hunterrose

But doesn’t that include things that we can’t even perceive?

To be more accurate, the passage seems to have very little to do with Primacy of Existence or axioms. Internal vs. external may be of use in building up the idea of Primacy of Existence, but that only gives more credence to the idea that Primacy of Existence is not an axiom. What part of it do you find most relevant to the idea that Primacy of Existence is (implicitly) self-evident?

I agree with what you’re saying about explicitly forming and stating axioms; my point is that you don’t need sophisticated formulations to implicitly grasp the perceptually self-evident. This Primacy of Existence is not an axiom – “every other kind of entity acts in a certain way and only in a certain way” is not something that is perceptually self-evident. Sure. No, but is that necessary for implicit knowledge of an axiom?

You provided arguments from authority, but you have not said which perceptions show that existents are causally independent of any consciousness. That’s what I'm looking for: a perception. But coming to the conclusion that all existents are causally-independent of all consciousnesses is not something you perceive, rather it’s an induction. Not an axiom. Somewhat, and I see that you’ve posted some other stuff today that I haven’t yet read. I’ll do that.

I wasn’t questioning your definition of the term axiom. I had similarly thought of Primacy of Existence as meaning that existents are causally independent of any consciousness (i.e. that a consciousness cannot alter any existent’s causality.) But Primacy of Existence was then stated as Phibetakappa, I was questioning your implication that “The universe exists independent of any consciousness” is an axiom. If in the causally-independent sense, how is this perceptually self-evident? If in the logically-independent sense, how would this set up an epistemological order necessary for establishing the Objectivist epistemology?

Yes. What self-evident perception makes you say that the universe exists independent of any consciousness?

Why? Presupposing existence doesn't mean you presuppose a particular existent's existence. Agreed.

They’re related. They both ask “is consciousness of an object necessary for that object to exist?” Primacy of existence defined as does not answer that question. What self-evident perception makes you say that ?

You really ought to be careful in "blaming" your great-grandmother for having kids!!! I'm not sure social Darwinism is the answer either. The virtuous businessman and generosity aren't mutually exclusive. If you really want to convince Granny, I'd argue that that virtuous businessmen are *far* more willing and able to help their fellow man (not as a defense of capitalism, but simply to make a point) than government bureaucrats.

So then how do we get from ["existence" is not logically dependent on "consciousness"… "consciousness" is logically dependent on "existence".] to [consciousness alone cannot change existence]?

I think the claim that Objectivism lacks rigor in some regards is valid. And if it’s true, it’s not necessarily a knock against Objectivism, as I think that the “rigorous” alternatives to Objectivism are weaker philosophies, rigor or not.

I did vote for Obama, and I wouldn't change that vote if I could. McCain would be doing the same thing as Obama is, just less eloquently. IMO one interesting effect of Obama's win is that the Democratic opposition seems to be focused on economic issues, rather than religious issues as in some years past.

"Mercy" is the closest thing I can think of.

Those are arbitrary claims, I suppose, but that isn't my argument. But I will note that in one case there may be something you that you don't know but could have and will be able to know and in another case there is something you couldn't have known and may never be able to know. Taking one who makes an error in judgement: If she is volitional, that she may be wrong because she doesn't know something is arbitrary and should be rejected as you say. My argument, that the universe's initial state is such that, if she is deterministic, it either was impossible for this person to have not made the error or will be impossible for this person to ever rectify her error, is not arbitrary. Surely you acknowledge these facts? I'm not saying determinism is erroneous because of the above, but it does impact the idea of knowledge (and dependent subjects) in a deterministic world, take it for what you will.

How would a deterministic person tell whether X is objectively correct or whether X is objectively incorrect, but she is determined to believe X was correct? The issue isn't that she can't be guaranteed that she's correctly distinguishing one from the other. That, as I believe you have stated, woud apply to volitional beings as well. The issue is that If the universe's initial state is "wrong" (i.e. is an initial state that determines that she will distinguish X incorrectly), it is impossible for her to distinguish X correctly; if the universe's initial state is "misleading" (i.e. is an initial state that determines that she won't find out that she is distinguishing X incorrectly), it is impossible for her to find out that she was distinguishing X incorrectly. it is impossible to know whether the universe's initial state is "wrong" or "misleading" in terms of X. Do these impossibilities exist for a volitional person?

Are you sure? Can you state this paradox? Then I'll make it more meaningful for you. If determinism is true and volition exists, then volition is supernatural, then it is outside the realm of science. That seems true, but that is not a paradox. It would be a paradox for Objectivists if Objectivists believed 1) volition exists even if determinism is true and 2) volition is within the realm of science. Do you understand why? If science explained human action in purely physical terms and anything explainable in physical terms was deterministic, then volition would be false, then the only way Objectivists could believe in volition would be by ignoring scientific findings. That also seems true, but that is not a paradox. It would be a paradox for Objectivists if Objectivists believed 1) anything explainable in physical terms was deterministic and 2) believing in volition does not require ignoring scientific findings. Do you understand why? <Deep breath> If science explained cognitive knowledge in purely physical terms and anything explainable in physical terms was deterministic, then determinism is true, then there is no way that a determinist can distinguish whether any cognitive knowledge is objectively true from whether he is merely determined to think so. That would be a paradox for a determinist who believed that, say 1) determinism wasn't scientifically unprovable and 2) a determinist can distinguish whether a determinism proof is objectively true from whether he is merely determined to think it is true and distinguish whether a determinism proof is objectively false from whether he is merely determined to think it is false. Do you understand why? Strictly speaking, the Objectivist paradoxes do not exist when your if-clauses (as you framed them) are false - but that's not why they're unsupported. Your paradoxes are unsupported because, even if your if-clauses are true, they aren't self-contradictory in terms of Objectivism.

When you get back: Aren't you using philosophical axioms (i.e. not using science) to defend your determinist beliefs, and then requiring that volition be scientifically proven?

Have you given up on your unsubstantiated paradox?

I agree. Let's say that this set of equations predicts that I will do X tomorrow, and I subsequently don't. Do you agree that this would be evidence that I have volition? Do you have scientific proof that inanimate matter is capable of producing, through a particular causal chain, only one series of events? Or is this one of your axioms?

When you are starting with the axiom that every action of a particle is caused by outside forces, it's impossible to accept any possibility of the non-deterministic/stochastic. If a particle acts for an unknown reason, you are already ignoring it and saying that "there is every reason to believe that it behaves in a deterministic manner." And when humans act in ways that in no way appear to be deterministic, you are ignoring these actions and falling back on your axiom that things made of determined particles are themselves determined. What would constitute evidence of non-determinstic/stochastic action? If nothing qualifies, then that's more indicative of your reliance on an axiom to make your case.

You and every other volitionist rejects that "principle." You fault the fallacy of composition for that? Scientific experiments show that the effect of gravity on a human is determined. So while we couldn't say that every action of a person is determined, we can say that some are. That's science. But the idea that every action of a particle (let alone a human) is caused by outside forces is not science. How would you disprove it??? Exactly: it's axiomatic. If you don't like pro-volition axioms, that's fine. But why are you then accepting pro-determinism axioms as if they were proven science?

If you were to say "all the parts of a system are determined according to the law of gravity,so the whole system is determined according to the law of gravity," then that indeed makes sense. Add in as many additional laws as you want, and it'd still make sense. The problem with Van Inwagen's statement is that there actually is no Law of Determinism that says that every action of a particle is determined by its environment. Such a theoretical law may make sense from a philosophic sense (and I think determinists kinda count on the sanction of their volitionist victims here) but it's not valid science.

That's one option. I've learned to not let false insults slide, because there's something to lose in allowing slander to stand as "facts." If you found my prior post so insulting, I'll apologize and rephrase that it's a shame if you can't appreciate what Michael did in life, but don't go out of your way to piss on his grave. But note that calling Michael a pedophile is more insulting and unsubstantiated than anything I've said. I didn't mean to insult Marilyn - I quite like her. What I meant was that criticizing Michael for drugs and association with kids is like insulting Marilyn for drugs and association with pornographers - it's part disingenuous and part irrelevant when you consider the overwhelming value these two brought to life.

The facts are that Marilyn was incredibly self destructive, surrounded herself with people much worse than children, and died from drugs. What's your point? It irks me when people go out of their way to criticize the dead for spurious reasons, even more so when said dead have left an undeniable positive effect on the world through their life's work. Jake, it's a shame if you can't appreciate what Michael did in life, but it sounds idiotic to go out of your way to piss on his grave. Even though I wouldn't say Marilyn was as great a person as Michael, I would agree that she was a great person despite her faults.

Which scientific law says that every particle obeys a set of laws which determine its actions in all cases??? Which set of laws can determine every particle's action in every case??? Are you assuming either exists?? It's unfortunate that you're using unsubstantiated ideas of science to say that the only way volition can coexist with reality is by the power of the supernatural/souls/magic. Either you're making this case for determinism using some heretofore Theory of Everything, or you're using the fallacy of composition.