ones. 27. If some false theory becomes mainstream, be patient—people will be forced to get it right at some point or another. 28. Do not be indulgent and charitable beyond the natural, reasonable range. People will take you for a fool. 29. Beware: people that value fairness naturally believe that others value it as well. Thus, they are highly prone to be deceived by others. And no, an outward appearance of fairness or a positive track record does not necessarily indicate that you can expect fairness. 30. Do not try to be someone you're not. Nature can't be forced. 31. If you see something contemptible in others, you have learned about something to fix in yourself. 32. People value your titles or office, not what's in your head. 33. Friendship is not what you've been taught in fairy tales. Also, appreciate the honesty of your enemies. 34. People feel threatened when they're around people they evaluate as being superior to them, so they will sometimes instinctively look for the company of people they deem to be below them. 35. Trust is hard, so don't expect it cheaply. As for you, don't give it foolishly either. 36. Politeness is the reason social harmony and order exists. 37. Do not try to perfectly replicate successful people's steps. Their circumstances (character, time, place etc.) were different from yours. 38. Getting corrected in public is a potential source of embarrassment for people. Show social intelligence by refraining from casually schooling people. 39. Speaking from facts gets you further than speaking from enthusiastic feelings. 40. Anything beyond modest self-praise can create suspicion. 41. To uncover a lie, play along with it until something incriminating comes up. In the same way, if you suspect that a certain matter is being hidden from you, pretend to have doubts about that matter—it might lead the other person to openly defend (and therefore, expose) it. 42. Information can be an unexpected, unsuspected weapon. Therefore, hide your personal affairs; show intelligence by shutting up. 43. Be glad for swindled money, for it has thought you something. 44. Learn what to expect from people by analyzing their characters. 45. There's a time and place to express your anger, and "in the midst of other people" is not it. 46. When you speak, putting emphasis on certain words can make people suspect that you're implying something about them. IV. Worldly Fortune 47. In spite of appearances, you can expect every life to be plagued by the same perennial problems, regardless of wealth and social position. 48. Adapt. Life is like chess: the way your rival plays will require you to make changes to your original plan until nothing of it remains. Also: Nature might endow you with a natural intuition for something, in contrast to the mechanical manner in which we sometimes approach tasks. 49. In moments of desperation, hold your horses. It's hard, but don't make rash decisions that you'll regret when the dust settles. 50. Don't expect anything to be obvious. If possible misfortunes were self-evident, we'd be taking prevention measures right now. 51. Misery is not a miracle, it's the norm. So, stop being surprised about it. 52. Do not confuse fate with being in a hurry and irresolute. 53. We need courage to slay life's dragons. But courage is an innate trait you might inherit or not. If you have it, use it.
  6. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from tadmjones in How To Be Happy   
    Schopenhauer was a big influence on Nietzsche, and Rand liked Nietzsche more than just a little. "His 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' is my Bible.  I can never commit suicide while I have it.", wrote Rand, answering a questionnaire, circa 1935[1]. By way of spiritual lineage, could it be that some of Schopenhauer's ethos inadvertently found its way into Objectivism? Well, probably not, but I'm getting paranoid! It's time for a trip down philosophical hall of fame.
    Like many philosophers of his era, Schopenhauer believed that jumping straight into philosophizing about this and that is irresponsible. If we're going to use philosophy to gain insights, we ought to take a look at philosophy first:
    Philosophy is concerned with explaining things, so explainability is assumed from the get go. Furthermore, if something requires an explanation, it means that it doesn't explain itself - some other thing does. In short, we assume the motion from an explanatory cause to that which it explains, from one state of matter to another.[2]
    As the above analysis indicates, things like matter, motion, cause and effect, object-for-a-subject are already built into metaphysical inquiry, like your lungs are built into your body. As for logical, mathematical or moral investigations, they each come with their own inbuilt structure as well, according to Schopenhauer.
    Interestingly, as Kant observed, those structures can mess up metaphysics big time. For instance, consider the claim that the world is One interconnected whole:
    From one angle, 'Mankind', 'The State' etc. are mere abstractions, because only real individuals exist, like Sally, John, and Suzy. From another angle, everything is just a word or name for something else: 'pillow' is a name for feathers and cotton, 'feather' is a name for alpha-keratin and beta-keratin, ad infinitum. Individuals are illusory, the Whole alone is real.
    This dilemma is rooted in the nature of the concepts themselves. Parts and wholes are two poles of a perspectival relation, similar to 'left and right', or 'here and there'. They are not something concrete like beef and candy, but ways of relating beef and candy, and all other empirical content.
    In Book II of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer proposes an alternative: instead of describing what the world is like, we might simply describe what it's like to be it. And what looks from the outside like a hand being raised, from the inside looks like raising a hand. Those are two ways of looking at the exact same thing, i.e. the angle of perception, plus the angle of a drive-for-activity.
    Quoting Robert Wicks, "as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself as they flow through everything else."[3] Schopenhauer calls this second aspect simply Will.
    Will is harmless - unless, of course, Will is perceived through human cognitive structures like part-whole relationships, each part requiring others for its being, a veritable fight for existence. And, as Rand observed, the alternative between life and death grounds all values, and therefore all joys and woes as well.
    Schopenhauer's Guide to Happiness
    Suppose you're given a choice between two computer operating systems. They are identical in every respect, save for a key difference: one is aesthetically pleasing, the other is a crime against visual design. Which one would you pick? Most people would probably pick the pretty one.
    Sure, being biased toward beauty makes sense in a sexual context, but come on - we're talking about pixels smeared on a screen! But Schopenhauer would have explained that the value of graphic design lies precisely in its uselessness for things like booting speed, security, software selection and the rest.
    Beauty is a normative ideal for what something ought to look like. It's not an individual, it's a unified standard that individuals can succeed or fail at embodying. Thus, archetypes are not specifically concerned with you, or your friends, or what has been or will be; they make you think in Absolute terms rather than relative ones. In other words, during aesthetic contemplation, you lacking something doesn't even cognitively register.
    Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that at the core, we are neither fragments nor wholes, but simply Reality proper. Remembering this can lead us to a more laid-back and friendly attitude to the world. In effect, we see ourselves in others. Universal empathy is, thus, another mark of happy individuals, according to Schopenhauer. And it's just as rare as artistic genius.
    But those are temporary. If we're honest, the only way to not be disturbed by anything ever is to not care about anything to begin with. Sometimes this attitude comes naturally to individuals who are genuinely fed up with the cycle of distress. They will gladly ignore their leftover habitual clinging - a "dark night of the soul" - for the prize of tranquility. Asceticism, then, is the aesthetic or ethical consciousness made permanent.
    However, poetic genius, empathy or ascetic inclination are reserved for extraordinary people, and those are one in a million. Everyone else must study the science of happiness, which Schopenhauer calls eudaemonology (Greek εὐδαίμων [happy] + λόγος [treatise]). However, just in case we forget that the world is not a problem-free place, Schopenhauer elaborates that the 'happy' part is an euphemism for "living tolerably."[4]
    So, what should we do to become cheerful, according to eudaemonology? Well, that's a trick question. We don't do things to become cheerful; we do things because we're cheerful. The "genial flow of good spirits" is like the zoomies your cat or dog has, an energy that flows naturally from your constitution. Once possessed by it, you blow off steam by engaging in activity. "To secure and promote this feeling of cheerfulness should be the supreme aim of all our endeavors after happiness", says Schopenhauer in The Wisdom of Life.
    He adds that nothing opens the gate to cheerfulness more than your physical condition, since the state of your body is also the state of your mind. However, "a man may be perfectly sound in his physique and still possess a melancholy temperament and be generally given up to sad thoughts. The ultimate cause of this is undoubtedly to be found in innate, and therefore unalterable, physical constitution."
    Schopenhauer presents us with an indirect route to a bearable (and if fate allows, enjoyable) life. "The first and foremost rule for the wise conduct of life seems to me to be contained in a view to which Aristotle parenthetically refers in the Nichomachean Ethics: [Greek: o phronimoz to alupon dioke e ou to aedu] or, as it may be rendered, not pleasure, but freedom from pain, is what the wise man will aim at."[5] In other words, it's impossible to enjoy ourselves when we are in pain, so we ought to always set the stage for happiness by keeping preventable woes at bay.
    (What about un-preventable problems, though? They are not the Boogeymen you think they are, according to Schopenhauer. His analysis of that is well worth a read.)
    Rand and Schopenhauer
    I did not feel discouragement very often, and when I did, it did not last longer than overnight. But there was one evening, during the writing of The Fountainhead, when I felt so profound an indignation at the state of "things as they are" that it seemed as if I would never regain the energy to move one step farther toward "things as they ought to be." Frank talked to me for hours, that night. He convinced me of why one cannot give up the world to those one despises. By the time he finished, my discouragement was gone; it never came back in so intense a form.[6]
    It did come back though, even in that less intense a form. Rand was not exactly shy about making it known that the world isn't as it could be and ought to be. But Rand is Rand. It seems to me that Rand treats life the same way she treats a lover. When you love someone, even their flaws become glamorized to some extent. It's as if saying "although I don't necessarily approve of this flaw, even it is marked with my lover's scent." (Other people's flaws can go to hell.)
    You know that a novel is a drama before you place your order on Amazon. That's what novels are, and novels are what you're into. So with life. I think Nietzsche had this element as well, of romanticizing life itself. And let me tell you: this is not for everyone. If you're not that kind of person, philosophy won't turn you into one. This romantic spirit might be like musical inclination, or introversion, or (as Schopenhauer says) physically-induced melancholy.
    Corollary: to fully grasp all the nooks and crannies of Objectivism, or Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, your spirit must already be a little bit like theirs.
    ----------
    FOOTNOTES
    [1] See the first footnote of Lester Hunt's essay, Ayn Rand’s Evolving View of Friedrich Nietzsche.
    [2] For Schopenhauer, human cognition is built around the principle of sufficient reason, to which he dedicates his PhD thesis, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813).
    [3] Wicks, Robert, Arthur Schopenhauer, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
    [4] Schopenhauer, Arthur, Introduction to Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life.
    [5] ———. Counsels and Maxims, §1.
    [6] Rand, Ayn, Introduction to The Fountainhead.
  7. Sad
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from EC in Rand and Kant Being Friends   
    No, it's not:
    ---
    From different premises, that's the whole point.
    Despite seemingly deal-breaking differences, both Rand and Kant were adults living in a world where success requires acquring a lot of practical wisdom. Combine that with their ferocious intellects and you're bound to learn a lot of profound lessons from reading both. The injustice done to Kant by O'ist thinkers is also important, but pales in comparision to this.
    The list is extracted from the OP. The context is there, though anybody who wants more on this can search it up.
    Never said that.
    No, you need that for your specific purposes. Not 'we' - as in, the whole forum. 

    The premise you're smuggling in here is that there's one, and only one, proper way to discuss books, such as your
    and if you don't do it like that, that's not in accord with the Rules of Philosophy, section 73, paragraph 2.
    I do whatever I want. The OP is a presentation in a language that (I hope) a five-year old or layman could understand. I'm not doing something as grandiose as defending a thesis, dressed in formal wear with PowerPoint presentations behind my back, being very careful about what my distinguished colleagues/blog readers might think about how I phrased paragraph 42.
    -----
    You're right Stephen, there is dissonance between Kant and Rand regarding this issue. Though this is not also true of Fichte and the early Schelling, who wanted to 'finish' Kant's project. My interest is in exploring affinities between O'ism and Kantianism, including other (major) Kantians.
    Fichte also dissolves the duty-pleasure dichotomy:
     
  8. Like
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in How To Be Happy   
    KP— Rand was continually and deeply at odds with Nietzsche, as shown in my Nietzsche v. Rand series. And surely any kinship in feeling she had with his outlooks went flat as she developed her philosophy. I have a favorite passage in Z, Before Sunrise, though only when I've stricken or bent some of that text. I read Nietzsche though I don't have any kinship to his spirit. Once I had studied him far enough, my overall feeling toward him was revulsion. In that I've some likeness with Rand's spirit. Indeed, I've much affection for her spirit.
    My feeling towards the spirit of Schopenhauer is some warmth. I see now that "Counsels and Maxims" is contained within my copy of volume II of his Parega and Paralipomena, which I've yet to study. What I've studied of him pretty well thus far are The Four-Fold Root of Sufficient Reason, On the Basis of Morality, and The World as Will and Presentation. I thought that he agreed with Kant in thinking that happiness and morality are regularly at odds, though he disagreed with Kant on what was the basis and content of right morality. I thought Nietzsche came to be at odds with Schopenhaur concerning the nature of the will and evaluation of the will. Certainly Nietzsche came to sharp disagreement with Schopenhauer on the rightness of indulging in empathy, compassion, and pity (starting at least by the time of Daybreak 133). He put Schopenhauer among those secularists still clinging to Christian virtues, which should be discarded, at least the ones distinctive of that religion. It's hard to think of Nietzsche thinking highly of happiness, his sights of blessedness being conflict and beings higher than we humans from which they, the higher, might emerge.
    Rand made enjoyment of life the purpose of morality (for genius and common person alike), unlike Schopenhauer or Nietzsche, it seems. Where Schopenhauer has the sensible goal for humans to be painlessness and not pleasure, Rand would spit, I'd think. And communion with Idea, Schopenhauer's redemption from life in art, is opposite the metaphysical import Rand sees in art. In quick sum, so far, I'm thinking you've got too much commonality among these three philosophers, at least in their mature views.
    Delicious topic. Stimulating. Thanks for sharing this. 
  9. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from Boydstun in How To Be Happy   
    Schopenhauer was a big influence on Nietzsche, and Rand liked Nietzsche more than just a little. "His 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' is my Bible.  I can never commit suicide while I have it.", wrote Rand, answering a questionnaire, circa 1935[1]. By way of spiritual lineage, could it be that some of Schopenhauer's ethos inadvertently found its way into Objectivism? Well, probably not, but I'm getting paranoid! It's time for a trip down philosophical hall of fame.
    Like many philosophers of his era, Schopenhauer believed that jumping straight into philosophizing about this and that is irresponsible. If we're going to use philosophy to gain insights, we ought to take a look at philosophy first:
    Philosophy is concerned with explaining things, so explainability is assumed from the get go. Furthermore, if something requires an explanation, it means that it doesn't explain itself - some other thing does. In short, we assume the motion from an explanatory cause to that which it explains, from one state of matter to another.[2]
    As the above analysis indicates, things like matter, motion, cause and effect, object-for-a-subject are already built into metaphysical inquiry, like your lungs are built into your body. As for logical, mathematical or moral investigations, they each come with their own inbuilt structure as well, according to Schopenhauer.
    Interestingly, as Kant observed, those structures can mess up metaphysics big time. For instance, consider the claim that the world is One interconnected whole:
    From one angle, 'Mankind', 'The State' etc. are mere abstractions, because only real individuals exist, like Sally, John, and Suzy. From another angle, everything is just a word or name for something else: 'pillow' is a name for feathers and cotton, 'feather' is a name for alpha-keratin and beta-keratin, ad infinitum. Individuals are illusory, the Whole alone is real.
    This dilemma is rooted in the nature of the concepts themselves. Parts and wholes are two poles of a perspectival relation, similar to 'left and right', or 'here and there'. They are not something concrete like beef and candy, but ways of relating beef and candy, and all other empirical content.
    In Book II of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer proposes an alternative: instead of describing what the world is like, we might simply describe what it's like to be it. And what looks from the outside like a hand being raised, from the inside looks like raising a hand. Those are two ways of looking at the exact same thing, i.e. the angle of perception, plus the angle of a drive-for-activity.
    Quoting Robert Wicks, "as one is a part of the universe as is everything else, the basic energies of the universe flow through oneself as they flow through everything else."[3] Schopenhauer calls this second aspect simply Will.
    Will is harmless - unless, of course, Will is perceived through human cognitive structures like part-whole relationships, each part requiring others for its being, a veritable fight for existence. And, as Rand observed, the alternative between life and death grounds all values, and therefore all joys and woes as well.
    Schopenhauer's Guide to Happiness
    Suppose you're given a choice between two computer operating systems. They are identical in every respect, save for a key difference: one is aesthetically pleasing, the other is a crime against visual design. Which one would you pick? Most people would probably pick the pretty one.
    Sure, being biased toward beauty makes sense in a sexual context, but come on - we're talking about pixels smeared on a screen! But Schopenhauer would have explained that the value of graphic design lies precisely in its uselessness for things like booting speed, security, software selection and the rest.
    Beauty is a normative ideal for what something ought to look like. It's not an individual, it's a unified standard that individuals can succeed or fail at embodying. Thus, archetypes are not specifically concerned with you, or your friends, or what has been or will be; they make you think in Absolute terms rather than relative ones. In other words, during aesthetic contemplation, you lacking something doesn't even cognitively register.
    Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that at the core, we are neither fragments nor wholes, but simply Reality proper. Remembering this can lead us to a more laid-back and friendly attitude to the world. In effect, we see ourselves in others. Universal empathy is, thus, another mark of happy individuals, according to Schopenhauer. And it's just as rare as artistic genius.
    But those are temporary. If we're honest, the only way to not be disturbed by anything ever is to not care about anything to begin with. Sometimes this attitude comes naturally to individuals who are genuinely fed up with the cycle of distress. They will gladly ignore their leftover habitual clinging - a "dark night of the soul" - for the prize of tranquility. Asceticism, then, is the aesthetic or ethical consciousness made permanent.
    However, poetic genius, empathy or ascetic inclination are reserved for extraordinary people, and those are one in a million. Everyone else must study the science of happiness, which Schopenhauer calls eudaemonology (Greek εὐδαίμων [happy] + λόγος [treatise]). However, just in case we forget that the world is not a problem-free place, Schopenhauer elaborates that the 'happy' part is an euphemism for "living tolerably."[4]
    So, what should we do to become cheerful, according to eudaemonology? Well, that's a trick question. We don't do things to become cheerful; we do things because we're cheerful. The "genial flow of good spirits" is like the zoomies your cat or dog has, an energy that flows naturally from your constitution. Once possessed by it, you blow off steam by engaging in activity. "To secure and promote this feeling of cheerfulness should be the supreme aim of all our endeavors after happiness", says Schopenhauer in The Wisdom of Life.
    He adds that nothing opens the gate to cheerfulness more than your physical condition, since the state of your body is also the state of your mind. However, "a man may be perfectly sound in his physique and still possess a melancholy temperament and be generally given up to sad thoughts. The ultimate cause of this is undoubtedly to be found in innate, and therefore unalterable, physical constitution."
    Schopenhauer presents us with an indirect route to a bearable (and if fate allows, enjoyable) life. "The first and foremost rule for the wise conduct of life seems to me to be contained in a view to which Aristotle parenthetically refers in the Nichomachean Ethics: [Greek: o phronimoz to alupon dioke e ou to aedu] or, as it may be rendered, not pleasure, but freedom from pain, is what the wise man will aim at."[5] In other words, it's impossible to enjoy ourselves when we are in pain, so we ought to always set the stage for happiness by keeping preventable woes at bay.
    (What about un-preventable problems, though? They are not the Boogeymen you think they are, according to Schopenhauer. His analysis of that is well worth a read.)
    Rand and Schopenhauer
    I did not feel discouragement very often, and when I did, it did not last longer than overnight. But there was one evening, during the writing of The Fountainhead, when I felt so profound an indignation at the state of "things as they are" that it seemed as if I would never regain the energy to move one step farther toward "things as they ought to be." Frank talked to me for hours, that night. He convinced me of why one cannot give up the world to those one despises. By the time he finished, my discouragement was gone; it never came back in so intense a form.[6]
    It did come back though, even in that less intense a form. Rand was not exactly shy about making it known that the world isn't as it could be and ought to be. But Rand is Rand. It seems to me that Rand treats life the same way she treats a lover. When you love someone, even their flaws become glamorized to some extent. It's as if saying "although I don't necessarily approve of this flaw, even it is marked with my lover's scent." (Other people's flaws can go to hell.)
    You know that a novel is a drama before you place your order on Amazon. That's what novels are, and novels are what you're into. So with life. I think Nietzsche had this element as well, of romanticizing life itself. And let me tell you: this is not for everyone. If you're not that kind of person, philosophy won't turn you into one. This romantic spirit might be like musical inclination, or introversion, or (as Schopenhauer says) physically-induced melancholy.
    Corollary: to fully grasp all the nooks and crannies of Objectivism, or Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, your spirit must already be a little bit like theirs.
    ----------
    FOOTNOTES
    [1] See the first footnote of Lester Hunt's essay, Ayn Rand’s Evolving View of Friedrich Nietzsche.
    [2] For Schopenhauer, human cognition is built around the principle of sufficient reason, to which he dedicates his PhD thesis, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (1813).
    [3] Wicks, Robert, Arthur Schopenhauer, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
    [4] Schopenhauer, Arthur, Introduction to Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life.
    [5] ———. Counsels and Maxims, §1.
    [6] Rand, Ayn, Introduction to The Fountainhead.
  10. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from The Laws of Biology in "The pursuit of truth is not important." What is the context and meaning of that Ayn Rand quote?   
    Not a real quote. Looks like it was added to Goodreads.com and a few other sites.
  11. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from tadmjones in Hypothetically, if scientific consensus became that objects do not exist independent of consciousness, could Objectivism stand?   
    Hi Frank,
    I have pondered this question a lot myself. In my experience, O'ist arguments against the primacy of consciousness can be divided into four classes:
    1. The 'Analytic' Argument
    Analytic judgements are allegedly true in virtue of the word's definition, e.g., 'all triangles have three sides'. In this example, the arguing party will uncritically assume the following definition of consciousness: 'being aware of things which are independent of consciousness itself' - and will provide the 'analytic' argument:
    Consciousness means being conscious of something; Existence precedes consciousness. Q.E.D Ironically, arguing from definitions and/or upholding the 'analytic-synthetic' dichotomy is an argumentation error which O'ists call rationalism.
    2. The Anstoß Argument
    Anstoß is a philosophical term introduced by a famous idealist philosopher to designate an obstacle, hindrance, or 'something that offends freedom'. The Objectivist argument goes like this: I can't choose to not see the color green; no matter how much I try, I see it all around. I can't even control my own sense-perception, so the limitation must be rooted in the nature of some physical organ.
    However, arguing from common-sense is not an argument at all. For example, because visual perceptions exhibit color, people have long assumed that things 'out-there' really are colored. Philosophy and science are supposed to free us from such errors of common-sense, not to defend them. 'Limitation' does not logically imply that the limit is caused by something outside of consciousness itself.
    3. Argumentum ad Peikoffum
    A (mistaken) O'ist characterization of Kant's philosophy is that Kant declared consciousness to be invalid because it has identity, or because it must process knowledge. In a twist of irony, Objectivists sometimes drop this charge altogheter, and replace it with its opposite: that idealists do not believe that consciousness has identity. Then, they go on to argue that if consciousness has no identity, it does not operate lawfully, and hence A is not A. Oh my Aristotle!
    However, a closer examination of Idealism will reveal that, in such systems, consciousness exists, is an instance of identity, knows of itself, has an 'in-itself' external to conscious experience (self-in-itself, ParaBrahman), that it operates by necessary laws, and that such facts are true even if consciousness itself denies them. Oh, did I mention that many idealists got into trouble due to charges of atheism, and that, although the charges were false, idealistic atheism is a real thing? 
    Things like these are not difficult to find if one simply scans the first pages of any important idealist system:
    (This comes from a philosopher that didn't even believe in Kant's thing-in-itself, let alone in a mind-independent world.)
    4. The 'System' Argument
    According to some Objectivists, if the mind creates its world, then A is no longer A, capitalism is false, rationality is useless, chickens will take over humans as the master-race, and Kalman's operettas are pessimistic-propaganda in disguise.
    However, most systematic idealist philosophies start with the world and its laws (the same world and laws which are meticulously described by Peikoff in OPAR), then proceed to give a transcendental account of how this world arises from consciousness. This means that, yes, the Objectivist ethics, politics etc, can be 100% true even if they are grounded in the laws of some mind-in-itself.
    I actually made a case like this a few months ago when I posted an outline of Schelling's 1800 System. Schelling takes the cue from Kant's conception of genius, namely that artists create in a lawful manner, bound by certain strict laws, yet without actually learning those laws beforehand. According to him, this makes art sui-generis, because even the scientific discoveries of geniuses like Newton can still be attributed to methods of investigation which are available to everyone. According to Schelling, the mind-in-itself is precisely such an artist, unwittingly finding itself in the spatio-temporal world of mechanical causation as a result of its striving to represent itself. My point was that this metaphysical view still leads Schelling to OPAR's familiar features, such as the stress on adjusting nature to man by using reason to penetrate its laws, and many other nice things. The reception was lukewarm; there were some great replies, which addressed the notion of 'conditions for possibility'. Apart from that, some people got hung up on how I used a certain word, or on whether I'm talking smack about Objectivism's reception of Kant - completely missing the actual purpose of the thread. Looks like this subject has resurfaced in this thread, with Schelling being replaced by quantum physics.
    ----
    To conclude, Frank, I noticed that this particular subject is of great interest to you (since many of your threads are dedicated to this aspect of metaphysics). I think that, if OPAR's arguments did not satisfy you, you're likely going to find the same unsatisfying arguments on this forum as well. My advice to you is to either study idealism (which will help you identify precisely what is causing your dissatisfaction with OPAR), or to look for articles written by Objectivists who have studied idealism themselves, because not everybody who studied O'ism in depth is automatically able to give you an O'ist critique of every metaphysical view, unless they are acquainted with said theories.
  12. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from Boydstun in Atlas Read-Through   
    Eddie believed that the oak tree from his childhood was so strong that "if a giant were to seize it by the top, he would not be able to uproot it, but would swing the hill and the whole of the earth with it". However, a lightning strike revealed that the tree's trunk was, in fact, hollow. In a similar way, Eddie subconsciously suspects that New York's trunk is hollow (for example, due to the stores going out of business).
    Nevertheless, Eddie is unable to identify why he feels a sense of impending doom, or why he connects this feeling to the oak tree. So he shrugs it off, thinking he's just imagining things. No heroism here 😛
    According to Jim, a feudal serf works for the prosperity of his employer, without caring if his employer is ethical or helps society etc. Eddie disagrees that there's a dichotomy between making money and being ethical, so he matter-of-factly accepts the moniker.
  13. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from dream_weaver in Freedom Versus 'Freedom'   
    Institutes like ARI and TAS follow a specific 'marketing plan', so I think it's worth considering what can and cannot be achieved by those plans. For the rest of us, who didn't choose a career in promoting Objectivism, I wholly agree with you on simply doing our thing and enjoying life.
    History abounds with philosopher-writers: Schiller, Dostoevsky, Sartre, Camus are prime examples. I noticed that many of them have at least one organization attached to their name. I think the Ayn Rand Institute is exactly that: an organization dedicated to promoting Ayn Rand's work - of which Objectivism is but one strand among many. Such an organization can expect precisely what, for example, the Albert Camus Society can expect: bringing together veteran fans, attracting a few new ones, and encouraging new scholarly research. 
    In this respect, I think the Atlas Society (the open-system advocate) is different from ARI. Imagine that a few intellectuals took it upon themselves to expand the philosophy of Camus. Well, you obviously can't do that, because Camus is Camus. So I think that TAS is, in fact, offering an alternative to Rand's system-as-she-left-it. (Of course, offering such an alternative is compatible with promoting Ayn Rand the philosopher-writer).
    If, let's say, 10% of the population read Camus, quoted Camus, attended lectures on Camus every summer, adopted his terminology verbatim, imitated his manner of acting, and excommunicated various individuals, what would we call that? A cult, or a fanatical fan base. Human knowledge is a decentralized business. People can accept Camus' ideas without liking his novels or haircut. No one is commiting a folly by choosing to never read Camus himself, and relying instead on accurate presentations by other authors. This is what it means for knowledge to successfully 'infect' the world. Science and philosophy cannot have Jesus-figures.
    Anyone who is committed to promoting Objectivism should imagine the following scenario: a world where everybody learns Objectivist ideas from K-pop and TV dramas, but barely anyone has heard of Atlas Shrugged and Ayn Rand. If said promoters find no problem with this picture, there's a high chance they're committed to spreading the philosophy, rather than to spreading Ayn Rand's writings.
  14. Like
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in Reason and Value by Roderick Long   
    3/19/23 – Live link 
  15. Like
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in Freedom Versus 'Freedom'   
    My spirit does not "revolt against limitation, all limitation." Without limitations there is no such thing as freedom or a bed that has been made or a word that has been said or written. Without limitations of structure and dynamics, there is no such thing as life, from amoeba to us. Limitations and our creativity utilizing them is all our engineering and all loveliness made by us.
  16. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from Boydstun in Freedom Versus 'Freedom'   
    Objectivism upholds the 'if/then' model of morality ('if you want X, do Y'). At first glance, this is completely incompatible with the Categorical Imperative, which simply demands you to 'do it', no matter the context or situation. However, in philosophical discussion, the restrictive CI is always connected to concepts such as freedom, autonomy and human dignity, so what gives? Since human freedom is a hot topic for Objectivism as well, perhaps we can extract some nuggets of truth from the CI's two most popular formulations (those of Kant and Fichte). After a brief presentation of both, I'll tackle the issue of human autonomy, as applicable to the Objectivist Ethics.
    ______
    Kant and the CI
    Kant tackled morality as part of a wider project encompassing the human faculties: reason (theory), conscience (morality) and taste (aesthetics). In the first installment of his project (The Critique of Pure Reason), he argued that in conscious experience, when the world undergoes changes, it still remains the same world, and thus, you also remain the same self throughout. He then shows how certain relations, such as causality, enable this sameness-in-difference. But, although you can prove that such relations are necessay for preserving the sameness of the self, Kant claims that it's an unjustified leap to assume that the exact same relations operate beyond the senses (Prolegomena, § 28). Reason is extremely tempted to do that, but whenever it tries to make claims about what lies beyond experience, it short-circuits and ends up in antinomies, i.e. for a given metaphysical thesis, it can also prove its opposite, the antithesis.
    However, since we're endowed with certain faculties such as moral conscience, we can show that certain assumptions are justified, albeit not provable. For example, morality presupposes a belief in freedom, i.e., in the ability to cause an action of our own will, without being forced to cause it. This model can be formally expressed as 'just do it' (the Categorical Imperative). The CI's rival is the Hypothetical Imperative, which can be expressed as follows: 'Do X, but only if you want to attain Y'.
    According to Kant, since the CI is implicit in freedom of action, our concrete actions should be in harmony with that. For example, it's not possible to 'just lie', because lying depends on first building trust; this turns lying into a Hypothetical, rather than Categorical imperative. Kant also thought that human conscience is innately biased toward the CI, and that following the HI takes a toll on our dignity (in the latter, freedom is merely the 'freedom' to dutifully comply with everything nature asks you to do, like a good boy/girl). Since the phenomenal self is rooted in the noumenal self (outside of the senses), it's reasonable to assume that both selves are in harmony somehow, even if it looks as if maintaining the CI is sometimes impractical or useless.
    Fichte's Formulation
    Fichte believed that the proposition 'A exists' does not have universal truth, since 'A' could be a unicorn or a talking chinchilla. However, the proposition 'A = A' does have universal validity, and grounds all of logic. He wanted to track the source of this universal validity, and allegedly found it. He explained that, in self-consciousness, the self (as subject) relates itself to its own self (as object). Thus, in the proposition 'I = I', the mind opposes the two terms, then relates them (in ITOE-parlance, ‘differentiates and integrates’ them). While the truth of 'A exists' is conditional upon what 'A' stands for, the truth of 'A = A' is universal, since it points to an actual content, namely, the unity of subject and object.
    Theoretical Portion Thesis: I am I. Antithesis: However, I (the subject) am also not I (the object). Those two are distinct, opposed. Synthesis: The 'I' and 'Not-I' co-exist, each having some quantity relative to the other. As you can see, rational integration (synthesis) does not succeed in resolving the separation of subject and object, it merely makes them cohabit. To properly achieve the unification that theoretical reason failed at, we'll simply have to incorporate this 'Not-I' into ourselves, through practical reason. In other words, if our bodies can follow our wills, so can the rest of material nature. Needless to say, that's a daunting project (but doable). Science, technology, art etc. will become our tools for this project.
    Rand and the Choice To Live
    Nature blackmails us with endless conditions to fulfill, so at first glance, it looks as if we're only 'free' to dutifully obey whatever nature nags us to do. One of the things I find remarkable about Rand's ethics, is that the basic choice underlying the 'if/then' model is unconditional. More specifically, the choice to live is a pre-moral choice, a precondition for the possibility of morality. Unfortunately, I think OPAR kind of ruins this insight by phrasing things like some pious cleric:
    No thanks. I'm not bowing my head to anything. Contrast this with Rand's own presentation:
    That’s a big difference of emphasis. A free being does not pursue life because it's forced to do so by natural appetites, but rather: pursues life (with all of its appetites) as an act of freedom. Back to OPAR:
    After claiming that the choice to live is pre-moral, Peikoff tactlessly brings up the rungs of hell, suggesting moral condemnation for the sin of not 'accepting reality' (choosing life). Kelley made fun of this in one of his lectures.
    I just want to empathize how truly radical the 'pre-moral' idea is. Obviously, there's a stark difference between the CI and the Objectivist Ethics. The CI does not even allow people to take their own lives, because that would remove from existence an instrument of freedom. But Objectivism roots the fundamental choice in our absolute autonomy. Not in mechanical causality, not in nature's whims or in externally imposed edicts, but in us.
    When it comes to those philosophies that uphold 'freedom for it's own sake' (e.g. Fichte's system of ethics), it's tempting to retort: 'no, it's freedom for life's sake'. But the dignity of freedom is so important, that its absence can completely absolish a person's desire to live. As always, one needs to go beyond what's 'technically true' and see the living, breathing reality that faces us. Another example: it's perfectly valid to speak of one's body as a tool/machine for one's will. Rand herself does this in Galt's Speech (FTNI, pg. 130) without contradicting her thesis that a person is an indivisible entity. Likewise, for Fichte, the 'Absolute I' is merely the target; the 'real I' is always a mind-body trying to incorporate the rest of nature into its will.
    I think there's a grain of truth in the idea that the desire for freedom somehow underpins all of our actions. We strive for a perfect state of affairs that will finally satisfy us, yet the moment we find something that fits the bill, we're struck by its ghastly restrictiveness and incompleteness. The spirit revolts against limitation, all limitation.
    Perhaps, if Objectivist 'activists' focused on presenting reason as a tool for freedom, we'd see a spike in interest for the philosophy. Personally, I'm definitely not in the camp of people that consider that it's not necessary to 'sell' reason to the masses. No human being is interested in something, unless that something bears positively on his freedom. At least, that's what attracted me to The Fountainhead and VoS in the first place: the fact that Rand wrote about the autonomy of the human spirit.
    To this day, I still don't care about fawning over how cool Ancient Greece was, or about cringey polemics regarding alternative logics. This is another fact to consider: there might be Objectivists out there who don't care about most of the Objectivist memes, and maybe, *gasp*, they don't even enjoy Atlas Shrugged. All the more reason to focus on properly marketing the philosophy (forgive my blasphemous language), rather than struggling to pull in 500-1000 'rational newcomers' per year, of which at least a portion will be dogmatists who don't care to challenge their views, anyway.
    ______
    Further Reading
    A brief, interesting overview of Kant's work Kant's weird list of 'duties' (notice the Christian influences) Stephen Boydstun's thorough coverage of Kant's moral theory in relation to Rand's A review of Michelle Kosch's book on Fichte's Ethics
  17. Thanks
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Eiuol in An Objectivist on Vacation   
    1. What do you mean by claim independence? If your point here is that some truths are independent of what somebody claims but are nonetheless dependent on something about their mind, that seems to be exactly what Rand thinks about emotions, and any kind of judgment that involves emotion. 
    2. Consistent with how Rand thinks knowledge ultimately comes from induction.
    3. In what way would Rand disagree? I would not say she said anything explicit about this, but it looks fine.
    4. Actually, even the claim about how consciousness is an axiomatic concept affirms how Rand sees introspection and extrospection as a form of sensing. 
    5. Sounds great, it's only a doubt to the extent that I don't think Rand said anything about this one way or the other. 
    6. I think that Oist review one perception is that percept and object is unified as far as the act of perception is concerned. That flows from the Aristotelian nature of what Rand says about perception. He was quite explicit about the unification of the perceiver and the object being perceived. 
    7. Not sure I see the objection.
    8. Your doubts seem to be coming from a strawman by now. Yeah, you are trying to preempt an objection, but who would come up with that kind of objection? 
    9. Seems consistent with the way Rand argued against God. Just because reality coheres in a certain way doesn't mean that it had to come from a creator. I know that's not what you're addressing, but the form of the argument is the same.
    10 & 11. These are the only doubts that I think even count as doubts. But it is such a minor doubt, it's more of a semantic disagreement. 
    12. This is the only substantial doubt you've listed. 
    Most of it is stuff that is entirely consistent with Oism, and the people you're disagreeing with probably are not thoroughly versed in Oist epistemology. Then again, I find that there is some kind split about views on the nature of consciousness within the Oist community. The question "can AI ever become conscious?" shows it just about every time. It's not that the answer to the question itself is what makes a difference, but it's a quick way to get a sense of their underlying views.
  18. Like
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in An Objectivist on Vacation   
    Kant was correct in noticing that I think or these thoughts are mine can be truly attached to any human cognition. Today we would investigate how far that is so for a young child or for higher animals besides us.
    However, one can acknowledge this insight of Kant's without taking self-relation of the mature human mind as subversive of or more primitive than the mind's self-to-things-not-self relation. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas expressed the truth that if one thinks, then one exists, but without making that into a most assured and primitive truth of human natural epistemology, as was done later by Descartes.
    ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    As you likely know, it is a secondary matter, ultimately, what is one's own philosophy or one's own position on various specific issues in their relation to some other philosophy, such as Rand's. Relation of your philosophic views concerning the world and fellow human beings to facts of them is primary. 
  19. Thanks
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Grames in Hypothetically, if scientific consensus became that objects do not exist independent of consciousness, could Objectivism stand?   
    From my notes on Dr. Kelley's "Evidence of the Senses" the outline of his take on the issue is as follows:
    ...
    II. Primacy of Existence cannot be proven
    A. Proof cannot begin by premising facts external to consciousness because that begs the question
    B. Proof cannot begin by premising facts about consciousness as that contradicts the thesis that facts external to consciousness must be known first before awareness of awareness is possible
    C. There are no other kinds of premises
    D. Primacy of Existence cannot be a conclusion
    E. "P of E" is self-evident not arbitrary or an act of faith
    F. "P of E" is axiomatic because existence is implicit in any and all instances of awareness, any attempt to deny it affirms it
    G. The third person external perspective when used to explain consciousness is implicitly a primacy of existence perspective.
    ...
    This and more, all in the first chapter.  I wonder if you are familiar with the work?
  20. Like
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Grames in Will AI teach us that Objectivism is correct?   
    What does "machine" mean and imply? There is an error in philosophy Rand to referred to as the "mind-body dichotomy" which insisted consciousness and all things spiritual was immaterial and that the body was material and therefore mechanical.  "Machine" means and implies the "body" side of the mind-body dichotomy and so by definition cannot be conscious or ever volitional.  In addition to all the arguments against the mind-body dichotomy which Rand had made I have my own ontological insight which I owe to modernity and science.   
    Philosophy is often said to start with Thales who tried to assert "everything was water".  Fast forwarding through thousands of years, we have Newton and others teaching that there is matter and energy.  Then Einstein taught that matter and energy are the same thing, in that one can be transformed into the other.  But the man the people forget is Claude Shannon who founded information theory as a field of study.  Fundamentally what exists is matter/energy and information.  All information exists in the form of some mass/energy and no mass/energy can exist without bearing information.   There can be no "pure mind" or "pure body", only ever a comingling of both.
    All discrete systems from inert rocks to microbes to people can be graded on a spectrum as to how elaborate is their information processing capacity.  Somewhere on the higher end consciousness becomes possible and then beyond that volition.   This is why I conclude volition is possible in non-human and even non-organic forms.  
  21. Thanks
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in Rand and Kant Being Friends   
    KyaryPamyu,
    So far as I recall, Kant did not write of his categories of the understanding as a universal grammar. He did write of general logic being analogous to a universal grammar. 
    From the Jäsche Logic: 
    “[We] set aside all knowledge that we can only borrow from objects, and reflect simply on the exercise of the understanding in general, [and] then we discover those rules which are absolutelay necessary, and independently of any particular objects of thought, because without them we cannot think at all. These rules, accordingly, can be discerned a priori, that is, independently of all experience, because they contain merely the conditions of the use of the understanding in general, whether pure or empirical, without distinction of its objects. . . . The science, therefore, which contains these universal and necessary laws is simply a science of the form of thought.” (Cf. KrV A52–55 B76–79)
    “Hence, also, it follows that the universal and necessary laws of thought can only be concerned with its form, not in anywise with its matter. The science, therefore, which contains these universal and necessary laws is simply a science of the form of thought. And we can form a conception of the possibility of such a science, just as a universal grammar which contains nothing beyond the mere form of language, without words, which belong to the matter of language.”
    That last sentence gives us some idea of what Kant means by saying that reflection on the exercise of the understanding enables us to discern absolutely necessary rules of our thought such as the constraint against contradictions. This reflection, then, is Kant’s replacement for Aristotle’s ‘intuitive induction’. Before school age, we follow elementary grammar in speaking our native language. We conform to that language’s grammar a good deal, and it has become habitual. We learn expressly what grammatical forms we are following and should be following from grammar school (after we have learned to write). Some earlier humans had to have reflected on the language, such as Latin or German, to have discovered its grammar. Kant’s analogy on the use, express statement, and normativity of grammar with the use, express statement, and normativity of logic that Jäsche and Abbott here publicize is corroborated as standard in Kant’s lectures on logic by student notes, the Bloomberg (early 1770’s), the Dohna-Wundlacken (1792), and the Vienna. The D-W notes indicate that because logic must contain a priori principles, “logic is a science and grammar is not, because its rules are contingent” (page 432 in Young 1992). I should mention that in Kant’s various remarks on logic, talk of the necessary v. the contingent is shorthand for (what is earlier stated as) the absolutely necessary v. the contingently necessary.
    Kant’s own logic lecture notes compiled by Jäsche were always available to German readers from 1800. Kant therein, in his Introduction to the discipline of logic, made an analogy between logic and grammar. (I see now that Capozzi and Roncaglia have also drawn attention to this analogy in the third chapter, p. 143, of The Development of Modern Logic [2009, L. Haaparanta, editor].) Logic is the form of thought, with contents of thought its matter; as grammar is the form of language, with particular words its matter. A book of Kant’s in 1798 includes his view on the relation between thought and language. That book is Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, which was always available in German, but did not come into English translations (two) until the 1970’s. From the Anthropology in a third translation, the Cambridge translation (2007) by Robert Louden:
    “All language is a signification of thought and, on the other hand, the best way of signifying thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and others. Thinking is speaking with oneself . . . consequently it is also listening to oneself inwardly (by means of the reproductive power of the imagination). . . . Those who can speak and hear do not always understand themselves or others, and it is due to the lack of the faculty of signification, or its faculty use (when signs are taken for things, and vice versa), that, especially in matters of reason, human beings who are united in language are as distant as heaven from earth in concepts.” (300)
    Kants drew an analogy also between how logic is discovered and how grammar is discovered. This analogy is mentioned Jäsche Logic. The parallel of grammar-logic discovery is set in further parallel, in Kant’s Prolegomena, to how fundamental categories of the understanding (necessary factors in making percepts [“appearances”] in experience into that experience) are discovered. Kants proffers a notion of the reflective act by which one could (mainly Aristotle, who did) originally discover the rules of logic together with their character of absolute necessity and normativity.
    We are able to violate logical rules. Can Kant account for that under his conception of the nature of logic? One cannot succeed in holding onto the absolutism of logical rules while saying also that we can violate them and that they are due only to the constitution of the mind.
    One kind of error Kant mentioned in the Anthropology was the error of mistaking linguistic signs for things they signify and vice versa. Such signs, Kant calls artificial, in contrast to natural indicators such as smoke for fire. Kant observed that people having common language can yet signify in their vocabulary concepts quite different one person to the next. He implies that this variance is due to infirmities in the faculty of signification, which rather suggests that if we were all working correctly in our linguistic significations, we should have no variance among persons in concepts signified by a word. I seriously doubt that, given the variance in individual backgrounds of experience and education and given the creativity in thought, especially in more abstract thought. Were Kant’s rigid connection between vocabulary and right concept correct, infirmity of word-concept powers would yet not explain how errors of logic or grammar are possible. The same goes under my denial of the word-concept complete rigidity of right signification, for then there is utter incommensurability between the would-be explanation and the thing to be explained, since the rules of logic and grammar are fixed, in Kant’s view, in all the heads talking and thinking to themselves and with others. Error of signification and its source (source pretty vague in Kant) does not help to explain error in logic or grammar.
    The Objectivist conception of logic is contrary that of Kant. Rand’s conception of logic was as a tool of identification. All existents possess identity. That is a full-bodied identity, including both (i) which among existents is this particular one and (ii) what sort of thing is this existent. The identities of existents are what they are in the world whether or not a mind discerns them. What are the proper ways of forming concepts, forming their definitions, and making inferences are ways tuned to identities in the world and getting and holding fast to those identities. Rand rests logic on an axiom “existence exists.” Logical maneuvers are maneuvers of consciousness, and consciousness is identification of existents, all of which have identities.
    Rand’s axioms are not established as true because they cannot be denied without falling into contradiction. No, that is a necessary condition for adopting a truth as an axiom, but the truth has to be established by observation and dealings with empirical reality. The wrongness of contradiction also has to be established in that empirical way. Not by enumerative induction in the case of PNC. Not by abstractive induction in the case of PNC. Rather, I say, in the way one picks up necessary form from empirical engagements. I’m thinking of necessary forms in the world, which forms can be grasped as necessary when they are grasped. Such would be apprehension that anything shaped like my left hand will have one less space between its appendages than there are appendages. Or that turning a left-hand glove inside-out makes a right-hand glove. Or that any object having the shape of an apple can be quartered with only three cuts of the knife. One knows those truths by experience, and one knows they are necessarily so of the world, so that empirically testing them for possible falsification would be stupid.
    I call such formalities in the world waiting to be discerned belonging-formalities of my metaphysical category situation. Rand did not take note of such forms in the world, and doing so might make one nervous of regression to Aristotle’s ideas on form. There is no such regression to Aristotle in this idea of forms in the world belonging to concretes. And the idea can boost Rand’s idea that identities in the natural world are not put there by the mind and that necessities in the formalities for right logical thought get their ultimate necessity from the world and get their normativity from aiming to identify correctly. (My working conjecture so far is that the belonging-formalities of the world underlying the tooling-formalities of logic are simple likenesses, differences, sameness, and repetitions in the world.) On the Objectivist view of logic, errors in logic are simply because one can run afoul of rules for success in the purpose of logic. The necessity of logic is not the incapability to think otherwise than logically, but the necessity of following the rules to get the prize insofar as that aim is facilitated by logical rules. In another sense of necessity, logic has its necessities from some of the belonging-formalities in the world (in my metaphysical categories passage and character, I expect).
    Objectivism agrees with your 2 in that sensations are not constructed by or made into percepts by activity of mind such as conscious or unconscious inference (see Kelley 1986, 61–62, 75–78, for example), but need not deny the established science showing receptors to be active sensors, nervous tissue, which is living (an activity) and excitable. Under your 4, Objectivism holding that essences are epistemological rather than metaphysical means only that what truths of the world should be taken for essentials in one’s definitions of things depends on one’s present context of knowledge of the world and in particular one’s present context of knowledge of what depends on what in the world among classes of things in the world. That is in contrast to the Ancient and Medieval essences, which were not a function of one’s context of knowledge at all, and which possessed causal powers (formal causes) in the world.
    In your 7, I think offhand it would be better to say "applied to the schematized categories" and to say "sensory experience" or "sensible intuitions" rather than "sense data."
    Rand thought of cognition in terms of measurements both in perception (e.g. perceptual similarities) and in conception. But she thought of measurements as mind discerning magnitude relations actually in the world. Because magnitude relations (she called "quantity") are in the world, discernment of them is useful to us (and the other high animals) for successful life and exactitude of fit of the human mind to the world.
  22. Like
    KyaryPamyu reacted to Boydstun in KANT’S WRESTLE WITH 'HAPPINESS' AND 'LIFE'   
    IV. Moral Worth, Necessary and Free
    –B–
    In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant reasoned that if the causal connections lain out in time and space were sufficient to produce any of the phenomena there are, if every particular cause is itself necessitated by other causes, if even a human choice to rise from a chair is necessitated by antecedent causal conditions lain out in time and space; then there are no choices of humans free of necessitation by empirical inputs (KrV B473–80 A445–51, B560–86 A533–58). Then no choices of action by humans are truly originative.
    What if there are other conditions, ones transcending the empirical, phenomenal world that set its character, that can never be experienced in empirical, phenomenal ways, that form an ultimate opaque stopping ground of rational comprehension? What if the human being, an empirical being, dwells also in that empirically transcendent realm in all occasions of truly originative rational choices of actions, where these actions effect no results in contradiction of natural laws and where the root cause of these actions is not necessitated by empirical fact? (KrV B566–69 A538–41). What if the phenomenal causal determinism of we human causes is not so determinative that we never make truly originative choices of action, free of coercion by empirical factors? (KrV B562 A534).
    Then “the effects can be considered as free with regard to its intelligible cause, and yet with regard to appearances be considered simultaneously as resulting from these according to the necessity of nature” (KrV B565 A537). Then too, we cannot theoretically know we have such freedom nor even that such freedom is a real possibility. But we can conceive of such a freedom without contradiction of the natural order, and we can take such freedom as presupposition for all our moral operations (KrV  B568 A540, B575–79 A547–51, B585–86 A557–58; KpV 5:54–57).
    From our modern perspective, sensitive to developments in physics and neuroscience of the last several decades, we should realize that Kant is mistaken about causal structure and necessity in the empirical, phenomenal world. Kant’s conception of the physical (and physiological) realm is overly deterministic. He presumes, as do many thinkers of his day and ours, that physical necessitation entails predetermination by past conditions however far into the past one might look. Complementing that error is another: he presumes that physical causal determinism implies in-principle predictability.
    “All actions of a human being are determined in appearance on the basis of his empirical character and the other contributing causes according to the order of nature; and if we could explore all appearances of his power of choice down to the bottom, there would not be a single human action that we could not with certainty predict and cognize as necessary from its preceding conditions” (KrV B577–78 A549–50). “But if we examine the same actions in reference to reason, . . . we find a rule and order quite different from the order of nature” (KrV B578 A550).
    “Reason is the permanent condition of all the voluntary actions under which the human being appears. Each of these actions, even before it occurs, is predetermined in the human being’s empirical character. But in regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical character is only the sensible schema, no before or after holds, and every action—regardless of its time relation to other appearances—is the direct effect of the intelligible character of pure reason. Hence pure reason acts freely, i.e., without being dynamically determined in the chain of natural causes by external or internal bases that precede the action as regards time. And this freedom of pure reason can be regarded not only negatively, as independence from empirical conditions (for the power of reason would thus cease to be a cause of appearances {the manmade}). Rather, this freedom can be designated also positively, as a power of reason to begin on its own a series of events. Reason begins the series in such a way that nothing begins in reason itself, but that reason, as unconditioned condition of any voluntary action, permits no conditions above itself that precede the action as regards time—although reason’s effect does begin in the series of appearances, but in the series can never amount to an absolutely first beginning.” (KrV B581–82 A553–54)
    That is not so. That we can, in our symbolic, reflective and self-reflective consciousness, contemplate things and relations and possibilities outside the course of nature unfolding immediately before us and within us does not show that power of consciousness to be itself outside the temporal unfolding of nature. We have the freedom of thought and action we have entirely within the one and only world there is: the world of concretes, within which and over which our thought ranges. (On Kant’s theory of free will, see also Allison 1990, 11–82; Bird 2006, 689–718; Wood 2008, 123–41.)
    In the Prolegomena (1783), Kant again proffers his way of reconciling the (overly) deterministic conception of nature with human freedom:
    “The law of nature remains, whether the rational being be a cause of effects in the sensible world through reason and hence through freedom, or whether that being does not determine such effects through rational grounds. For if the first is the case, the action takes place according to maxims whose effect within appearance will always conform to constant laws; if the second is the case, and the action does not take place according to principles of reason, then it is subject to the empirical laws of sensibility, and in both cases the effects are connected according to constant laws . . . . In the first case, however, reason is the cause of these natural laws {adopted maxims} and is therefore free, in the second case the effects flow according to mere natural laws of sensibility, because reason exercises no influence on them; but, because of this, reason is not itself determined by sensibility (which is impossible), and it is therefore also free in this case. Therefore freedom does not impede the natural law of appearances, any more than this law interferes with the freedom of the practical use of reason, a use that stands in connection with things in themselves as determining grounds. / In this way practical freedom—namely, that freedom in which reason has causality in accordance with objective determining grounds—is rescued, without natural necessity suffering the least harm with respect to the very same effects, as appearances.” (P 4:345–46)
    Kant is using the concept natural laws in the broad sense of constancies or patterns that are necessary. Kant chased the relation of moral necessities to natural necessities across more than three decades, without a clear and stable settlement.
    There are practical laws having obligatory force reason cognizes as (not relatively, but) absolutely necessary (KrV B662 A634). In moral life, “there is an absolute necessity that something must occur, viz., that I comply in all points with the moral law” (KrV B856 A828). Having made these moral precepts my operating maxims, required by reason for fruitful operation of reason, these, “my moral principles, . . . I cannot renounce without being detestable in my own eyes” (KrV B856 A828).
    We saw in Part I that in Kant’s precritical “Inquiry” (1764) he thought moral necessity of an end must stem from something necessarily right in itself. In his mature, critical philosophy, he continued with that general doctrine. Our ends can be unfolded towards a “necessary unity of all possible purposes” (KrV B385 A328). This systematic unity of purposes is an ideal world, intelligible apart from the sensible world, in which there is an exact balance between happiness actual and happiness deserved by free, rational beings who have made themselves worthy of happiness (KrV B841 A813; 1793 8:278n).
    We know the necessity in moral obligation within ourselves (e.g. G 4:401; KpV 5:161–62; MS 6:216). The basis of that necessity is the concerted causal effectiveness of free, morally right action taken in a world in which everyone acted only morally, as if their actions “sprang from a supreme will comprising all private power of choice within itself” (KrV B838 A810). The basis of moral necessity is not natural causality alone, under which happiness does not necessarily follow from right action. For there to be a necessary connection between right action and hoped-for happiness, “a supreme reason that commands according to moral laws is also laid at the basis of nature, as nature’s cause” (KrV B838 A810).
    In the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant had written: “Pure morality contains merely the moral laws of a free will as such; the doctrine of virtue examines these laws as impeded by the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which human beings are more or less subject” (KrV B79 A55). Kant had realized however that certain empirical concepts must be presupposed in thinking about the pure, a priori principles and concepts of morality. In the second edition (1787), coming after Groundwork, Kant enters the concept duty into an expanded articulation of the relation between concepts of empirical origin and the concepts and principles of pure morality. “Although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality do not lay these empirical concepts themselves at the basis of their precepts, they must still bring in such pleasure and displeasure, desires and inclinations, etc., in [formulating] the concept of duty: viz., as an obstacle to be overcome, or as a stimulus that is {nevertheless} not to be turned into a motive” (KrV B29; see also MS 6:217).
    In 1783 Christian Garve published Philosophical Remarks and Essays on Cicero’s Books on Duties. Garve was influenced by Leibniz and Wolff, but he was influenced much more by Lockean empiricism. Garve published also that year an early critical review of Kant’s first Critique, objecting to Kant’s characterization of sensation and its relation to understanding, to his courting skepticism, to his undermining of common sense, and to his inversion of objects and subjective nature (53–77).
    Composition of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) was influenced by Garve’s book on Cicero. Manfred Kuehn writes that publication of Garve’s book “brought home to Kant not only the importance of Cicero, but also his continuing effect on Kant’s German contemporaries” (2001, 278). Kant intended his little book to be accessible, like Cicero’s, to a wide audience. So it is.
    Like Kant and many other ethicists, Cicero had upheld an ethics based on reason and in opposition to impulse and hedonism. Kant needed to wrest Cicero’s key concept duty from the eudaimonistic setting given it by Cirero. He needed to reform the concept duty and trumpet it in his inaugural work devoted entirely to ethics, the Groundwork. Cicero had maintained that following duties is ultimately following the tendencies of human nature to self-preservation, to prevention of harm, to procreation, and to protection of offspring. Kant aimed to give duty a new meaning for a new rational ethical theory.
    I think Kant had in addition an even greater ambition for Groundwork. Not only did he aim to supersede Cicero and other eudaimonists, he aimed to offer an entire and entirely rational alternative to the ethics of Lutheran Christianity. Kant needed to craft a naturalistic ethics with basic moral force equal the commands of an all-wise supernatural God. That is not to say that what is proclaimed as virtuous or right action in Kant’s ethics are to be roundly at odds with what is proclaimed by Christianity of his day.
    A rational being can represent principles and by will conform her conduct to them. A moral necessity is one in which conformity is open to choice (G 4:413). Kant presumes that distinctly moral norms and choices are those affecting minded selves, affecting persons. Choices about the control and treatment of persons, one’s own person or another’s, are the distinctly moral choices. This is the presumed topic of moral principles and necessities.
    The most general moral laws, the most general objective practical laws, pertain to “the relation of a will to itself insofar as it determines itself only by reason” (G 4:427). Formulas of universally applicable moral commands of reason, Kant calls imperatives. The Kantian imperative of special interest for the present study is this one: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (G 4:429; see also KpV 5:87).
    Here again we see Kant attaching moral necessity in ends to the idea of something that is an end in itself. At the same time, he attaches moral necessity to the purely formal, the non-empirical. Only in one’s reason, and apart from consideration of material incentives and means, is one able to determine oneself by objective moral motives towards objective moral ends. Kant thinks there is one thing, and really only one thing, “the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws,” by which he means universally applicable determinate moral laws (G 4:428). “I say the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion” (G 4:428). At bedrock “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (G 428–29).
    It is true, I should say, that rational nature is a similitude of an end in itself. That comes about because rational nature is the living nature that is the overarching information and control system of the animal that is man. When Rand writes “I am, therefore I’ll think,” the existence of the thinking self is a living existence (AS 1058). In apprehending that one exists, one apprehends that one lives and that this, oneself, is an end in itself.
    We saw in Part 1 that, in his first Critique (1781), Kant had drawn an analogy between systematic organization by reason and organization of animate nature (KrV B860–61 A832–33; cf. B425). Kant knows that living things grow, that they are self-generating in individual development and in species reproduction, that they are self-preserving, and that in their essence they are purposive, or of-functions, in their structure and action (KU 366–71). He knows they are that way naturally, without artifice of intelligence. He does not see the natural purposive organizations that are organisms as ends in themselves. Life is not an end in itself.
    “Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end” (G 4:437). An end that can be the end of a will that is unconditionally good would have to be not some particular end to be effected, but an independently existing end. This end “can be nothing other than the subject {rational agent} of all possible ends itself, because this subject is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without contradiction be subordinated to any other object” (G 4:437). Only rational nature is an end in itself without further qualification.
    The internal purposive characteristic of organisms is a matter of objective fact, but for Kant it is an analogical objective fact. The anatomist and the embryologist are rewarded by proceeding under the general hypothesis that the parts and behaviors of organisms have specific functions analogous to our own conscious, rational purposes. Kant does not see it the other way around, the way Rand and many contemporary thinkers see it: conscious purpose is a species of natural animal behavior. This is one reason Kant would not see that life of the organism is an end in itself.
    That rational nature is the only real end in itself would make one think Kant would take rational nature as the ultimate end towards which all good ends should be directed. Kant addresses ultimate purposes in a more restricted sense, as “the purpose by reference to which all other natural things constitute a system of purposes” (KU 429). The contrast of nature is to freedom. In Kant’s sense, the ultimate end for humans is the end (presumed single) set by nature for humans. That cannot be happiness. What happiness amounts to is not something determinately set by our animal nature. Rather, happiness is an idea humans formulate for themselves, with great variety and changeability. Even if the concept of happiness were restricted “to the true natural needs shared by our species, . . . [man] would still never reach what he means by happiness, and reach what is in fact his own ultimate purpose, . . . for it is not his nature to stop possessing and enjoying at some point and be satisfied” (KU 431). Moreover, nature “is very far from having adopted him as its special darling, . . . but has in fact spared him no more than any other animal from its destructive workings. . . . In the chain of natural purposes, man is never more than a link” (KU 430).
    What nature has done for man, aside from constitution for the pursuit of happiness on earth, is to prepare him “for what he himself must do in order to be a final purpose” (KU 431). Final purpose is distinct from ultimate purpose in Kant’s fully developed ethics. Final purpose is “a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of its possibility” (KU 434).  If man makes happiness “his whole purpose, it makes him unable to set a final purpose for his own existence and to harmonize with this final purpose” (KU 431). Yes, I say as Rand says: happiness alone is an inadequate standard to guide one’s actions for the purpose of achieving happiness. For us the standard is human life, but as we have seen, that candidate is on the field for Kant mainly in the shadow of happiness. Nature’s ultimate purpose with regard to man is giving him the “aptitude in general for setting himself purposes, and for using nature (independently of [the element of] nature in man’s determination of purposes) as a means [for achieving them] in conformity with the maxims of his free purposes generally. Producing in a rational being an aptitude for purposes generally (hence [in a way that leaves] that being free) is culture. Hence only culture can be the ultimate purpose that we have cause to attribute to nature with respect to the human species.” (KU 431)
    One might have wondered, at the end of Part II, why (in 1785) Kant had taken ever-higher development of reason and advancing culture to be something valuable in itself. In Critique of Judgment (KU 1790), Kant has set out somewhat more the way in which culture can be valuable—a sort of natural ultimate value—by its relation to the one true valuable end in itself, which is rational nature.
    The skills we acquire from culture are not all that is needed in order to have an aptitude to promote purposes generally. We require also our own directing will. Nature through culture liberates “the will from the despotism of desires, a despotism that rivets us to certain natural things and renders us unable to do our own selecting; we allow ourselves to be fettered by the impulses that nature gave us only as guides so that we would not neglect or even injure our animal characteristics, whereas in fact we are free enough to tighten or to slacken, to lengthen or to shorten them, as the purposes of reason require” (KU 432).
    As we have seen, Kant resisted the thought that happiness might not be one’s aim when direction of one’s purposes by will is slackened. Rand rightly held that human beings do not automatically desire happiness. More fundamentally, humans do not automatically desire to live; their directive will extends that widely. Kant would hold that were that indeed the case, then Rand’s standard of morality would be profoundly inadequate.
    In all of nature, according to Kant, it is only in man’s supersensible, noumenal nature that there is a purpose that is not conditioned on other purposes. Only in man’s existence as a moral agent, where moral legislation is not conditioned by any of the purposes in empirical nature, do we find a purpose not dependent on other purposes. That is unlike every purpose in empirical nature (KU 435–36; 1793, 8:279–80). Life could not be a final end, for it is conditional. It would not do as a standard for morality. Furthermore, if life is subject to continual choice by humans for its continuance, then human life is all the more conditioned and all the less suitable as a standard for morality. Requirements of morality conditioned by the clause “if you want to live,” would fail to have the objective necessity of themselves that Kant thought required of distinctly moral principles (G 4:414). (For more on Kant’s conception of life, see Ginsborg 2001, 246–54; Zammito 2007, 54–56, 67n13; Huneman 2007a, 86–92; Richards 2002, 229–37.)
    That conception of moral necessity was wrongly tuned (cf. Rand 1974). The conditionality of life and the circumstance that human life is open to choice has the structure of necessity right for morality. The absoluteness of life or death is the absoluteness of moral necessity. That one freely chooses life, originates life, in thought and action respecting its requirements and opportunities—this is one’s moral glory.
    References
    Allison, H. E. 1990. Kant’s Theory of Freedom. Cambridge.
    Bird, G. 2006. The Revolutionary Kant – A Commentary on the Critique of Pure Reason. Open Court.
    Garve, C. 1783. Review of Critique of Pure Reason. In Kant’s Early Critics. B. Sassen, editor and translator. 2000. Cambridge.
    Ginsborg, H. 2001. Kant on Understanding Organisms as Natural Purposes. In Kant and the Sciences. E. Watkins, editor. Oxford.
    Gregor, M. J., editor and translator, 1996. Immanuel Kant – Practical Philosophy. Cambridge.
    Huneman, P. 2007a. Reflexive Judgment and Wolffian Embology: Kant’s Shift between the First and the Third Critiques. In Huneman 2007b.
    ——., editor, 2007b. Understanding Purpose – Kant and the Philosophy of Biology. Rochester.
    Kant, I. 1764. Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality. In Immanuel Kant – Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770. P. Walford, editor and translator. Cambridge.
    ——. 1781, 1787. Critique of Pure Reason. W. S. Pluhar, translator. Hackett.
    ——. 1783. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. In Immanuel Kant – Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. H. Allison and P. Heath, editors. G. Hatfield, translator. Cambridge.
    ——. 1785. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In Gregor 1996.
    ——. 1788. Critique of Practical Reason. In Gregor 1996.
    ——. 1790. Critique of Judgment. W. S. Pluhar, translator. Hackett.
    ——. 1793. On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice. In Gregor 1996.
    ——. 1797. The Metaphysics of Morals. In Gregor 1996.
    Kuehn, M. 2001. Kant – A Biography. Cambridge.
    Rand, A. 1957. Atlas Shrugged. Random House.
    ——. 1974. Causality versus Duty. In Philosophy: Who Needs It. 1982. Signet.
    Richards, R. J. 2002. The Romantic Conception of Life. Chicago.
    Wood, A. W. 2008. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge.
    Zammito, J. H. 2007. Kant’s Persistent Ambivalence toward Epigenesis 1764–90. In Huneman 2007b.
  23. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from Harrison Danneskjold in How is this statement true? "A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something."   
    It takes awhile for a child to graduate from the level of 'this object, that object' to the realization that 'this is my perception of this object and that object'. He learns that people in his environment do not see, hear etc. the same things as he does, so he needs to distinguish between different minds, of which one of them is 'his'. This is why self-consciousness is inseparable from the discovery of consciousness itself. Galt's argument is probably in this line, that consciousness of consciousness (self-consciousness) depends on perceiving a world of objects and people first.
    Pure self-consciousness, in the context of Yoga, is a physiological state achieved by entering a very low metabolic state, where the five senses and the thinking faculties (citta) are temporarily suspended. It's like dreamless sleep, except the meditator maintains awareness in the midst of it. The goal is to shift the attention toward the subtler, quieter levels of the mind, which normally go unnoticed because the attention is too engrossed in objects, thoughts and feelings to notice what's underneath them: the sense of observer-hood, of being a witness to such and such object, thought and feeling. 
    The meditator's argument is that self-consciousness is always 'on', underneath every object of experience, from babyhood to old age. This includes underneath the dreaming state and even (!) underneath dreamless sleep; a sign of enlightenment is said to be when the Yogi becomes aware during sleep, and realizes that even unconsciousness is, paradoxically, an object presenting itself to consciousness. 
    Rand's philosophy does not mention or discuss the idea that sense perception might be influenced by unconsciously performed mental acts. This is a consequence of her theory that every concept, without exception, is derived from the conscious level, including the concepts used in arguing for a pre-conscious activity. Yoga is an interesting challenge to this theory, because it's based on bringing the unnoticed, unconscious levels of the mind into conscious awareness. Experienced Yogis claim to directly perceive the mechanism by which the mind generates the phenomenal world, and have meticulously documented it.
  24. Like
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from Jon Letendre in How is this statement true? "A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something."   
    Suppose I say that strawberry yogurt is a light dessert. I take it that the word 'light' means 'easy on the stomach', not that yogurt is made of sunlight, or that it's light like a bird's feather, or that yogurt is an easygoing individual. How is that obvious? By refering to the full sentence, its surrounding paragraph (after all, it might be a post about things made of sunlight), and cues from earlier posts. It doesn't look like this is a popular idea on ObjectivismOnline.
    For example, this part:
    ...makes reference to Rand's theory of volition as focus-regulation. A few hours later, the same poster makes this claim:
    which means: for Rand, the shift from lesser to sharper focus is 'your fault' simply because you feel that you're the one producing that shift. 
    My point? Not everybody assumes that feeling like you're 'seizing the reigns' of your mind, is an argument. And not everybody assumes that passively receiving visual and tactile sensation proves that the mind does not unconsciously originate its contents. However, everybody starts with the experience of perceiving an allegedly external world and of having control over one's mind.
    This is not a serious level of discussion, so I will not be replying to any further requests for clarification. Everything is 'messy' when it's read in a certain manner.
  25. Thanks
    KyaryPamyu got a reaction from Easy Truth in How is this statement true? "A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something."   
    The post-kantians claim that all consciousness is basically self-consciousness (this is also true of indian philosophy, but I'll limit myself to the former). The argument can take this form: self-awareness is a quality possesed by certain objects of observation (humans), but not by other objects (like rocks). Now, if you have no clue what self-awareness is, you are unable to recognize it, even if you encounter it a quintillion times. You must have a prior acquaintance with it, even to recognize it in your own person. This prior acquaintance is demonstrated by showing how all human judgements, without exception, have a universal abstract form, which could be formulated like this: 'I'm aware of my self-awareness'.
    Take the statement: 'I love the Spice Girls'. What is its basic form? 'I know that I'm acquainted with my musical taste'; I know (awareness), that I'm acquainted with myself in some way (self-awareness). Another example: the statement 'Tiger Woods did not properly study his opponents' occurs in a declarative form: 'I know that I'm acquainted with my opinions about Tiger Woods'. 
    Now, do you imagine your reality? Well, not quite. The mind does have the power to delimit itself to particular thoughts; however, to delimit itself to something is, nevertheless, a form of being limited. Those two perspectives are reconciled by synthesis: consciousness is theoretically unlimited, but practically limited. That is, there's no theoretical limit to how much you can alter your world, but there's the practical limit of being constrained by your past choices and shortcomings. By the time you finished reading the previous sentence, you've already deduced time, space and Kant's categories (which he merely lifted from Aristotle). This kind of dual-consciousness is Rand's starting point, and she never considers anything other than what is given in it: 'I don't feel that I create nature, therefore I don't. I feel that I'm free, therefore I am free. Q.E.D.'
    Inspired by Kant's third critique, Hegel and Schelling consider the possibility of an original non-difference of freedom and determinism. The unconscious plant has no clue what its doing, yet it appears utterly purposive, as if it was consciously grasping at some end-goal. The kantians try to strip away the mistique surrounding freedom by proposing that determinism and freedom could be a single phenomenon: a blind, mechanical march of nature towards increasingly sophisticated tools of self-knowledge (organisms). Under this model, there's no skepticism about whether the world of mental phenomena conforms to the world of material objects, since they're one world, not two. This is a proto-darwinian view that suggests the possibility of laws which are both mechanical and somehow purposive (laws of evolution).
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