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Jonathan Weissberg

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Posts posted by Jonathan Weissberg

  1. On 9/27/2021 at 12:13 AM, Boydstun said:

    Jonathan,

    Thank you for bringing together these significant issues and reflections.

    I think there is a most basic and ever-present form of the human fear of death, and that is our animal wire-up to avoid death joined with our distinctive ability to think about the past and future and know that we shall die.

    For each individual, ancient to modern, I think their coming end of existence is known to them at the deepest level, and that is directly terrifying left to itself, untied from conscious wider engagement in the stream of life. So when Plato has an old man speaking his terrors, especially at night when trying to sleep, of what awaits in the afterlife, I do not think that Plato and his fellows are being entirely honest with themselves and with others concerning what their fear is really about. Indeed the whole spiel—Egyptian, Greek, Christian/Muslim—about an afterlife is not simply an error of knowledge, but a psychological defense, an attempt to brainwash oneself against a truth one cannot get free of all the way down: one is going to cease to exist. From before Plato to the billboard signs of today that read “Where will you spend eternity?” we have the same self-foolery of the coming full stop.

    “Thou hast become dark and cannot hear me. When I die shall I not be like Enkidu? Sorrow enters my heart. I am afraid of death.”—The Babylonian epic of Gilgamesh.

      This awareness seems to affect people differently at different points in their life:

    "For some of us the fear of death manifests only indirectly, either as generalized unrest or masqueraded as another psychological symptom; other individuals experience an explicit and conscious stream of anxiety about death; and for some of us the fear of death erupts into terror that negates all happiness and fulfillment." - Staring at the Sun, Yaalom.

    Yaalom thinks that we find ways to 'repress' this fear, although I would distinguish between dealing with this fear by finding rational meaning that makes life worthwhile on its own and irrational attempts at finding meaning through what he calls 'immortality projects' like having children or seeking to create another kind of legacy (specifically when motivated by this fear, rather than some other reason).

     

    On 9/27/2021 at 12:13 AM, Boydstun said:

    One common thought from believers in afterlife is that otherwise: life is meaningless. The thought becomes dubious as they think more specifically and fully about their life with their spouse and children and other projects and enjoyments. Rand’s theory of value is the full deliverance from the muddle “otherwise, life would be meaningless.” All meaning and worth and purpose is derivative from our life and life before us. All chanting upon life beyond what arose in nature and ends in nature is primordial human self-foolery, and Rand’s insight brings the completeness of realizing squarely that all value and worth and purpose and problems exist only within the phenomenon of life.

    Brushes with death and traumatic losses surely do occasion turns to new sorts of life. Those are turns in the making of one’s life, that is, turns in what we call making a life. The most basic fear of death retains its place under any such turns. But as ever, one can become fully aware not only of one’s coming nonexistence, but to its place in life.

    I quote this before, but it's relevant again:

    Quote

     

    “What precisely do you fear about death?”, a question I often ask clients, elicits varied answers that often accelerate the work of therapy. Julia’s answer, “All the things I would not have not done,” points to a theme of great importance to many who ponder or face death: the positive correlation between the fear of death and the sense of unlived life. In other words, the more unlived your life, the greater your death anxiety. The more you fail to experience your life fully, the more you will fear death. Nietzsche expressed this idea forcefully in two short epigrams: “Consummate your life” and “Die at the right time”—as did Zorba the Greek in urging, “Leave death nothing but a burned out castle,” and Sartre, in his autobiography: “I was going quietly to my end … certain that the last burst of my heart would be inscribed on the last page of my work and that death would be taking only a dead man.”
    It does seem to be the case that people who do feel this way consistently share this kind of evaluation. Life on its own, without an afterlife, is meaningless if they "have not lived."

     

     
    See Also 'Death of Ivan Illych':
     
    Quote

    In Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilych, the protagonist—a middle-aged, self-absorbed, arrogant bureaucrat—develops a fatal abdominal illness and is dying in unremitting pain. As death approaches, Ivan Ilych realizes that all his life he has shielded himself from the notion of death through his preoccupation with prestige, appearance, and money. He becomes enraged with everyone about him who perpetuates denial and falsity by offering unfounded hopes for recovery. 

    Then, following an astounding conversation with the deepest part of himself, he awakens in a moment of great clarity to the fact that he is dying so badly because he has lived so badly. His whole life has been wrong.

     

     
    So rational values pursued, internalized and embodied lead one not to even raise these kinds of questions is my take-away. One can setup irrational 'defense mechanisms', i.e., unreal explanations and life projects engaged in out of fear of this death rather than love of life, which reality constantly presents counter evidence for, and which eventually will result in an 'existential meltdown' (Like a Jim Taggart moment).
     
    In what sense did you mean one becomes aware of the place of one's own eventual non-existence in one's life? That would be a case for what Yaalom is claiming when he says that it's important to "derepress" this fear if it has been smothered with irrational coping mechanisms.
     
     
     
     
  2. Quote

     

    "This spiritual life, in the end it is not a choice, it’s what’s left when you run out of choices. If when you’re in a crowded room you automatically find yourself thinking ‘all of us in this room will die. Someone will be the first to die, and someone the last to die, but there is an order,’ then gloomily ponder what the order might be, I suggest that you are already excluded from material solutions to the spiritual problem of being alive."
    (Russel Brand, Comedian)

     

     
    Quote

    "After about thirty years of creative activity which included some work in chemistry, Newton became depressed and suffered a nervous breakdown. He left Cambridge University to become Warden of the British Mint in 1696 and thereafter confined his scientific activities to the investigation of an occasional problem. He did, however, devote himself to theological studies, which he regarded as more fundamental than science and mathematics because the latter disciplines concerned only the physical world ...An example of his theological writing is The Chronology of the Ancient Kings Amended, in which he sought to determine the dates of Biblical events by utilizing astronomical facts mentioned in connection with these events." (Mathematics for the Non-Mathematician)

     
    I've seen this a lot. Someone experiences an "existential meltdown" / a nervous or mental breakdown and they are suddenly deep into (usually mystical) philosophy. Behind the scenes is an intense focus on death, which the Russel Brand quote captures well. Apart from comedians, it happens to successful businessmen, athletes, friends, anyone. Why is it usually mystical philosophy that is pursued? Because God is Dead:
     
    Quote

    "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?" (Nietzsche)

     

    God is dead. And philosophies that are mystical offer comfort, if you can buy into their premises. A more naturalistic, this-worldly-only philosophy like Objectivism is rare, but it would also be a much more potentially bitter pill to swallow at first—because what if it's too late? what if you can't make meaning?

    Of course everyone's answer to this experience varies, but the experience usually prefigures significant psychological change.
     
    Quote

     

    "Ebenezer Scrooge, the grasping, isolated, mean-spirited old man in Charles Dickens’s A Christmas Carol. Yet something happened to Ebenezer Scrooge at the end of the story—a remarkable transformation. His icy countenance melts, and he becomes warm, generous, and eager to help his employees and associates. What happened? What fueled Scrooge’s transformation? Not his conscience. Not the warmth of Yule cheer. Instead, it was a form of existential shock therapy or, as I shall refer to it in this book, an awakening experience. The Ghost of the Future (the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come) visits Scrooge and delivers a powerful dose of shock therapy by offering him a preview of the future. Scrooge observes his neglected corpse, sees strangers pawning his belongings (even his bed sheets and nightdress), and overhears members of his community discuss his death and dismiss it lightly. Next, the Ghost of the Future escorts Scrooge to the churchyard to view his grave. Scrooge gazes at his tombstone, fingers the letters of his name, and at that moment he undergoes a transformation. In the next scene Scrooge is a new and compassionate person.
    ...
    "Pierre, the protagonist of Tolstoy’s epic novel War and Peace, faces death by firing squad, only to be reprieved after several men in line ahead of him have been shot. A lost soul before this event, Pierre is transformed and lives with zest and purpose in the remainder of the novel." 
    (Staring at the Sun, Irvin Yaalom)

     

     
    What is going on here in philosophic terms? The best understanding I could make of it is that there is (forced) complete re-evaluation of values, of one's life, and that the judgement is negative. If one has lived by (and is embodying) what one now judges as wrong values, has one ever really lived or only meaninglessly existed? will one still have a chance to experience living? 
     
    Quote

    “What precisely do you fear about death?”, a question I often ask clients, elicits varied answers that often accelerate the work of therapy. Julia’s answer, “All the things I would not have not done,” points to a theme of great importance to many who ponder or face death: the positive correlation between the fear of death and the sense of unlived life. In other words, the more unlived your life, the greater your death anxiety. The more you fail to experience your life fully, the more you will fear death. Nietzsche expressed this idea forcefully in two short epigrams: “Consummate your life” and “Die at the right time”—as did Zorba the Greek in urging, “Leave death nothing but a burned out castle,” and Sartre, in his autobiography: “I was going quietly to my end … certain that the last burst of my heart would be inscribed on the last page of my work and that death would be taking only a dead man.” (Irvin Yaalom, Psychotherapist)

     

     
    There is some complication here because, as far as I can tell, it's not only a complete re-evaluation of values that leads one to this state:
    Quote

    "Certain life situations almost always evoke death anxiety: for example, a serious illness, the death of someone close, or a major irreversible threat to one’s basic security—such as being raped, divorced, fired, or mugged. Reflection on such an event will generally result in the emergence of overt death fears." (Irvin Yaalom, Psychotherapist)

    Unless by this he means that the situation forcefully leads to the re-evaluation of all values.

     
    What are the two most basic motivations man can have? a love of life, of (his) values or fear of death, fear of dis-value. If one is stripped of values then all that remains is to stare into the abyss? But saying this feels like a mathematically deductive reductio ad absurdum not appropriate to this enquiry. Why the intense focus on death that many experience in the wake of an "existential meltdown?" 
  3. On 6/14/2021 at 12:25 PM, Easy Truth said:

    The more I have thought about this statement, the more I am convinced that this is an arbitrary assertion.

    The potential to harm is not an identifying component of the unknown. In fact, nothing is identifiable about the unknown. If you are truly speaking of the unknown, you would not know what potential it has. To make any assertion about it would be arbitrary.

    So it is a certain definition or category of unknown you are speaking of. You seem to know "something" about this unknown.

    I agree that if I'm speaking of a specific unknown that would not make sense. But I'm speaking of unknowns as such. Unknowns as such are entities with attributes. Everything that exists has identity. Not all entities and their attributes under all conditions are conducive to life. So if I say that it's possible that some unknowns can be harmful to you that's the equivalent of saying "it's possible that some planes will crash." Does this make sense?

  4. On 6/8/2021 at 1:28 PM, Eiuol said:

    The difficulty here I think is that much of this deals with emotion. It's not just the idea that the universe is intelligible (and the rest). I think of it as an emotional premise as well, granting that such intelligibility is important and positive. That's why I call the benevolent universe premise an aesthetic abstraction, dealing with a wide range of concretes and concepts united by some emotional evaluation. So it is not so much a matter of being convinced, it's more of an emotional development. At the very least, you can learn about the value of feeling that way, and the necessary concepts to get to that point. 

     

    I see what you're getting at and I like it: a chain of abstractions that, when subconsciously held, results in a particular emotional sum. 

  5. 6 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

    I have a question: Do you see “unknown, unforeseen factors” as necessarily being harmful?

    If you do, then not being harmed by these infinite unknowns would indicate an ever present shield against this eternal malevolence. And therefore, underneath that thought process is a belief that the universe is in fact malevolent.

    But the vast majority of unknowns are benign, irrelevant, imatterial, harmless.

    I know know how many red cars are in New York. I don't know how many hairs are on Donald Trump's head. I don't know if you are wearing shoes. I don't know if Louie wears glasses. etc. These are unknowns and there are many more.

    I'm not going to fall victim to these. Most unknowns are like this, they don't victimize.

    I see as I review and respond to these replies, I get clearer on what I was thinking about, but the kind of question I have about the whole thing changes. If the benevolent universe is only a matter of "success is possible to me" vs. "success is impossible" then I don't think my question relates to it anymore. I may need to set aside time for a different line of thought. But here's what I've got so far:


    It's a good point to make and I agree with you. It's especially illuminating with respect to the phrase "fear of the unknown" as capturing either unidentified fears or a metaphysical fear (but that's a different discussion). And no, I don't see the unknown itself being harmful, but as having potential for harm. And this capacity itself is "in the nature of things." Also I don't think it's the quantity of benign unknowns that matters, but the severity of the harmful unknowns. There millions of unknowns that are irrelevant to me, e.g., the number of hairs on Joe Biden's head or the thread count of his mask, as you pointed out. But the fact is that one bad unknown can end or crush my life. That too is written into reality, into the nature of things. I suppose we can call it an "accident", but I don't think it's the right way to think about it, i.e., statistically.  Why is this devastating unknown, not also considered a "norm" or "essential" about life? Both it and success, together, are in the nature of things.

    6 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

    What is a necessary concept to get to that point? If you are talking your own track record, then we talking self esteem and confidence based on experience not necessarily abstract principles.

    I can imagine this attitude wouldn't even be a question for someone who has implicitly reached it, but the conceptual stepping stones are necessary for anyone who wants to get there or keep it. I only saw your other posts later, but I do think you can develop the attitude by beginning with it conceptually and then applying that knowledge to choices small and large throughout your life. 

    6 hours ago, Easy Truth said:

    Another thing to consider is one's amount of risk aversion. How much do you think that is going to influence the attitude (the sense of safety and optimism toward the universe)? Some can naturally live in a very scary environment and never consider that "things" are malevolent.

    I do wonder if "risk aversion" is even a good way to think about this. Consider these:
    Is a North Korean watching bootlegged American movies at the risk of being sent to a labor camp "aggressively risky"? Or is art just such a deep need that he can't live without it? Is a businessman who hires someone because he wants to expand his business "risk tolerant" or does he just value growing his business and acknowledge that hiring is part of that process? Is a paranoiac who refuses to leave his house for fear of asteroids "risk averse"? 

  6. My summarized take after reading all your responses:

    The Benevolent Universe Premise describes an attitude that views man as empowered to survive in an intelligible universe: he can discover facts, causal connections and the unknown. He is equipped with a tool that, when applied correctly, allows him to build an ever-growing context of knowledge which, rather than being threatened by new knowledge, is strengthened by it.

    It's also helpful to make a few distinctions that clarify thinking about the kind of world we live in: (1) the metaphysical vs. the man-made; (2) the unknowable vs. the unknown;

    With respect to distinction #1: The differences between men and objects are consequential enough (a badly styled outfit is capable of being visually irritating, a badly developed soul is capable of murder) to separate them out for analysis.

     

     With respect to distinction #2: A quote from John Galt's speech describing the feeling of living in an unknowable universe:

    Quote

    "To a savage, the world is a place of unintelligible miracles where anything is possible to inanimate matter and nothing is possible to him. His world is not the unknown, but that irrational horror: the unknowable. He believes that physical objects are endowed with a mysterious volition, moved by causeless, unpredictable whims, while he is a helpless pawn at the mercy of forces beyond his control. He believes that nature is ruled by demons who possess an omnipotent power and that reality is their fluid plaything, where they can turn his bowl of meal into a snake and his wife into a beetle at any moment, where the A he has never discovered can be any non-A they choose, where the only knowledge he possesses is that he must not attempt to know."

     

    Quote

    Eiuol: After all, we are even talking about things that happen accidentally. How should we interpret things when they truly are not our fault?

    Actually, this is something I had in mind originally too. According to the quotes below we consider “accidents” as not being the essence or the “norm” of human life. It’s still not really clear to me what kind of conceptual stepping stones I need to jump over to be fully convinced of this. I can see that we have a tool to discover the unknown, but there is still the unknown—and the unknown can include causes of negative, deadly consequences and this fact is "in the nature of existence." I don’t think I’ll get an answer until I explore lots of real-world examples of how men actually dealt with the unknown, e.g., the case of discovering blood types compatibility and how that unfolded. This is what Greg pointed out with exploring “positive reinforcements” too.

    Some quotes:

    With respect to distinction (1), the man-made:

    Rearden reflecting in Atlas Shrugged:

    Quote

    “… this dinner was a felony—meant no more to him than the possibility of being run over by a truck: an ugly physical accident without any moral significance.”

    “The Inexplicable Personal Alchemy:"

    Quote

    “No matter what corruption one observes in one’s immediate background, one is unable to accept it as normal, permanent or metaphysically right. One feels: “This injustice (or terror or falsehood or frustration or pain or agony) is the exception in life, not the rule.” One feels certain that somewhere on earth—even if not anywhere in one’s surroundings or within one’s reach—a proper, human way of life is possible to human beings, and justice matters.”

    With respect to distinction (2), an unknown as opposed to unknowable universe:

    Leonard Peikoff's lectures:

    Quote

     

    Although accidents and failures are possible, they are not, according to Objectivism, the essence of human life. On the contrary, the achievement of values is the norm—speaking now for the moral man, moral by the Objectivist definition. Success and happiness are the metaphysically to-be-expected. In other words, Objectivism rejects the view that human fulfillment is impossible, that man is doomed to misery, that the universe is malevolent. We advocate the “benevolent universe” premise.

    The “benevolent universe” does not mean that the universe feels kindly to man or that it is out to help him achieve his goals. No, the universe is neutral; it simply is; it is indifferent to you. You must care about and adapt to it, not the other way around. But reality is “benevolent” in the sense that if you do adapt to it—i.e., if you do think, value, and act rationally, then you can (and barring accidents you will) achieve your values. You will, because those values are based on reality.

    Pain, suffering, failure do not have metaphysical significance—they do not reveal the nature of reality.

     

     

  7. Principles are about fulfillment, not specific negative consequence for their violation?

    I understand the Objectivist conception of morality to be that choices and actions guided from rationally self-interested moral principle are good for living a happy, fulfilled, flourishing life; and I understand that choices and actions which violate those same moral principles are bad, i.e., self-destructive or inching oneself closer to death. But when I look out into the world, I’m not able to clearly perceive this in a concrete way. I perceive some cases where someone is unprincipled and incurs a penalty, but I also perceive plenty where the opposite appears to true, at least when you expand the time horizon by which you judge it. I’m looking for some different angles to think about this and for feedback on my thought process. There are some questions at the bottom.

    Consider these examples:
    (1) A man who spent his 20’s robbing banks. He violated principles of independence, productivity, rights, etc. In one of his attempted robberies was shot & was killed by the police;
    (2) A man who spent his 20’s robbing banks. He violated everything: honesty, integrity, independence, rights, etc. He was arrested but then managed to escape to India where he lived out so great an adventure that he became a famous novelist and had great commercial success. He made amends for his crimes by serving out his remaining sentence and lived an incredible life thereafter. 

    In the example above you can see that both men have violated moral principles. One incurred a penalty: his life. The other incurred some penalties, e.g., the paranoia about being caught, the beatings from police, subsequent involvement in the underworld, etc., but judged on the whole and looking back at his life from the vantage point of his making amends and his current success, all his errors, stupidity, evils, have provided him with so many exciting and fascinating tales and a kind of ‘character’ that he would’ve otherwise not have had. From the vantage point of his current position, having made amends, it’s like the bad choices contributed to a good whole. If he never robbed banks and escaped to India, would he have become a famous novelist? Would he have had the commercial success he has now?

    Obviously, alternatives are difficult to project. So, I couldn’t actually tell you what man two would’ve become had he been rationally self-interested and principled on that basis. 

    Am I right to say that the only thing one can draw from a validated principle is that his life would’ve been more fulfilling had he been principled? But the concrete details we just can never project? 

    Am I right to say that when thinking about principles the consideration is the kind of life lived rather than the perceived penalties or rewards? 

    Am I also right to say that the appeal of the ‘irrational’ (some instances of it, like the one above) in our culture are usually due to a conventional morality that often packages good and actual evil? E.g., a strong, ambitious, dangerous, sexually appealing character who engages in multiple love affairs might be viewed as made up of a lot of conventionally morally bad elements but on a rational morality might actually be principled and good?

  8. Is the fact that I don't constantly observe and experience "unforeseeable accidents" evidence of a benevolent universe?
     
    If I want to fly from Sydney to New York, I can say that I will certainly land when I’ve checked my situation against the conditions (standard of proof) required for planes to land. Sometimes however there may be something outside of my context of knowledge, a new factor or qualification. In the plane example, let’s say the military mistakenly shoots down my plane because of a bureaucratic error from their military command-control: in this case, even if I somehow survived, I was right to conclude what I did and be certain, but reality introduced some new unforeseen condition (military error). Another example would be discovery of blood type compatibilities and then only discovering additional qualifiers or conditions (RH factor) after someone has died through blood transfusion. At first this idea frustrated and confused me: “Oh what, so we can walk around saying I’m certain of this and that and then suddenly we die because of the introduction of a factor previously outside of our specified context of knowledge!!!???”
     
    The answer I later discovered is yes, but more so the answer is that to agitate against this is actually to implicitly hold onto omniscience as a standard of certainty. We can only be guided by what we know. We need a standard of certainty that is actually functional for life given our nature as non-omniscient, fallible beings. The only alternative is arbitrary considerations qualifying as evidence which, in principle, leads to dysfunctional paranoia.
     
    But there is something else I thought: I don’t seem to live in a universe where there are constantly new unaccounted for conditions introduced into my context of knowledge that results in death or injury. It seems like there’s some kind of fit between my mind and the universe such that people are not constantly being hit and dying because of unanticipated asteroids, unknown diseases, or dangerous unknown insects. Is this part of what we mean by a benevolent universe? That yes, we’re non-omniscient, and so there can be unaccounted for factors in reality but we’re not so fragile that we’re always being killed by them (at least not in developed, relatively free countries)? 
     
    I feel like there’s some link, but I also am not sure because I realize that in observing that people seem to be thriving and not falling victim to “unknown, unforeseen factors” all the time, I’m making a statistical observation and saying that “most of the time” our mind is able to deal with reality and not fall victim to an “unknown factor.” Is it right then to make this observation to support one’s conviction of a benevolent universe—to observe the times man is confronted with some new, previously unknown factor and survived it?
  9. Thank you Boydstun & StrictlyLogical for clarifying this. Here is my summarized understanding after having read both your replies.
     
    The assumed context here is that man survives by a particular method of thought and action.You cannot evaluate an object when it is obtained by irrational action because it is moral principle that sets the context (a commensurable standard) for evaluating that object in relation to your other values. You can evaluate the method as good or bad, i.e., this is for my life or against my life, but not the object. Similarly, in epistemology, a proposition accepted on faith cannot in some sense be evaluated on its own, but in terms of method. 
     
    An example with StrictlyLogical's breakfast: 
    If I obtained the breakfast by cheating a shop keeper and he later hits me with a rock does it make sense to say the breakfast was good because I enjoyed it while it lasted? Or what about if I suffered no immediately perceivable consequences but began obtaining more things in the future through fraud? In either case I can't really make sense of the situation by looking just at the breakfast (evaluating the object in terms of my other values) but only by looking at how I obtained it (against moral principle, bad when evaluated in terms of action or method).
  10. There's a passage from OPAR I'm finding interest but not understanding. It states that some objects have no evaluative standing:
     

    Quote

    "This point applies to all human behavior, not only to the issue of honesty. Just as, in epistemology, irrational mental processes detach a conclusion from the realm of cognition; so, in ethics, irrational action detaches a goal from the realm of evaluation. Whenever an object, spiritual or material, is sought or obtained by behavior in conflict with moral principle—whether the behavior involves fraud, improper compromise, the initiation of force, or any other evil—the means employed, by their very nature, clash with reality and thereby deprive the object in that context of any evaluative standing. Once the guidance of principle is dropped, there is no rational method of evaluating an object."

    If an object is obtained through behavior in conflict with moral principle isn't it the case that the object is evaluated as bad? Why is it that the object is deprived of "any evaluative standing"? I'm not really following how you can say an object can be detached from evaluation in the same way that a conclusion can be detached from cognition.

  11. On 3/27/2021 at 2:03 PM, MisterSwig said:

    That said, have you tried applying Peikoff's conclusion in that quote to the conclusion itself? If it's possible that he's wrong about the possibility of being wrong, then it's possible to be infallible.

    Hah hah, yes, true, although I was questioning specifically scenarios where something is already metaphysically possible, e.g., a plane crashing or "dying tomorrow", and not something that is metaphysically impossible, e.g., the existence of the non-identity of consciousness.
     
    In the plane example, you could've checked all the conditions required for a safe flight and said to yourself it's impossible (epistemologically) for this flight to crash. You don't consider or think about metaphysical possibility when deciding whether or not to fly. So you fly because it's impossible for the plane to crash, but then the Chinese Air Force shoots your plane down, which was the unconsidered, unknown factor that actuated the metaphysical possibility of the plane crashing. This factor was 'arbitrary' when you made your decision. 
     
    My understanding is that to agitate against this is to implicitly hold onto omniscience as the standard of certainty. The whole point of advocating a certain thinking method and mentally pushing aside the metaphysically possible but epistemologically impossible is to simply provide the best possible guide to action given our fallibility and non-omniscience. And it so happens that we do not live in a universe where we are constantly destroyed by metaphysically possible but epistemologically impossible ("arbitrary") factors—perhaps this is part of what is meant by an "auspicious" universe.
  12.  

    @Easy Truth, @MisterSwig, @StrictlyLogical

    Sorry, I see there were some typos and inaccuracies in my original post. Eiuol filled in the blanks and was correct. There's more context I could've originally provided so I'll do it now. The rest will take me some more time to think through before replying. Keep in mind the majority of what I'm about to write was in the context of a discussion about asking the question of "will this flight that I'm about to catch crash?" and how to think about such a statement.
     
    Yes, I meant to say man is non-omniscient and fallible. LP said fallibility is addressed by logic. And that non-omniscience is addressed by specifying the context, i.e., by implicitly acknowledging for complex items of knowledge (inductive generalizations) that your statement is preceded by “within the available context of my knowledge”. He states that this does not mean anything else is possible or “maybe I will discover something to upset this”, but only: “everything now known supports this and I acknowledge there is more to learn. If my method is right, the more I learn will not contradict what I have so far.” The more knowledge you have that’s relevant to your current context will simply mean the addition of new conditions, e.g., the discovery of the Rh factor blood as relevant for blood type compatibility (from the OPAR chapter on Reason.)
     
    LP says that there are two ways to be wrong: (1) you’ve applied the method of objectivity correctly and specified a context, but new knowledge teaches you a qualification which doesn’t contradict the old context; or (2) you’ve erred in your method and new knowledge will contradict your old knowledge. 
     
    Metaphysical possibility and epistemological possibility are different concepts. LP says that metaphysical possibility refers to a capacity or capability or potentiality, e.g., a plane has the capacity to crash but a feather does not. A metaphysical ‘possibility’ is a statement about the nature of the entity and an epistemological possibility refers to advancing a hypothesis about a situation. You cannot say it's impossible for the plane to crash metaphysically, but you can say it's impossible epistemologically with no evidence of causal factors or conditions that actuate that metaphysical possibility.
     
    On 3/29/2021 at 8:22 AM, Easy Truth said:

    Yes, mainly because if you want certainty that is not contextual, as in omniscient certainty, you will not make any decisions in life.

    The fundamental issue around certain is "can or should I make a decision?". That fact is: The only kind of certainty available to our consciousness is in fact contextual certainty.

    Yes, I think this is what I was getting at. 'Certainty' is epistemological. A plane crash is metaphysically possible, but may be epistemologically impossible. If, on principle, you're concerned about the metaphysically possible as a guide to action but with no evidence of epistemological possibility then you end up paralyzed and unable to act.
  13. After listening to Peikoff's 'Art of Thinking' Lecture, I've been thinking a lot lately about the importance of hypotheticals and specifically the kind of hypotheticals one asks and how that affects the quality of one's actions and decisions. I have some questions from this lecture which I'm going to number. Feel free to answer only one or whatever interests. 

    (1) Why does ‘metaphysical’ possibility not imply ‘epistemological’ possibility in any given case? 
    Paraphrasing LP: ‘Context does not eliminate the possibility of error. No philosophy is going to make you infallible. You can follow the method to the utmost that is originally possible to you, you can specify your conclusion and still be wrong.’ 

    Let’s assume no error in method, but a situation where some unaccounted for factor is causally relevant. We know that such a situation is metaphysically possible, so then why do we not say given this general fact, it ‘may’ be possible in any given situation?

    Isn’t there some similarity here to statistics, which is applicable to concretes of which you have no knowledge? So the metaphysical knowledge of possibility is applicable to your ignorance of unknown causal factors (just as statistics is applicable to concretes which you are ignorant of). 

    My understanding is that ‘epistemology’ is about method and if we were to use our minds to consider something which we cannot consider, e.g., an unknown factor that is causally relevant, we then cannot mentally function since we will be paralyzed on any given inductive generalization for fear of the ‘possibility of being wrong.’ Is this correct? That we dismiss ‘possibility’ epistemologically on the basis of it not allowing us to function well?

    (2) Given the above, does it ever make sense to consider a hypothetical of metaphysical possibility but epistemological impossibility for the purpose of informing action?
    I think no because then you’d need to consider a meteorite hitting you when leaving the house and you’d be completely paralyzed. LP later says statistics applied when there’s no basis to hypothesize some specific phenomenon results in total paranoia so I assume this applies. 

    (3) What’s the epistemological status of “Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die?”
    I recently overheard a conversation in which someone was talking about working hard to save money and the other person replied that they should just make sure they spend it all before they go into the grave which might be tomorrow because who knows. What is the epistemological status of such a statement? 

    (4) Why is it only philosophy that makes long-range predictions? 
    LP makes the case that long-range predictions, e.g., 50 years out or longer, are out of the question because so much can change and many new factors relevant to your prediction cannot be anticipated or accounted for. But he says that this is not true for a philosopher making a prediction like “this country will ultimately become a dictatorship?” What is the justification for this? My understanding is that a philosophical prediction has fewer conditions to consider in making such a generalization, but even so aren’t those few conditions dependent on the free will of many people, which one cannot predict?

    (5) Without an explicit theory of induction, is error inevitable?
    We are both omniscient and fallible. Specifying context addresses omniscience, logic fallibility. Given that there’s no explicit theory of induction, then isn’t error an inevitability when making inductive generalizations, just as it was pre-Aristotle’s discovery logic when discovering new knowledge?
     

  14. Does it take courage to act on one's own judgement? If yes, what would be the reason for it?  Is it only the uncertainty of an outcome which demands courage? To take a concrete example we can refer to, I'm specifically thinking of the first run of the John Galt line which Dagny & Rearden both participate in. Later, Francisco tells Dagny that every act of saying 'it is' and acting on one's own judgement (I assume especially when you are the first on a new path) requires courage.

    I define courage as an act of integrity. It's acting with integrity when confronted by fear in pursuit of a value.

    There's a relevant quote from Atlas Shrugged where Francisco is talking to Dagny.

    Quote

    “Dagny,” he said, looking at the city as it moved past their taxi window, “think of the first man who thought of making a steel girder. He knew what he saw, what he thought and what he wanted. He did not say, ‘It seems to me,’ and he did not take orders from those who say, ‘In my opinion.’ ” 

    She chuckled, wondering at his accuracy: he had guessed the nature of the sickening sense that held her, the sense of a swamp which she had to escape. “Look around you,” he said. “A city is the frozen shape of human courage—the courage of those men who thought for the first time of every bolt, rivet and power generator that went to make it. The courage to say, not ‘It seems to me,’ but ‘It is’—and to stake one’s life on one’s judgment. You’re not alone. Those men exist. They have always existed. There was a time when human beings crouched in caves, at the mercy of any pestilence and any storm. Could men such as those on your Board of Directors have brought them out of the cave and up to this?” He pointed at the city. “God, no!” “Then there’s your proof that another kind of men does exist.”

     

    I understand that I personally might feel fear when acting on my own judgement in some specific situations, especially when confronted with vigorous opposition, but take a completely rational being with correctly integrated subconscious premises and let me try to apply Objectivist epistemology to him (with the above examples of the John Galt line & Francisco in mind). If this rational being came to his newly found conclusion and discovery by a process of logic, including both reduction to observations or first principles and integration by essentials to the rest of his knowledge, what would the fear to act on his judgement, which requires courage to be overcome, be based on? "they might be right, I might be wrong" would be arbitrary since there's no evidence for your judgement being wrong; "I might get hurt"—isn't that also wrong, since on what evidence would there be for you getting hurt? 

    Is the issue here my definition of courage? or have I overlooked something?

  15. What is the relationship between good philosophy (specifically, a highly integrated, habituated correct epistemology) and excelling in other fields?

    In my current context of knowledge, the fundamental methods of thinking are:

    (1) Purpose: this provides a standard by which to judge the value & relevance of all other thoughts and questions.
    (2) Logic: this includes reduction back to the perceptual level or ‘fundamentals’ (similar to Elon Musk’s need to reduce everything to ‘first principles’ and ‘back to physics’) and it also includes contextual integration as an additional way to identify contradictions.
    The next two are less clear to me, but I’ll do my best:
    (3) Thinking in principles: this means trying to identify what principle is operative in any given behavior, action, event.
    (4) Thinking in fundamentals: this means identifying that causal factor or characteristic that is most causally significant in an entity, behavior, action, event.

    Is there anything I’ve missed here?

    I’m curious if anyone has found self-consciously adopting, integrating, habituating these principles significantly helpful in any other productive fields? And if you had not adopted them where do you think you’d be? How much do you think a disregard for these principles causes people to have difficulty learning in (any) field?

    Are the principles less relevant to some pursuits, e.g., to learning piano or to drawing?


     

  16. 7 minutes ago, Easy Truth said:

    Depends on frequency of what?

    Yes, if it is wrong, it is wrong no matter what the frequency.

    But if frequency refers to likelihood or probability of harm, that's going to have some relevance in determining "friend or foe". If there are two choices with equal benefit and one has a more likely hood of producing a benefit, it is "better".

    I understood David to be saying that it doesn't make sense to speak of moral actions in terms of statistical frequencies, e.g., Borris is good 80% of the time, but bad 20%. The thought that came to mind is murder: he can be good most of the time, 99%, but then the 1% is what should be weighted more significantly when judging if to interact with him. I think this is what you're referring to when you say "likelihood or probability of harm"? Although, I find making the jump form 'this is bad' to 'there's a high probability of harm' difficult, even in the example of a murderer. I can more easily say if the person does bad against me, there's a high probability of harm, but not 'there's a high probability of harm,' if that makes sense.

  17. On 1/7/2021 at 4:57 PM, DavidOdden said:

    The goal is to reach a conclusion about a person (then use it in future dealings: just as you reach a conclusion about a particular adhesive and use that conclusion in deciding what to use on future projects). You should focus on facts about the person that are relevant, for example hair color and skin color are irrelevant for a moral evaluation, but they could be relevant if you are casting an acting role. Since human actions are chosen, you must focus on what causes a person to person to act the way they do. You may consider the possibility that a person is self-destructive, or you may think that he believes that other people exist as sacrificial animals to support his whims; or, you may think that he is confused about what constitutes good versus evil. If you only know that Smith took an apple without paying for it, you don’t know enough to evaluate his moral code (a standard problem with single-instance hypotheticals is that they trick you into making unwarranted factual assumptions: how do you know that he didn’t pay? Did the owner give it to him?).

    It’s impossible to provide a rational moral evaluation if you don’t have a moral theory. (Too) many people simply emote an answer, that it angers them when X or it makes them happy what X. We have that part figured out (the moral theory). The theory that allows reasoning from observed actions to moral code is IMO much less developed, because it’s not easily testable. What causes a colleague to “seem a bit cranky at staff meetings”? Is he a death-worshipping hater? Has he chosen not to gush semantically-empty ebullient noises every couple of minutes, and why has he made that choice (especially when others around him make a very different choice)? Should you even give consideration to the fact that he recently arrived from The Old Country, where standards of public behavior are different?

    Ok, a multi-instance hypothetical open to anyone still reading now: let's say your co-worker Alex (whom you deal with only remotely) is known to (1) talk behind people's backs, (2) share information that is private & confidential in an attempt to trade it for other information, (3) has stolen before in his past, (4) is often evasive and dishonest when confronted over a conflict and does not admit fault or recognize guilt. Judged against independence, integrity, honesty, justice we can say he is definitely not virtuous. But is he evil? Let's say he has one thing in his favor: he works hard (sometimes) and so can sometimes provide you with valuable updates. Could you say that for you he is not evil because when dealt with at enough of a distance and carefully, e.g., via phone only, he still offers some value? but that for anyone else judged against a rational code of ethics, he is evil? 

    On 1/7/2021 at 4:57 PM, DavidOdden said:

    Weighting evidence (in the statistical-model sense) is about how reliable a fact is as proof of a proposition, which in turn is about reasonable alternatives. It is guided by the law of non-contradiction, therefore there is something wrong with thinking “Smith chooses to live 60% of the time and chooses to die 40% of the time, thus Smith is somewhat good”. An alternative theory is that Smith chooses to live more often, but he suffers from errors in reasoning in some domains, for example he may not have properly integrated “intellectual property” into his moral code and probably does not know how to apply that code to specific instances.

    OK, I follow. The more reasonable alternatives (alternatives based on your own validated knowledge of human behavior or observations of it) the less weight. The less reasonable alternatives, the more weight. And percentages don't make sense because frequency is not what is important in evaluating action in relation to a moral code. 

     

  18. On 1/6/2021 at 4:58 PM, whYNOT said:

    Personality together with temperament strike me as the ~expression~ of a sense of life. The pre-conceptual subconscious manifesting itself in form. Which may be actions and responses and subconscious-held values into certain emotional responses. So pretty much, personality is a given (from one's early development).

    Would you say if personality & temperament are expressions of sense of life then it doesn't make sense to try and categorize either personality or temperament since sense of life is unique? And if it does make sense to classify personality types and temperaments, then what might that say about sense of life? (Maybe we can take this to another thread, if you'd like to answer?)

  19. On 1/6/2021 at 5:57 AM, Eiuol said:

    I think it would be fair to say that evil *eventually* wins out. A lesser degree of evil might mean that it takes longer to win out, or the damage is easier to correct, or whatever else you can imagine. What I'm trying to convey is that, as you pointed out, you aren't as bad as a dictator for checking your phone once out of impulse. It will still be a matter of degree. In some sense, yeah, you could check your phone and the consequences of that will never need to be corrected because nothing happened except maybe 15 minutes wasted time. But it isn't benefiting your life, and if you did do it repeatedly like an addiction, that would be an example of the evil winning out. You might need to change your frame of mind about spending your time wisely - fortunately, that's not hard to do early on before it becomes a habit. We aren't concerned here only of the measurable consequences. We also care about the frame of mind required to take the action, especially if we want to judge if a person is good or bad.

    Since this is unrelated, but still an interest: where can I find more arguments made and concretizations on this principle of 'evil' winning out and what this means? I assume evil means an irrational principle. 

    Now more related: when you say 'frame of mind' is that referring to the operating principle, whether implicit or explicit, that caused the decision, and if yes, is there anything else?

  20. On 2/9/2021 at 12:02 PM, Boydstun said:

    Jonathan, this is a response to only part of your inquiry.

    I rather think that proceeding according to the principle that reason is the only source of knowledge and only proper guide to action entails contouring one’s hour-by-hour activities by one’s craft of one’s setting. We have deliberately decided not to have a smart phone. We don’t want that continual possibility for distraction, which we see among friends and family, and our stage of life (retirement) does not require we have one. My older sister, age 80, has opted to not introduce a computer into her life. We just write letters or talk on the phone.

    Proceeding by reason alone entails knowing that reason is pilot of the full living system we are, and that includes knowing to include sex, social interaction, taking breaks, getting sleep, listening to or making music, getting exercise, and hobbies. I’d say, too, that some spontaneity is part of the good in life. There was some spontaneity that I turn to writing this note just now, taking a little break from this morning’s study of Hegel’s anti-foundational conception of method in philosophy. I can be continually aware of roughly how much time is passing, and what I am doing just now in the fuller context of the day and decade.

    When you turned to write this was it 'spontaneity' in the sense of not having planned to take a break by browsing a forum or spontaneity in the sense of having planned to take a break and then chosen from a set of possible pre-deliberated-upon options for what you will do when you take breaks?

     

    Quote

    It seems a joy and a smart habit to always be cognizant or open to becoming cognizant of reasons for any action-impulses whatever. Then too, Rand once remarked that all thinking is a creative process. I think that correct and that rational thought itself requires internal spontaneity in the quest for reality and its connections.

    So then if I understood this correctly then one should be cognizant of action-impulses, i.e., one should use reason to validate the life-affirming nature of an impulse (when appropriate). If one didn't, and if one acted on some unplanned impulse. Would I be right then to say that would be considered dishonesty? My motivation in asking is to try concretize ethics & its application better.

    And what do you mean by internal spontaneity? I am interpreting this as the ability to consider new data observed or provided by the subconscious and then start thinking in a new, perhaps unexpected, direction. As opposed to planning to think about one issue for the whole day and sticking to that no matter what. In both cases however, you may still be operating within the scope of having planned to dedicate a day to philosophy.

     

  21. On 2/9/2021 at 8:46 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

    First, reason is not the "source" of knowledge. 

    It is a process by which some kinds of knowledge can be gained in tandem with other processes, memory, perception etc. Reason also can be used to validate purported knowledge, memory, experience, intuition.  Reason can be also used to help guide or inform choices on the basis of perception, held knowledge, memory, experience, intuition, feeling etc.

    Thank you for this added clarification. When you put it this way I agree that reason cannot be the "source" of all knowledge as it is just one faculty among many others including perception, memory and emotion. If I rethink this as I've been prompted to do now, I'm not sure I'd be asking this same question in the way I did. A more precise way to think about this would simply be: reason is the only tool for validating conceptual knowledge.

    On 2/9/2021 at 8:46 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

     

    Disregarding reason in the moment and jumping off a cliff in response to a solitary maladaptive impulse would be catastrophic.  But not only reason works to dissuade one from a single rogue impulse... as the psyche is filled with multiple impulse systems which in a healthy mind should be well balanced.  What should happen when such a dangerous impulse comes into consciousness, is the invocation of the will to focus and use reason.

    Yes, my original concern was for not for something as obvious and perceptual as this, but very small unanalyzed decisions which may have much more long-range impact.  

    On 2/9/2021 at 8:46 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

     

    Now, having already decided to allow weekends to count as  "cheat nights" after weeks of dieting and exercise, the subsequent impulse to eat a tub of ice cream fakes nothing about reality.  In such a situation the person is not engaged in dry philosophical rationality, but has permitted oneself the follow those impulses... we would say "within reason", but better to say when those impulses do not require examination by purposeful or attentive reason.  That is not to say that intuitively, the person would not in fact stop himself from eating 4 tubs of ice cream... common sense autopilot intuition can be a good enough guard dog to warn and wake up reason when it is needed, but that does not imply it must always be operative in all things at all times, ... within a permitted scope it certainly is NOT always needed.

    Let's say it's not a cheat night and you've worked very hard for the day. Might it not make sense to be spontaneous in the moment and have one extra ice cream tub today just to reward this very hard work? Let's say that you can reason that it's fine because you'll remove one ice cream tub from your cheat day. Thoughts? 

    The reason I bring this up is not because I'm opposed to spontaneity but simply because I find this kind of in-the-moment decision of what I should do for some things not very good at helping me become who I want to be long-range.

    On 2/9/2021 at 8:46 PM, StrictlyLogical said:

     

    The acquisition of Knowledge is only but one aspect of being human.

    Knowing the fact that Reason is not the key to all of human experience, always and at all times, is not any denial of reality but a form of wisdom about what it means to be a whole and integrated human being.

     

    Agree.

  22.  

    On 2/9/2021 at 10:06 PM, Eiuol said:

    The difficult thing about fictional representations in literature is that they seem to be concretizations of already-created abstractions. These representations might assist you in forming concepts in the sense that the artist is showing you their own concretizations of abstractions. If Rand concretizes independence in Howard Roark, it is the concretization of her own concept of independence - which may or may not be valid. You may then wonder if the concept makes sense, or it may provoke your thinking, or what about the concept is essential, but the work is still something completely invented by Rand including all of his characteristics.

    Because the material is fictional, I think the material should not be thought of as the material that can be used to form the concept. That is, when you talk about independence, you aren't referring to Howard Roark. He might be inspirational to considerations about what counts as independence, or get you to ask where in reality you can see such independence. At best, you have an approximation of the concept independence if Roark is the only concrete of independence you have ever observed. Whether or not you know to use or build on the concretization you see in fiction probably depends on your reaction to the work and whether it provokes your creativity and imagination. If it doesn't, then there is probably no point to use that fictional material. 

    Remember, the benefits of art for concept formation or validation are wonderful, but this is a side benefit. Art is first about sense of life, that's what's essential here. If it resonates with you, that's usually reason enough to think more about it. Sometimes to me that's just a matter of thinking "oh that's cool" and I go from there. 

    OK, I'm following now: so the assistance is in provoking you think about an abstraction from a potentially new perspective. E.g., you see independence essentialized and concretized in Roark and you start reconsidering what is and isn't essential about it. Non-essentials: wearing a suit (doesn't mean dependent), dressing unconventionally (doesn't mean independent). Now with this in mind you go out into the world and start attempting to observe instances of independence and reorganizing the concept in your mind by reweighting the considerations that characterize it (essentials vs. non-essentials).

    And when we say what is essential about art is sense of life, we are saying an equivalent of the purpose of art is to fuel man's consciousness in accordance with the philosophy he is responding to, right?

     

     

     

  23. Let's take a person who agrees broadly that reason is our only source of knowledge. Even just someone who knows that thoughts precede emotions and thoughts have or should have a basis in the 'world out there' (on the perceptual level). If that person then proceeds to make a decision based on an impulse whose source he does not know, no matter how tiny, would that qualify as dishonesty in the Objectivist conception of it (the refusal to fake reality)? For example, let us say this person has decided he wants to sit down and read a book and proceeds to do so, but while he is reading he feels an impulse to check a social media application on his phone and does so (without identification or the reason for why or at least attempt at identification and then acknowledgement of such before making a decision), would that qualify?

    Since this person knows, on some level at least, that reason is his only source of knowledge, is he not disregarding this fact (faking reality) implicitly by acting on any unexamined impulse at any time? 

    And on this question, do we distinguish between "context dropping" (and active evasion let's say) and someone who is simply not very good at holding the context even though the material might be in his mind somewhere in explicit form?

  24. On 1/18/2021 at 2:54 PM, whYNOT said:

    Most certainly, the second. "...forming all kinds of concepts". The reason we find art, all art, valuable is that it yields to one's mind the meeting between reality and man's consciousness--as typified by a specific artist. We catch an insight into his re-created world, a particular view of existence which is supremely significant to he/she. Whether one is in metaphysical accord or not with their depiction, one gains and takes away from their creation for one's own purposes (by conceptualization). Here is a corrupt or bleak or impotent or petty view of life and man's mind - there is the antithesis: I.E. existence is knowable and valuable, and man is able to know it and appreciate it. But the bad/ugly/trivial/etc. do exist in others' minds and actions and it's a denial to not conceptualize those as well. Strength of mind depends on the confidence to stay true to rational convictions, not be subjugated to any random input from any other, artists' works in particular.

    A "good author"- especially the good Romantic Realist, while not exclusively - doesn't try to make it easy for the reader, imo. His plot and characterization needs to be authentically realist if we are to believe his narrative. He puts across the competing, dark forces against e.g. reason and individualism, freedom and success and so on, which readers can relate to from their experience, creating that necessary "tension" which his protagonist, whose acts we identify with, eventually overcomes through conviction, independence and rationality. (Or succumbs to by futility and weakness, in other depictions). For myself I look for that "tension" in art. I think like in all things real, one needs a challenge from artworks to have to conceptually grapple with, or the art may become prosaic or sentimentalist or ornamental. That personal effort put in by reader/viewer is what gives a work its 'sticking power' in a mind. The darkness, of imagery and writing (and music) can 'fit' my moods on occasion, all the while resting in the knowledge that shadows don't exist without light. Penetrating questions, Jonathan.

    I enjoyed reading this a lot & look forward to having some of these experiences while viewing art.

    So the gain, in this concept-formation sense, is only a gain to the extent that you manage to form a concept on the basis of the fictional work? Is this something you do from having reflected on fictional events and integrated them as you might do from events in daily life? Or would you describe this process of forming concepts from fiction as more like a redirection of focus in reality that you then use to collect future material or observations which you previously didn't notice but now do and use it to form a concept you otherwise wouldn't have?

    Semi-related:
    Does a work that resonates (or that one is in metaphysical accord with) always strike one as realistic? and a work that one is not in 'metaphysical accord' with strike one as unrealistic? Rand's books are a great example. Some say they're completely unrealistic fictions both in terms of characters and events, others do not and are inspired. So the former (those that think Rand's characters are unrealistic) would definitely not form any concepts on the basis of the fictional events, the latter might? And so with other works, a similar pattern follows, regardless of whether the fictional events are or are not metaphysically possible?

    When we're reading or viewing art how would you know that what is being represented is useful material for forming a concept? An example is on the nature of evil: is evil maniacal, potent all the while being sharply conscious, focused and brilliantly intelligent (like a Bond villain) or is it a sweaty forehead, droopy eyes and a smear whose default mental state is blur (Jim Taggart)? Since fiction is not reality, how would you know when to take fictional material and use it for the material of a concept and when not to?

  25. On 12/22/2020 at 4:52 AM, Repairman said:

    I don't think it's necessary to repress yourself in the pursuit of anything rational. If there is a "function of nihilistic" art, I'm not entirely sure I can answer that; I can only speak for myself. Nihilism and/or realism in bold artistic statements of human imperfect gives me a sense of connection with the outraged and frustrated others, as so many of us feel in moments of alienation. I find it's something that can help me to explore or sink to the depths of my own darker moods with music or other "culture for misfits" that reflects some sort of macabre aesthetic, or noir realism. Dark moods are a part of life. Dark moods won't guide your life, unless you allow them. Rationality can be inspired through art as well, however, art that inspires rationality and heroism is rare in these desperate times, so you have to seek it. My observations have been that some people only consume the sort of culture that inspires darkness and meaninglessness. They immerse themselves in it. It's always a matter of choice. Rising from out of the depth of darkness, to live again, is very rational.

    Would you be open to expanding more on what it means to "explore or sink to the depths of my own darker moods?"

    Do you mean as a tool for introspecting? or as a kind of soothing balm to help you stay with your feeling rather than escape it? 

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