hunterrose

Okay the problem, as initially used would mean: 0.999repeating equals the sum of 9/10^x, where x goes from 1 to infinity. This question has been rephrased to mean: 0.999repeating equals the limit of the sum of 9/10^x, where x goes from 1 to infinity. Just because the infinite series uses infinity doesn't make it a limit. Now if you take infinite series, a second error occured regularly: x = 0.999repeating 10 * x = 10 * 0.999repeating 10x = 10 * 0.999repeating 10x - x = 10 * 0.999repeating - 0.999repeating 9x = 10 * 0.999repeating - 0.999repeating 9x = 9.99repeating - 0.999repeating 9.99repeating - 0.999repeating = 9 That's the error. The reasoning, I suppose is that 10 * 0.999 repeating - 0.999repeating equals [ 9 + {sum of 9/10^x, x from 1 to infinity} ] - [sum of 9/10^x, x from 1 to infinity]. It doesn't, AFAIK.

Thus the ultimate problem is you don't get 0.999repeating = 1 from infinite series, only if you change the problem to a limit one.

I've almost worked all this through, but a quick reply to #78: Definition: .999... = lim(k = 1 to inf) SUM(j = 1 to k) 9/(10^j) You've made 0.999repeating into a limit, which is neither necessary nor a stated part of the original question. 0.999repeated, as originally used (i.e. not a limit) is an infinite series, which is not the same thing as a limit. Like I said, if you (incorrectly) change the problem into a limit one, then you get 1. On the other hand, if you use infinite series, you don't get 0.999repeating equaling one.

Which post #? But if 9 * 0.999repeating = 9x and 9 * 0.999repeating = 8.999repeating then 9x = 8.999repeating, not 9. That still doesn't prove that either 0.999repeating = 1, or 8.999repeating = 9. I'm working on a full argument, but at this point, 0.999repeating can't be said to equal 1. The problem is that he didn't say the limit of 0.999repeating = 1, which everyone would agree with. The problem isn't one of limits, though many have used them and IMO thus come up with a false answer.

WI_Rifleman, curse you for this plague I'm still in that "0.999repeating does not equal 1" school. Doesn't 9 * 0.999repeating equal 8.999repeating, like Bryan said in post #4? That, and his coffee example in #18, would lead to saying 0.999repeating does not equal one, wouldn't it??

I guess the only question is what do we do should Rand and reality go separate ways? If we should, through an increased context of knowledge about reality, find Ayn's philosophy to be errant in some significant respect (read: not Beethoven, prefering d'Anconia, etc,) does Objectivism (and thus, Objectivists) sway with Rand, or sway with objectivity? Or is it unnecessary to formulate principles of actions about theoreticals?

I believe you phrased your question wrong, jimdevine. Perhaps you meant: Is Objectivism a personal philosophy or THE objective philosophy? Does Objectivism allow dissent from Rand's philosophical arguments, are we rationally bound to recognize the true, regardless of how we feel about it? Of course, the two options aren't necessarily exclusive. jimdevine, your question, as phrased, is answered by DPW. As phrased, your question can't give any meaningful answer, because perhaps both options in your original question can have whatever attribute you seem to find undesirable. However, perhaps this question is irrelevant. The ideas of Objectivism are objective, as all contrary arguments have been refuted by Objectivist theory. You make some assumptions, but I agree. As Objectivism is based on objective reality, it has the same relationship as science. Scientists don't create something new, they discover the existent. They come to understand the nature of reality. Check your premises. Ultimately, it is up to each of us to reconcile the contradictions of d'Anconia qua playboy and d'Anconia qua man of the mind. The irony.

"An error made on your own is safer than ten truths made on faith."

Good question, OPM. I'm not sure you've gotten an exact answer to your query While my argument isn't either canon or killer, I think you might find it interesting. The answer IMO is that, (1) by robbing the bank, you create a degree of dependency, (2) nothing is 100%, (3) and robbing the bank isn't a necessary for your survival. Suppose you rob the bank. In doing this, you've chosen to value robbing the bank under certain circumstances (e.g. you "need" their money, you've calculated and believe your plan to be viable.) The first problem is, how do you discard this value? Any subsequent time you "need" money, you are liable to rob a bank again. Granted, you've qualified the example by saying this is an extreme amount of money, such that the idea is that you won't have to rob again. While I'll accept the idea that this heist could be an extreme amount of money, I don't accept that this amount could be guaranteed to set you for life. If we assume that you can pull this action off, you have to assume that someone else can con you. In other words, there's no valid (IMO) assumption that this is only necessary once. So (and if you have any objections, let me know) any subsequent time you "need" money, you are liable to rob a bank again. While I won't attack the idea that one robbery be "foolproof," I can't accept the idea that an unspecified series of robberies could be foolproof. Supposing we say there is a one in a million chance of getting caught/failing. Here, you've taken a slight risk of loss, and you have accepted values that contextually will multiply the threat to your life/well being. Up to this point, my case would be: once a robber, always a robber You'd always accept the viability of robbing under certain contexts, and under those contexts, you'd be taking a risk to your life. Of course, this is merely the Jean Valjean scenario: stealing is immoral, even if it greatly ensures your life. The difference is that robbing the bank isn't necessary. If Valjean doesn't steal the bread, he'll die His alternatives are steal the bread, or choose to die. If the prime value is life, he morally has to steal the bread. On the other hand, you as the robber, your alternatives are gain a great value, or gain a lesser value (productive work.) Life or death is not an alternative of the robber's choice (at least not short term.) We can justify Valjean accepting a value that long-term risks his life, because there won't be a life in the long term otherwise. On the other hand, the robber is accepting a long-term risk (liability to rob under certain contexts) without a gaining a necessity (which is what justifies taking any risk to life.) If life is the ultimate value (?), taking such risks can only be justified by gaining a necessity. One again, that's not approved Objective theory (though I believe it to be objective,) so it's likely to be either ignored or dismissed by some others. Nonetheless, I think, even though it's not ironclad, you'll find my argument interesting. I agree to a large, but not total extent.

Then someone could at least have said that the idea was correct. All I got was 2 digressions, a question of my motives, a (granted) request for elaboration, and a response that the idea was a part of that undefinable fount of knowledge known as "common sense." I suppose the answers to my questions were also "common sensical," as I received not an answer. My ideas would lead to saying that Galt wasn't the ideal man. If that's "common sensical," then common sense runs contrary to the thoughts of Rand on this matter. I have to take that to be true within the context of my knowledge and the elucidation of my peers. But I get your point nonetheless, Cole. Whether Galt is the ideal, a person's choices have any moral significance, or I think this topic is relevant, is irrelevant. There are more important things to discuss. I'll go find the Katrina topic, or post in the 0.999... = 1 topic. 86

Wha? All's quiet on the Objectivist front? *does Gladiator impression* hunterrose: Are you not entertained? Are you not entertained? Is this not why you are here? Crowd: Spaniard, Spaniard, Spaniard... *sigh* One last summation If A chooses B over C for marriage, C's response can/should only objectively be 1) realizing A is not good enough for marriage with C or 2) C must change C's attributes. Not doing at least one of these under the situations would be immoral. By everything I know, this is objectively right. Is this conclusion wrong, or not applicable to all contexts?

Good question. The short answer: Would you take offense if Dominique ran off with (married) the sculptor at the end of The Fountainhead? I'd find that immoral. To anyone who wouldn't mind that ending, my point doesn't have any relevance. If Dagny had chosen Galt over d'Anconia simply because, say, she preferred blondes, I wouldn't respect her. I'd find that immoral. What kind of woman would d'Anconia want for a wife (i.e. has Dagny's decision affected Francisco's?) This part's not a moral issue; it's just a development of my theory that he would rationally want a woman different from Dagny after her knowing her choice.

I agree. The person who determines what's "critical" is the person being sought. And I agree that the necessary degree of this "critical" attribute might change depending on the type of relationship sought. I'm not saying that beauty, or any attribute, is held by everyone to be "critical," but for those that do, to whatever degree they hold it "critical," I think my ideas apply. Ah ah, it's not nice to answer a question with a question! Would my answer affect yours? Nonetheless, I'll let you shoot first. Why is this important? Well, some say Galt is "better" than Francisco. Personally, I can't agree with that, but another's opinion is another's opinion. However, I not only don't agree but find it flat-out wrong, to say that Galt is objectively better. Galt is better than Francisco in some ways, sure. And vice versa. But to me, this only amounts to saying Dostoevsky is objectively better than Hugo. These two characters, as these two authors, aren't objectively preferentially weighable. This belief of mine affects my thoughts on John, Dagny, and d'Anconia (though not in a detrimental way to any of them.) Now, you've missed a lot of interesting things on the way, but that's the answer to your question. Fortunately, I have a lot more

Welcome from one hunter to another There are a lot of interesting people here, so I'm sure you'll fit in. I've never read any Goodkind, and you aren't the only person to mention the name. I guess I'm going to have to go out and see what all the hubbub is about

Well that's what I need you all for I need to find out what tweaks and changes need to be made to the theory. As far as ugliness goes, if it needed rating, that'd be #3 - insufficiency. Beauty (or what degree of) would be the characteristic/value/whatever here. As everyone has some amount of beauty, it would be a matter of whether that beauty was satisfactory or not. This of course is if beauty were a critical attribute. ...I see my unusual post has not intrigued most people Let's use a more interesting example, then. I'll assume no one has an objection to my Willers characterization for the moment. d'Anconia, my man Dagny choosing Galt over Francisco is partly what this whole idea derived from. Why would Dagny choose Galt over Francisco? While Francisco possibly misunderstood Dagny's desires, I don't think she misunderstood his characteristics. Throw out #1. Is this a case of #2, or #3 (or something I haven't thought of?) This is a bit difficult for me to sort out, but I have some ideas.

Hmm. The problem here is that opponents (ironically) place laissez-faire and mixed systems on different ends of the "practicality" scale. You can't compare two things, so long as one is "practical" and the other "impractical": the "practical" one wins out by force. So our objective here is to, first, put both ideas in the same space on this "practicality" scale Start on his turf: the opponent's premise that mixed is practical, laissez is not. Show that to be wrong, and you've succeeded. You either have to show that laissez is practical, or mixed is impractical. Ultimately, your goal is to do both, but first, remember you want him to accept that laissez is at least as practical/impractical as mixed. If he doesn't accept that , then you can't get the ultimate goal of flipping the script on his argument. Showing that mixed is at least as impractical as laissez is better shown first. Showing the laissez is practical (i.e. based on reality) presupposes he can or will accept a lot of Objectivist ideas. Not likely. Okay, the idea that mixed is practical. Laissez is "impractical" because it doesn't have historical proof of its effectiveness, it assumes people will act in a certain way, it has no concern for the unable and doesn't check the powerful. I'm assuming you've asked why it's "impractical," and an answer of one of the former types was given. "Lack of historical proof," were it true, wouldn't make laissez impractical. Spaceships and computers lacked historical proof before they were demonstrated. If laissez is impractical, it'll have to be proven by more than "it's never been done before!" Ask your adversary what assumptions does laissez make that mixed systems don't. Laissez makes no more assumptions than mixed systems do about how people will act. What they generally mean by such suggestions is that laissez faire has less concern for the plight of the unable, which isn't an assumption of how people will act in the first place. The idea that laissez is impractical because it has less concern for the weak and unable of society itself makes some assumptions. It assumes that concern for the weak, at the expense of the strong, should be a value of economic systems. And what basis does that assumption have? This tactic of opponents basically translates to "laissez is impractical because it's mean." That may or may not be true, but such an assumption makes it at least as assumptive as laissez. Ask why this mixed assumption is more "practical" than the laissez assumption. Galt would love to hear it

Wha? No response? Impatience has to be a vice. I'll apply my theory a bit. What # would Eddie's relationship to Dagny be, and what's the significance of defining that rejection in the first place? Dagny knew Eddie didn't possess her critical attributes, she wasn't misunderstanding him. So not #1. #2 or #3? Eddie in reference to Dagny, I'd group him in that #3 category. Whether he realized it or not (he did IMO, but that's immaterial,) he wasn't what Dagny was looking for, didn't make the Dagny cut. I've heard people refer to Eddie as being wrong for not professing his love to Dagny, or at least making some sort of move on her. If all my ideas are the case, Eddie wasn't wrong in not pursuing Dagny. If anything, pursuing her would have been wrong, as he couldn't attain her in the first place! Disclaimer The extent to which Eddie could change this "insufficiency" changes the thought of whether he could have, eventually, pursued or not. That is, if you believe that Willers could have, through hard work, become worthy of Dagny (in at least a gf sense,) then the eventual possibility of pursuit would still exist. If Willers couldn't have ever become worthy of Dagny, then trying to make moves on her would be disingenuous at best, immoral at worst. In any case, he didn't change, so... Original? I'd doubt all of it is, but hopefully something here is novel, or lead to some new ideas. I'll post more later.

The idea I'm presenting was conceived by me in after analyzing a particular Rand novel relationship/potential relationship, my own experiences, and discussions in some other topics here. Tell me what you think, I have some interesting things I've derived from this. Of course I can't expect anyone to fully evaluate this until they know the context I plan to use it in, but give me a general idea what you think, and I'll take it from there. When you wish to establish a relationship with someone, failure is always a possibility. It doesn't matter whether that relationship is friendship, bf/gf, marriage, or some other form of alliance. You might be rejected. And why? Well, I've thought of it as there being three possible reasons why: 1) misunderstanding This one's the simplest. In these cases, the value of the wooee (what?) is not realized by the wooer (at least that's a word.) That is, the person being tempted incorrectly believes the entreater to have a certain undesirable characteristic/value/insert word here. 2) differing values Also pretty basic. The suitor's values are just different from the other party (critical, i.e. in a way important enough to influence the yes/no decision) so the enticed chooses to decline the relationship. The person seeking the relationship isn't good in the eyes of the other person. 3) insufficiency This would be cases in which the entreating party's qualities are the right ones, but the quantity of the values don't meet the standard of the desired party. In other words, someone's good, but not good enough. These aren't exclusive; a rejection could be one, or a combination of the reasons. Let me know what you think

Sorry to resurrect an old topic, but this is exactly one of the questions I had. I was going to create a topic, but I luckily saw this one. If a question of mine has already been answered, my bad. I'll try to only ask questions that I still have after reading the topic's posts. *revivifies immortal* Okay, using our "immortal," whose noteworthy attribute here is that he doesn't face the alternative of death. Here's one thing IMO. These immortal cases can be separated into (1) those that have values at the onset of the example (e.g. Superman,) and (2) those that don't have values at the onset of the example. An immortal being that doesn't have values at the onset of the example has no way or reason to choose one action over another, or no action at all. Everything would have the same result. But Rand's example didn't refer to just (2) immortals. That'd be circular logic: Immortals don't have values -> immortals can't have values -> immortals don't have values -> immortals can't have values ad infinitum. That is, if we assume immortals can't have values at the onset, then the example is nothing more than a self-fulfilling prophecy. ( I should say that I believe that to be an assumption, as I've not seen an argument that shows that immortals don't ever have values. For my part, take our kryptonite-less Superman. Saving Lois Lane, or Metropolis would/could still be a value, right?) I believe Rand's argument applies to cases in which the immortal has prior values, otherwise her example would translate to some immortals can't have values. Let's say our immortal has value of hoarding red objects. We needn't ask why he has that particular value, or how he obtained it, anymore than we'd ask why an enfant how or why an enfant has the value of life. The point here would be the immortal has a value at the onset of our consideration. I'm taking some latitude here. As Rand applied her immortal example to the entire class of immortals (not just ones without onset values) my assumption would be that her example applied to immortals with values at the onset. As these immortals do have values at the onset of our example I think Rand's argument would be interpreted as the immortal will eventually not have values anymore. So my question would be, why would this immortal, having values at the onset of the example, lose the capacity to have values? In this case the immortal's primary (i.e. only) value would be hoarding red objects. I agree the immortal wouldn't have a higher value requiring him to hoard, but that doesn't say why he'd lose the capacity to value his hoarding, either instantly, or eventually. Comments?

You mean NO and the Superdome, right? I agree with you about the situation. It's pretty grim. I read that people won't be able to come back for a month, and that the highways out of the city (east and west) have been destroyed. It's kind of like a microcosm of society down there: People working hard to improve situations, people taking advantage of chaos, etc. I'm not sure about who do donate to, except the Red Cross.

If you're saying his motive was both refusing unfavorable conditions and (possibly) an attempt to influence others, I agree with megan on the first motive, but I don't see how trying to influence others could be considered in as acceptable a light. Sorry, I guess I'm just a little confused.

Do you mean that the monk's motive wasn't to influence others to stop the oppression? If that's the case, how do you know his motive wasn't to influence others? He could have killed himself anywhere ( his house, place of worship, forest, etc.) The fact that he chose a populated and public implies that it's at least possible his motive was influencing.

You agree with Megan if the monk's goal was either goal, or just leaving unlivable conditions? And I'm definitely not going to try and empirically prove you wrong about the pain of human torching!

Hm. I am making some assumptions her, so I suppose I should state them. Assuming his motive was to convince others that the goings-on were bad, and the reason for his macabre actions was to make people acknowledge the situation, I stand by my comment. If indeed, as you suggest JMeganSnow, he did it as a refusal to live in those conditions, I agree with you. If this was his reason, then he wasn't trying to influence anyone in the first place, but committing a personal, if highly painful, act. I guess the considerations of him depend on his reasons. If he simply refused to live in an unlivable world, nothing else can be said (except that there has to be an easier way to go!) If, on the other hand, he was using his death as a final appeal to others, I can't say I'd agree with that, consequentially or philosophically.

Interesting. Unless something changes, you have to assume papa's not going to intervene in between you and your stepmom. You're going to have to deal with her. So this is my suggestion, straight from the d'Anconia Conflict Resolution Center. Your best bet here is to be crafty. You have to make her not have any grounds to argue. How? 1) You need to bear one phrase in mind: "Why?" Don't explain to her why your actions weren't wrong. Ask her what you did wrong. She'll reply, or evade. Suppose in this case, she says you're disrespecting your parents and her. Ask her if she doesn't want you to call your mother. If she says "yes," that's one step toward proving she's a nut, gather more. Even poppa can't ignore a wealth of evidence (hopefully!) If she says "no," then ask her again how you're disrespecting anyone. And if she evades, that's evidence that's she's telling you to do stuff without any reason, gather more. The whole point isn't to play mind games with someone you don't like (though the d'Anconia school doesn't condemn it ) the goal here is to get her, or your father, to realize she's enforcing things that are silly at best, harmful at worst. 2) Be polite, ask questions in an "innocent" manner. If she can honestly and convincingly say you're being "smart" or disrespectful to her, she has some wiggle room. Don't give it to her. I'm not saying play dumb, but at least act like you believe she knows something you don't. Make her tell it to you, and let that rationale she gives you stand on its own two feet. Get that Oscar, baby! If you can get her to regularly evade explaining herself or saying things she can't defend, at the worst, she's only going to deal with you when she has to (and you won't even have done anything wrong! ) She won't bother you with stupid stuff, because she knows what logical beatdown will result. Disclaimer you have to have your A game for this to work!