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Franklin

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Franklin last won the day on November 2 2013

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  1. No offense, but there is a hierarchy of values. I think physical appearance and athleticism while still being worthy of praise are below intellectual values. I for one care more about reading and studying than I do about my outward appearance. I walk to work, and I walk to class; but---otherwise---I follow Hutchins example,"If I get the urge to excercise, I lie down until it goes away." Seriously, I think it wrong to judge people primarily on the basis of physical attractiveness (the romantic and aesthetic contexts are obviously different). The reason Rand's heros are portrayed as being attractive has more to do with her aesthetic philosophy than it does with the moral values implicit in being attractive. One of the things that troubles me about objectivism is the correlation it draws between relationships and moral values. While a relationship should be determined by one's moral character and virtues intellectual and physical alike, I think it unwise to hold people accountable for not having a relationship on this basis. Mathematically, since there are more male objectivists than female, not ever male objectivist will be able to find a relationship. Also, there are more men seeking fertile women at any given time than there are women seeking men. It is a game of musical chairs and somebody's got to lose. Why is it that Objectivism is more appealing to men---on average---than women?
  2. I think the book contains a damning portrayal of what altruism is in practice---of course, the book is not written by an objectivist and, thus, contains many confusions. However, if a person wants to see what a horrible thing altruism is when taken to its furthest extent, this book shows it.
  3. I must preface my remarks. First, I must say that Peikoff is right to criticize the philosophical conclusions many people like Reichenbach (though I admire much of Reichebach's work on time and space and his refutations of Kantian epistemology) draw about casuality from Quantum Mechanics. Peikoff, however, does not have the expertise in physics (a man cannot learn all there is to know) to judge the real philosophical implications of the theory from those that many claim result from it. The incorrect philosophical interpretation of a theory on the part of some (even those formulating it) does not neccessarily refute the theory. For example, there are no objectivists who reject evolution simply because of the ethical conclusions of Herbert Spencer (the first major social Darwinist). The theory is separate from Spencer's understanding of its implications; the theory should not be faulted for Spencer's philosophical errors. For this same reason, Quantum Mechanics should not be rejected because of the faulty conclusions some philosophers make from it. Second, Quantum Mechanics (hereafter QM) accepts that it is only a partial theory. Objectivist epistemology states that partial integrations are frequently needed as one builds his way up to more advanced and general concepts---it is simply necessary that these early concepts be formed in a manner that considers their context and can ultimately be reconciled with the larger abstraction. An example from Joeseph's Introduction to Logic [available at the ARI bookstore], makes my point; a person learns the terms mom and dad before he learns the term human. QM contradicts aspects of relativity theory---scientists are aware of this and are actively trying to solve it. The "Theory of Everything" is really an attempt to create a new theory that is valid in a larger context than QM and RT, replacing the two mutually inconsistent theories with a single theory. Instead of two theories, one for small phenomena and one for large phenomena we will have one theory for both large and small physical phenomena. This might seem like a violation of the A is A principle; however, I believe that the context dependence of concepts can be evoked to explain this: The two theories were developed in different contexts to explain different phenomena. The fact that they have yet to be reconciled to each other is no more a refutation of them than the fact that psychology has yet to be reconciled with neurology and physics, or that Newtonian Mechanics for a time could not be reconciled with Electro-magnetism. To paraphrase Aristotle, the things more knowable to us and the things more knowable by nature are not one and the same. Once the reconciliation of QM and RT takes place, the ideas are seen as valid in the context under which they were originally formed: The new theory shows how and why the old theory worked. I give you the example of Newtonian Mechanics and Relativity. The errors in their interpretation were really errors in defining the contexts under which they were valid. Both are and will always be valid in the contexts under which they were formed---even if they could not be extended universally to describe all phenomena (which what was originally hoped for) Schrödinger proposed his cat thought experiment (as far as I know no one has accomplished it) as a criticism of QM. This should be kept in mind. Of course, the assumption that the cat is both dead and alive is absurd---that was Shrodinger's point. Everyone is aware of this problem, and the fact that some scientists lacking philosophical training are likely to celebrate this absurdity says more about the psychology of those scientists than it says about QM. Luckily, the scientific method enshrines certain epistemology assumptions in the very act of performing standardized scientific research---making it difficult for even the extremely philosophically confused to totally mess the process up. Indeed, this is the reason we frequently get results that work well predictively but that are used to justify ridiculous conclusions. Many scientists discussing QM refer to the "influence of the observer". Sadly, this is very sloppy language since the observer being refered to is not an observer at all but a certain amount of light. This is very different from saying that it is consciousness that interfers with the phenomena. What should really be said is this, For an event to have the quality of being observable in one respect (momentum or position) it is less observable in the other respect since observability of each requires a distinctly different form of interaction that inherently reduces the effectivness of the other. Given the length of the above formulation, which I will explain shortly, one can see why scientists wanted to shorten it into a shorter form, sadly adopting the confusing term "observer effect". Indeed, in rigorous scientific literature the term observer effect is not used for the uncertainty principle. The basic idea of QM is that light comes in discrete packets, called photons. Like atoms, there is a smallest fundamental unit of light. To know the position requires that one use smaller and smaller wavelengths of light, but since light comes in packets of maximally smallness there is a limit here. Conversly, larger wavelengths are needed to determine the momentum since there is a maximal speed of light. That these two means of measurement pull against each other should be obvious. Two last points. The idea of superposition should not be taken as a description of what is but rather of what is known. If I say there is a fifty percent chance of a certain thing happening, I am not saying that it is both going to happen and not happen. If I say that a person has a one in ten thousand chance of drawing a royal flush, I am not claiming that before he looks at it the cards are in a state of non-identity. QM---in the interpretation I favor---represents probabalitically what is known about the objects it considers, not its ontological state. Lastly, the notion of casuality that QM is used to refute is not the Objectivist notion of casuality. Objectivists hold that the law of casuality requires a thing to operate in accordance with its nature since to think otherwise eliminates the possiblility of self-generated action. The kind of casuality that QM is used to undermine is the idea that every action is a byproduct of the conditions surrounding it. While objectivists hold that the surroundings can effect results in certain contexts, this is not always the case. The idea that the atom behaves in accordance with its nature and that some of its actions are self-generated is perfectly consistent with the objectivist idea of casuality; it only violates a strictly deterministic and enviromental view of casuality.
  4. What makes the Koran scarier than the Bible---and I am not defending the Bible here---is the context in which the book itself was written: While the Bilbe is thought to be written by numerous different authors at different times each under the inspiration of God but still including elements of his own mindset and personal opionions, the Koran is (in the mind of Muslims) the infallible word of God. This is a crucial difference. A Christian or Jew can give more weight to one part of the Bible than another, seeing the whole as an historical process of revelation from more barbarous revelations to more sophisticated ones. Of course, what was happening here was that the culture itself was becoming more sophisticated, but the fact that the Bible is considered a work of human beings who can and obviously contradict each other mitigates the Bible's deadly intent. Indeed, more sophisticated historicist theories of Biblical interpretation (theories orthodox Islam will not allow to be applied to the Koran itself since it would show Muhammed's authorship) marked the Enlightenment. A very notable early proponent of modern hermenuetics was Spinoza. The Bible is seen partly as the work of men, the Koran solely the work of God. This makes a huge difference in how those violent passages are going to be interpreted.
  5. Defamation does not entail the use of force. Presenting false information to a third party that prevents a person from obtaining a value from that party is not the same thing as actively employing force. For this reason, no criminal penalty is appropriate. Indeed, crime properly understood requires mens rea, i.e. intention to commit the act, and the application of force. Defamation is clearly lacking the second. However, there is another side to the story. While defamation should not be considered a crime, it does do unjust damage to another's interest. For this reason, it is valid for the defamed person to seek redress in a civil suit. Such suits, however, are not intended to punish an action but rather to correct the harm done by that action: This is a very different thing. I hate to mention it again, but to punish people for acts of speech is a dangerous bit of bussiness indeed; it is virtually begging the government to abuse its authority. This is obviously bad.
  6. Why is it slanted? Because the author writes for Pravda? Your statement is about as reasonable as this one. Or, if you want a more reasonable analogy, "Why is it slanted? Just because it was drafted by the DNC? The fact that the author writes for the Heritage Foundation is a good reason to suspect a slant and not to take this context into consideration is ridiculous. I guess you---on similar grounds---might disapprove of racial profiling because being an Arab does not necessitate being a terrorist. Once again, I am in awe of your astoundingly mediocre intellect. The designers of IQ tests should stop with their involved statistical norming and simply test you. Your argument---to the extent one exists---seems to rest on the assumption that hedonism as it exists today is worse than religiously motivated morality. That is hardly the truth. I can't seem to recall the last time a group of hedonists stoned a woman to death for getting raped (happens amongst the Muhammedens all the time). When was the last time a bunch of hedonists bombed a medical clinic? When I consider the relative harms of hedonism and of religion, I firmly---while still holding it in disdain---come down on the side of hedonism. Pleasure is, in fact, a value. Faith is a destroyer of values.
  7. No offense intended, but did you even stop to consider that the sort of data Kinsey was trying to get from the pedophile could be used to make children safer from pedophiles? The best way to destroy a thing is to understand it. I do not believe you have thought your opinion through very well. During war, loyal citizens frequently join the enemy's ranks for the purpose of discovering information that can later be used against that enemy. Such men are not reviled as co-conspirators; rather, they are hailed as heros. Frequently, the only way to destroy an evil is to seem to befriend it. I am sure you would not crticize these men as collaborators. Every day law enforcement and the courts offer criminals immunity for the purpose of catching more dangerous criminals. No one in his right mind, no matter what his opinion about offering immunity to criminals is, would accuse the DA's and police of being evil in this regard. Furthermore, every day lawyers are ethically required to keep the secrets of their clients. If your client admitted to you that he is a pedophile, you can't tell the court, "Hey, guess what, my client told me he did it". You are ethically forbidden from revealing that information. If you do so, you will be disbarred. Why? Because a higher value is at stake: insuring that criminals get a fair trial. How much more important is it then to keep the communication between a scientist and a research subject confidential if that is the only way to stop sexual predators? Kinsey's actions were justified. While I know the law does not acknowledge such a privelege between researcher and subject, the moral grounds for it are the same: A greater good. Now, I could not bring myself to do what Kinsey did, but then again I couldn't bring myself to be a lawyer either. I can tell from your post that you did not do any serious thinking when coming to this moral pronouncement. You mention no related facts; you appeal to no moral principles; you make no argument. It seems that you felt a certain way and decided to run with it. Indeed, you begin your post by claiming that you know nothing about the man whom you are judging. Judging people without the relevant facts and without reasoned argument is not objectivism. Basing moral judgements upon feeling alone is not what objectivists do. Lastly, the idea that the quality of a movie depends entirely on the moral character of its subject is silly when the movie is biographical. Would you not see a movie about Alexander the Great because he murdered his best friend? Is a movie about Napoleon inherently evil because Napoleon was a butcher bent on conquest? Whether you agree with my analysis of the Kinsey question, I hope I made one point clear: Moral judgement on the basis of feeling is absolutely, postively, utterly unacceptable.
  8. I do remember what I said which sounded to Ashley like [color="#000000"]contradicts the nature of the reals now. I said that constructivism does not allow for the real numbers to exist, which I found flat wrong given the effectiveness of physical theories using the real numbers. Thus, I said that "Failing to accept the axiom of choice is to contradict nature. The rejection of the real numbers is a sign of this." This is what she did not understand. I believe she overheard a conversation between a brilliant mathematics student named Chris Dodd and me. While Dodd is brilliant, at that time he had not read much on the philosophy of mathematics, so I was explaining the Hilbert (Formalist)/Brouwer (Constructivist) divide to him. Please delete your earlier comments that insult me; it is only fair. God, I would hate it if most objectivists familiar with math became followers of those neo-Kantian jackasses like Brouwer---the constructivists.
  9. Actually, the quotes were not the same. The later contained the phrase that I was not contradicting Peikoff but simply furthering the identification so that an apparent hostility to computers might be eliminated. My question was, Is a computer like the Bird that chirps 2+2=4 and therefore meaningless even though a computer is not conscious? I answer no, and I give my reason. Please read the OPAR section on reason and then see my above comment. I admit that this topic is rather far from the axiom of choice question we, but it did eventually develope into this.
  10. Looking at this a year later, I still cannot believe that you did not consider the possibility that I was misquoted. Ashley's account of what I was saying was distorted beyond recognition by the fact that the ideas I was discussing were highly unfamiliar to her. All I said was that the Axiom of choice has the unusual consequence of showing certain things to exist mathematically without necessitating that a concrete example can be given. For example, the proof of the existence of transcendental numbers came before an example of a transcendental number could be given. I simply commented that this had interesting philosophical consequences. I think you are a disgusting slanderer. You should have considered the possibility that Ashley---though she is very bright---might have been the mistaken one given that she has no serious mathematical experience. I demand an apology---you slander me most unfairly. After a year you never apologized. How could the possibility that she was mistaken never occur to you? I am furious with you. Ashley mistakenly paraphrased me because the ideas I was discussing were not familiar to her. I can't believe that you did not consider this possibility. I would not use a phrase "contradicts the nature of the real numbers" unless I was possibly trying to show something was clealry false. Again, look at my other posts to see what I was really discussing (i.e. that the axiom of choice leads to proofs of existence without specific examples being available. I am furious and I think your comment is borderline slander.
  11. [Edit: It is unnecessarily wasteful to repeat your immediately preceding post. I deleted the repetition D.O.] I see my comments were not well understood. I think I can put them better now. The question is, Is a computer carrying out a program to perform a given calculation like the bird in Peikoff's writing that says 2+2=4, or is it fundamentally different? My answer is that a consistent causal relationship is as important as consciousness when it comes to meaning and actually has to be present at each step of the process of producing a meaningful statement while consciousness needs only to be present at one point in the process. While the meaning of the symbols the computer gives as output is formed by the humans creating the language of the program, no human is aware of all the specific steps the computer takes in performing its task---only the general character of those steps. The reason that the output of the computer has meaning is that a causal relationship to reality has been maintained throughout. It is this causal relationship that matters. The identifications of conscious minds have meaning because they also necessitate a causal relationship (when the concepts are properly formed). To give another example, if I see a bear's footprint in the snow, I can say that that means a bear has walked there even though no conscious mind produced the print. The meaning is found in the causal relationship between the foot and the snow and only requires the involvment of a consciousness at one point in the chain (namely, when I look at the bear foot print). This may seem like a trivial point, but think about the consequences for computer sciences if the output of unconcsious entities was considered meaningless in all contexts. If my account seems confused, I welcome questions and comments. My only purpose is to make Peikoff's account of Reason in OPAR consistent with the reality that computers can perform meaningful tasks---i.e. give output that has meaning. (This is what I meant by "produce meaning" before. Give output that has meaning seems clearer though.) I also want to clarify some of my other posts when I have the time. [Edit: It is also unnecessarily wasteful to repeat to include the current post in itself. I deleted the repetition. D.O.]
  12. I strongly disagree with your assessment: Objectivists condemn those things they see as a destructive and harmful to a reality/life oriented ethics. However, it is certainly not totalitarian: They never claim that force or government action should be used to enforce artistic standards; such controls are at the very heart of totalitarianism, and objectivists oppose this sort of government more vehemently than anybody else. To express one's opinion freely and to "vote with your dollar"---on the other hand---is the opposite of totalitarianism; it is the individual living his life on his terms and actively supporting his values. Furthermore, art has objective meaning just as language does: Musical taste reflects aspects of the psychology of the hearer. Now, I do not mean to insult you; you seem like a fine young man. However, if somebody were to watch almost exclusively slasher movies (and not merely out of childish curiousity but as their primary means of distraction), I would fear for his psychological stability since slasher films are, by their very construction, contrary to life [in general, I think pretty young co-eds are better when they are alive; and I would dare to say that this is not merely a matter of personal taste either]. A penchant for heavy metal is similar to a penchant towards watching slashing movies. What is the purpose of heavy metal's lack of clear melody; what is the purpose of the unfocused screaming in heavy metal music; why does heavy metal reject every aspect of musical form and structure? It is not merely to portray anger. Much brilliant classical music is angry; the portrayal of anger is a frequent classical theme, just as it ought to be since righteous anger is a valid and even noble emotion. However, heavy metal's denial of melody, harmony, and every other traditional aspect of musical structure is not a necessity of portraying anger: it is a necesity of portraying blind rage, which is a very different beast. By denying the mind all the ques that orient it within a musical peice---that constitute the very meaning of that peice---the heavy metal musician shows the true target of his anger, not injustice but the mind itself.
  13. Sadly, this book is difficult to discuss because it contains a major plot twist: Basically, your understanding develops in much the same way as the narrator's; to discuss it too deeply might ruin this effect. However, I think it is perhaps the best novel written in twenty years or more. I really hope people read this work. I would like to know what objectivists think about it.
  14. First, I think I know what book you are reading. It is Brown's "The Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to Picture and Proofs". This book has some definite virtues, but fails to be rigorous; (you should also not that his proof of Godel Incompleteness misuses some of the brackets.) He is very biased towards platonism. First, let's understand that Rand was not a scientist and that her ideas need to be understood in the context that gave birth to them. She once said that the amount of matter in the universe is fixed: This statement is patently false. Mass-energy is constant, not mass by itself. She clearly thought in Newtonian terms that have been shown inaccurate (I will not use the word false because they are TRUE IN MOST CONTEXTS. Rand herself writes about the context dependence of truth and the need to reformalize thought in the light of new information. Mathematics is not the "science of measurement". This would completely eliminate number theory, the theory of polynomials, and much of analytic geometry from mathematics. Mathematics is the study of number, quantity, structure, space, change, and the logical systems that underpin those studies. It is foremost the study of identity---the internal consistency of the structures we use to discuss the outside world just as Grammar is the study of the way language is used to discuss the outside world. This analogy also holds who Math is empirical while still not entirely relying on experience: It is exactly like grammar in this sense. To put it simply, the best philosophy of mathematics is structuralist (mathematical entities gain their meaning from the structures they inhabit; this fights platonist trends), naturalist (inspired by observation of nature and the identity of representation itself) and weak constructivist (meaning like the construcivism of Jaako Hintikka; please read Constructivism Reconstructed in "The Principles of Mathematics Revisted"). I have discussed constructivism elsewhere here and what my problems with the stronger versions of constructivism are. Brown covers these ideas some too.
  15. Yeah, it is crap. Godel has non of the implications most people assign to him. Read Boolos' proof (which can be found in a book of mixed quality called "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to a World of Proofs and Pictures" by Brown---its Platonic bent is a little annoying at times esp. since it gives far to little say to naturalists and logicists) of Incompleteness and then read Hintikka's response to it. Hintikka achieves the benefits of constructivism without the unnecessary and unwarranted destruction of the mathematical edifice intuitionists would cause. The guy who wrote Godel, Escher, Bach is one of those humanist bastards who read far too much into Godel.
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