The Trendy Cynic

Perhaps it's my complete and utter lack of experience with philosophy that makes me suspect reasoning like this as mental sleight-of-hand. I understand arbitrary things to be propositions for which there exists no evidence for or against, not that they 'must forever be outside man's awareness.' Claiming that there is an alien civilization on Pluto would be an arbitrary proposition, but that in no way means that it must be forever out of our awareness (we could, for example, go there and check ourselves in a few decades). As such, I do not believe there is a fundamental violation of identity when it comes to arbitrary claims. I lean more towards what JMeganSnow said, in that arbitrary claims are empty and must be treated as if nothing was said. There's no contradiction inherent to saying nothing, is there? How can there be? Saying something is 'impossible,' to me, means it cannot be; it implies knowledge that this thing is not true. Arbitrary statements, though, by definition, are unknowable -- how can you have the knowledge that an unknowable proposition is impossible? Okay, fair enough -- but in this particular argument, when there only exist two possible alternatives (in that it's not even possible to conceive of something else, because it's an either-or sort of thing), it is no less valid to negatively attack the wrong one than it is to positively support the right one, correct?

I realise that. I was asking a question relating to the structure of his definition. When analysing a definition, is it always the case that adjectives placed in front of the genus are included in that genus? You seemed to look at that definition and choose 'profoundly experiential relationship' as the genus. I looked at that definition and chose 'relationship' as the genus, identifying 'profoundly experiential' as differentia. Following the steps you outlined: 1. What am I defining? (Life) 2. What am I differentiating it from? (Relationships) 3. How is it different from other similar objects? (Profoundly Experiential, Man & Existence) Woops, you caught me! To think I could have pulled one over on you...

My main objection is to the part where he claims the herd lacks volition, as opposed to the correct interpretation of their behavior (ie. they are choosing not to think, or are making mistakes based on false premises). The only alternative to the absence of volition is determinism, and so it follows that anyone advocating a lack of volition is also advocating determinism. It's fairly explicit. Perhaps he was speaking metaphorically, but then this whole article doesn't warrant consideration as it doesn't constitute any contradiction to Objectivist principles.

Why? Isn't this a further refinement of the broader genus, 'relationship'? Though "profoundly experiential" appears as an adjective in front of relationship, does that alone afford it the status of genus as opposed to differentia? If not, I don't see how the difference between 'profoundly experiential' and 'between a man and existence' has any cognitive difference; both are further qualifications to the type of relationship.

I'm by no means an expert on Objectivist epistemology, but I'll give it a go The genus is the class of existents you are distinguishing your concept from, in that they all possess common characteristics that you will then refine to distinguish 'life'. You definition of life (which, actually, I do like, at least in a human sense) is: "Life is the profoundly experiental relationship b/t man and his existence with reality." You've got your genus and differentia explicitly written. You can determine the genus by extracting all of the information that serves to qualify or restrict the definition, then look for what's left. The genus of your definition of life would be 'relationship;' life, by your definition, is a type of relationship. Genus: Relationship. The CCD(s) is the characteric(s) that all members of the genus possess, and that you are using to distinguish your type of relationship. Concepts of relationships are composed of two things: The nature of the relationship, and the entities it applies to. Your definition differentiates 'life' on the basis of both, and so both would be your Conceptual Common Denominators. CCDs: 1) The nature of the relationship. 2) The entities it applies to. Your differentia are the specific range or qualities of the CCDs that distinguish your type of relationship from all types of relationships. Differentia: 1) The nature of the relationship: "profoundly experiential" 2) The entites it applies to: "man and existence" Thus, life is a type of relationship (genus) that is both profoundly experiential and applied to man and existence (differentia).

When presented with a complete list of possibile explanations for something (say, volition vs. determinism), I know that I can support one of the explanations by shutting down the others. Evidence that clearly eliminates determinism as a viable option is, as I see it, just as effective as evidence that clearly supports volition. The reason I choose the former over the latter has to do, I think, with my experience with irrational theists. Regardless of the evidence I present in support of an atheistic argument, I learned to loathe the "well, divine alternative X is still possible," while at the same time being unable to deny the truth of that statement -- alternative X, I would think to myself, is technically possible. The result became the deep-seated conviction that it is necessary to defeat alternative explanations (negative), regardless of how effectively you support you own explanation (positive). While I always knew that the arbitrary could be dismissed as irrelevant, I've come to evaluate a conclusion that states "this is true, because all alternatives are arbitrary" as being somewhat less convincing than a conclusion that says "this is true, because all alternatives are impossible." I just can't find it within myself to allow the wiggle-room afforded by the former type of conclusion when I'm capable of drawing up the latter type. Could you expand a bit on why taking the negative position should be considered less logically appealing than taking a positive stance (err, assuming that taking the negative position can lead to a decisive conclusion, such as when you're able to negatively address all alternatives)?

It's fairly clear that the author of this article is not saying that reason is invalid, or that people do not follow reason, or that free choice is an illusion or non-existent. He clearly supports the existence of free choice; to the author, volition is real. He just believes that it only exists for some people, and not for others. What evidence does he present to support the idea that some people are void of free will? He shows that a large group of society (his 'herd') consistently make mistakes in the evaluation of the stock market. It follows, by his logic, that this herd does not follow reason and, thus, lacks free will. If this herd lacked volition, then they would not merely avoid following reason, they would be incapable of reason. In other words, a necessary premise to the author's argument is that every member of that 'Small Speculators' category is absolutely incapable of reason -- not merely ignorant of reason, but incapable of it. What does this mean for his argument? It means that, according to the author, it is impossible for any member of the 'Small Speculators' group to elevate himself to the 'Large Speculators' group. The latter, by the author's claim, does possess reason and volition, while the former does not. How can one learn reason and volition when he is supposedly incapable of both? Thus, demonstrating even a single instance of a member of the herd becoming an effective trader would invalidate his argument that being a member of the herd necessarily implies you lack volition and reason. And then there's this blatant contradiction. The members of the herd have reasons for what they're doing? Then they accept, understand and apply the faculty of reason! The fact that they do it wrongly is irrelevant -- they're still aware of their freedom of choice and applying 'reasons' to their actions. The problem for the author is that he's using evidence of fallibility as conclusive evidence of determinism. Nothing about fallibility implies that humans can't be fallible as a collective; just look at religion, or altruism. No one claims that the legions of Catholics or philanthropists are automatons; they're just irrational. The same is true, evidently, of the yellow bar, and just like those other groups, it's probably traceable to some fundamental contradiction they all believe in. The search for such an irrational premise, some defining contradiction, perhaps by comparing the reasons given by members of the herd to those given by successful traders... now that would be an interesting article to read.

Woo, I'm famous Actually, returning to this issue and summarizing it will be useful to my continued grasp of the nature of volition and the rejection of determinism. There were two main points brought to bear in the rejection of determinism outlined in that thread. The first point is that free choice is absolutely necessary to knowing anything. Through introspection, you can see that you have free choice. Thus, if your consciousness is determined, then it's clear that this free choice you can sense must be illusionary: You are not aware of all of the causes that force you to think a thought or make a choice, otherwise you wouldn't be able to believe you're doing it freely. Human minds are fallible, though. It is obvious that the inner workings of your mind are not a perfect means of observing reality. These causes, then, that you're unaware of, are likewise fallible -- and you have absolutely no way of judging or evaluating them, as you're unaware of them. Any attempt to judge anything, any attempt at thought, is pre-empted by these mysterious, unknowable, fallible causes that you are forced to follow. When you 'trust' knowledge, how do you know that you aren't being forced to trust it, forced to believe in something that's a lie, by these mysterious causes that exist beneath your awareness? The problem I had in grasping this first point was grasping the pervasiveness of this fact. Every thought is affected, when holding to this theory. No thought can be trusted, no shred of knowledge, however trivial, accepted with any confidence whatsoever. The second point attacks the reason for considering that determinism is even possible. Determinism rests on the false assumption that one can make conclusions about the nature of consciousness by making inferences about the nature of the brain as a physical object. We look around us and observe all manner of physical objects, of which the brain is one. We observe that all physical objects operate under mechanical causality (cause-and-effect, like dominoes falling), and so we can infer that the brain behaves in the same manner, based on these observations. This is not an entirely unreasonable conclusion to draw, because we can immediately observe the similarities between the brain and other physical objects. The point to grasp is that all of this reasoning is based on our observation of these existents, and the conclusions we can draw based on the similarities between these observations. The error is to then make another, similar leap of logic and state that because the brain likely follows mechanical causality, that consciousness does, too. This requires a separate evaluation of the similarities between our observations, this time among physical objects and the processes that arise from them. The problem here is that consciousness is utterly unique; our observation of the brain-consciousness relationship bears no similarity, even remotely, between any other relationship we have observed. All observations of consciousness are from the 'inside out,' as in, we are the consciousness and we are trying to grasp it from 'inside' it. You can never look at consciousness from the outside in, as you do with every other physical process. There's a clear, obvious rift between our observations of consciousness and our observation of the brain or other physical objects: Inside->Out vs. Outside->In. But any inference about the nature of consciousness from applying materialistic causality MUST be derived from similar observations about other existents, and there simply cannot exist any observations that are similar to those made of consciousness. Thus, it follows that no observations made of any other relationship in reality can be applied to the brain-consciousness relationship. While it may seem intuitive to think that consciousness-from-the-brain is similar to Windows-from-your-computer, there simply exists no logical basis to justify such an intuition: We can never see Windows from the inside-out (by... somehow... 'being' Windows), and so it cannot be related to our observations about consciousness. The claim that we can apply knowledge about other physical processes to our knowledge of consciousness is arbitrary. In order to doubt the self-evident, we need a valid objection that is supported by evidence. We can see, through introspection, that we possess volition. While it is not impossible that this volition is illusionary, it is also not impossible that an invisible leprechaun is sitting on your shoulder and making you imagine the words on your screen. We can safely dismiss both determinism and leprechauns on the same basis: There exists no logical evidence to support either. I'm sorry if that was convoluted... I'm kind of hurrying with this so I can catch my bus home from work

It's sarcastic, meant to parody the absurdity of the generally cynical attitude of today's society by painting it as a social fad that, to be consistent, they should be equally cynical of. While this admittedly doesn't fly with the Greek origins of the word, I coined it years ago considering only the colloquial definition. It's a rejection of cynicism through sarcasm, not an acceptance of it, primarily as a defense against today's oh-so-trendy rejection of idealism. It's also a fairly good defense against those people who put more stock in one's name than in one's words, wouldn't you say?

Sum 41, a Canadian punk-rock band, is great. Sometimes their songs are just so able to be interpreted as being supported by an Objectivist philosophy that I have to wonder. Of course, some of their other songs are quite the opposite. Here's the lyrics to a song I see as praising individualism, lamenting the loss of reason, and condemning society as blind and irrational... whaddayathink?

I'm CRUSHED that no one has mentioned LOST yet. An incredible show. My list: Lost Carnivale Firefly (cancelled) Boston Legal 24

I've read the series up to Naked Empire, then stopped. Faith of the Fallen was brilliant. Pillars of Creation and Naked Empire? Predictable, pedestrian, nonsensical trash in my humble opinion. I have no idea what happened to him between FotF and PoC, but for some reason, those last two books were painful for me to read -- especially when compared against Faith of the Fallen, which was spectacular. Am I alone in thinking the last two entries were just atrociously awful when compared to the other six?

Still have to read TEW. I'm going to read it right this instant... as soon as I finish this post. Having just completed chapter 4 today, I'm in complete agreement with you -- in fact, I think I'll include Chapter 5 in that as well because I feel the section on arbitrary propositions has huge ramifications on how the average person might process claims made in the first few chapters. Had I read through to the end of chapter 5 before questioning volition in chapter 2, for example, I would have understood the contextual/hierarchical nature of knowledge, the fallacy of the stolen concept (which I thought, until recently, referred to making use of a concept without aknowledging it) and the nature of arbitrary claims -- all of which would have helped me better understand the axiomatic nature of volition.

Exactly. And let me just say... it's foolish to think that physicists -- physicists -- would arbitrarily dismiss contradiction and theorize some form of physical nature to probability as if they didn't value identity, causality and non-contradiction to the same level Objectivists do. They do. Their entire study -- the sum total of scientific knowledge -- is based upon the universality of those concepts, and they aren't going to flaunt them capriciously. I'm not saying they are correct, but these sorts of wacky conclusions are necessitated by the current understanding of QM. There is currently no other way to describe single photon behaviour in the double-slit experiment without radically contradicting something profound: Either causality, locality or identity, something is being flipped on its head. Blissfully steamrolling over this fact is irresponsible at best, as in all likelihood it probably will have profound implications on all fields of human knowledge (including philosophy) when the answers are finally understood.

Thank you all for your help -- all of my questions were answered, and most of my unexpressed 'could he mean this?' questions were confirmed with a 'yes he does!' Well, actually there is evidence to support the fact that, in QM, 'likely state' and 'actual state' are one and the same. I've listed it below in quotes if you're interested... it has no bearing, really, on this discussion... I agree with the comments made regarding QM in this thread, and no longer see any conflict (and I've yet to read the Little Waves page, which I'm looking forward to). Besides, it's clear to me that the axiomatic concepts are inviolable, and it's silly to question them solely on the basis of a very poorly understood science. So, as I said, this is just for your personal interest, so stop reading if you aren't curious

While reading OPAR, I have a pad of paper and a pen next to me and I write down any questions or confusions that I'm unable to figure out at the time. When I finish a chapter, I go back and see if I can answer some of the questions I wrote, but I'm still left with a collection of minor questions and little clarifications that I was hoping you may be able to help me with. These all refer to the first chapter of OPAR -- "Reality." 1) What is meant by "existence IS identity"? I'm having a bit of difficulty grasping the exact way the word 'is' is being used in the expression 'existence IS identity.' The ways of using 'is' that I'm familiar with are to either: a) state that the first concept is subsumed in the second ('a bird IS an animal') or state that the concepts are completely interchangable ('speed IS velocity') Am I right in assuming that 'existence IS identity' doesn't fit into either of those categories? I just want to verify that this is a unique use of the word 'is,' in that it explains the fact that existence and identity do refer to the same things, but aren't completely interchangable because they do so from different perspectives... I'm unable to think of another example where 'is' was used in the same way. 2) Isn't consciousness implicit in the first sensation, in that you are sensing it? Dr. Peikoff says that consciousness is grasped -- even in implicit form -- by a child much later in his development. As I understand "implicit," it means that all of the necessary facts are present but have yet to be integrated into a concept. Doesn't a baby possess implicit knowledge of all of the axiomatic concepts after that first sensation? "There is (existence) a sensation (identity) of which the baby is aware (consciousness)?" 3) What is the Objectivist definition of the Universe? I see it clashing a little bit with the physicists' definition of the Universe. Objectivists hold (and I do not know how they can make this statement) that the Universe is eternal. But this is blatantly contradicted by the prevailing theory of the time, the Big Bang theory (which, among other things, theorizes a beginning to Time itself). I understood philosophy to take a pretty much 'hands-off' view of the sciences, yet in this situation I see it contradicting scientific evidence without any evidence of its own. 4) How does Objectivism assimiliate Quantum Mechanics? Quantum Mechanics is weird, weird, weird. Duality of identity seems to be supported by weight of evidence (ie. if, at any given time, an atom is 50% likely to decay, then it is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED in equal parts until it is observed and it 'chooses' one of them). This has been extended to the macroscopic world via Schroedinger's Cat... if there's a cat sharing the interior of a closed, opaque box with a cyanide capsule that's configured to break when the atom mentioned above decays, then if the atom is both DECAYED and NOT-DECAYED, then the cat is both DEAD and NOT-DEAD. Once again, I would prefer Objectivism to take a hands-off position on science (in that, if Objectivism is going to be contradicting scientific research, I'm going to have to say 'uh-uh'). As I see it, though, current understanding of quantum mechanics (particularly Schroedinger's Cat) explicitly violates Identity. 5) How is God necessarily primacy of consciousness? This will be a sticky question, because I'm not supporting the existence of God at all. I'm merely questioning one tiny assertion Peikoff makes about the concept of God, namely that it is necessarily primacy of consciousness. But couldn't a theist relate intuition to a sixth sense of the world, thus claiming that intuition is indeed an element of existence that his consciousness is aware of (thus supporting primacy of existence)? Just to support the idea that it isn't immediately arbitrary, if that theist is genuinely feeling it, then wouldn't dismissing such a feeling be akin to dismissing the perceptually self-evident? 6) A quote I completely do not understand: "By the nature of existence, however, such "hope" and "prayer" are futile. Leaving aside the man-made, nothing is possible except what is actual. The concept of "omnipotence," in other words, is logically incompatible with the law of identity." Huh-what? How does the emphasized line 'nothing is possible except what is actual' somehow lead to the next sentence? Peikoff seems to state this as if it is an inarguable conclusion, but it seems to me he left out a couple of sentences before getting there... could someone please explain what logic leads from the second sentence to the last one?

Huh? I responded to what you said regarding what you quoted me on: Me: the moral relativist is not saying 'should not do so on moral grounds,' but 'cannot do so on rational grounds.' You: It is still a moral statement dictating what you ought or ought not do.... Me: (by way of jumping to the moon example) It's saying cannot, not ought not, so not a moral statement. I don't see where I took anything out of context, or responded to something that wasn't said.

Yep, you do, as I understand it. Realise that I don't really consider myself qualified to be an authority on this subject (not until I finish OPAR); it's probably best to learn more from the way people respond to my posts... if they don't argue, then I might be on to something Is saying "you can't jump to the moon" a moral statement because it's telling people they ought not to jump to the moon? That's a perfect analogy to what the moral relativist is saying; he's saying "you can't support an objective moral code." It's not that you ought not to do it, but that you can't do it. So they bring up an argument about your moral code only to conclude it with 'nevermind, we can agree and disagree, so there's no argument?' Ask them if it's their intention to pointlessly torment you, or if they're just being adorably oblivious

You're right, up to this point. You're incorrectly equivocating the validity of a moral judgment with the content of a moral judgment. The moral relativist has an absolute statement about the validity of moral judgments: They are relative. The moral objectivist has an absolute statement about the validity of moral judgments: They are absolute. Neither of those statements are themselves moral judgments; they are both absolute, objective statements about moral judgments. Exactly.

Disclaimer: I haven't gotten to Peikoff's Ethics chapter in OPAR yet, so all I know about Objectivist morality is what I've gleaned from Atlas Shrugged. Take what I say in consideration of that. As I see it, the only real way to disprove moral relativism is to convince them of an objective standard of moral evaluation. You're the one who has to support a standard of moral evaluation, as moral relativism necessarily follows from dismissing all such standards as arbitrary. A great deal of Objectivist theory goes to doing just that. Asking someone to claim that morals are relative is akin to asking someone to prove that God doesn't exist; you're the one that has to support the idea that an objective moral heirarchy is not arbitrary. Some arguments I've seen in response to your question are not sound: The moral relativist is not saying that nothing is absolute, just that morals aren't. If he were claiming that condemning another's moral code was morally reprehensible, then that would obviously be paradoxical. It does if you cannot support that the number of fingers you're holding up" is an objective statement. Naturally, we do that through perceptual self-evidency. Perceptual self-evidency does not work in justifying the objective nature of a moral hierarchy, though. That's not what the moral relativist is saying. The moral relativist is saying that there exist no objective grounds to base morality on, and so it is irrational to judge one subjective moral code with another. In other words, the moral relativist is not saying 'should not do so on moral grounds,' but 'cannot do so on rational grounds.' That is not the argument any moral relativist I've spoken to (invariably of the "street" variety, though) is following. The moral relativist is not trying to prove something, but correctly demanding that the Objectivist prove his objective standard of morality before he accepts it. Without such support, that objective standard can be dismissed as arbitrary. From perceptual self-evidence, I see moral relativism as the perceptual 'default.' There is no perceptually self-evident objective heirarchy of morals. Moral relativism follows necessarily from the rejection of any objective heirarchy, and most accurately describes what we directly perceive about cultures and their morals (ie. they're all different). To prove that those cultures are wrong in being different, one must support the objective standard you're using to make that claim. For the "plain Jane" moral relativist, I think it's fairly easy to get them to see their own moral absolutism by forcing them to admit that genocide is moral if the society perpetrating the genocide considers it to be so. As plaintext said (great name, btw), if this tactic doesn't work then you know you're dealing with a more philosophical moral relativist. For such a person, the only real way to argue with them is to support your objective standard of morality.

Just a few more meanderings I've had on the subject, some of which may be interesting to those of you with a morbid curiosity on exactly how my logic derailed itself: I now realise that it is impossible to know anything if your thoughts are determined by factors you are not aware of. To know something, you must accept as objectively true every single one of the causes that led to that knowledge (otherwise you cannot accept that knowledge as objective truth). But to accept something, you must be aware of it. Thus, it follows that to know something, you must be aware of every one of the causes that led to that knowledge. Volition, then, is necessary to validation not because volition is somehow implicitly inherent to the definition of validation (this is what I was trying, unsuccessfully, to nail down), but because any alternative to volition requires some lack of awareness about the methods of your own mind -- and such a lack of awareness immediately and inarguably contradicts any method of acquiring knowledge. I also realise now that any assertion of illusionary volition is arbitrary. My stumbling block was in considering the brain alone. Yes, the brain is a physical object, and I can apply the evidence I have acquired about physical objects to the brain: Its component processes likely involve mechanical determinism; this statement is not arbitrary. But the relationship of the brain to consciousness is unprecedented. It does not follow that evidence that the brain is mechanically determined translates to evidence that consciousness is mechanically determined, because there is no set of perceptual observations that I have made about such a brain-consciousness relationship that would allow me to draw conclusions about it. Another point I was concocting. It is fundamentally impossible to observe the nature of consciousness from the 'outside looking in;' one can observe the brain from the outside looking in, but one can only observe consciousness from the 'inside looking out.' It is impossible to make any statements of knowledge about a relationship between two existents (such as "the brain gives rise to mechanically determined consciousness") unless you are capable, in some way, of conceiving of that relationship from the same perspective. It is self-evident that there exists a fundamental difference between the perspective with which we observe the brain and the perspective with which we observe consciousness; there is a fundamental conceptual rift between the two. I don't consider this affirmation of the mind/body conflict, because the conflict is not between the existents or their natures -- the conflict is between our perspective of each existent and the nature by which we can conceptualize them. Thanks so much to all of you. I'm stunned that you stuck with me this long, and with such willing patience to help me work through this -- I hope you understand my dogged insistence on understanding it fully before I accepted it and moved on to the next chapter While I told myself I wouldn't jump to conclusions without first sleeping on it, I'm fairly certain that I've figured out (and agree with) all of the objections and refutations of determinism you were presenting. Onward ho, I say!

You guys type too fast. I've deleted and rewritten this post three times only to have to start again because I find more responses when I go to preview it "That perception of choice, is choice." So any explanation you come up with would have to end "and therefore we have free will." Wow. That's good. Very good. Okay. Before I leap on the bandwagon like I did a few posts ago, only to revert back and infuriate the lot of you, I need to think on that. Let me apply what I believe that validation to be to the tree conversation (I really think I learn best by analogies, combined with explanations of the ways in which those analogies don't exactly relate to the original subject matter). In fact, I responded to Inspector's tree conversation, then read your post, and that let me type up the final bolded line that, as I see it, is very persuasive. However, even though I'm on the cusp of accepting this now, please let me know if the way in which I applied it to the tree conversation wasn't right (I want to make sure my logic is sound, not merely the conclusions I'm drawing). Inspector: "Wow, a red tree." Me: "Yes, it certainly looks like a red tree. Every tree I've ever seen is brown, though. I would like to consider the possibility that this is not really a red tree." Inspector: "But that's totally arbitrary. We can see the tree is red, and in the absence of any other evidence, we must conclude it is simply different from all other trees." Me: "But there is other evidence: The fact that all of the other trees I've seen aren't red. That is, at least, some evidence that trees aren't red, right? Am I not able to apply knowledge I know about things I have observed to draw general conclusions about all of those things? In this case, my knowledge about the trees I have observed says that trees are not red. Before I accept that this tree is actually red, can I not responsibly say that this may not be a red tree, based on that knowledge?" Inspector: "(I still haven't gotten an answer from anyone that I could slip in here, and would really like one just to tie up those loose ends)" Me: "If there is evidence that all trees aren't red, and this tree appears red to us, then something about its appearance must be deceptive. Thus, as there is evidence that all trees aren't red, then there is also evidence that this tree's appearance is deceptive in some way. Should we not even consider that possibility?" Inspector: "No. Any and all possible alternatives to what we see are irrelevant. Our perceptions tell us that this is a red tree... considering that it might be something other, whatever its strange difference from other trees, is pointless, illogical and arbitrary, despite the evidence that all trees are brown." Me: "But why, then, is this tree red when all of the others in the forest are brown?" Inspector: "No clue." Me: "You don't think that this tree deserves a little bit more study, a consideration of possible explanations for its incredibly strange nature? The evidence that I have gathered from other trees seems to support the possibility that trees are not red. If trees aren't red, then something must be making this tree appear red, right?" (And that's where I ended it, expecting Inspector to have to re-evaluate his own argument to continue our back-and-forth. Here is the line I added after reading IDC's post:) Inspector: "That may all be true. But regardless, it is a red tree. It is a tree and it is red. Whatever the nature of that redness, it is red. Martians could be painting it with interplanetary red-rifles, and that would be making the tree red, but the tree IS red. Any explanation of that redness will only serve to explain why the tree is red, such as pulse rifles, not that it 'really isn't.'" Right? Marc K: I debate on religious websites frequently, and I know how frustrating it is to ask a question repeatedly and have your opponent ignore you. I was not deliberately evading your question, I just did not see the relevance to the discussion at hand. Even so, I shouldn't have ignored you after you repeated yourself that second time, and I apologize. To answer your question: Of course, concepts cannot exist independent of a consciousness. To relate that to this discussion, however, you must show that either concepts or consciousness cannot exist without volition. Please do That perception of choice IS choice. Very nice. That makes sense, at least for now. IDC, if I can't find fault with that by tomorrow, you've earned a place in my signature line with my profuse thanks

I'm quite impressed with (and appreciative of) your intellectual fortitude... were our positions reversed, I'd likely have thrown my hands up in the air or made liberal use of the head-banging emoticon and gone off to a less frustrating discussion. I think breaking down my thinking into bite-sized questions is the best way to help you see exactly where I'm wrong, so that's what I'm going to keep doing. Basically, if you can do what IDC did by answering 'Yes' to my reasoning until I screw up, I think that will be most helpful. I am determined (pun intended) to understand this, and I'm going to keep at it until I do or there's no one left who's willing to talk to me Anyways, please, if you're still willing, ask me to expand on a point or answer a question you'd like clarified or think I haven't addressed. Here is a road-map to how I'm thinking. I'm breaking this down into sub-arguments; as I see it, each sub-argument is completely self-sufficient and should stand or fail only on its own merits: Argument #1: Axioms As The Only Possible Alternative I see a lot of people saying "it's perceptually self-evident; look and see, there it is." That's a very effective phrase, because it presents the only evidence that can exist in support of an axiom: It is a necessary condition of axioms. But is this truly a sufficient condition of axioms? Is the fact that something is evident to our perceptions truly enough to identify it as axiomatic, without having to consider possible alternatives? If perceptual self-evidency is sufficient identification of axioms, then everything that appears to our perceptions must be accepted as it appears, axiomatically and inarguably. The stars are actually pinpricks of white light; that's perceptually self-evident: "Look and see, there it is." The sun actually spins around the Earth: "Look and see, there it is." Sticks actually bend when you put them into water: "Look and see, there it is." We actually do possess the faculty of choice: "Look and see, there it is." To use introspection as your only evidence of volition -- and to stop there -- is no different from the Christians who persecuted Galileo for arguing against the self-evidency of the sun's passage around the Earth. All knowledge, all axioms, are ultimately an explanation of perceptual evidence. For an explanation of perceptual evidence to be considered axiomatic, it must exist prior to any antecedent knowledge. To validate an explanation of perceptual evidence as 'true,' there can exist no valid (ie. possible) alternatives to explain that evidence. Why not? Because arbitrary and impossible alternatives can be dismissed without antecedent knowledge, but possible alternatives cannot, and to accept something as axiomatic one cannot make use of antecedent knowledge. Existence, Consciousness and Identity are axiomatic, because only impossible and/or arbitrary alternatives exist -- all of which can be rejected without appealing to antecedent knowledge. Obviously, 'look and see, there it is' is not sufficient to accept something as axiomatic. What else must we consider? The answer is obvious: Any and all possible alternatives (NOT imagined/random/arbitrary, NOT impossible) that would also explain the evidence presented. Conclusion: To be axiomatic, a concept cannot possess possible (ie. non-arbitrary, non-impossible) alternatives. Argument #2: Determinism Is Not Arbitrary (ie. Not Randomly Imagined) We can use perceptual evidence we have gained about the observed referents of a concept as evidence in making conclusions about those referents we have not observed, correct? Example: The concept of 'tree.' Through perceptual evidence, I have observed that trees are solid. The next time I see something that appears to be a tree, I am justified in applying the perceptual evidence I have observed about other trees to this new existent, this tree-like thing in front of me. Let's apply this to the concept of 'macroscopic combination of matter and energy' (for brevity, I'm going to call those things 'physical objects'). Through perceptual evidence, I have observed that all physical objects can only give rise to mechanically determined existents. Thus, the next time I see a physical object, I am justified in applying this fact as evidence that it, too, can only give rise to mechanically determined existents. A crucial sidenote here: I am not saying that this necessitates that physical objects can only give rise to mechanically determined existents, only that the perceptual evidence I've acquired from all other physical objects can be used as some evidence that any given physical object shares those characteristics. The brain is a physical object and, so, I am justified in applying as evidence the fact that all physical objects I have observed can only give rise to mechanically determined existents. Now, right here we reach the elimination of this idea that a deterministic consciousness is arbitrary. To be arbitrary, there can exist no evidence for it. But the exact same type of evidence I use to conclude that a given tree is solid is also being used to conclude that the brain can only give rise to deterministic consciousness: There is objective evidence to support this. Once again, this by itself is not conclusive -- it seems to me that some of you are presenting a false dichotomy between 'necessary' and 'arbitrary,' when all I am struggling to support is something in between: 'possible.' So. Regardless of your conclusions based on introspection or anything else, the fact is that some evidence does exist to support the idea that the brain can only give rise to mechanical causality: It is a physical object, and all physical objects of which I am aware can only give rise to mechanical causality. I simply cannot see how this evidence can be completely, utterly dismissed, which is necessary if you want to identify this claim as arbitrary. Here's a scenario that I think is analogous to the discussion we're having. Imagine all of us are in a forest, surrounded by trees (physical objects). We've come across one very odd looking, strangely shaped tree that's apparently covered in glass (that one physical object that's apparently giving rise to volition). Me: "Hmm. Something's not right about this." You: "What do you mean? Obviously, it's a tree. Obviously, it's covered in glass. Look, run your hands along it. Look and see." Me: "Well, yes, I agree that it looks like glass, but shouldn't we at least consider that it might be something else, something that doesn't contradict what we know about all other trees, something, perhaps, like sap that LOOKS like glass?" You: "What evidence do you have of this glass-like sap? That's entirely arbitrary! The fact that it is glass is self-evident. Look. Touch it. We have no evidence to support that this isn't glass or that the tree is incapable of growing it." Me: "No, the idea that aliens have come down and tricked me into thinking this tree is here would be completely arbitrary, but we know that trees sprout sap, and I don't see anything contradictory about the idea of sap that resembles glass. Besides, how would a tree sprout glass?" You: "Somehow. I'm sure we'll figure it out one day... but there's no way that anything could ever be found to contradict this self-evident fact that this tree is clearly covered in glass and that it somehow sprouted it." Me: "But no other trees are covered in glass. Every other tree we know of can't grow glass out of its bark. Shouldn't we entertain the possibility that things aren't as they seem?" You: "Nope. Just accept that it's glass, that the tree grew it, and let's move along, never to consider it again." I can't see how this scenario could ever end with me following you guys out of the forest. I'd still be there with my pick and test-tubes, trying to figure out what it is about this tree or this glass that makes it so special, and I'm not going to be able to 'just accept it' when possible, non-arbitrary alternative explanations exist that DON'T contradict the evidence. Anyways. At this point, following what I believe to be an unbroken chain of logic from inarguable premises, I have arrived at the conclusion that some objective evidence exists to support the idea that consciousness is mechanically determined. Please, please note the emphasis -- again, this is not to say that this is necessary, only that it is not arbitrary, such that it occupies that state in between of possible. Conclusion: Determinism is not an arbitrary (or randomly imagined) assertion; some objective evidence exists to support it. Argument #3: Determinism Is Not Impossible For something to be impossible, there must exist contradicting evidence. Contradicting evidence is evidence that necessarily forbids the claim on the basis of the law of identity (A is A). Introspection shows to us that we possess volition. Is that contradictory to determinism? Surely not, nothing about introspection necessarily forbids the claim of determinism. In fact, the opposite is true: Determinism would necessarily forbid the idea of being aware of it. Many of you have spent time showing the necessary consequences of accepting determinism. You are right: To accept determinism would result in a cerebral meltdown, nihilism and ultimate destruction. If determinism were true, then no determined species could possibly be aware of his deterministic consciousness because such awareness would, as you have shown, necessarily result in that species' destruction! Determinism does necessitate the invalidity of introspection. Introspection, on the other hand, does not necessitate the invalidity of determinism. So. What else exists to contradict determinism? That's what I'm looking for. At this point, something other than introspection must demonstrate that determinism is completely impossible (ie. necessarily contradictory). Conclusion: Some evidence, unrelated to introspection, must demonstrate that determinism is necessarily contradictory if volition is to be accepted as axiomatic. Now, I think I am right with this conclusion. I think my error is in thinking that there does NOT exist some evidence, unrelated to introspection, to demonstrate the impossibility of determinism. I still don't understand the logic behind volition being a requirement of validation (I don't even understand it enough to disagree with it... the idea just makes me go 'huh...?').

From "Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand," pp. 8: The above is the validation of the Objectivist axioms [of Existence, Consciousness and Identity]. "Validation" I take to be a broader term than "proof," one that subsumes any process of establishing an idea's relationship to reality, whether deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, or perceptual self-evidence. In this sense, one can and must validate every item of knowledge, including axioms. The validation of axioms, however, is the simplest of all: sense perception. An axiom must be certain, within the context of our knowledge, correct? An idea cannot be certain if there exists a non-arbitrary, possible alternative, correct? Illusionary volition is a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to volition, correct? If you answer yes to all of the above questions, then it necessarily follows that volition is not an axiomatic concept. Here's why (and an answer to the second part of your post): While sense perception is listed as the method of validating axioms, the relationship of that sense perception to reality must be established (as that is the defined nature of validation in the passage quoted). To do that, one must consider the nature of that relationship: What is that sense perception telling you about reality? To be axiomatic, there can be only one non-arbitrary, possible answer to that question -- otherwise, antecedent knowledge is required to choose between the multiple answers and antecedent knowledge cannot exist for axioms. In other words, the existence of a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to an axiom instantly invalidates that concept as axiomatic. There exists no non-arbitrary, possible alternative to Existence, Identity and Consciousness. There does exist a non-arbitrary, possible alternative to Volition, which necessarily invalidates Volition as an axiom. To accept volition as axiomatic, all alternatives must be shown as either arbitrary or impossible. There exists evidence that the brain is mechanically caused, and so the alternative of determinism is not arbitrary. Thus, it is critical to the acceptance of volition that all alternatives are shown to be impossible. Introspection must be discarded as this means of distinguishing between true volition and illusionary volition (which, I remind you, is not arbitrary), and so there must exist some other means of distinguishing. The validation vs. volition thing is, I believe, that means, and I'm hoping that when it's explained further it will allow me to reject illusionary volition as impossible.

Yes, but all knowledge must be validated. Too move from 'we observe ourselves choosing' to 'we choose,' one must demonstrate that 'we choose' is necessitated by 'we observe ourselves choosing.' Existence, Identity and Consciousness are all necessitated by our perception of them, as no possible alternative to explain our observation of those facts exists. With volition, however, a possible alternative does exist (illusionary volition). To accept volition, then, that possible alternative must be rejected in some way. The purpose of my last post was to show that the alternative of illusionary volition is neither arbitrary nor impossible, and so it cannot be rejected without further study. This study would qualify as antecedent knowledge, eliminating volition as an axiomatic concept (preceding all knowledge). I never said that it automatically followed; if it did, then determinism would be an inescapable conclusion. I said that our conceptual knowledge of macroscopic combinations of matter and energy (and the brain is such a beast) as universally exhibiting mechanical causality serves as some evidence that the brain does too. That's all -- it's just enough evidence to elevate 'the brain is mechanically caused' above arbitrariness, thus necessitating some kind of contradicting evidence to be able to identify it as impossible, to reject it, and to accept the alternative as axiomatic.